Defining Third-Party Duty of Care and Corporate Veil Piercing Limits Under Rhode Island Worker’s Compensation Act

Introduction

In William Boggs v. Johnston Asphalt, LLC (No. 2024-91-Appeal), decided May 22, 2025, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island addressed whether a non-employer contractor owes a tort duty of care to an injured worker and whether limited liability protections may be pierced to impose extra-statutory liability. Plaintiff Boggs, an employee of All States Asphalt, was burned by a defective distribution truck while transferring liquid asphalt in Massachusetts. He sued Johnston Asphalt—whose sole member was All States Asphalt, Inc.—for negligent maintenance of the truck. The Superior Court granted Johnston Asphalt’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that (1) no evidence established that Johnston Asphalt owned or controlled the vehicle or employed the mechanic who serviced it; and (2) the Workers’ Compensation Act barred vicarious liability. Plaintiff appealed, arguing genuine issues of fact existed as to duty and that the corporate veil should be pierced.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Robinson, affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court held:

Johnston Asphalt did not own, operate, inspect, maintain, or repair the truck that injured Boggs.
No competent evidence showed that Johnston Asphalt employed the mechanic (Michael Kelly) who serviced the vehicle.
The single piece of mail addressed to Kelly at Johnston Asphalt’s address did not raise a genuine issue of employment fact.
Absent ownership or control, Johnston Asphalt owed no third-party duty of care to Boggs.
Piercing the corporate veil was unwarranted because Boggs failed to demonstrate unity of interest or an inequitable result.
The Workers’ Compensation Act (G.L. 1956 § 28-29-20) immunizes non-statutory tort claims against employers and their alter egos.

Accordingly, the Court found no duty to reach breach, causation, or damages and affirmed summary judgment.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) – summary judgment standard: burden on nonmoving party to produce evidence of material fact.
Holley v. Argonaut Holdings, Inc., 968 A.2d 271 (R.I. 2009) – no duty, no negligence; exception to the general rule that negligence is for the jury.
Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 1987) – duty is a threshold question of law.
Ouch v. Khea, 963 A.2d 630 (R.I. 2009) – summary judgment appropriate when no duty exists.
McAdam v. Grzelczyk, 911 A.2d 255 (R.I. 2006) – de novo review of summary judgment.
Gushlaw v. Milner, 42 A.3d 1245 (R.I. 2012) – tragic outcome does not create duty in law.
Doe v. Gelineau, 732 A.2d 43 (R.I. 1999) – elements for piercing the corporate veil: unity of interest and inequity if not disregarded.

Legal Reasoning

The Court began by reaffirming that “whether a defendant is under a legal duty in a given case is a question of law.” Under Rhode Island tort and summary‐judgment law, a nonmoving plaintiff must present admissible evidence creating a genuine dispute of material fact. Here:

No Duty Absent Control: Johnston Asphalt neither owned the truck nor exercised any operational or maintenance control. The sole maintenance employee, Michael Kelly, was undisputedly employed by All States Asphalt.
Insufficient Evidence: The lone piece of mail addressed to Kelly at Johnston Asphalt’s premises—absent testimony or corporate records—cannot substitute for evidence of employment or control.
Corporate Veil Piercing: Rhode Island requires a showing of unity of interest (e.g., shared officers, commingled funds, undercapitalization) and that failure to pierce would sanction fraud or promote injustice. Plaintiff failed to prove either element.
Workers’ Compensation Immunity: Even if Johnston Asphalt were deemed the employer or alter ego, G.L. 1956 § 28-29-20 bars common‐law negligence claims by employees covered by the Act.

As no duty existed, the Court did not address breach, causation, or damages. Summary judgment was therefore correct.

Impact

This decision clarifies three critical points under Rhode Island law:

Third-Party Duty of Care: A non-employer contractor or landlord owes no tort duty to an injured worker absent evidence of ownership, control, or contractual obligation to maintain equipment.
Corporate Veil Piercing: Mere common ownership or a single stray mail item cannot justify piercing the veil; plaintiffs must present clear proof of commingling, undercapitalization, or inequitable conduct.
Workers’ Compensation Bar: The ruling underscores the broad immunity conferred by § 28-29-20, discouraging collateral negligence suits when the Act provides an exclusive remedy.

Future litigants should heed the necessity of evidentiary showings on duty and corporate separateness before advancing third‐party negligence or veil‐piercing claims.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary Judgment: A procedural device allowing disposal of claims when no factual dispute exists and the moving party is entitled to win as a matter of law.
Third-Party Duty of Care: The legal obligation one party owes to another to act with reasonable care, even if they are not in a direct employment relationship.
Corporate Veil: The legal separation between a corporation and its shareholders or affiliated entities. “Piercing” it imposes liability on individuals or related entities.
Workers’ Compensation Immunity: Under Rhode Island law, an employee’s exclusive remedy for work‐related injuries is the statutory compensation scheme; employers and certain related entities are shielded from tort suits.

Conclusion

William Boggs v. Johnston Asphalt, LLC reaffirms that, in Rhode Island, a non-employer contractor cannot be held liable in negligence absent proof of ownership or control over the instrumentality that caused injury. It also underscores the stringent requirements for piercing the corporate veil and the exclusivity of the Workers’ Compensation remedy. Practitioners must ensure that duty and evidentiary thresholds are satisfied before pursuing third-party negligence or alter-ego theories in workplace‐injury contexts.