Defining the Limitation Period for Legal Malpractice: Court Rejects Continuous Representation Rule in Groff v. Scoggin

Defining the Limitation Period for Legal Malpractice: Court Rejects Continuous Representation Rule in Groff v. Scoggin

Introduction

Nichole M. Groff v. McKellar Tiedeken & Scoggin, LLC and Sean W. Scoggin, Esq. (2025 WY 54) is a Wyoming Supreme Court decision resolving the timeliness of a legal malpractice suit under Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-107(a). Background: Ms. Groff retained attorney Sean W. Scoggin and his firm in April 2018 to handle her divorce. She alleged multiple breaches of professional duty—failure to depose her spouse, inadequate discovery and trial preparation, failure to exchange exhibits, and declining to request a continuance when undisclosed financial accounts emerged. Key Issues:

  1. Whether Ms. Groff’s malpractice claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations beginning with the “act, error or omission.”
  2. Whether Wyoming should adopt the “continuous representation” doctrine to delay the limitations period until counsel’s withdrawal.
Parties:
  • Appellant (Plaintiff): Nichole M. Groff
  • Appellees (Defendants): Sean W. Scoggin, Esq. and McKellar, Tiedeken & Scoggin, LLC

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants. It held that under Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-107(a) the two-year limitations period begins to run on the date of the last alleged “act, error or omission.” Here, the final asserted malpractice occurred on May 24, 2019—the second day of trial when counsel declined to seek a continuance without first consulting Ms. Groff. Because Ms. Groff filed her malpractice complaint on June 7, 2021—more than two years later—the claim was time-barred. The Court declined to recognize a “continuous representation” rule in legal malpractice, reaffirming that the statutory text controls.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

  • W.S. § 1-3-107(a) – Establishes a two-year limitations period measured from the date of the professional’s “act, error or omission,” or from discovery if not reasonably discoverable.
  • Lucky Gate Ranch, L.L.C. v. Baker & Assoc. (2009 WY 69) – Interpreted § 1-3-107 to start the clock at the time of the negligent act itself, not accrual of injury, emphasizing “plain meaning.”
  • Pioneer Homestead Apartments III v. Sargent Eng’rs (2018 WY 80) – Reinforced that the statute is tied to the act, not its consequences, and that damages’ occurrence does not postpone limitations.
  • Bankers Standard Ins. Co. v. JTec, Inc. (2025 WY 51) – Clarified that when multiple negligent acts occur, the statute attaches to the act that was a “substantial factor” in causing injury.
  • Ballinger v. Thompson (2005 WY 101), Connell v. Barrett (1997) and Hiltz v. Horn P.C. (1996) – Each rejected adoption of a continuous representation doctrine in legal malpractice, analogous to medical malpractice’s continuous treatment rule.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court applied a de novo review of the summary judgment. It held:

  • The statutory phrase “date of the alleged act, error or omission” is unambiguous, and controlling.
  • Each asserted lapse in counsel’s performance—failure to depose, file a responsive motion, prepare exhibits, request continuance—constituted a discrete act or omission for limitations purposes.
  • The last such omission occurred May 24, 2019, when counsel declined to seek a continuance without client input. No later malpractice was pled as a factual matter.
  • Because Ms. Groff did not file within two years of that date, her suit was time-barred under § 1-3-107(a).
  • The Court reaffirmed that Wyoming will not extend the limitations period by adopting a “continuous representation” rule. The Legislature chose a bright-line rule keyed to specific acts, not ongoing fiduciary relationships.

3. Impact

For Practitioners: Lawyers should be aware that any discrete act of alleged malpractice—even late in a representation—starts the limitations clock. Continuous representation will not toll or delay the deadline. For Clients: Potential claimants must evaluate and file malpractice claims promptly after the last actionable error, rather than relying on counsel’s ongoing status or withdrawal timing. On Wyoming Law: The decision cements a strict, text-based approach to professional malpractice limitations, discouraging judicial creation of equitable tolling doctrines like continuous representation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Statute of Limitations vs. Accrual: - “Accrual” refers to when a claim arises—often when injury manifests. - Under § 1-3-107, the limitations period is pegged to the negligent act’s date, not injury or cause’s accrual.
  • Continuous Representation Rule: - In some jurisdictions, ongoing attorney-client relationships can postpone the start of the limitations period until termination of services. - Wyoming declines this, treating each error as a separate trigger for the two-year clock.
  • Summary Judgment De Novo Review: The Supreme Court reviews summary judgment without deference, asking whether any genuine dispute of material fact remains and who is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Conclusion

Groff v. Scoggin reaffirms that in Wyoming legal malpractice suits, the two-year limitations period set by W.S. § 1-3-107(a) begins on the date of the last alleged professional “act, error or omission.” The Court rejects a continuous representation tolling rule and emphasizes strict adherence to the statute’s plain language. Practitioners and clients alike must recognize each distinct act of alleged malpractice as the starting point for the limitations period, ensuring timely preservation of claims.

Case Details

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