Defining the Bounds of the Wisconsin Governor’s Partial Veto: Striking Digits to Alter Fiscal Duration Permissible Under Article V § 10

Introduction

In Jeffery A. LeMieux, et al. v. Tony Evers, et al. (2025 WI 12), the Wisconsin Supreme Court was asked to resolve two novel questions about the governor’s partial veto authority under Article V, Section 10(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution. At issue was the governor’s deletion of words and digits in the 2023–25 biennial budget bill—expanding an education revenue limit increase from two years to 402 years. Petitioners argued that the governor had exceeded his constitutional power by (1) approving more than “a part” of the original two-year duration, and (2) striking digits to create a new number in violation of § 10(1)(c). The court’s majority upheld the partial vetoes, reaffirming the traditional four “deletion veto” principles, rejecting any broad “write-in” extension beyond appropriation amounts, and interpreting § 10(1)(c) as barring only letter-based alterations—not digit deletions or extensions of numeric durations.

Summary of the Judgment

On April 18, 2025, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, by a 4–3 vote, denied the petition for relief. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Karofsky, held:

The 2023 partial vetoes did not violate Article V, Section 10(1)(b). They complied with all four established deletion-veto principles: the result remained a complete, entire, and workable law; the vetoes affected only appropriation legislation; the law remained germane; and only words and numbers were struck.
The write-in veto principle of Citizens Utility Board v. Klauser applies only to appropriation amounts, not to durations or fiscal years. Extending two years to 402 years is not a reduction and therefore not within that narrow precedent.
Section 10(1)(c) prohibits the governor from striking individual letters to create new words or combining sentence fragments to form new sentences—but does not bar striking digits to create a new number.
The court offered legislative options—future budgets, constitutional amendment, and drafting strategies—to address perceived policy or structural concerns, but declined to rewrite or overrule existing partial-veto doctrine.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The majority traced its reasoning to nearly a century of partial-veto jurisprudence:

State ex rel. Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Henry (1935) – Established that deletion vetoes are constitutional if the remaining text is a “complete, entire, and workable law,” and suggested severability limits when vetoed text is “essential, integral, and interdependent.”
State ex rel. Finnegan v. Dammann (1936) – Clarified that the governor may veto any separable part of an appropriation bill within its “four corners.”
State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson (1988) – Reaffirmed broad gubernatorial power to strike words, letters, and digits, subject to four-corner and germaneness constraints; later clarified by the 1990 amendment.
Citizens Utility Board v. Klauser (1995) – Held that the governor may strike an appropriation amount and write in a smaller amount, applying the definition of “part” as “something less than a whole,” but limited strictly to monetary figures.
Risser v. Klauser (1997) – Reinforced that the write-in authority is narrowly confined to appropriation amounts, not other bill content.
Bartlett v. Evers (2020) – Per curiam decision invalidated three deletion vetoes for exceeding constitutional bounds; while not establishing binding precedent, it demonstrated heightened scrutiny of governor-crafted policy.

Legal Reasoning

The majority’s analysis focused on two subdivisions of Article V, Section 10(1):

Section 10(1)(b) – “Approved in part”
The court applied four deletion-veto principles:
- Workability: The vetoed law (with a 402-year revenue limit) remains a coherent, enforceable statute.
- Appropriation Scope: All vetoes occurred within the budget’s appropriation sections.
- Germaneness: The core subject—educational revenue limits—remains unchanged and germane.
- Textual Deletion: Only words and digits were deleted; no letters were excised to form new words, and no fragments were combined to form new sentences.
The petitioners’ attempt to import Klauser’s “part”-as-substantively-less-than-whole test into durations was rejected: Klauser’s reasoning applies only to monetary amounts, not temporal durations.
Section 10(1)(c) – “No new word by rejecting individual letters…”
The court read the prohibition in its plain text context: “word” refers to alphabetic constructs and “letters” excludes digits. Historical practice and dictionary definitions confirm that digits are not letters. Accordingly, § 10(1)(c) bars only letter-based tinkering, not digit deletion or recombination.

Impact

This decision carries several important ramifications:

Affirmation of Broad Gubernatorial Authority: It preserves a governor’s wide latitude to reshape appropriation bills under the “deletion veto” framework.
Limitation of Write-In Veto: It confines the Klauser write-in precedent to appropriation amounts, preventing future attempts to rewrite non-monetary components by striking and inserting new text.
Clearer § 10(1)(c) Boundary: It resolves ambiguity around digit deletion, permitting numeric extensions so long as alphabetic letters remain untouched.
Legislative Remedies Emphasized: The court underscores the legislature’s power to override vetoes, pass corrective measures in future budgets, or amend the constitution if the policy outcome is objectionable.
Future Litigation and Drafting: Agencies, school districts, and counsel will need to anticipate that numeric durations can be altered by deletion vetoes and may plan override or amendment strategies accordingly.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Partial Veto: Unlike a full veto—rejecting an entire bill—a partial veto allows the governor to remove (“veto”) only certain sections or words of an appropriations bill.

Deletion Veto vs. Write-In Veto: A deletion veto means the governor only erases text. A write-in veto (very limited) means the governor crosses out one figure and pens in another smaller figure—allowed only for money amounts, not for years or policy wording.

Complete, Entire, and Workable Law: After any text deletion, what remains must be grammatically coherent and legally enforceable without further legislative tinkering.

Germaneness: The governor cannot use deletions to convert a bill’s subject into something unrelated; the core policy area must remain the same.

Conclusion

The LeMieux v. Evers decision reaffirms that under Article V, Section 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution:

Governors may delete words and digits in appropriation bills so long as the text that remains yields a complete, workable law and stays germane to the original legislative intent;
The narrow “write-in” authority applies strictly to money figures, not to durations or other numeric provisions;
Section 10(1)(c) protects only alphabetic letter deletions that would form new words or sentence fragments, leaving numeric alterations unscathed.

While the decision preserves the status quo of Wisconsin’s robust partial veto power, it underscores the legislature’s ultimate authority to override, amend, or refine constitutional and statutory schemes when necessary. By delineating the lines between permissible deletion vetoes and impermissible executive lawmaking, the court both honors past precedent and provides guidance for future budget drafting and constitutional reform efforts.