Defining Standards for Admissibility of Hearsay and Prior-Act Evidence in §1983 Excessive-Force Litigation

Introduction

The appeal in Lyrah Hernandez v. City of Peoria, Illinois (7th Cir. Apr. 21, 2025) arose from a §1983 wrongful-death suit filed after Peoria Police Officer Ryan Isonhart fatally shot Luis Cruz while Cruz fled in July 2018. Cruz’s sister Lyrah Hernandez, as special administrator of his estate, sued Officer Isonhart, his partner Officer Nicholas Mason, and the City of Peoria. In district court, summary judgment was granted for Officer Mason, and a jury thereafter returned a defense verdict on the claims against Isonhart and the City. On appeal Hernandez challenged six evidentiary rulings: the admission of (1) two “49 messages” notifying officers of probable-cause bases to arrest Cruz, (2) evidence of Cruz’s incarceration when his twin daughters were born, (3) testimony about the Illinois Department of Child and Family Services investigation into his parenting, and (4) Cruz’s pending drug charge at the time of death; and the exclusion of (5) a recorded statement of Cruz’s driver-witness Shaquille Alexander under the residual hearsay exception (Fed. R. Evid. 807), and (6) forensic scientist Jennifer MacRitchie’s testimony because she was not disclosed as an expert. The Seventh Circuit affirmed all rulings, clarifying the proper use of prior-act evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), the standards for §807 residual hearsay, and the relevance of a decedent’s background in wrongful-death damages.

Summary of the Judgment

The Seventh Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court’s decisions. It held:

The “49 messages” identifying Cruz as wanted for a shooting and a domestic-battery charge were properly admitted—not as impermissible character evidence under Rule 404(b) but to show Officer Isonhart’s state of mind and the severity of the suspected offenses under the Graham v. Connor reasonableness inquiry.
Evidence of Cruz’s incarceration at his daughters’ birth and the Child and Family Services investigation was relevant to assess damages—specifically the loss of paternal care and society—rather than inadmissible character or propensity evidence.
Cruz’s pending drug charge, though unproven, was admissible on the same damages theory; in any event, any error in its admission was harmless given the strength of the defense case.
Audio-video statements of Shaquille Alexander were properly excluded under Rule 807 because they lacked the “adequate guarantees of trustworthiness” required for residual hearsay: Alexander admitted he did not see the critical moments, made assumptions, and his unavailability was not explained.
Forensic scientist Jennifer MacRitchie’s proffered testimony about investigatory practices and testing thresholds was expert in nature, and she had not been disclosed as an expert witness; the district court correctly refused to allow her testimony.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989): Established that excessive-force claims under §1983 must be judged by “objective reasonableness,” considering the severity of the crime and the threat posed.
Doornbos v. City of Chicago, 868 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2017), and Perry v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 248 (7th Cir. 2013): Set the abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings and reaffirmed that evidence is prejudicial only if it leads to irrational jury behavior disproportionate to its probative value.
Burton v. City of Zion, 901 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2018): Clarified that other-act evidence is permissible if introduced for a non-propensity purpose—here, officers’ state of mind—so long as the chain of reasoning does not rely on an impermissible inference.
Cobige v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 2011): Recognized that once a plaintiff extols a decedent’s virtues to prove damages, defendants may rebut with evidence that tempers or contradicts that portrayal.
Fed. R. Evid. 807 (Residual Hearsay Exception): Requires reliable guarantees of trustworthiness “equivalent” to specified exceptions; the district court must conduct a searching inquiry into such guarantees pre-admission.

Legal Reasoning

1. Admitting the 49 Messages: The court held that these messages were not “other bad-act” evidence under Rule 404(b) because they were introduced to explain the officers’ motive for pursuit and the seriousness of the underlying probable-cause allegations—core components of the objective-reasonableness inquiry in an excessive-force claim. Their limited detail (no underlying facts of the shooting or battery) minimized undue prejudice.

2. Decedent’s Background in Damages: Viewed through the lens of loss-of-society damages, evidence of Cruz’s incarceration and failure to complete required parenting classes directly undercut plaintiff’s portrayal of him as an ever-present, affectionate father. Under Cobige, once the plaintiff placed Cruz’s paternal character in issue, the defendants could present contradictory evidence.

3. Pending Drug Charge: Although an unadjudicated charge raises distinct concerns, the court found it relevant to the pattern of Cruz’s conduct impacting his relationship with his children—and harmless, in any event, given the undisputed ballistic and eyewitness evidence supporting the defense verdict.

4. Residual Hearsay Exception for Alexander’s Statement: The Seventh Circuit reiterated that hearsay admitted under Rule 807 must carry “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” equal to those in established exceptions. Alexander admitted he lacked direct observation of the shooting and his unavailability was unexplained, undermining any finding of trustworthiness.

5. Expert-Testimony Exclusion for MacRitchie: The district court properly characterized her proposed testimony—concerning how a forensic laboratory decides which parts of a firearm to swab and why certain tests proceed—as expert in nature, requiring formal disclosure under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a).

Impact

This decision provides several practical guideposts for §1983 litigants:

Evidence of prior alerts or “49 messages” can be admitted to explain an officer’s state of mind or to frame the severity of the suspected crime, even if they reference untried allegations.
In wrongful-death and loss-of-society claims, a plaintiff’s characterization of a decedent’s character invites a judicial “opening the door” to rebuttal evidence, including prior incarcerations and family-services interventions.
Rule 807 will not be a cure-all for hearsay: litigants must demonstrate Alexander-type statements carry strong trustworthiness indicia, and they must explain unavailability.
Testimony about scientific protocol and decision-making within forensic labs is expert testimony; counsel must disclose such witnesses under Rule 26(a) or risk exclusion.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“49 messages”: Internal police alerts summarizing probable-cause grounds to arrest; analogous to an officer’s “heads up” that a suspect is wanted for specific violent offenses.
Rule 404(b) (Other-Act Evidence): Bars using past wrongs to show propensity but allows such evidence for other purposes (e.g., motive, intent, state of mind) if prejudicial risk does not substantially outweigh probative value.
Fed. R. Evid. 807 (Residual Exception): Permits admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay only when (1) it is material, (2) it is more probative than any other evidence, (3) it serves the interests of justice, and (4) it bears equivalent trustworthiness to established exceptions.
Loss of Society: A form of pecuniary damages in wrongful-death actions that compensates survivors for the emotional and practical benefits they would have received from the decedent’s continued life.
Expert vs. Fact Witness: A fact witness recounts personal observations; an expert explains technical or scientific principles. Testimony on how a forensic scientist decides which tests to run is expert testimony.

Conclusion

Hernandez v. City of Peoria reaffirms that §1983 excessive-force suits must be confined to admissible evidence of an officer’s state of mind and the decedent’s background, avoiding impermissible propensity inferences. It underscores the narrow scope of the hearsay residual exception—trustworthiness and unavailability must be rigorously demonstrated—and clarifies that evidence bearing on a decedent’s pre-death conduct can be fair rebuttal once a plaintiff portrays the decedent in wholly positive terms. Trial courts retain broad discretion in balancing probative value against undue prejudice, and parties must carefully disclose any would-be expert testimony on forensic procedures to avoid exclusion. This decision will guide practitioners in preparing for evidentiary battles over both liability and damages in §1983 and wrongful-death litigation.