Deferred Felony Child Endangerment Plus Alcohol-Related Recidivism Warrants Actual Suspension Under RGDP Rule 7

Case: STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. GIES, 2025 OK 59 (Okla. Sept. 23, 2025)
Forum: Oklahoma Supreme Court (original jurisdiction; bar discipline)
Disposition: Six-month suspension; costs of $3,027.28 assessed; suspension begins upon RGDP Rule 9.1 compliance.

1) Introduction

This bar disciplinary decision addresses how Oklahoma disciplines lawyers under RGDP Rule 7 when the lawyer has entered a nolo contendere plea resulting in a deferred sentence for criminal conduct demonstrating unfitness to practice law—particularly where the conduct involves alcohol, endangers a child, and is followed by a subsequent alcohol-related arrest during the pendency of the disciplinary proceeding.

Parties: The Oklahoma Bar Association (Complainant) prosecuted the disciplinary case against attorney Cassity B. Gies (Respondent). The matter proceeded through the Professional Responsibility Tribunal (PRT), whose recommendations are advisory only.

2) Summary of the Opinion

Gies entered nolo contendere pleas and received a three-year deferred sentence (supervised probation) for: (1) felony child endangerment (21 O.S.2021, § 852.1) and (2) misdemeanor DUI (47 O.S.2021, § 11-902(A)(2)). The OBA initiated a Rule 7 disciplinary proceeding; the Oklahoma Supreme Court issued a show-cause order but declined interim suspension. While the bar case was pending, Gies was arrested for public intoxication after a night of heavy drinking and belligerent conduct toward police.

The PRT found violations of ORPC Rule 8.4 and RGDP Rule 1.3 and recommended a public censure with conditions (sobriety, Lawyers Helping Lawyers, and therapy). The Supreme Court disagreed with the recommended sanction and held that the record supported:

• Immediate suspension for six (6) months, commencing after withdrawal from pending matters and the filing of an affidavit under RGDP Rule 9.1.
• Assessment of costs in the amount of $3,027.28, payable within one year after the opinion becomes final.

3) Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The Court’s reasoning is anchored in a consistent body of Oklahoma discipline cases interpreting RGDP Rule 7 proceedings, ORPC Rule 8.4(b), and the Court’s institutional role in protecting the public and the profession.

• State of Okla. ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Woodward, 2022 OK 72: cited for the Court’s “sole authority” and exclusive original jurisdiction over lawyer discipline. This frames the PRT’s findings as non-binding.
• State of Okla. ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Drummond, 2017 OK 24: reinforces that PRT recommendations are “merely advisory,” supporting the Court’s willingness to increase discipline beyond a public censure.
• State of Okla. ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Willis, 2022 OK 15: provides two key guideposts: (1) discipline is not punishment but a fitness/protection inquiry, and (2) not every conviction automatically equals an ethics violation—what matters is the nature and circumstances of the conduct.
• State of Okla. ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Dunivan, 2018 OK 101: crucial for Rule 7 mechanics—“a deferred sentence constitutes conclusive evidence that the attorney committed the underlying criminal conduct.” This limits relitigation of guilt and directs the case toward fitness and sanction.
• State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Hart, 2014 OK 96: supplies the de novo standard and the two-step Rule 7 inquiry: (1) whether the conviction/deferred sentence reflects unfitness, and (2) what discipline is warranted on the full record.
• State of Okla. ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Cooley, 2013 OK 42 and State of Okla. ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Aston, 2003 OK 101: used to clarify that criminal conduct can implicate professional fitness even without client harm and even when it does not arise from legal practice.
• State of Okla. ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Conrady, 2012 OK 29: central for interpreting ORPC Rule 8.4(b) (“criminal act” reflecting adversely on fitness) and for the proposition that felony pleas are routinely treated as satisfactory evidence of professional misconduct; also cited for deterrence as a disciplinary objective.
• State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Bethea, 2024 OK 33: illustrates that even a single DUI can violate Rule 8.4(b), particularly where public safety is jeopardized. Bethea’s one-year suspension (with credit for interim suspension) served as a comparator on sanction severity.
• State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Shahan, 2017 OK 10: the closest factual analogue: DUI and public intoxication convictions. Shahan culminated in a public censure after interim suspension and evidence of rehabilitation. The Court distinguishes Gies by emphasizing seriousness (felony child endangerment) and the later public intoxication incident while on probation.
• State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n ४. Townsend, 2012 OK 44: cited for the principle that discipline is fact-specific; precedent guides but does not dictate outcomes.
• State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Albert, 2007 OK 31: reiterates the protective function of discipline and the need to preserve confidence in the judiciary and legal profession.
• State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Kinsey, 2009 OK 31: confirms consideration of the lawyer’s full record and aggravating/mitigating factors.
• State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Hunt, 2017 OK 28 and State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. McMillen, 2017 OK 26: additional comparators for alcohol-related misconduct where interim suspensions were imposed and later lifted in favor of public discipline in appropriate circumstances.
• Disciplinary Counsel v. Salters, 50 N.E.3d 546: an out-of-state reference supporting the view that child endangerment and intoxication-related offenses can constitute professional misconduct.

Takeaway on precedent use: The Court treats Rule 7 as a streamlined vehicle for converting certain criminal dispositions into conclusive proof of the underlying criminal acts, then uses a comparative-sanctions approach—tempered by mitigation and deterrence—to set the discipline.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in two distinct stages: establishing misconduct and determining sanction.

A) Misconduct established under Rule 7 and ORPC/RGDP standards

• Rule 7 trigger and evidentiary effect: Once the OBA submitted certified copies of the deferred sentence, RGDP Rule 7.2 triggered the case, and under State of Okla. ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Dunivan, the deferred sentence operated as conclusive evidence that Gies committed the underlying conduct.
• Not “every conviction,” but this one: Consistent with Willis, Cooley, and Aston, the Court examined the nature/circumstances. Here, the combination of felony child endangerment and DUI (plus later public intoxication conduct) implicated public safety and professional fitness.
• ORPC Rule 8.4(b) and RGDP Rule 1.3: The felony child endangerment plea was treated as conduct reflecting adversely on “fitness as a lawyer,” and the later public intoxication episode—especially belligerence toward officers and identification as an attorney—was treated as conduct bringing discredit upon the profession (RGDP Rule 1.3).

B) Sanction: why the Court increased discipline from public censure to a six-month suspension

After finding misconduct, the Court weighed (i) public protection and confidence, (ii) deterrence, (iii) comparability with prior sanctions, and (iv) mitigation.

• Aggravating features: felony child endangerment; DUI with a child present; and a subsequent alcohol-related arrest while on probation and while the disciplinary case was pending— all of which the Court found raised “serious concerns” and reflected poorly on the profession.
• Mitigation credited: therapy and a residential workshop; credible testimony of abuse and divorce from the volatile relationship; remorse; no client harm; no prior discipline; and cooperation with the OBA.
• Calibration without interim-suspension credit: The Court explicitly noted that in comparator cases (Bethea, Shahan, Hunt, McMillen) the attorneys were placed on interim suspension. Gies was not. That procedural reality matters because interim suspension often functions as “time served” when final discipline is imposed. Here, the Court imposed an actual six-month suspension to achieve an appropriate protective and deterrent effect.

Finally, the Court specified the operational start of the suspension: it commences after Gies withdraws from all pending matters and files the RGDP Rule 9.1 affidavit, reflecting the Court’s emphasis on orderly client protection during discipline.

3.3 Impact

• Rule 7 consequences are not limited to client-related crimes: The decision reinforces that off-duty criminal conduct—especially involving intoxication and endangerment—can demonstrate unfitness under ORPC Rule 8.4(b).
• Felony child endangerment is treated as qualitatively grave: Even without client harm, the felony’s nature supports suspension rather than merely public censure when combined with DUI facts and subsequent alcohol-related misconduct.
• Post-plea behavior can materially worsen sanction exposure: The public intoxication incident (though pending at the time of the PRT hearing) served as additional evidence of discrediting conduct and impaired judgment, supporting escalation beyond the PRT’s recommendation.
• Procedural posture (interim suspension granted or denied) influences ultimate sanction design: By stressing the absence of interim suspension here, the Court signals that it may impose a real period of suspension to ensure meaningful protective effect rather than rely on interim suspension as de facto discipline.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

• Nolo contendere (no contest) plea: A plea where the defendant does not admit guilt but accepts conviction. In Oklahoma bar discipline under Rule 7, the resulting deferred sentence can still serve as conclusive evidence of the underlying criminal conduct.
• Deferred sentence: A criminal disposition where judgment is deferred and the defendant is placed on probation; if conditions are met, a conviction may be avoided. For lawyer discipline purposes, the Court treats the deferred sentence as sufficient to prove the conduct occurred.
• RGDP Rule 7 proceeding: A streamlined disciplinary process triggered by certain criminal convictions/pleas (including deferred sentences) showing potential unfitness. The key questions become fitness and appropriate sanction, not re-trying the criminal case.
• Interim suspension: A temporary suspension during the pendency of discipline. It is not automatic; the Court may decline it for “good cause.” Interim time can affect later sanction calculations in comparable cases.
• De novo review: The Supreme Court independently reviews the record and is not bound by the PRT’s findings or recommendations.
• ORPC Rule 8.4(b): Professional misconduct includes committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on a lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness. The focus is “fitness,” not merely whether clients were harmed.
• RGDP Rule 1.3: Broad “discredit to the profession” standard; discipline can be imposed even without a conviction and even if the conduct is outside legal practice.
• RGDP Rule 9.1 affidavit: A compliance mechanism requiring the disciplined attorney to formally demonstrate withdrawal/notice steps; here, it also determines when the suspension clock starts.

5) Conclusion

STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. GIES establishes a clear disciplinary message: when a lawyer’s deferred felony plea for child endangerment is paired with DUI conduct and followed by further alcohol-related misconduct during probation, a public censure may be insufficient even with meaningful mitigation. Applying de novo review and Rule 7’s evidentiary framework, the Oklahoma Supreme Court elevated the sanction to a six-month suspension, underscoring public protection, deterrence, and the profession’s reputational interests—while still acknowledging rehabilitation efforts and the absence of client harm.