Deferential Substantive-Reasonableness Review: Upholding a Below-Guidelines (Statutory-Max) Sentence for Murder-for-Hire Conspiracy Despite Claimed Provocation and Plea Mitigation

Note on status: This disposition is a Second Circuit Summary Order and “do[es] not have precedential effect.” It nonetheless illustrates how the court applies existing substantive-reasonableness doctrine to a fact pattern involving solicitation steps toward a murder-for-hire.

1. Introduction

Case: United States v. Massarone, No. 24-2428-cr (2d Cir. Jan. 9, 2026) (summary order).
Parties: United States (Appellee) v. Reshma Massarone (a/k/a Reshma Bhoopersaud) (Defendant-Appellant).
Charge and posture: Massarone pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to commit murder-for-hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958, and appealed only the substantive reasonableness of her sentence.
Sentence: 114 months’ imprisonment (plus three years’ supervised release), i.e., six months below the advisory Guidelines sentence after the statutory maximum capped the otherwise-applicable range.

Central issues on appeal: (1) whether 114 months was “shockingly high” or otherwise outside the “range of permissible decisions” under the abuse-of-discretion standard; (2) whether the district court gave inadequate weight to mitigation (claimed provocation by the intended victim and the guilty plea); and (3) whether the sentence created unwarranted disparities under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed. Applying the highly deferential substantive-reasonableness framework, it held that the district court permissibly emphasized the seriousness of the murder-for-hire conspiracy, Massarone’s affirmative steps (including arranging for a hitman through the victim’s bodyguard and wiring a $2,500 down payment toward a $10,000 fee), and public-safety concerns arising from evidence suggesting contemplation of additional violence. The panel rejected arguments that the district court insufficiently credited provocation or the guilty plea, and it found the disparity argument unpersuasive because the comparator cases were distinguishable.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009)
Cited for the governing standard: substantive reasonableness is reviewed under a deferential abuse-of-discretion framework considering the “totality of the circumstances.” In Massarone, this frames the inquiry as whether the sentence is within a broad zone of permissible outcomes rather than whether the appellate panel would have sentenced differently.
United States v. Muzio, 966 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2020)
Supplies the oft-quoted “shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law” formulation. The panel uses Muzio as the threshold: even a severe sentence will stand unless it crosses this extreme boundary.
United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc)
Anchors two key propositions used repeatedly in the order: (i) appellate courts do not substitute their judgment for the district court’s assessment of what satisfies § 3553(a); and (ii) reversal is reserved for “exceptional cases” where the sentence cannot be located within the permissible range. The panel also invokes Cavera to validate the district court’s allocation of weight among factors (“can bear the weight assigned”).
United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007)
Used for the pragmatic observation that, while no presumption of reasonableness attaches to a within-Guidelines sentence, “in the overwhelming majority of cases” a Guidelines sentence will fall comfortably within the reasonable range. Here, the point supports affirmance a fortiori because the district court imposed a sentence below the advisory Guidelines sentence.
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007)
Appears indirectly, as the decision “abrogat[ing]” Fernandez on other grounds. Although the summary order does not elaborate, the citation situates the Second Circuit’s approach within Supreme Court post-Booker sentencing review doctrine.
United States v. Guldi, 141 F.4th 435 (2d Cir. 2025)
This is the opinion’s most pointed answer to Massarone’s core argument. Quoting Guldi, the panel states that when the sentence is reasonable and procedurally sound, the appellate court will not “second guess the weight (or lack thereof)” the district court assigned to particular § 3553(a) factors or mitigation arguments. This directly defeats the claim that the judge should have credited provocation and the guilty plea more heavily.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning is structured around the modern sentencing review template:

Identify the review lens: substantive reasonableness is exceptionally deferential.
The panel reiterates the Second Circuit’s settled approach (from Rigas, Muzio, and Cavera): the question is not whether 114 months is “best,” but whether it is so extreme as to undermine justice or fall outside the permissible range.
Confirm the sentencing “anchor”: the Guidelines were capped by the statutory maximum.
The otherwise-applicable Guidelines range was 168 to 210 months, but the statutory maximum was 10 years (120 months). Applying U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a), the advisory “Guidelines sentence” became 120 months. The district court then varied downward to 114 months. This matters because a below-Guidelines sentence—especially below a statutory-cap-adjusted Guidelines sentence—typically makes a substantive-reasonableness challenge harder, not easier, under the “totality” analysis.
Approve the district court’s weighting of § 3553(a) factors tied to the facts of execution steps.
The panel highlights the district judge’s emphasis on:
- Nature and circumstances / seriousness (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A)): the conduct was “about as serious as it gets without there being actual violence,” including solicitation of the victim’s bodyguard, agreement on a $10,000 fee, and a $2,500 wire transfer.
- History and characteristics (§ 3553(a)(1)): despite no criminal record, the district court was troubled by evidence suggesting contemplation of killing another person after the victim.
- Protection of the public (§ 3553(a)(2)(C)): the court stressed the apparent willingness to “take a hit out” and potentially “do it again.”
The appellate panel concludes these factors “can bear the weight assigned” (Cavera) and the outcome was not “shockingly high” (Muzio).
Reject “the judge did not consider mitigation” by pointing to explicit consideration in the record.
On provocation, the district court expressly found, by at least a preponderance, that the victim “undert[ook]” a campaign of making Massarone miserable—but deemed Massarone’s response “wildly disproportionate” and only slightly mitigating (“murder is not the answer”). The panel treats this as consideration-and-weighing, not neglect.
Address guilty plea mitigation without transforming it into a required discount.
The district court noted Massarone did not receive acceptance-of-responsibility credit because she minimized conduct in her plea allocution, but still gave “some form of credit” for saving trial resources. The panel accepts the district court’s calibrated approach: partial credit is permissible; full credit is not compelled; and, under Guldi, appellate courts do not reweigh it absent an unreasonable endpoint.
Dispense with disparity arguments by demanding meaningful comparability.
Massarone cited other murder-for-hire cases with lower sentences, but the panel found different mitigating factors and concluded nothing showed the 114-month sentence was outside permissible bounds. This reflects a recurring appellate stance: § 3553(a)(6) does not require numerical parity across loosely similar offenses; it concerns unwarranted disparities among truly similarly situated defendants.

3.3 Impact

Although nonprecedential, Massarone reinforces several practical realities in Second Circuit sentencing appeals:

Substantive-reasonableness challenges remain steep—especially to below-Guidelines sentences. The panel’s analysis exemplifies how the “shockingly high” and “range of permissible decisions” formulations make reversal uncommon when the district court tied § 3553(a) factors to concrete facts.
“Considered but discounted” mitigation is rarely reversible. When a sentencing judge explicitly addresses provocation, plea-related efficiencies, or personal history, the appellate court is likely to treat the dispute as one about weight—foreclosed by Guldi unless the final sentence is outside the lawful reasonable range.
Execution steps and demonstrated willingness can drive severity even without physical harm. The order underscores that serious preparatory acts—agreement on price, use of an intermediary, and payment—support heavy emphasis on seriousness and public protection, even though the intended murder did not occur.
Disparity arguments need close factual matching. Citing lower sentences in other murder-for-hire plots is not enough; the appellant must show comparable aggravators and mitigators such that the difference is plausibly “unwarranted.”

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantive reasonableness: A check on the length of the sentence—whether it is within a broad band of reasonable outcomes—distinct from whether the judge followed correct procedures.
Abuse of discretion: A deferential standard. The appellate court asks whether the sentence falls outside the range of permissible choices, not whether it would have imposed a different sentence.
Guidelines range vs. statutory maximum (U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a)): If the Guidelines recommend more time than the law allows, the statutory maximum becomes the advisory Guidelines sentence. Here, 120 months replaced the higher 168–210-month range.
Downward variance: A sentence below the advisory Guidelines sentence based on § 3553(a) factors. Massarone received a 6-month downward variance (120 → 114).
Acceptance of responsibility: A Guidelines reduction usually available when a defendant clearly admits and accepts wrongdoing; minimizing one’s conduct can jeopardize it. The district court distinguished between formal Guidelines credit and informal “credit” for avoiding trial.
Preponderance of the evidence: “More likely than not.” Sentencing courts may resolve many factual disputes under this lower standard (as compared to “beyond a reasonable doubt” at trial).
Unwarranted sentencing disparity (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)): The goal is to avoid unjustified differences among similarly situated defendants; differences explained by distinct facts (e.g., different mitigation) are often considered warranted.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Massarone affirms a 114-month sentence for a murder-for-hire conspiracy as substantively reasonable where the district court (i) grounded its decision in the seriousness of concrete steps toward a killing, (ii) weighed public-protection concerns arising from evidence of openness to repeated violence, and (iii) expressly considered—but limited—the mitigating force of provocation and a guilty plea. The order’s core lesson is methodological: under Cavera, Muzio, and Guldi, appellate review does not re-balance sentencing factors; it asks only whether the final sentence remains within the broad zone of permissible discretion.