Deference to ALJ Credibility Findings and Rebuttal of the LHWCA § 20(a) Presumption in Psychological-Injury Claims: Commentary on Gabriel v. U.S. Department of Labor

Deference to ALJ Credibility Findings and Rebuttal of the LHWCA § 20(a) Presumption in Psychological‑Injury Claims: Commentary on Gabriel v. U.S. Department of Labor

Table of Contents

I. Introduction

The Second Circuit’s summary order in Gabriel v. United States Department of Labor, No. 24‑2254 (2d Cir. Dec. 17, 2025), addresses a claim for psychological injuries brought by a private security contractor working in Iraq under a U.S. Department of Defense contract. The case arises under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq., as extended by the Defense Base Act (“DBA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1651 et seq..

The petitioner, Roger Avendano Gabriel (“Avendano”), claimed that various traumatic events during his service in Iraq—mortar attacks, exposure to disturbing conditions, and related incidents—caused psychological injury warranting compensation and medical benefits. His employer, SOC‑SMG, Inc. (“SOC”), and its insurer denied the claim. An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) at the Department of Labor rejected his claim, the Benefits Review Board (“BRB” or “Board”) affirmed, and Avendano petitioned the Second Circuit for review.

Though the disposition is a “summary order” without precedential effect under Second Circuit rules, it is citable and provides a clear, practical illustration of several recurring issues in LHWCA/DBA litigation, particularly:

  • the very high level of deference appellate courts give to ALJ credibility determinations;
  • how inconsistencies in a claimant’s narrative can undermine both testimony and medical opinions predicated on that narrative;
  • the role of objective psychological testing in rebutting the LHWCA’s causation presumption under 33 U.S.C. § 920(a); and
  • the application of harmless error analysis to alleged procedural missteps (here, judicial notice).

The core issues before the court were:

  1. Whether the ALJ’s finding that Avendano’s credibility was “questionable” was supported by substantial evidence and thus entitled to deference.
  2. Whether the ALJ properly concluded that Avendano failed to establish a causal connection between his alleged psychological injury and his employment in Iraq, especially in light of the LHWCA § 20(a) presumption.
  3. Whether any procedural errors, including alleged improper judicial notice of other reports by one of Avendano’s experts, required reversal.

II. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Order

The Second Circuit denied Avendano’s petition for review and affirmed the Board’s decision, which had upheld the ALJ’s denial of benefits.

The court held:

  1. Credibility determination upheld: The ALJ’s determination that Avendano’s credibility was “questionable” was supported by substantial evidence, in particular multiple inconsistencies in his account of:
    • why he returned to Peru in 2012 (psychological reasons vs. treatment‑resistant allergies);
    • why he was not allowed to return to Iraq (feeling psychologically unwell vs. failing an English test);
    • the timing and description of traumatic incidents; and
    • the onset and course of his psychological symptoms.
    Under established law, such credibility findings by an ALJ can be reversed only if “patently unreasonable,” a standard not met here.
  2. Causation finding and weighing of medical evidence affirmed: The ALJ permissibly accorded greater weight to the employer’s medical expert, Dr. Yuri Lorenzo, than to the claimant’s expert, Dr. Gustavo Benejam, and to other treating physicians. The ALJ reasonably discounted opinions that relied primarily on Avendano’s self‑reports, given the adverse credibility finding, and relied instead on Dr. Lorenzo’s use of multiple objective psychological tests and a DSM‑V–based analysis. That evidence constituted “substantial evidence” sufficient to rebut the LHWCA § 20(a) presumption of work‑related causation.
  3. Any judicial‑notice error was harmless: Even assuming the ALJ erred in taking judicial notice of reports Dr. Benejam had filed in unrelated cases, that error did not affect the outcome, because the denial of benefits rested on substantial, independent grounds. Under the harmless error doctrine, no remand was warranted.

Consequently, the petition for review was denied and the denial of LHWCA/DBA benefits to Avendano was left undisturbed.

III. Legal and Statutory Framework

1. The LHWCA and Its Extension by the DBA

The Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act is a federal workers’ compensation statute covering certain maritime workers injured in the course of employment. The Defense Base Act extends LHWCA coverage to civilian employees working overseas on U.S. military bases or under contracts with U.S. government agencies, including private security contractors in war zones.

Because of the DBA extension, someone like Avendano—posted as a security guard in Iraq under a Department of Defense contract—is potentially entitled to LHWCA‑type benefits (wage replacement and medical care) for work‑related injuries, including psychological injuries such as PTSD, if the statutory elements are met.

2. The Administrative Review Structure

The structure is essentially three‑tiered:

  1. ALJ (fact‑finder): Conducts a formal hearing, takes testimony, evaluates credibility, weighs conflicting medical and non‑medical evidence, and issues a written decision.
  2. Benefits Review Board: Reviews the ALJ’s decision for legal error and for support by substantial evidence. The Board may not re‑weigh evidence or make new credibility determinations.
  3. Court of Appeals (here, the Second Circuit): Reviews the Board’s decision with a narrow focus: whether the Board committed errors of law and whether it correctly applied the “substantial evidence” standard to the ALJ’s factual findings.

3. The “Substantial Evidence” Standard and Deference to the ALJ

The Second Circuit reiterates the well‑established standard (citing Am. Stevedoring Ltd. v. Marinelli and Serv. Emps. Int’l, Inc. v. Director, OWCP):

“Substantial evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB)

When that threshold is met, appellate courts:

  • must affirm the ALJ’s decision if it is not irrational and is in accordance with law; and
  • may not re‑weigh evidence or reassess witness credibility (citing Pietrunti and Sealand Terminals).

4. The LHWCA § 20(a) Presumption of Causation

Under 33 U.S.C. § 920(a):

“In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation … it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary … [t]hat the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter.”

In practice, for causation:

  1. The claimant must initially show:
    • a physical or psychological harm; and
    • working conditions or workplace events that could have caused or aggravated that harm.
  2. If that initial showing is made, § 20(a) creates a presumption that the injury is work‑related.
  3. The employer may then rebut the presumption with “substantial evidence to the contrary,” typically through contrary medical evidence or other proof undermining causation.
  4. If the presumption is rebutted, the case proceeds “on the record as a whole,” and the claimant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion on causation.

In Gabriel, the Second Circuit accepts that the ALJ found the presumption rebutted by the employer’s evidence, particularly Dr. Lorenzo’s report, and holds that this rebuttal was supported by substantial evidence.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

Although the order is non‑precedential, its reasoning draws heavily on earlier precedents that do bind lower tribunals. These cases provide the doctrinal scaffolding for the court’s analysis.

1. American Stevedoring Ltd. v. Marinelli, 248 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 2001)

Marinelli is a significant Second Circuit LHWCA decision. There, the court:

  • defined the standard of review for BRB decisions, emphasizing that courts examine whether the Board committed errors of law and whether it properly applied the “substantial evidence” test to the ALJ’s findings;
  • reaffirmed that ALJ findings of fact must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence, even when the evidence is conflicting; and
  • addressed how the ALJ should evaluate and weigh medical opinions in a LHWCA context.

In Gabriel, Marinelli supports the limited role of the appellate court: it cannot re‑try the case but must respect the ALJ’s fact‑finding if supported by substantial evidence.

2. Serv. Emps. Int’l, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 595 F.3d 447 (2d Cir. 2010)

Service Employees is another DBA/LHWCA case involving overseas contractors. Among other things, the court in that case:

  • quoted Universal Camera in defining “substantial evidence”;
  • applied the LHWCA’s presumptions and burden‑shifting framework in the DBA context; and
  • reinforced the deference accorded to ALJ fact‑finding in administrative benefit claims.

In Gabriel, it is invoked chiefly to reinforce the definition of “substantial evidence” and to underscore the continuity of standards across different types of administrative claims.

3. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951)

Universal Camera is a landmark Supreme Court case establishing the modern understanding of “substantial evidence” in judicial review of administrative agency decisions. It emphasizes that:

  • “substantial evidence” is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; and
  • courts must consider the record as a whole, not just evidence that supports the agency’s result.

The Second Circuit in Gabriel tracks this formulation and applies it to the ALJ’s findings.

4. Pietrunti v. Director, OWCP, 119 F.3d 1035 (2d Cir. 1997)

Pietrunti is an important LHWCA case involving psychiatric injury, making it particularly relevant here. In Pietrunti, the Second Circuit:

  • stressed that ALJ credibility findings are entitled to “great deference”; and
  • explained that such findings may be reversed only if “patently unreasonable.”

The court in Gabriel directly quotes Pietrunti for:

“Credibility findings of an ALJ are entitled to great deference and therefore can be reversed only if they are patently unreasonable.”

By invoking Pietrunti, the court strongly signals that even in psychiatric or psychological injury cases—where much may hinge on subjective reporting and expert interpretation—the ALJ’s credibility assessments remain largely invulnerable to second‑guessing on appeal.

5. Sealand Terminals, Inc. v. Gasparic, 7 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1993)

In Sealand, the Second Circuit:

  • held that a court of appeals reviewing a BRB decision is “not free to re‑weigh the evidence or to make determinations of credibility”; and
  • reaffirmed that the ALJ is the primary fact‑finder whose role is not easily displaced.

Gabriel uses Sealand as a concise reminder that the Second Circuit cannot substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ regarding how to resolve conflicts in testimony or medical opinion.

6. Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2006)

Lin is an immigration case, not a LHWCA matter. Nonetheless, it is regularly cited for its articulation of the deference owed to administrative fact‑finders’ credibility determinations:

  • the court emphasized giving “particular deference” to credibility findings, especially when the fact‑finder has articulated specific reasons; and
  • recognized that discrepancies, omissions, and inconsistencies can undercut a witness’s reliability.

By citing Lin, the Second Circuit underscores that strong deference to credibility findings is a cross‑cutting principle across administrative law, not confined to any one statutory regime.

7. Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402 (2d Cir. 2010)

Zabala is a Social Security disability case. It is cited in Gabriel solely for its statement of the harmless error doctrine in the administrative review context:

  • an error is harmless when correcting it would not change the outcome; and
  • courts need not remand for purely formal errors that have no practical bearing on the decision.

In Gabriel, this principle is invoked to dispose of the argument that the ALJ’s purportedly improper judicial notice of other reports by Dr. Benejam requires remand.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Credibility Determinations

1. The ALJ’s Role and the “Patently Unreasonable” Threshold

The court starts with a restatement of the ALJ’s role:

“As a factfinder, the ALJ ‘has the discretion to evaluate the credibility of a claimant and to arrive at an independent judgment, in light of medical findings and other evidence.’” (quoting Pietrunti)

From this, it follows that:

  • the ALJ may accept or reject a claimant’s testimony, in whole or in part;
  • the ALJ may weigh inconsistencies and contradictions as evidence of questionable credibility; and
  • the court of appeals will disturb such a determination only if it is “patently unreasonable,” a deliberately stringent standard that sets a high bar for reversal.

2. Specific Inconsistencies in Avendano’s Testimony

The Second Circuit identifies concrete examples that, in its view, rationally support the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding:

  1. Reason for return to Peru in 2012:
    • Avendano testified in deposition and told several doctors that he was sent back to Peru on medical leave for psychological reasons.
    • However, the camp physician’s letter states he was being returned due to “repeated episodes of hives” resistant to treatment and “symptoms of airway edema,” with no mention of psychological issues, and that he needed allergy testing not available in Iraq.
    • This direct conflict between self‑report and contemporaneous medical documentation was a substantial basis for questioning his narrative.
  2. Why he did not return to Iraq:
    • In deposition, he testified that he could not return to complete his one‑year contract because he was “feeling bad” (suggesting psychological incapacity).
    • But he told Dr. Lorenzo that he was not allowed to return because he failed an English test.
    • This discrepancy goes to the heart of whether his departure and non‑return were driven by psychological injury or unrelated employment issues.
  3. Details of traumatic incidents:
    • Avendano could not consistently recall whether a night attack on his camp occurred in 2010 or 2011.
    • He told his own expert, Dr. Benejam, that he found part of a finger on blood‑covered ground while on duty, but this vivid event was never mentioned to any other doctor or in his deposition.
    • Such selective and inconsistent reporting undercut the reliability of his overall account of trauma exposure.
  4. Onset and progression of psychological symptoms:
    • He told at least one doctor that he developed psychological problems and nightmares during the “first months” of his stay in Iraq (which began in 2007 with a different contractor, Triple Canopy).
    • He testified at deposition that he slept “like normal” before working for SOC and told Dr. Lorenzo that his insomnia followed a 2010 explosion.
    • These differing timeframes complicate any causal link between specific employment with SOC and his symptoms.

3. Cognitive Difficulties vs. Credibility Problems

Avendano argued that the inconsistencies were explainable by “cognitive difficulties and recall problems” rather than deceit. The court’s response is procedural rather than psychiatric:

“[I]t is for the ALJ to evaluate whether a petitioner’s testimony resulted from a lack of credibility or a more innocent cause.”

In other words:

  • even if cognitive deficits might explain inconsistencies, it is the ALJ—not the appellate court—who decides whether to accept that explanation;
  • so long as the ALJ’s conclusion (that the inconsistencies indicate questionable credibility) is not “patently unreasonable,” the court will not interfere.

That is exactly what the court finds: the ALJ provided “clearly stated rationale” grounded in specific evidence, satisfying the substantial evidence standard and precluding reversal.

B. Causation, Medical Evidence, and the § 20(a) Presumption

1. Weighting Competing Medical Opinions

Avendano also argued that the ALJ erred by giving “too little weight” to the opinions of his own physicians when assessing causation. The court rejects this, explaining that:

  • the ALJ gave greater weight to the report of SOC’s expert, Dr. Yuri Lorenzo;
  • the ALJ discounted reports by Dr. Benejam and Avendano’s treating physicians because they relied heavily on Avendano’s self‑reporting; and
  • after finding Avendano’s credibility “questionable,” the ALJ reasonably found that those self‑report–based opinions were less reliable.

By contrast, Dr. Lorenzo:

  • used “multiple objective psychological tests”;
  • “discussed in detail Avendano’s experiences in Iraq, personal history and education, and occupational history”; and
  • performed a symptom analysis against DSM‑V criteria for PTSD and adjustment disorder.

On this basis, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Lorenzo’s opinion was more persuasive and more firmly grounded in objective data and standardized diagnostic criteria, independent of the claimant’s subjective narrative.

2. Rebutting the § 20(a) Presumption

The court emphasizes that Dr. Lorenzo’s report qualified as “substantial evidence” sufficient to rebut the § 20(a) presumption:

“It follows that the ALJ properly relied on Dr. Lorenzo’s report as ‘substantial evidence’ sufficient to rebut the Section 20(a) presumption.”

The significance is twofold:

  1. Objective psychological testing matters: Where an employer’s expert relies on well‑recognized psychological testing and rigorous application of DSM‑V criteria, that can constitute substantial evidence “to the contrary” within the meaning of § 920(a), especially in contrast to opinions based primarily on self‑reported history.
  2. Credibility and medical opinion are intertwined: Because many psychiatric and psychological diagnoses depend heavily on the patient’s narrative, an ALJ’s adverse credibility finding can substantially diminish the probative value of claimant‑side medical reports that simply accept the claimant’s story at face value. This, in turn, makes it easier for the employer to meet its rebuttal burden.

3. The Ultimate Burden of Persuasion

Once the employer rebuts the § 20(a) presumption, the ALJ must decide the case based on the record as a whole, with the claimant bearing the ultimate burden to prove causation. The Second Circuit’s conclusion that:

“the ALJ’s conclusions were supported by substantial evidence, and … it is for the ALJ, and not this Court, to weigh conflicting evidence”

signals that:

  • the ALJ permissibly found the employer’s evidence more persuasive;
  • the presumption having been rebutted, the claimant failed to carry his ultimate burden; and
  • appellate review ends there, so long as the evidence could reasonably support the ALJ’s view.

C. Judicial Notice and Harmless Error

1. The Alleged Error

Avendano also argued that the ALJ improperly took judicial notice of reports that his expert, Dr. Benejam, had filed in two unrelated cases. The concern was presumably that the ALJ might have viewed Dr. Benejam as biased or unreliable based on his work in other matters, instead of confining the evaluation to the evidence in this record.

2. The Court’s Harmless Error Analysis

The Second Circuit does not definitively decide whether taking judicial notice was improper. Instead, it assumes arguendo that any such error occurred and classifies it as harmless:

  • the order notes that the ALJ made “just a passing reference” to those other reports;
  • the court explains that, independent of any reference to other cases, the ALJ had substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Avendano failed to prove causation; and
  • therefore, under Zabala v. Astrue, the error did not affect the outcome and does not justify remand.

This approach underscores a common reality in administrative appeals: even arguable procedural anomalies will not result in relief if the reviewing court is convinced that the overall evidentiary basis for the outcome is sound and that the error did not materially influence the ultimate decision.

VI. Likely Impact on LHWCA/DBA Practice

While this is a non‑precedential summary order, it is citable and thus likely to influence how parties, ALJs, and practitioners think about psychological‑injury claims under the LHWCA/DBA. Several practical lessons emerge.

1. Reinforcement of Deference to ALJs on Credibility

The opinion reinforces that challenging an ALJ’s credibility finding on appeal is extremely difficult. Unless a claimant can show that the ALJ’s assessment is “patently unreasonable,” the order suggests that:

  • inconsistencies, even if arguably attributable to cognitive issues, may be treated as credibility problems; and
  • the court of appeals will not second‑guess the ALJ’s decision about whether to accept claimed memory or cognitive limitations as an explanation.

For practitioners, this underscores the importance of:

  • preparing claimants thoroughly for depositions and hearings;
  • ensuring that narratives given to different examiners, treating physicians, and experts are as consistent as possible; and
  • documenting explanations for any discrepancies (e.g., language barriers, cognitive testing, contemporaneous notes about memory issues).

2. Strategic Value of Objective Psychological Testing

The court’s reliance on Dr. Lorenzo’s use of multiple objective tests and DSM‑V criteria suggests that:

  • in DBA cases involving alleged PTSD or related disorders, an expert who grounds his or her opinion in standardized, objective instruments and rigorous diagnostic criteria may carry substantial weight with ALJs and reviewing courts;
  • employer‑retained experts who conduct such testing may be especially effective in rebutting the § 20(a) presumption; and
  • claimants’ experts should consider using similarly robust testing where appropriate, rather than relying primarily on clinical interviews and self‑reports.

3. Effect on § 20(a) Presumption Arguments in Psychological Claims

This order illustrates that the § 20(a) presumption, while powerful, is not insurmountable in psychological‑injury claims. Once the employer offers:

  • a credible, well‑supported expert opinion that disputes the diagnosis, the severity, or the work‑related causation of the condition; and
  • evidence undermining the claimant’s narrative of trauma and symptom onset,

the presumption can be rebutted, placing the full burden back on the claimant. This has implications for:

  • how claimants document their symptoms over time;
  • the importance of early contemporaneous reporting of psychological symptoms (e.g., in theater medical records); and
  • the need to carefully link specific work events to the development or worsening of symptoms.

4. Treatment of Treating vs. Retained Experts

LHWCA jurisprudence does not follow a rigid “treating physician rule” like some Social Security contexts, but ALJs often give significant weight to treating sources. Gabriel shows that:

  • treating physicians’ opinions can be discounted when based largely on self‑report from a claimant whose credibility has been discredited;
  • retained experts may be preferred if their methods are more objective and better explained; and
  • the “quality” of the reasoning and testing underlying an opinion may trump its “status” as a treating vs. non‑treating provider.

5. Limited Practical Consequences of Procedural Missteps

The harmless‑error discussion signals that:

  • not all procedural irregularities in ALJ proceedings will justify remand; and
  • practitioners appealing procedural issues must show a plausible impact on the outcome, not just theoretical impropriety.

This may discourage purely technical appeals where the substantive evidentiary case for reversal is weak.

VII. Complex Concepts Explained

1. “Summary Order” and Non‑Precedential Effect

The Second Circuit begins by noting that:

  • “RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.”
  • However, summary orders filed on or after January 1, 2007, may be cited under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1.

That means:

  • this disposition does not bind future panels or lower courts in the way a published opinion does;
  • but lawyers may cite it as persuasive authority, and it can influence decision‑making, especially where it applies or illustrates existing precedents.

2. “Substantial Evidence”

“Substantial evidence” is a term of art in administrative law:

  • it is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion;
  • it is more than a mere scintilla, but it does not require the evidence to outweigh opposing evidence;
  • so long as a reasonable person could agree with the ALJ’s view, even if another reasonable person might disagree, the substantial evidence test is satisfied.

This standard is intentionally deferential, reflecting Congress’s choice to entrust fact‑finding primarily to administrative tribunals rather than courts.

3. Credibility Determinations and the “Patently Unreasonable” Standard

A credibility determination is the fact‑finder’s assessment of whether a witness is believable. Under cases like Pietrunti and Lin:

  • ALJs can consider demeanor, internal consistency, consistency with other evidence, and plausibility;
  • a reviewing court gives “great deference” to these determinations; and
  • such findings are reversible only if they are “patently unreasonable”—that is, if no rational fact‑finder could have reached that conclusion on the transcript and exhibits.

4. The LHWCA § 20(a) Presumption

Section 20(a) creates a rebuttable presumption that an injury is work‑related once certain basic elements are shown. In simplified terms:

  1. The claimant shows:
    • an injury (physical or psychological); and
    • work conditions that could have caused or contributed to it.
  2. The law then assumes—unless the employer offers convincing contrary evidence—that the injury is work‑related.
  3. The employer can rebut by producing substantial evidence that the injury did not arise out of employment (for example, an expert opinion showing no causal connection).
  4. If rebutted, the presumption drops out, and the ALJ decides the issue on the full record, with the claimant carrying the ultimate burden.

5. DSM‑V and Objective Psychological Testing

The DSM‑V (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition) is the principal diagnostic manual used by mental‑health professionals in the United States. A reference to DSM‑V criteria signals:

  • that the expert is using standardized criteria for diagnosing disorders like PTSD or adjustment disorder; and
  • that the expert’s opinion is grounded in widely accepted psychiatric practice.

“Objective psychological tests” might include standardized instruments such as personality inventories, symptom validity tests, or trauma‑related scales. Their “objective” character lies in:

  • standardized administration and scoring; and
  • norm‑based interpretation, which offers some check on purely subjective impressions.

In Gabriel, the court views such testing as a strength of the employer’s medical evidence.

6. Judicial Notice in Administrative Proceedings

“Judicial notice” allows a tribunal to accept certain facts as true without formal proof, particularly facts that are generally known or readily verifiable. In administrative settings:

  • ALJs sometimes take notice of prior decisions, professional literature, or other official records;
  • however, taking notice of an expert’s prior reports in unrelated cases raises fairness concerns if those reports were never introduced as evidence and the parties lacked a chance to contest them.

In Gabriel, the alleged error was the ALJ’s reference to reports by Dr. Benejam in two other cases. The Second Circuit, applying harmless error analysis, found any such mistake inconsequential to the outcome.

7. Harmless Error

Under the harmless error doctrine (as applied in Zabala):

  • not every error requires reversal; only errors that may have affected the outcome do;
  • if the reviewing court is convinced that, even without the error, the agency would have reached the same conclusion, the error is deemed harmless; and
  • harmless errors do not justify remand or reversal because they do not prejudice the complaining party in a material way.

VIII. Conclusion

Gabriel v. U.S. Department of Labor, although a summary order without precedential effect, meaningfully illustrates how the Second Circuit applies core LHWCA/DBA principles to psychological‑injury claims by overseas contractors.

Key takeaways include:

  • ALJ credibility findings—especially when grounded in detailed, documented inconsistencies—are almost unassailable on appeal absent a showing that they are “patently unreasonable.”
  • Medical opinions that rest heavily on a claimant’s discredited self‑reports can be significantly discounted, even if offered by treating physicians or claimant‑side experts.
  • Employer‑side experts who employ rigorous, standardized psychological testing and DSM‑V–based analysis can provide the “substantial evidence” necessary to rebut the LHWCA § 20(a) presumption of causation.
  • Once the presumption is rebutted, the claimant bears the full burden of persuasion on causation, and appellate courts will not disturb the ALJ’s weighing of conflicting expert opinions if supported by substantial evidence.
  • Alleged procedural missteps such as questionable judicial notice will not warrant reversal absent a showing of prejudice; harmless error principles apply robustly in this context.

In the broader legal context, the order reaffirms:

  • the centrality of the ALJ’s role as fact‑finder in LHWCA/DBA proceedings;
  • the difficulty of overturning denials of benefits based on adverse credibility findings and carefully reasoned weighting of medical evidence; and
  • the practical need for meticulous, consistent factual development and robust, methodologically sound expert testimony in psychological‑injury claims arising from war‑zone contracting.

While not binding precedent, Gabriel will likely serve as persuasive authority and a cautionary example in future cases, shaping how counsel present, document, and litigate similar claims under the LHWCA and DBA.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

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