Deference Stops at the Line: Tenth Circuit Limits Arbitrators to Precisely Submitted Issues Under a CBA

Introduction

This commentary examines the Tenth Circuit’s published decision in HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial & Service Workers International Union Local 11-574 (No. 23-8046, Mar. 25, 2025). The case arises from HollyFrontier’s 2021 conversion of a petroleum refinery into a renewable diesel facility and its corresponding shift of laboratory work from hourly, union-represented Lab Testers to higher-credentialed, salaried Chemists. The Union grieved the reassignment as a violation of the collective-bargaining agreement (CBA). After the arbitrator rejected the grievance on the merits, he directed the parties to address whether the new Chemist position belonged inside or outside the bargaining unit and, when they could not agree, issued a second award compelling inclusion of Chemists in the unit.

HollyFrontier sought vacatur, arguing the arbitrator exceeded his authority by deciding a representational question the parties never submitted to arbitration. The district court vacated the award, and the Union appealed. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that because the parties precisely confined their submission to whether the reassignment of lab work violated the CBA, the arbitrator lacked authority to decide bargaining-unit scope, notwithstanding any deference ordinarily due to arbitral decisions.

The majority opinion, authored by Judge Eid, clarifies a critical boundary in labor arbitration: when the parties’ submissions are clear and precise, courts owe no deference to an arbitrator’s expansion into unsubmitted issues and must vacate such overreach under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Judge Phillips dissented, urging strong deference to an arbitrator’s interpretation of the scope of the issues submitted and warning that the majority’s approach departs from the weight of authority.

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s vacatur of an arbitration award that added salaried Chemists to the bargaining unit.
Core holding: An arbitrator exceeds his powers under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) when he decides an issue that the parties did not submit for arbitration. The court’s “great deference” standard applies only to disputes the parties agreed to arbitrate.
Here, the parties precisely submitted one issue: whether HollyFrontier violated the CBA by reassigning lab work from union-represented Lab Testers to Chemists. The arbitrator resolved that issue in HollyFrontier’s favor. By then proceeding to decide whether Chemists are within the bargaining unit, the arbitrator crossed the line.
The CBA’s arbitration clause further confined arbitral authority to interpreting and applying “challenged provision(s).” The Union’s grievance and arbitration brief challenged the reassignment of work, not unit composition. Broad prayers for relief did not expand the submission.
The court distinguished prior Tenth Circuit authority (Burlington Northern) and explained that many out-of-circuit cases cited by the dissent either involved broad or vague submissions or do not require deference where the parties’ submission is clear and narrow.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

FAA § 10(a)(4): Authorizes vacatur when arbitrators “exceed their powers.” The majority applies this as the linchpin for reviewing ultra vires arbitral action beyond the submitted issues.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574: Establishes that a party cannot be forced to arbitrate issues it did not agree to submit. The majority relies on this contractual- consent principle to define the judicial task: first determine what the parties agreed to arbitrate.
Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614: The court’s “first task” is to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute. If not, no deference is due. The majority uses this as an entry point to limit the scope of deference.
Retail Store Employees Union Local 782 v. Sav-On Groceries, 508 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1975): When parties submit a narrow and not-vague issue, the arbitrator must “stay within the areas marked out for his consideration.” The Tenth Circuit invokes Sav-On as a near blueprint: a narrow submission cabined the arbitrator’s authority, and an award addressing an unsubmitted issue was vacated.
United Food & Commercial Workers Local 7R v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 889 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1989): Parties may limit an arbitrator’s power either through a precise submission or express CBA limits. When the submission is clear, courts look to that submission (not to broader arbitrability) to define the arbitrator’s remit. The court applies Safeway to emphasize that the submission here was precise and limiting.
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593: While arbitrators have flexibility crafting remedies, they cannot go “beyond the submission.” The majority uses Enterprise Wheel to underscore that remedial breadth does not license deciding new questions.
Dish Network L.L.C. v. Ray, 900 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 2018): Confirms “great deference” to arbitral decisions, but only as to issues submitted to arbitration. The majority reads Dish Network as consistent with its threshold-contractual approach.
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, 636 F.3d 562 (10th Cir. 2010): On which the dissent leans; the court there applied deference to the board’s determination of scope because the disputed finding was “directly related” to issues in the submission agreement. The majority distinguishes Burlington Northern on the ground that, in this case, neither party submitted unit-composition/ inclusion of Chemists, making deference inapposite.
Out-of-circuit decisions (e.g., El Dorado; Metromedia; Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R.; Pack Concrete; IBEW v. Verizon Fla.; Madison Hotel; NFLPA v. NFL): The dissent presents these to argue for strong deference to an arbitrator’s view of what was submitted. The majority responds that those cases either featured broader submissions, were distinguishable, or themselves recognize that deference depends on the submission’s breadth or ambiguity. Where the submission is clear and narrow—as here—deference is not warranted.
Matteson v. Ryder Systems (3d Cir.); John Morrell (8th Cir.); Bowater Carolina (4th Cir.); Courier-Citizen (1st Cir.): The majority invokes these to show a robust body of law approving vacatur when arbitrators decide unsubmitted questions—reinforcing that its approach does not create a circuit split.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeds along three pillars: contract, submission, and deference.

Arbitration is a creature of contract. The CBA’s “challenged provisions” clause gives the arbitrator authority only to interpret or apply the provisions actually challenged. Arbitration’s deference regime presupposes that the arbitrator is deciding disputes the parties agreed to arbitrate.
The parties’ submission controls the arbitrator’s remit. The court first looks to the “precise statement of the issues” submitted. Here, both sides presented the issue as whether HollyFrontier violated the CBA by reassigning lab work from union-represented Lab Testers to salaried Chemists. The arbitrator himself recognized this and decided it: he found no violation in creating the Chemist role and reassigning work.
No deference when the arbitrator strays beyond the submission. After resolving the work-reassignment question, the arbitrator declared that the parties must determine whether the Chemist position belongs inside or outside the unit and later ordered inclusion. Because neither party submitted the unit-composition question, and because the submission was clear and narrow, deciding the inclusion of Chemists exceeded his authority. Under § 10(a)(4), vacatur was proper.

The majority rejects the Union’s position that merely citing the recognition clause (Article 1, § 1.01) or offering broad remedial prayers expands the arbitrator’s jurisdiction. General references to CBA provisions and catch-all remedies do not override the precise issue the parties actually put to the arbitrator. The court underscores that even the Union “readily acknowledges” it did not explicitly ask the arbitrator to include Chemists in the unit and that the inclusion result was “neither party’s desired” outcome.

Finally, the court addresses the dissent’s proposed standard—extreme deference to an arbitrator’s view of issue scope. The majority maintains that deference applies only after the court determines the issue was actually submitted. Where the submission is narrow and unambiguous, allowing the arbitrator to redefine the scope would invert the contractual bedrock of arbitration.

Impact

Submission discipline is determinative. Within the Tenth Circuit, parties who precisely frame an arbitration submission can expect courts to enforce those limits. Arbitrators who decide issues beyond that submission risk vacatur, even if their extra-step ruling “draws its essence” from the CBA or seems closely related.
Remedial creativity has limits. While arbitrators retain flexibility to craft remedies, that flexibility operates within the bounds of the submitted dispute. Broad remedial requests (“make whole in all ways”) will not expand an otherwise narrow submission.
Drafting and advocacy strategies will change.
- Unions and employers should consider joint submission agreements that define—with intent—the scope of issues and permissible remedies.
- If parties want an arbitrator to resolve representational questions with contractual underpinnings (e.g., recognition clause disputes related to unit scope), they should say so explicitly in the submission.
- Conversely, a party wishing to prevent arbitral forays into unit composition should anchor the submission in the specific contract question (e.g., work-assignment or management-rights issues).
Interface with the NLRB. The district court (and dissent) recognized arbitrators may have concurrent jurisdiction to resolve contractual disputes that affect representational issues. The majority did not disturb that premise; it held only that the parties did not submit a representational/unit-scope question here. Future parties can still channel contractual recognition-clause disputes to arbitration—if they clearly submit them.
Deference calibration in the Tenth Circuit. The decision clarifies that Burlington Northern’s deference to an arbitrator’s view of scope applies when the submission is broad or the board’s finding is directly related to submitted issues. When a submission is narrow and precise, Sav-On and Safeway control: courts will not defer to an arbitrator’s enlargement of the issue set.
Potential for broader litigation. The dissent highlights extensive out-of-circuit authority counseling deference to an arbitrator’s view of submission scope. While the majority contends its approach aligns with substantial authority (and Tenth Circuit precedent), the tension it surfaces may invite en banc or Supreme Court attention if similar cases proliferate.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Arbitrability vs. Scope of Submission:
- Arbitrability asks whether a type of dispute must be arbitrated at all under the parties’ agreement. Courts typically decide this gateway question de novo unless clearly delegated to the arbitrator.
- Scope of Submission asks what precise issues the parties actually asked the arbitrator to decide in a given case. Here, the court held it need not defer to an arbitrator’s view of scope when the parties’ submission is clear and narrow.
Challenged-Provisions Clause: The CBA confined the arbitrator’s “sole authority” to interpreting/applying only the CBA provisions the parties actually challenged. This contractual limit reinforces the primacy of the parties’ issue-framing.
Accretion: In labor law, “accretion” refers to adding employees to an existing bargaining unit without a new election because they share a community of interest with the unit. It is traditionally within the NLRB’s province, though arbitrators may address contractual disputes with representational implications if the parties’ agreement and submission allow it. The majority did not reach the merits of accretion; it found the issue was never submitted.
“Draws its essence” from the CBA: A highly deferential merits standard: an arbitral award is upheld if the arbitrator is even arguably interpreting and applying the contract. That deference presupposes the arbitrator is deciding submitted disputes. It does not shield decisions that resolve unsubmitted issues.
FAA § 10(a)(4): The statutory basis for vacating an arbitral award when the arbitrator exceeds the powers conferred by the parties’ agreement or their submission.

Key Takeaways and Practical Guidance

In the Tenth Circuit, a clear and narrow submission acts as a hard boundary. Arbitrators must decide only those issues—and courts will vacate decisions that go beyond.
Broad references to the CBA or catch-all remedy requests do not expand the issues submitted. If parties want an arbitrator to decide unit composition or recognition-clause remedies that alter unit scope, they should expressly submit those questions.
Consider adopting a joint submission agreement that:
- States the precise questions to be decided;
- Identifies the CBA provisions being “challenged” within the meaning of any challenged-provisions clause; and
- Clarifies the scope of permissible remedies.
Arbitrators should memorialize the submission clearly and refrain from sua sponte expanding into representational questions absent express party agreement.
When seeking to preserve arbitral flexibility, parties can jointly frame broader submissions or explicitly authorize the arbitrator to resolve all issues “reasonably necessary” to implement the award. Absent that, the arbitrator’s remedial discretion remains tethered to the submitted issue.

Conclusion

HollyFrontier v. United Steelworkers reaffirms a foundational principle: arbitration is consensual, and the scope of an arbitrator’s authority is set by what the parties actually submit—especially when the CBA itself limits authority to interpreting and applying “challenged provisions.” In the Tenth Circuit, deference to arbitral awards stops where the submission line is clearly drawn. While the dissent persuasively articulates the virtues of broader deference to an arbitrator’s view of submission scope, the majority grounds its holding in contract and longstanding circuit precedent (Sav-On; Safeway): when submissions are precise, arbitrators must stay within those confines, and courts will ensure they do so.

For practitioners, this decision elevates the strategic importance of drafting precise submission statements and aligning requested remedies with the submitted issues. For arbitrators, it is a cautionary marker: resolve what is asked, and no more. And for labor relations generally, it delineates a clean, administrable rule that promotes predictability in grievance arbitration while preserving room for parties to design broader arbitral authority when they choose to do so.