Deference on Arrest Timing: Officer Testimony May Outweigh CAD Timestamps to Uphold a Search Incident to Arrest

Introduction

In State of West Virginia v. Roderick Levi Howard (No. 24-88), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia issued a memorandum decision on October 24, 2025, affirming the denial of a suppression motion following a no contest plea to attempted possession with intent to deliver fentanyl. The appeal centered on a narrow but consequential Fourth Amendment question: when the only direct witness testifies that the defendant was under arrest before a search, but a computer-aided dispatch (CAD) log records the arrest timestamp much later, may a trial court credit the officer’s testimony and uphold the search as valid incident to arrest?

The Court held that, under the clearly erroneous standard governing factual findings on suppression, the circuit court could reasonably accept the officer’s account that the arrest preceded the search. That finding in turn justified the warrantless search under the well-established search-incident-to-arrest exception. The Court also rejected a Miranda-based challenge, concluding that having an arrestee retrieve concealed contraband from his clothing at officers’ direction constitutes a permissible component of a search incident to arrest rather than custodial interrogation requiring warnings.

The decision offers practical guidance on the evidentiary weight of CAD logs versus live testimony, reinforces the burden allocation when the State invokes a warrant exception, and clarifies the boundary between physical evidence gathering and testimonial self-incrimination in the context of on-scene arrests.

Summary of the Opinion

The defendant was stopped after traffic infractions; dispatch reported an outstanding warrant. Officers arrested him, handcuffed him, and, noticing he was standing “funny,” suspected concealed contraband in his underwear. To avoid intrusive touching, they had him retrieve the item himself—9.5 grams of fentanyl. A later vehicle search yielded a handgun.
A CAD log reflected the arrest time as occurring 1 hour and 41 minutes after the stop, seemingly conflicting with the officer’s testimony that the arrest occurred within approximately 10 minutes of the stop and before the personal search.
The circuit court, crediting the officer’s testimony, found the arrest predated the search. It denied suppression, reasoning that the search was incident to arrest and fell within recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
On appeal, applying the standard from State v. Lacy and State v. Snyder, the Supreme Court construed facts in the State’s favor, reviewed factual findings for clear error, and examined constitutional reasonableness de novo. It found no clear error in the circuit court’s factual finding and affirmed.
Because the arrest preceded the search, the Court declined to reach plain-feel arguments premised on a Terry detention and rejected the Miranda-based claim, citing State v. Bradshaw and State v. Julius to explain that physical evidence seized incident to lawful arrest is not barred by Miranda or right-to-counsel doctrines.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

State v. Lacy, 196 W. Va. 104, 468 S.E.2d 719 (1996): Provides the bedrock standard of review for suppression rulings—facts viewed in the light most favorable to the State; factual findings reviewed for clear error; constitutional determinations reviewed de novo. Its syllabus points frame the Court’s deferential stance toward trial-level credibility determinations.
State v. Snyder, 245 W. Va. 42, 857 S.E.2d 180 (2021): Reaffirms Lacy’s bifurcated standard. The Court expressly invoked Snyder to anchor its approach to the record and burden allocations on appeal.
State v. Ladd, 210 W. Va. 413, 557 S.E.2d 820 (2001) (Syl. Pt. 20): Restates the general rule that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable subject to “jealously and carefully drawn” exceptions. This underscores the State’s burden to justify resort to any warrant exception.
State v. Barefield, 240 W. Va. 587, 814 S.E.2d 250 (2018) (Syl. Pt. 6): Authorizes a warrantless search of an arrestee’s person and the immediate area under his control incident to a valid arrest—precisely the exception the State invoked.
United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974): Explains the traditional justifications for the search-incident doctrine: officer safety (weapons), preventing escape, and preservation of evidence. The Court relied on this federal authority to situate the search within recognized rationales.
State v. Farley, 230 W. Va. 193, 737 S.E.2d 90 (2012): Lists recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, including searches incident to a valid arrest and exigent circumstances. It frames how this search fits within permissible categories.
State v. Stuart, 192 W. Va. 428, 452 S.E.2d 886 (1994) (Syl. Pt. 3, in part): Emphasizes that factual determinations underlying suppression rulings are reviewed for clear error—key to the Court’s acceptance of the circuit court’s timeline finding despite the CAD log discrepancy.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966): Referenced in the arguments; the Court clarifies its scope through state cases, reiterating that Miranda protects against custodial interrogation, not the collection of physical evidence in a search incident to arrest.
State v. Julius, 185 W. Va. 422, 408 S.E.2d 1 (1991) (Syl. Pt. 5): Holds that lawful seizure of physical evidence from an arrestee’s person is not invalidated by invocation of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Applied to reject the defendant’s claim that officer-directed retrieval of contraband was a constitutional violation.
State v. Bradshaw, 193 W. Va. 519, 457 S.E.2d 456 (1995) (Syl. Pt. 3, in part): Confirms that Miranda rights are not implicated outside custodial interrogation. The Court used Bradshaw to distinguish between physical evidence gathering and elicitation of testimonial statements.
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009): Cited by the circuit court. Gant limits vehicle searches incident to arrest. Although person-search doctrine is separate and more permissive than Gant’s vehicle-search limits, the Supreme Court here affirmed on the search-of-person rationale (as recognized in Barefield and Edwards).

Legal Reasoning

Framing the question and standard of review. The pivotal issue was factual: whether the defendant was under arrest when officers searched his person. The Court applied Lacy/Snyder to (a) view facts favorably to the State, (b) review factual findings for clear error, and (c) evaluate the constitutional question de novo only after fixing the facts. This approach functionally determined the outcome: if the arrest predated the search, the search-incident exception applied and suppression would fail.
Resolving the CAD log versus testimony conflict. The defendant offered three items to challenge the officer’s timeline: a CAD sheet showing an arrest time 1:41 after the stop, two dispatch-transcript excerpts without timestamps, and a friend’s phone log showing a long call during the stop. The Court found the dispatch transcripts non-probative due to missing timestamps and deemed the phone records inconclusive without contextual testimony. That left the CAD sheet as the only contradictory evidence. The officer, however, consistently testified across the suppression hearing and both grand jury appearances that the arrest occurred within about 10 minutes—after the warrant check—and before the personal search. He also offered plausible explanations for why the CAD might reflect a later time, including delayed radioing, delegating and forgetting to report, or waiting until after a lengthy vehicle search to report the formal arrest time. In the absence of counter-witnesses (no dispatcher, no other officer, and no defendant testimony), the circuit court credited the officer. On appeal, the Supreme Court—bound by the clear-error standard—declined to disturb that credibility determination.
Applying the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine. With the arrest deemed to have occurred before the search, Barefield and Edwards controlled. The officers could lawfully search the arrestee’s person and areas within his immediate control for weapons, means of escape, or destructible evidence. The decision references that the officers observed “standing funny,” leading to suspicion of concealed contraband in the groin area. Allowing the arrestee to retrieve it himself rather than performing a more intrusive manual search did not invalidate the search; it was simply an alternative means of executing a lawful search of the person incident to arrest.
Rejecting plain-feel and Terry-based arguments. The defendant’s plain-feel contention (that non-weapon contraband cannot be removed during a patdown unless its incriminating nature is immediately apparent) is a feature of Terry stops, not post-arrest searches. Because the Court affirmed the finding that this was a post-arrest search, the “immediately apparent” requirement was inapposite.
Clarifying Miranda’s inapplicability to physical retrieval during a search. The defense theory that the officer’s request—“retrieve the item yourself”—was an elicitation of a self-incriminating statement failed because Miranda governs testimonial or communicative statements in custodial interrogation, not the seizure of physical evidence incident to arrest. Julius and Bradshaw supplied the doctrinal boundary: lawfully seized physical evidence from an arrestee is not suppressed merely because officers did not give Miranda warnings before executing the search.
Burden of proof on warrant exceptions. Consistent with Lacy and Ladd, the Court reaffirmed that the State bears the burden to show that the search fits within a recognized exception. Here, that burden was met through sworn testimony establishing the arrest timing, coupled with the doctrinal scope of search incident to arrest.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although issued as a Rule 21 memorandum decision (indicating no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error), the Court’s analysis has clear practical and doctrinal significance:

Weight of CAD logs versus live testimony. CAD timestamps are useful but not dispositive in establishing the timing of an arrest. If an officer provides a consistent, plausible account, and the defense does not present corroborating witnesses or timestamped records to contradict it, trial courts may credit the officer’s testimony. On appeal, such credibility-based findings will be upheld absent clear error.
Building a suppression record. For defendants, this case underscores the importance of developing a robust factual record: call dispatchers, introduce timestamped audio, body-worn camera metadata, and testimony from all officers on scene. Reliance on a bare CAD entry, without supporting testimony, may not carry the day on appeal.
Scope of “search incident to arrest.” Officers may perform a full search of the person post-arrest; asking an arrestee to retrieve contraband from a sensitive area, when done as part of executing that search, does not require Miranda warnings and is not recharacterized as “interrogation.”
Distinguishing Gant’s vehicle limits from person-search authority. While Gant limits vehicle searches incident to arrest, it does not restrict the baseline authority to search the arrestee’s person. Practitioners should avoid importing Gant’s vehicle-search rule into person-search scenarios.
Prosecutorial diligence on charging statutes. The case’s early detour—dismissal of a count brought under a repealed statute and reindictment under a current code provision—serves as a cautionary tale on statutory updates in controlled substances prosecutions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Search incident to arrest: A longstanding exception to the warrant requirement that allows officers, after making a lawful arrest, to search the arrestee’s person and nearby area for safety and evidence-preservation reasons. It does not require probable cause beyond the arrest itself and is broader than a limited “patdown” frisk for weapons.
Terry stop versus arrest: A Terry stop is a brief detention based on reasonable suspicion; officers may conduct a limited patdown for weapons. Removal of items requires that their illegal nature be immediately apparent by “plain feel.” After a full arrest, officers may conduct a comprehensive search of the person without the “immediately apparent” constraint.
CAD (Computer-Aided Dispatch) sheet: A dispatch system’s time-stamped log of calls and officer reports. Useful for timelines, but its timestamps may reflect when information was relayed or recorded rather than when an event occurred in the field.
Clearly erroneous standard: An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s factual finding unless, after reviewing the record, it is left with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Credibility judgments by the trial judge receive substantial deference.
Miranda warnings: Advisements required before custodial interrogation, designed to protect a suspect’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. They do not apply to the mere physical seizure of evidence during a lawful search incident to arrest, absent interrogation seeking testimonial admissions.
Memorandum decision (Rule 21): A decision format the West Virginia high court uses for cases presenting no new or unsettled legal question and no prejudicial error. Such decisions are primarily fact-bound and emphasize existing law.

Conclusion

State v. Howard reinforces a practical and doctrinal point that will recur in suppression litigation: when CAD timestamps and officer testimony conflict on the timing of a custodial arrest, the trial court’s credibility determination—if supported by a coherent evidentiary basis—will control on appeal, and a search of the person will stand as valid incident to arrest. The ruling also clarifies that officer-directed retrieval of concealed contraband by an arrestee is a permissible component of a search incident to arrest and does not trigger Miranda’s prophylactic requirements in the absence of custodial interrogation.

The decision does not shift substantive Fourth or Fifth Amendment doctrine; rather, it underscores existing rules: the State bears the burden to justify warrant exceptions; factual findings on suppression receive substantial deference; and Miranda guards against compelled testimony, not the lawful seizure of physical evidence. For practitioners, the case offers both a roadmap and a warning: evidentiary details and record-building at the suppression stage can be outcome-determinative, especially when electronic logs do not neatly align with what happened roadside.

Case Details

Case: State of West Virginia v. Roderick Levi Howard
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
Date: October 24, 2025
Docket: No. 24-88 (Putnam County CC-40-2022-F-94)
Disposition: Affirmed (memorandum decision under W. Va. R. App. P. 21)