Defense Counsel’s Silence Not “Good Cause”: Clarifying Iowa Code § 668.11 Deadlines

Introduction

This commentary examines the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Douglas Wilson and Jane Wilson v. Shenandoah Medical Center (Iowa 2025). The dispute centers on whether plaintiffs may rely on defense counsel’s silence to excuse a three-month delay in certifying their expert under Iowa Code § 668.11. Douglas and Jane Wilson sued Shenandoah Medical Center (SMC) for medical negligence after Mr. Wilson fell from his hospital bed following hip replacement surgery. The plaintiffs identified and disclosed a nursing-care expert in early discovery but failed to file the formal § 668.11 certification by the agreed-upon September 1 deadline. When SMC moved for summary judgment in November, the plaintiffs belatedly submitted their designation on December 2. The district court excused the delay as “good cause” based on defense counsel’s silence; the court of appeals affirmed by majority; the Iowa Supreme Court granted further review.

Summary of the Judgment

The Iowa Supreme Court unanimously held that the district court abused its discretion by finding “good cause” based solely on defense counsel’s silence. The court reaffirmed that under § 668.11, a plaintiff must certify expert identity, qualifications, and purpose within 180 days of the defendant’s answer (or by any earlier court-approved date). Failure to do so ordinarily bars the expert’s testimony absent bona fide good cause. Here:

The plaintiffs missed their agreed September 1, 2022, deadline by three months.
They offered no sound explanation—blaming only defense counsel’s silence.
The Iowa Supreme Court held that defense counsel has no duty to remind opposing counsel of deadlines (“not their brother’s keeper”).
Lack of actual prejudice to the defendant does not alone establish good cause.

Accordingly, the court vacated the court of appeals, reversed the district court, prohibited the nursing expert from testifying, and remanded for determination whether the plaintiffs’ claims require expert proof to survive summary judgment.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Hantsbarger v. Coffin (501 N.W.2d 501 (Iowa 1993)): Established that § 668.11’s objectives are to ensure early expert identification and to prevent last-minute dismissals of meritless professional-liability claims.
Nedved v. Welch (585 N.W.2d 238 (Iowa 1998)): Held that a three-month delay is a “serious deviation” and that lack of prejudice does not excuse untimely expert designation.
Donovan v. State (445 N.W.2d 763 (Iowa 1989)): Defined “good cause” as a “sound, effective, truthful reason” beyond mere negligence or carelessness.
Kirlin v. Monaster (19 N.W.3d 108 (Iowa 2025)): Reaffirmed the multi-factor good-cause analysis and rejected strict counting of days when deadlines are ambiguous.
Struck v. Mercy Health Servs.-Iowa Corp. (973 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 2022)): Confirmed that expert testimony is typically required to withstand summary judgment in medical-malpractice actions.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolds in three steps:

Statutory Interpretation of § 668.11: The statute mandates that plaintiffs file expert certifications within 180 days of the defendant’s answer, unless extended for good cause. Failure bars the expert absent court leave.
Definition and Application of “Good Cause”: Following Donovan and Nedved, good cause requires more than an excuse or oversight; it demands a “sound, effective, truthful reason.” Mere silence by opposing counsel—even if they knew of the deadline—is not enough. Lawyers represent their clients, not their adversaries.
Abuse of Discretion: The district court’s conclusion that defense counsel’s silence equated to acquiescence misread § 668.11 and imposed an extrastatutory duty on defense lawyers. That error of law vitiated the exercise of discretion, warranting reversal.

Impact

This decision has immediate and far-reaching consequences:

Strict Adherence to Deadlines: Plaintiffs in all professional-liability cases must diligently calendar and meet expert-certification deadlines, irrespective of defense counsel’s conduct.
No Duty to Remind: Defense attorneys are relieved of any purported obligation to inform opposing counsel of statutory deadlines—they may instead deploy timing as a litigation strategy.
Uniform Good-Cause Analysis: Courts will continue to apply the multi-factor framework—seriousness of deviation, actual prejudice, plaintiffs’ diligence, and defense conduct—but will not count silence as a factor favoring extension.
Encouraging Early Case Disposition: By upholding the statute’s strict timelines, the court furthers legislative aims of weeding out unfounded professional-liability claims before protracted discovery.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 668.11 Certification: A formal filing that lists an expert’s name, credentials, and what they will testify about. Required early in professional-liability (e.g., medical-malpractice) lawsuits.
Good Cause: A strong, truthful justification for missing a deadline. Examples that do qualify include a genuine misunderstanding or accident beyond counsel’s control. Simple oversight or silence by the other side does not qualify.
Serious Deviation: A delay of several weeks or months in expert certification is considered “serious” and weighs against finding good cause.
Actual Prejudice vs. Potential Prejudice: Courts look for real harm suffered by the non-moving party (e.g., lost opportunity to prepare a rebuttal expert), not a mere hypothetical disadvantage.

Conclusion

The Iowa Supreme Court’s ruling in Wilson v. Shenandoah Medical Center clarifies that defense counsel have no duty to remind adversaries of statutory expert-certification deadlines under Iowa Code § 668.11. Plaintiffs cannot rely on an opponent’s silence to excuse a serious, multi-month delay. Absent a bona fide, substantive justification, experts disclosed after the deadline are barred from testifying. This decision reinforces the statute’s purpose—to promote early expert identification, minimize meritless claims, and facilitate efficient resolution of professional-liability actions.