Defendant’s Autonomy to Contest or Concede Individual Substantive Elements: Third Circuit Bars Counsel from Stipulating Over Client’s Objection; Old Chief/Rehaif Interface Clarified; § 922(g)(1) Not Plainly Unconstitutional

Introduction

In United States v. Walters, the Third Circuit handed down a precedential decision that meaningfully refines the line between attorney strategy and defendant autonomy under the Sixth Amendment. The case arises from a felon-in-possession prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) in which the defendant, Raymon Walters, refused to stipulate to two elements: his felon status and his knowledge of that status, the latter required by Rehaif. His counsel, believing the stipulation was tactically advantageous, sought to sign it anyway. The district court refused, admitted limited evidence of Walters’s prior convictions to prove both elements, and the jury convicted.

On appeal, two overarching issues were presented:

Whether defense counsel can stipulate to elements of the charged offense over a defendant’s express objection, and relatedly, whether the admission of prior conviction evidence was an abuse of discretion; and
Whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Walters under the Second Amendment in light of Bruen, Rahimi, and the Third Circuit’s en banc decision in Range, reviewed for plain error because the argument was not preserved below.

The Third Circuit affirmed the conviction, establishing an important autonomy principle: the defendant, not counsel, has the ultimate authority to concede or contest substantive elements of the offense (including mens rea and status), with a narrow exception for purely jurisdictional elements unrelated to the defendant’s conduct. The court also held it was not plainly unconstitutional to apply § 922(g)(1) to Walters given his criminal history.

Summary of the Judgment

Sixth Amendment—Element-by-Element Autonomy: The defendant has the ultimate authority to decide whether to concede or contest substantive elements of the charged offense, including mental state and status elements tied to the defendant’s conduct or culpability. Counsel cannot stipulate to those elements over the defendant’s objection. A narrow exception allows counsel to manage concessions of purely jurisdictional elements “that have nothing to do with the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct.”
Evidence of Prior Convictions—Old Chief/Rehaif Interface: Because Walters refused to stipulate to his felon status or his knowledge of that status, Old Chief’s evidentiary restraint did not apply. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting prior-conviction evidence to prove those elements, subject to routine Rule 403 gatekeeping.
Second Amendment—As-Applied Challenge to § 922(g)(1): Reviewed for plain error, it is not “clear or obvious” under current law that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Walters, given his history—including three drug-distribution convictions—and circuit precedent emphasizing criminal history and dangerousness. Conviction affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Faretta v. California (self-representation roots) and Powell v. Alabama, Kimmelman v. Morrison, Taylor v. Illinois: The opinion charts the historical expansion of counsel’s role, yet emphasizes that autonomy over fundamental defense objectives remains with the accused.
Gonzalez v. United States, New York v. Hill, Garza v. Idaho, Jones v. Barnes: These decisions demarcate categories of strategic decisions (e.g., evidentiary objections, scheduling, arguments) that counsel controls, versus objectives (e.g., plea, jury waiver, testify, appeal) that the defendant controls.
McCoy v. Louisiana: The cornerstone autonomy case. It held counsel may not concede guilt over the client’s “vociferous” objection. Walters extends McCoy’s autonomy principle to discrete substantive elements—not only to guilt “as a whole.”
United States v. Wilson (3d Cir. 2020): Provides a narrow exception: counsel may handle purely jurisdictional elements (e.g., FDIC insurance in bank robbery) that do not implicate the wrongfulness of conduct or stigma concerns; those remain within counsel’s strategic domain.
In re Winship and Carella v. California: Reaffirm the State’s burden to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. This supports treating element-by-element contestation as a protected defense objective.
Old Chief v. United States: When a defendant offers to stipulate to felon status in a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, introducing the nature of prior convictions to prove status is generally an abuse of discretion; but Old Chief presupposes a valid stipulation.
Rehaif v. United States: The government must prove a defendant knew his prohibited status. This added a substantive mens rea element to § 922(g)(1), making the knowledge-of-status concession uniquely sensitive to defendant autonomy.
Fed. R. Evid. 403: Governs admission of prior-conviction evidence when Old Chief does not apply; the district court’s familiar balancing remains the key safeguard against unfair prejudice.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano: Plain-error framework controlling Walters’s unpreserved Second Amendment claim: error must be clear or obvious under current law and affect substantial rights.
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen: Sets the Second Amendment test: (1) covered conduct by “the people,” and (2) historical tradition of regulation. This is the controlling framework for § 922(g)(1) challenges.
United States v. Rahimi: Evaluated § 922(g)(8) (domestic-violence restraining orders) without resolving the full scope of legislatures’ ability to disarm categories of persons; did not dictate outcomes for § 922(g)(1).
Range v. Attorney General (3d Cir. en banc): A “narrow” as-applied holding invalidating § 922(g)(1) for a decades-old, nonviolent food-stamp fraud conviction with virtually no subsequent criminality. The court stressed it was not previewing future outcomes.
United States v. Dorsey (3d Cir. 2024): Upheld a § 922(g)(1) conviction on plain-error review post-Bruen; emphasized that Range is narrow and that dissimilar criminal histories (including weapons-related offenses) complicate as-applied claims.
Pitsilides v. Barr (3d Cir. 2025) and Folatjar v. Attorney General (3d Cir. 2020) (dissent cited): Support the proposition that drug trafficking offenses correlate with dangerousness, relevant to the § 922(g)(1) analysis.
Sister-circuit decisions (1st, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th en banc, 11th): Substantial post-Bruen authority affirming § 922(g)(1) convictions in varied circumstances, underscoring the absence of “clear or obvious” error here.

Legal Reasoning

1) Who decides to concede an element: counsel or the accused?

Building on McCoy and the burden-of-proof architecture of Winship and Carella, the court recognizes that the objective of the defense includes the choice to maintain innocence as to particular elements—so long as those elements are substantive (i.e., tied to conduct, mental state, or status that defines culpability). This is a logical extension of McCoy: if the defendant alone can refuse to concede “guilt” in the aggregate, then the defendant must also control whether to concede the elements that make up that guilt, because failure of proof on any one element still requires an acquittal.

The court carves out a narrow exception for purely jurisdictional elements—technical predicates that enable federal prosecution but do not describe the wrongfulness of the conduct (e.g., FDIC insurance). These may be managed by counsel as matters of strategy. But elements that go to the defendant’s behavior, culpability, or stigma (including knowledge-of-status under Rehaif) are reserved to the defendant.

Notably, the Third Circuit expressly “depart[s] from the Second Circuit” (citing Rosemond) by holding that McCoy’s autonomy principle applies element-by-element, not only to a global concession of guilt. This is a consequential point likely to generate further appellate attention.

2) Admissibility of prior convictions when no valid stipulation exists

Old Chief is triggered by a valid defense offer to stipulate to felon status. Here, there was no valid stipulation because the client objected and counsel lacked authority to bind him on substantive elements. Once Old Chief drops out, the government may introduce prior-conviction evidence to prove both status and knowledge-of-status as required by Rehaif.

The safeguard is Rule 403. The court emphasizes that district judges remain “exceedingly adept” at calibrating the scope and detail of prior-conviction evidence to avoid unfair prejudice—e.g., by admitting the fact and length of qualifying imprisonment while omitting inflammatory details. The opinion explicitly trusts district courts to continue this careful gatekeeping and suggests practical approaches (e.g., limiting the number of convictions, sanitizing the description) depending on case-specific context.

3) Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) under plain-error review

Applying Bruen’s two-step, the court agrees that felons remain among “the people” and that possession is core conduct. But because Walters did not preserve the challenge, he must show a “clear or obvious” error under Olano. He cannot.

Range is explicitly “narrow,” turning on a decades-old, nonviolent, essentially fraudulent offense with negligible subsequent criminality. Walters’s record—nine convictions by 2013, including three for drug distribution—materially differs. Consistent with Dorsey and Pitsilides, the panel reasons that drug trafficking is closely associated with violence and dangerousness, undercutting Walters’s as-applied claim. The court also canvasses post-Bruen sister-circuit decisions largely upholding § 922(g)(1), reinforcing that any error is, at minimum, debatable—thus not “plain.”

Rahimi does not aid Walters: it addressed temporary disarmament under § 922(g)(8) and specifically left open broader categorical disarmament questions, including permanent disarmament of persons convicted of certain crimes. The Third Circuit also “formally affirm[s] Dorsey,” stating its reasoning comports with Rahimi and Range.

Impact

1) Sixth Amendment trial practice

Client consent is mandatory for substantive-element concessions: After Walters, defense counsel in the Third Circuit may not stipulate to substantive elements (status, mens rea, conduct-defining facts) over a client’s objection. This will require affirmative client buy-in for stipulations that concede elements like Rehaif knowledge, drug quantity, or identity if tied to culpability.
On-the-record colloquies are prudent: District courts should consider brief colloquies to confirm a defendant’s personal assent to stipulations that concede substantive elements. This reduces later disputes about authority.
Tactical recalibration: Defense strategies that traditionally depended on stipulating away prejudicial elements (e.g., Old Chief stipulations) must now account for client vetoes. Counsel’s duty to consult remains robust; the opinion does not lessen that duty.

2) Evidence and trial management

Old Chief remains potent but conditional: The prosecution’s use of prior convictions to prove § 922(g)(1) elements remains restricted if—and only if—the defendant validly stipulates. Without a valid stipulation, Old Chief does not bar admission, though Rule 403 balancing still applies.
Gatekeeping tools: Courts can mitigate prejudice through sanitized descriptions, limiting the number of convictions presented, excluding detailed narratives, stipulating to sentence length rather than offense labels, and issuing tailored limiting instructions.

3) Second Amendment litigation

Range is narrow; Dorsey is reaffirmed: As-applied relief under § 922(g)(1) remains possible but will be rare, particularly on plain-error review. The nature, timing, and continuity of a defendant’s criminal history are pivotal.
Dangerousness theme persists: Nonviolent drug-trafficking convictions can suffice to sustain disarmament, especially where the record shows repeated offenses or proximity in time.
Circuit convergence: The court’s canvass of sister circuits underscores a broad judicial reluctance to declare § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional on an as-applied basis in cases with substantial criminal histories.

4) Potential for Supreme Court review

The Third Circuit acknowledges a divergence from the Second Circuit (Rosemond) on whether McCoy’s autonomy principle extends to discrete elements. This crisp split over a recurring issue—defense concessions of key elements—makes the case a plausible vehicle for further clarification by the Supreme Court.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Stipulation: An agreement between parties to accept a fact as true, avoiding the need for proof. In criminal cases, stipulations can prevent the jury from hearing potentially prejudicial details—if the defendant validly agrees.
Element of an offense: Basic building block the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt (e.g., status as a felon; knowing possession; knowledge of prohibited status under Rehaif).
Substantive vs. Jurisdictional elements: Substantive elements define the wrongful conduct or culpability (and often carry stigma). Jurisdictional elements are technical predicates allowing federal prosecution (e.g., interstate nexus, FDIC insurance) and generally do not speak to blameworthiness.
Mens rea: The required mental state (e.g., knowledge, intent, recklessness). After Rehaif, § 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of prohibited status.
Old Chief rule: When the defense validly offers to stipulate to felon status, the government ordinarily cannot parade the specifics of prior convictions to prove that element; the stipulation suffices. If there is no valid stipulation, Old Chief does not bar admission.
Rule 403: The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a risk of unfair prejudice or confusion. This is the main guardrail when prior convictions are introduced without a stipulation.
Plain error: A difficult appellate standard for unpreserved claims. The error must be clear or obvious under existing law and affect substantial rights. Disputed or evolving legal questions rarely qualify.
As-applied vs. facial challenges: An as-applied challenge argues a law is unconstitutional as applied to a specific person’s circumstances, rather than invalid in all applications. Walters raised an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1).
Bruen framework: If conduct is covered and the person is among “the people,” the government must show the regulation aligns with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.

Conclusion

Walters is a significant defense-autonomy decision with immediate trial-level consequences. The Third Circuit holds that a defendant, not counsel, controls concessions of substantive elements, including mens rea and prohibited status. Counsel cannot sign a stipulation over a client’s express objection, and when no valid stipulation exists, Old Chief does not bar the government from introducing prior convictions to prove status and knowledge—subject to Rule 403 safeguards. On the Second Amendment claim, the court applies plain-error review and, reaffirming Dorsey, concludes that § 922(g)(1) is not clearly unconstitutional as applied to a defendant with multiple drug-distribution convictions and a substantial criminal record.

Two points loom large beyond this case: first, the court’s element-by-element extension of McCoy, paired with its narrow jurisdictional-element exception, clarifies and strengthens defendant autonomy in the Third Circuit—but also cements a circuit split with the Second Circuit that could prompt Supreme Court review. Second, in the post-Bruen landscape, Range remains narrow and fact-bound; defendants with recent or repeated convictions—especially for offenses associated with dangerousness—face steep odds in as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1), particularly on plain-error review.