Introduction

In In re: Tristan Patrick Gilley, No. 2025-B-0713 (La. Sept. 10, 2025), the Supreme Court of Louisiana imposed a suspension of one year and one day on an attorney who failed to communicate with a criminal client, failed to surrender the client’s file upon request, and failed to cooperate with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC). The case arrives against the backdrop of respondent’s prior discipline in 2023 for similar client neglect and noncommunication, after which he had not sought reinstatement.

The central issues presented were:

• Whether deemed‑admitted factual allegations under Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3) established violations of Rules 1.4, 1.16(d), 8.1(c), and 8.4(a) of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct;
• What the appropriate sanction should be in light of prior discipline, multiple offenses, and bad‑faith obstruction of the disciplinary process; and
• How the harm to an incarcerated client—whose post‑conviction efforts depend on access to his file—should factor into sanction severity.

The decision reaffirms that noncooperation with disciplinary authorities, coupled with repeat failures to communicate and to surrender a client’s file, will draw a significant suspension—here, one year and one day, which triggers the formal reinstatement process and heightened scrutiny before any return to practice.

Summary of the Opinion

Respondent, a Louisiana lawyer admitted in 2011 and formerly a public defender, represented Tevin Turner in a Webster Parish criminal case. After Turner’s 2020 guilty plea and sentencing, Turner requested his file; respondent did not provide it. Turner complained to the ODC in 2023. The ODC repeatedly sought a response and the file from respondent at his registered mailing and email addresses, to no avail.

The ODC filed formal charges in January 2025 alleging violations of:

• Rule 1.4 (failure to communicate),
• Rule 1.16(d) (failure to protect client interests on termination, including surrendering papers/property),
• Rule 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with disciplinary investigation), and
• Rule 8.4(a) (violating the Rules of Professional Conduct).

Respondent did not answer; the allegations were deemed admitted under Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). The hearing committee found knowing, if not intentional, misconduct; actual harm to Turner (delaying his post‑conviction efforts); and harm to the disciplinary system (expending resources on a “relatively simple issue”). Citing the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee identified suspension as the baseline sanction and recommended a suspension of one year and one day, noting aggravating factors: prior discipline for similar misconduct, multiple offenses, bad‑faith obstruction of the disciplinary process, and substantial experience. No mitigating factors were found.

The Supreme Court independently reviewed the record, affirmed the rule violations, found the aggravating factors supported by the evidence, and concluded that the recommended sanction—one year and one day—was appropriate. The Court analogized to In re: Collins, 19-1746 (La. 2/26/20), 290 So. 3d 173, in which similar misconduct led to the same suspension length. Costs and interest were assessed under Rule XIX, § 10.1.

Analysis

Procedural Posture and Standard of Review

Bar discipline falls within the Louisiana Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. See La. Const. art. V, § 5(B). The Court sits as trier of fact and conducts an independent review to determine whether misconduct is proven by clear and convincing evidence. See In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09), 18 So. 3d 57.

Where the respondent fails to answer formal charges, the factual allegations are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). However, deemed admissions pertain to facts, not necessarily the legal conclusions that flow from them; if a rule violation is not apparent from admitted facts, additional proof may be required. See In re: Donnan, 01-3058 (La. 1/10/03), 838 So. 2d 715. In Gilley, the admitted facts plainly established violations of Rules 1.4, 1.16(d), 8.1(c), and 8.4(a), obviating the need for further proof.

Findings of Misconduct and Rule Violations

• Rule 1.4: Respondent failed to communicate with his client, Turner, after the guilty plea and sentencing.
• Rule 1.16(d): Upon termination, respondent failed to surrender the client’s file, hindering Turner’s ability to pursue post‑conviction relief.
• Rule 8.1(c): Respondent failed to respond to multiple ODC inquiries, constituting noncooperation.
• Rule 8.4(a): By violating these rules, respondent also violated Rule 8.4(a).

The hearing committee and Court characterized respondent’s conduct as knowing, if not intentional. The harm was twofold: (1) actual harm to Turner in the form of delayed post‑conviction efforts, and (2) harm to the disciplinary system due to needless depletion of ODC resources on what should have been a straightforward file‑return issue.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors; Baseline Sanction

The committee, applying the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, identified suspension as the baseline sanction given knowing neglect/noncommunication and noncooperation. Aggravators found were:

• Prior discipline for similar misconduct (In re: Gilley, 23-0989 (La. 12/5/23), 373 So. 3d 704);
• Multiple offenses;
• Bad‑faith obstruction of the disciplinary process (failure to engage with ODC); and
• Substantial experience in practice (admitted 2011).

No mitigating factors were identified. The absence of mitigation, combined with recidivism and demonstrable harm, supports elevating the sanction beyond a short suspension or probationary disposition.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court’s analysis explicitly relied upon three core precedents and governing provisions:

• In re: Banks, 18 So. 3d 57 (La. 2009): Articulates the Court’s independent, de novo review in bar discipline and the clear‑and‑convincing evidence standard. This frames the Court’s role and explains why it does not defer to the committee on ultimate findings.
• In re: Donnan, 838 So. 2d 715 (La. 2003): Clarifies that deemed‑admitted allegations under Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3) establish facts but not necessarily legal conclusions; additional proof is only required if the rule violation does not flow from the admitted facts. In Gilley, the admitted facts sufficed to prove each charged rule violation without further evidence.
• In re: Collins, 290 So. 3d 173 (La. 2020): Provides sanction guidance for similar misconduct—neglect, failure to communicate, and failure to protect client interests—where the Court imposed a one‑year‑and‑one‑day suspension, particularly in the presence of prior, similar discipline and no mitigation. The Court deemed Collins “instructive” and aligned Gilley’s sanction accordingly.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in a disciplined sequence:

1. Deemed admissions under Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3) establish the factual record because respondent defaulted. Under Donnan, those facts sufficed to prove the charged rule violations.
2. The Court identified respondent’s duties to the client and the profession, found knowing (if not intentional) breach of those duties, and expressly found actual harm to both the client (delayed post‑conviction efforts) and the disciplinary system (resource drain).
3. Using the ABA Standards as a compass, the Court set suspension as the baseline and then considered aggravation and mitigation. The Court adopted the committee’s aggravator findings and the absence of mitigation.
4. For sanction calibration, the Court analogized to Collins and concluded that one year and one day is appropriate. This length is significant because it requires respondent to file a formal petition for reinstatement and prove fitness before resuming practice, addressing public protection concerns raised by recidivism and noncooperation.

Impact and Forward‑Looking Implications

The opinion has several practical and doctrinal effects:

• Reinforces that failure to surrender a client’s file—especially in the criminal context where post‑conviction deadlines loom—will be treated as causing “actual harm,” aggravating sanction severity.
• Confirms that noncooperation with ODC is not a neutral posture: it is an aggravator and can convert a “simple issue” (file return) into a sanction that includes a reinstatement hurdle.
• Signals to repeat offenders that a one‑year‑and‑one‑day suspension is an expected sanction benchmark for serial neglect/noncommunication coupled with ODC noncooperation and an absence of mitigation.
• Validates the use of deemed‑admissions procedure to efficiently adjudicate uncontested charges, while preserving the Donnan caveat that legal conclusions must be supported by facts.
• Emphasizes public‑protection features of Louisiana’s disciplinary system: suspensions at or beyond one year trigger a formal reinstatement process requiring affirmative proof of rehabilitation and fitness.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Deemed admitted (Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3)): If a lawyer fails to answer formal disciplinary charges, the factual allegations are treated as true. The ODC need not prove them at a hearing. However, if the facts do not obviously establish a rule violation, the ODC may need additional evidence for the legal conclusion (per Donnan).
• One year and one day: In Louisiana, a suspension of one year or more typically requires a formal petition for reinstatement. This length ensures the lawyer cannot automatically return to practice at the end of the period; instead, the lawyer must prove rehabilitation, compliance, and fitness.
• Client file and Rule 1.16(d): When representation ends, the lawyer must protect the client’s interests, which includes promptly surrendering papers and property the client is entitled to. In criminal matters, the file can be crucial for pursuing appeals or post‑conviction relief.
• Rule 8.1(c) cooperation: Lawyers must respond to lawful ODC inquiries. Silence or evasion is an ethical violation in itself and tends to aggravate sanctions for the underlying misconduct.
• Baseline sanction and aggravators/mitigators: Under the ABA Standards, a court identifies a baseline sanction (e.g., reprimand, suspension) and then adjusts up or down based on aggravating and mitigating factors, such as prior discipline, multiple offenses, indifference to restitution, remorse, personal circumstances, or cooperation.
• Costs and interest (Rule XIX, § 10.1): Disciplinary costs may be assessed, and interest accrues starting 30 days after the judgment becomes final until paid.

Practice Pointers for Louisiana Attorneys

• Promptly surrender the client file at termination. Develop a written file‑transfer protocol, including a checklist and documented mailing or delivery, especially for incarcerated clients.
• Maintain and monitor current contact information with the bar and ODC. Respond to all ODC communications timely and in writing; request reasonable extensions if needed.
• Communicate regularly with clients (Rule 1.4). If representation ends, send a close‑out letter explaining status, deadlines, and how to obtain the file.
• Where prior discipline exists, expect that similar new violations will likely trigger a suspension requiring a reinstatement petition. Plan remediation early (ethics CLE, practice management changes, mentorship).
• For public defenders and criminal defense lawyers, recognize that delays in file transfer can impede post‑conviction timelines and will be viewed as causing actual harm.

Conclusion

In re: Gilley fortifies Louisiana’s disciplinary jurisprudence in three key respects: (1) it underscores that deemed‑admitted factual defaults can and will support summary findings of ethical violations, consistent with Donnan; (2) it emphasizes that noncooperation with the ODC is an aggravating factor that transforms simple administrative oversights into sanctionable misconduct; and (3) it calibrates the sanction at one year and one day for recidivist neglect/noncommunication and failure to surrender a client file, aligning with Collins and ensuring that reinstatement is contingent on demonstrated rehabilitation.

The opinion’s broader message is clear: client‑protection duties—especially communication and timely file surrender—are non‑negotiable, and the disciplinary system’s integrity depends on lawyers’ cooperation. Where those duties are breached repeatedly and without mitigation, a significant suspension with a reinstatement requirement is both predictable and appropriate.

Citations and Authorities Referenced

• La. Const. art. V, § 5(B) (Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction in bar discipline)
• Supreme Court Rule XIX, §§ 10.1 (costs and interest), 11(E)(3) (deemed admitted), 11(G) (committee report submission)
• In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09), 18 So. 3d 57
• In re: Donnan, 01-3058 (La. 1/10/03), 838 So. 2d 715
• In re: Collins, 19-1746 (La. 2/26/20), 290 So. 3d 173
• In re: Gilley, 23-0989 (La. 12/5/23), 373 So. 3d 704 (prior discipline)