Decoupling “Practicable to Proceed” from Probable Cause: The Supreme Court of Texas Clarifies Juvenile Transfer Good-Cause Requirements in In the Matter of J.J.T.

Decoupling “Practicable to Proceed” from Probable Cause: The Supreme Court of Texas Clarifies Juvenile Transfer Good-Cause Requirements in In the Matter of J.J.T.

I. Introduction

In In the Matter of J.J.T., No. 23-1028 (Tex. Apr. 21, 2025), the Supreme Court of Texas addresses a recurring and important question at the intersection of juvenile and adult criminal jurisdiction: under what circumstances may the State prosecute an adult in criminal court for conduct committed as a juvenile when the State did not proceed before the person turned eighteen?

The case turns on the proper interpretation of Texas Family Code § 54.02(j)(4)(A), which allows a juvenile court to waive its exclusive jurisdiction and transfer the case to adult criminal court if “for a reason beyond the control of the state it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday of the person.” The court of appeals had held, in essence, that if probable cause to arrest existed before the juvenile’s eighteenth birthday, then it was necessarily

The Supreme Court of Texas largely adopts the dissent’s view, holding that the existence of probable cause before age eighteen does not, by itself, defeat the State’s ability to prove that it was “not practicable to proceed” for reasons beyond its control. At the same time, the Court concludes that the juvenile court itself also misapplied the statute by conflating the “practicable to proceed” ground in § 54.02(j)(4)(A) with the separate, more specific grounds in § 54.02(j)(4)(B) that turn on the timing of probable cause and “new evidence.”

The Court therefore reverses the dismissal ordered by the court of appeals and remands the case to the juvenile court for a new transfer hearing under a clarified legal standard.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. Factual Background

On October 4, 2020, Milford Gutierrez was shot and killed during an attempted sale of an ounce of marijuana. Surveillance video showed three individuals fleeing the scene and walking in the direction of the residence of one of them, Alfonso Tovar. At the time of the offense, respondent J.J.T. was 16 years and 8 months old—about 16 months short of his eighteenth birthday.

Deputy David Crain, the lead investigator, examined Gutierrez’s phone and found text messages arranging the drug deal. These messages were linked to Tovar, who was a friend and next-door neighbor of J.J.T. Investigators questioned J.J.T. at his home. He initially denied knowledge of the shooting, then acknowledged that Tovar told him about a marijuana deal that “ended in a shooting,” but he denied any personal involvement.

Based on the text messages and a latent fingerprint attributed to Tovar, Crain obtained a warrant for Tovar’s arrest in November 2020. Tovar eventually admitted he was present at the murder and implicated both J.J.T. and another person, stating that J.J.T. shot Gutierrez and took the marijuana.

Crain seized Tovar’s password-protected phone and submitted it for forensic decryption using a tool that could take months to a year to succeed. He then largely paused further investigation, citing the COVID-19 pandemic, his heavy caseload, and a personal preference not to re-interview juveniles until an arrest warrant could be obtained.

In December 2021, about a year later, Tovar met with prosecutors in connection with plea negotiations. He gave a detailed account of the crime and J.J.T.’s role, and he also provided the password to his phone, allowing investigators to examine its contents. The next month, January 2022, J.J.T. turned eighteen.

In July 2022, Crain obtained J.J.T.’s phone records, which he received within about ten days. These records corroborated Tovar’s account that both he and J.J.T. were present at the shooting. In November 2022, roughly two years after the offense, Crain obtained a warrant for J.J.T.’s arrest.

After his arrest, J.J.T. continued to deny involvement, but then admitted he participated in a plan to rob Gutierrez, though he claimed Tovar was the shooter. Crain considered this admission sufficient to establish probable cause, and the State shortly thereafter charged J.J.T. with capital murder.

B. Statutory Framework: Juvenile Jurisdiction and Late-Filed Cases

Texas juvenile courts have exclusive, original jurisdiction over proceedings involving a “child” alleged to have engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision. See Tex. Fam. Code § 51.04; In re N.J.A., 997 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1999). Ordinarily, dispositions in juvenile court terminate when the respondent turns eighteen, with a few limited exceptions (e.g., some probation modifications). Tex. Fam. Code § 54.05(b).

For felony offenses, however, Texas law allows the juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction and transfer the case to criminal court. When the State seeks to prosecute an adult for conduct committed as a juvenile, Texas Family Code § 54.02(j) governs. Under § 54.02(j), the State must prove:

  1. The respondent was within certain age ranges at the time of the alleged offense (with different ranges depending on the offense’s severity). Tex. Fam. Code § 54.02(j)(2).
  2. No adjudication hearing or transfer hearing was previously conducted regarding the alleged offense. Id. § 54.02(j)(3).
  3. There is probable cause to believe the respondent committed the alleged offense. Id. § 54.02(j)(5).
  4. There is statutory “good cause” explaining why the State did not proceed in juvenile court before the respondent turned eighteen. Id. § 54.02(j)(4).

The last element—whether statutory good cause exists—lies at the heart of J.J.T. Section 54.02(j)(4) provides two alternative good-cause pathways:

  • (A) “Beyond the control” / “not practicable to proceed”:
    The juvenile court may transfer if it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “for a reason beyond the control of the state it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday of the person.” Tex. Fam. Code § 54.02(j)(4)(A).
  • (B) “Due diligence” plus specific grounds tied to probable cause, location of the person, or prior orders:
    The court may also transfer if, “after due diligence of the state it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday” because:
    1. the State lacked probable cause before age eighteen and new evidence has been found since the eighteenth birthday;
    2. the person could not be found; or
    3. a previous transfer order was reversed or set aside. Id. § 54.02(j)(4)(B)(i)-(iii).

If § 54.02(j)’s criteria are not satisfied, and the proceeding is initiated after the person turns eighteen, the juvenile court must dismiss the case. See In re N.J.A., 997 S.W.2d at 557.

C. Procedural History

The State moved under § 54.02(j) to transfer J.J.T.’s case to an adult criminal court. A hearing was held in juvenile court.

The juvenile court’s written order granted the motion, but it did so using language that spliced together different parts of § 54.02(j)(4)(A) and (B):

The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that for a reason beyond the control of the State it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday of the Respondent [sic] the State did not have probable cause to proceed in juvenile court and new evidence has been found since the 18th birthday of Respondent.

As the Supreme Court later observed, the juvenile court essentially grafted the opening language of subsection (A) (“for a reason beyond the control of the state it was not practicable to proceed”) onto the tail of subsection (B)(i) (“the state did not have probable cause to proceed in juvenile court and new evidence has been found since the 18th birthday”).

On appeal, the First Court of Appeals vacated the transfer order and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction. In the Matter of J.J.T., 698 S.W.3d 320 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023). It reasoned that:

  • A valid transfer under § 54.02(j)(4)(B) requires a finding of “due diligence,” which the juvenile court did not make.
  • Therefore, the transfer could be upheld only, if at all, under § 54.02(j)(4)(A), the “beyond the control of the state / practicable to proceed” pathway.
  • The evidence, according to the court of appeals, showed that the State did have probable cause to arrest and charge J.J.T. before he turned eighteen—particularly based on Tovar’s accomplice testimony and corroborating evidence.
  • Because probable cause existed pre-eighteen, the State’s failure to proceed in juvenile court could not be “for a reason beyond the control of the state,” making transfer improper.

Justice Farris dissented, arguing that subsection (A) is not conditioned on the timing of probable cause and that “practicable to proceed” encompasses more than whether probable cause exists. She would have allowed the juvenile court to consider other reasons—besides probable cause—why proceeding before age eighteen was not practicable.

The Supreme Court of Texas granted review.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

Justice Bland, writing for the Court, reverses the court of appeals and remands to the juvenile court for a new transfer hearing.

The Court holds:

  1. Subsection (A)’s “practicable to proceed” standard is not tethered to the timing of the development of probable cause.
    The court of appeals erred in effectively turning the existence of pre-eighteen probable cause into a dispositive bar to transfer under § 54.02(j)(4)(A). The statutory text of subsection (A) does not mention probable cause. Instead, it asks whether, for reasons beyond the State’s control, it was “not practicable to proceed” in juvenile court before the respondent turned eighteen.
  2. Subsection (B) provides a separate, more specific pathway for cases where probable cause developed only after the respondent turned eighteen.
    Subsection (B)(i) expressly addresses situations where the State did not have probable cause before the eighteenth birthday but later acquired “new evidence” that created probable cause. It also requires a finding that the State acted with “due diligence.”
  3. The juvenile court misapplied the statute by conflating subsections (A) and (B).
    The juvenile court’s order merged language from both subsections and appeared to rely, at least in part, on a finding that probable cause did not exist until after the eighteenth birthday and that new evidence was later discovered. Yet the court made no “due diligence” finding, which is required under subsection (B). For subsection (A), the relevant inquiry is whether reasons beyond the State’s control made it “not practicable to proceed” before age eighteen, not whether probable cause was lacking.
  4. Because both the court of appeals and the juvenile court applied incorrect legal standards, a remand is necessary.
    The Court clarifies the law and remands for a new transfer hearing so that the juvenile court may properly assess whether:
    • the State proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “for a reason beyond the control of the state it was not practicable to proceed” in juvenile court before J.J.T. turned eighteen; and/or
    • the State satisfied the distinct requirements of § 54.02(j)(4)(B), including “due diligence” and, as applicable, lack of pre-eighteen probable cause plus new evidence, inability to find the respondent, or a reversed/voided prior transfer order.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Statutory Evolution

1. Evolution of § 54.02(j)

The Court situates § 54.02(j) in its statutory history. When first enacted in 1975, the predecessor statute allowed transfer only if:

  • the State lacked probable cause to proceed before the juvenile turned eighteen and later discovered new evidence, or
  • the juvenile could not be found.

See Act of May 19, 1975, 64th Leg., R.S., ch. 693, § 16, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 2152, 2156.

In 1995, the Legislature added the “beyond the control of the state / not practicable to proceed” language now codified at § 54.02(j)(4)(A). Act of May 25, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 262, § 34, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2517, 2534. This amendment introduced a broader, more flexible good-cause ground not explicitly tied to probable cause or the three discrete scenarios that now appear in subsection (B).

Over time, the Legislature has also expanded the age ranges of respondents eligible for transfer depending on the seriousness of the alleged offense. See Tex. Fam. Code § 54.02(j)(2). The framework, as interpreted by the Court, aims to:

  • prevent the State from circumventing juvenile court jurisdiction by simply delaying prosecution, and
  • allow serious offenses committed by juveniles to be prosecuted even if, for legitimate reasons, proceedings could not reasonably occur before age eighteen.

2. In re N.J.A. and the Consequence of Failing to Meet § 54.02(j)

In In re N.J.A., 997 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1999), the Court held that if a proceeding is not properly transferred and the respondent is now over eighteen, the juvenile court must dismiss the case unless the statutory criteria for transfer are satisfied. The Legislature later adopted § 51.0412 to provide “continuing jurisdiction” in some circumstances when proceedings were initiated before eighteen, but that does not change the fundamental role of § 54.02(j) when proceedings begin after the eighteenth birthday.

3. Moon v. State and Ex parte Thomas: Standard of Review

The Court notes that appellate courts have generally followed the two-step framework from the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), as modified by Ex parte Thomas, 623 S.W.3d 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021):

  1. Review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s findings; and
  2. If supported by legally (and, for the courts of appeals, factually) sufficient evidence, review the ultimate transfer decision for abuse of discretion.

Although Thomas overruled Moon to the extent it required detailed written findings in the transfer order itself, it did not impose a new substantive standard of review. With jurisdiction over appeals from juvenile transfer orders now resting with the courts of appeals and, ultimately, the Supreme Court of Texas, this two-step approach continues to apply.

4. Moore v. State and Interpretation of § 54.02(j)(4)(A)

The most important precedent in J.J.T. is the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in Moore v. State, 532 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). Like J.J.T., Moore involved an adult prosecuted for acts committed as a juvenile and a challenge to a transfer under § 54.02(j).

In Moore:

  • The investigation began when Moore was sixteen.
  • Law enforcement delayed sending the file to the district attorney for over two years, citing the detective’s heavy caseload and mistaken belief that Moore was not yet eighteen.
  • The transfer order was challenged, and the Court of Criminal Appeals evaluated whether delays were “beyond the control of the state” under § 54.02(j)(4)(A).

The Court held that:

  • Investigative delays and administrative oversights are generally chargeable to the State.
  • The State did not meet its burden to show that it was “not practicable to proceed” for reasons beyond its control when the delay was caused by an officer’s heavy caseload and miscalculation of the respondent’s age.

Significantly, Moore interpreted subsection (A) without linking its application to the timing of probable cause. J.J.T. reads Moore as confirming that subsection (A) focuses on whether reasons “beyond the control of the state” rendered it not “reasonably capable of being accomplished” to proceed before age eighteen, and not on whether or when probable cause formally coalesced.

5. Conflicting Appellate Approaches and the Role of Probable Cause

The Supreme Court acknowledges that Texas courts of appeals have struggled with how to apply § 54.02(j)(4)(A) to specific reasons for delay:

  • Some have held that an investigator’s desire for more corroborating evidence does not qualify as a reason beyond the State’s control. See, e.g., In re A.M., 577 S.W.3d 653, 670–72 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied).
  • Others have upheld transfer where the State sought additional corroborating physical evidence, viewing the investigative posture as showing that it was not practicable to proceed earlier. See, e.g., In re E.B., No. 12-22-00162-CV, 2022 WL 17074849, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 17, 2022, no pet.).
  • Courts have also emphasized the timing of the outcry in relation to the eighteenth birthday and practical constraints such as court calendars, social evaluations, and the pandemic. See, e.g., In re B.C.B., No. 05-16-00207-CV, 2016 WL 3165595, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 7, 2016, pet. denied); In re L.M.B., No. 11-16-00241-CV, 2017 WL 253654, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 6, 2017, no pet.).
  • In pandemic-era cases, courts have sometimes weighed court- and defense-caused delays against State-caused delay and affirmed transfer when, on balance, it was not practicable to proceed earlier. See In re N.J.T., No. 13-21-00089-CR, 2021 WL 4202165, at *5–7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Sept. 21, 2021, no pet.).

J.J.T. does not attempt to codify a bright-line list of acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delay. Instead, it underscores that determinations under subsection (A) are fact-intensive, resting on the juvenile court’s role as factfinder and evaluator of credibility and the cumulative impact of both State- and non-State-caused delays.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Two Distinct Good-Cause Pathways Under § 54.02(j)(4)

The Court reads § 54.02(j)(4) as creating two distinct but complementary paths to establish good cause:

  • Subsection (A):
    Applies whenever the State can show that, for reasons beyond its control, it was not “practicable to proceed” in juvenile court before age eighteen. This provision does not mention probable cause and is not textually conditioned on when probable cause developed.
  • Subsection (B):
    Applies in narrower circumstances where, after “due diligence,” it was not practicable to proceed earlier because:
    1. probable cause did not exist before eighteen but new evidence since then created it (B)(i);
    2. the respondent could not be found (B)(ii); or
    3. a previous transfer order was reversed or set aside (B)(iii).
    Here, timing of probable cause and the existence of “new evidence” are explicit requirements under (B)(i).

The Court explains that, “under the two alternatives, the path to transfer diverges based on the development of probable cause.” Where probable cause develops after eighteen, subsection (B)(i) provides the relevant framework—subject to a showing of due diligence and new evidence. Where probable cause develops before eighteen, subsection (A) may still support transfer so long as the State proves that reasons beyond its control made it “not practicable” to proceed earlier.

Importantly, the State is free to plead and attempt to prove both pathways in the alternative, as it did here. If the juvenile court ultimately rejects the State’s claim that probable cause developed only after age eighteen (undermining subsection (B)(i)), it may still find good cause under subsection (A) if the circumstances show that proceeding earlier was impracticable for reasons beyond the State’s control.

2. Ordinary Meaning of “Practicable to Proceed”

The Court applies the usual rule that undefined statutory terms are given their ordinary meaning. Citing Black’s Law Dictionary, it defines “practicable” as “reasonably capable of being accomplished; feasible in a particular situation.”

Thus, under § 54.02(j)(4)(A), the juvenile court must:

  • identify what it would have meant to “proceed in juvenile court” before the eighteenth birthday in that particular case (e.g., complete the investigation, file a petition, hold the transfer hearing);
  • evaluate the reasons for any delay—including systemic factors, investigative necessities, and case-specific complications; and
  • determine whether, considering “reasons beyond the control of the state,” it was reasonably capable of being accomplished to proceed before age eighteen.

The statute places the burden of proof on the State, which must show by a preponderance of the evidence that it was not practicable to proceed before eighteen for reasons beyond its control.

3. Rejection of the Court of Appeals’ Probable-Cause-Based Rule

The First Court of Appeals had effectively turned the existence of pre-eighteen probable cause into a dispositive test under subsection (A): if probable cause existed, the State could not show that it was “not practicable” to proceed.

The Supreme Court rejects this approach for several reasons:

  • Textual silence: Subsection (A) says nothing about probable cause. The Legislature chose to mention probable cause and “new evidence” in subsection (B)(i), but did not import those requirements into (A).
  • Structural context: Subsection (B)(i) clearly addresses the specific scenario where probable cause exists only after eighteen. If subsection (A) were read to make pre-eighteen probable cause dispositive in the opposite direction, the resulting scheme would improperly collapse the two distinct frameworks and contradict the broader “practicability” language of (A).
  • Precedent: Moore interpreted subsection (A) without tethering it to the timing of probable cause, focusing instead on reasons for delay that were (or were not) beyond the State’s control.

Accordingly, the Court holds that “development of probable cause, standing alone, does not conclusively determine whether it is ‘practicable to proceed’” under § 54.02(j)(4)(A). Probable cause may be relevant to the overall timeline, but it is not the sole or controlling factor.

4. Fact-Specific Nature of “Beyond the Control of the State”

The Court acknowledges that determining whether reasons for delay were “beyond the control of the state” is highly fact-specific. Relevant considerations include:

  • how much time remained between the offense (or outcry) and the eighteenth birthday;
  • the complexity of the investigation and need for forensic or digital evidence (e.g., phone decryption delays);
  • court and system-wide constraints (e.g., pandemic-related disruptions, scheduling, availability of evaluations);
  • defense-requested continuances or other actions contributing to delay; and
  • delays attributable to the State, such as investigator workload, miscalculation of age, or strategic decisions to defer particular investigative steps.

The Court emphasizes:

  • the State has substantial discretion in how it conducts investigations; but
  • the juvenile court has the responsibility to police whether the exercise of that discretion “devolved into unreasonable delay.”

In other words, investigative strategy is not insulated from review. When the State’s choices significantly contribute to missing the juvenile window, the State may fail to meet its burden under § 54.02(j)(4)(A).

5. Application to the Facts of J.J.T.

With the legal framework established, the Court considers how it fits this case.

On one side, the record showed factors that could support a finding that it was not practicable to proceed before age eighteen for reasons beyond the State’s control:

  • The time between the offense and J.J.T.’s eighteenth birthday was relatively short—about one year and four months.
  • The period overlapped with the height of the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • The decryption of Tovar’s phone took a long time, and crucially, Tovar did not provide his password until December 2021, only a month before J.J.T. turned eighteen.

On the other side, the record also contained features that weighed against good cause:

  • Crain stopped active investigation for a long period, citing his caseload and pandemic conditions.
  • He expressed a personal preference not to re-interview juveniles until he had an arrest warrant, which the Court implicitly suggests may not be a reason “beyond the control of the state.”
  • He did not obtain J.J.T.’s phone records until six months after the eighteenth birthday—a step that, once taken, yielded corroborating evidence in about ten days.

The Court notes that the juvenile court’s transfer order did not squarely analyze these competing factors under the correct legal standard. Instead, the court appeared to rely on the idea that probable cause did not exist before age eighteen and that “new evidence” after eighteen created it—language drawn from subsection (B)(i). Yet the juvenile court made no express finding that the State exercised “due diligence,” as (B) requires.

Because proper application of subsection (A) demands a focused inquiry on whether reasons beyond the State’s control rendered it not practicable to proceed, and because the juvenile court’s order conflated (A) and (B) and misapplied the law, the Supreme Court declines to affirm on a re-characterized basis or substitute its own fact-finding. Instead, it remands for a new hearing.

C. Impact and Implications

1. Clarified Standard for Prosecutors

For prosecutors, J.J.T. delivers two clear messages:

  1. You cannot rely solely on the timing of probable cause.
    Having pre-eighteen probable cause does not automatically defeat a transfer motion under § 54.02(j)(4)(A). Conversely, having post-eighteen probable cause does not, by itself, guarantee transfer under (B)(i). In both cases, you must prove the statutory elements, including impracticability and, where relevant, due diligence and “new evidence.”
  2. Build a comprehensive record of reasons for delay and State efforts.
    Prosecutors should present detailed evidence explaining investigative timelines, forensic delays, witness availability, pandemic or systemic constraints, and what steps were taken to move the case forward. Demonstrating that the State actively attempted to proceed but was hampered by forces beyond its control will often be crucial to satisfying § 54.02(j)(4)(A).

2. Strategic Opportunities for Juvenile Defense

Defense counsel, particularly in serious felony cases where the State seeks transfer after the client turns eighteen, can use J.J.T. to:

  • separate and attack each statutory element under both (A) and (B);
  • cross-examine investigators about periods of inactivity, choices not to pursue basic investigative steps (e.g., phone records), or personal preferences that delayed action;
  • highlight that delays arising from workload, internal miscommunication, or strategy choices are generally within the State’s control; and
  • emphasize that the burden of proof lies with the State and that unclear or mixed reasons for delay should be resolved against transfer.

3. Guidance for Juvenile Courts

For juvenile courts, J.J.T. provides practical guidance on how to structure analysis and findings:

  • Analyze subsection (A) and subsection (B) separately; do not splice their language or conflate their elements.
  • Under (A), focus on:
    • what steps were necessary to “proceed in juvenile court” (e.g., filing, hearings);
    • the actual timeline; and
    • which reasons for delay were truly beyond the State’s control and which were not.
  • Under (B), ensure:
    • a specific finding of “due diligence”; and
    • proof of the particular subparagraph invoked: lack of pre-eighteen probable cause plus new evidence, inability to find the respondent, or a reversed/voided transfer order.
  • Make a record that enables appellate review, even if detailed, factor-by-factor findings in the order itself are no longer mandated by Moon/Thomas.

4. Systemic and Policy Effects

At a broader level, J.J.T. carefully balances two policy concerns:

  • Fairness to individuals who offended as juveniles:
    The decision reaffirms that § 54.02(j) “limit[s] the prosecution of an adult for an act he committed as a juvenile if his case could reasonably have been dealt with when he was still a juvenile.” (quoting Moore). The State cannot use its own slowness or inattention as a reason to escape juvenile-court constraints.
  • Public safety and accountability in serious cases:
    The Court acknowledges that, especially in serious offenses like capital murder, legitimate investigative and systemic barriers may prevent a case from being reasonably handled before age eighteen. The opinion leaves room for transfer when the State can genuinely show that it was not practicable to proceed in time for reasons beyond its control.

The COVID-19 pandemic looms in the background of this case, and although the Court does not declare pandemic conditions categorically sufficient or insufficient, its fact-specific approach suggests courts may consider such systemic disruptions as part of the “beyond the control of the state” analysis.

5. Unresolved Questions

While clarifying the role of probable cause, J.J.T. leaves some questions for future litigation:

  • Where is the outer boundary of “beyond the control of the state”? For example, are chronic understaffing or persistent backlogs within or beyond the State’s control?
  • How much delay attributable to the State (e.g., months of investigator inaction) can be offset by external factors (e.g., pandemic, late witness cooperation) and still satisfy § 54.02(j)(4)(A)?
  • How rigorously will appellate courts scrutinize juvenile courts’ credibility determinations and balancing of factors within the abuse-of-discretion framework?

These issues will likely be developed through case-by-case application of the clarified standard.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Exclusive Juvenile Jurisdiction

Juvenile courts in Texas have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases alleging delinquent conduct committed by a “child” (usually defined as ten to seventeen years old). This means adult criminal courts cannot initially take such cases unless the juvenile court first transfers its jurisdiction through a proper waiver order.

2. Discretionary Transfer (“Certification”)

“Transfer” or “certification” refers to a juvenile court’s decision to waive its jurisdiction and send the case to adult criminal court. For late-filed cases where the person is already an adult, § 54.02(j) controls. Without a valid transfer under that section, the case must be dismissed.

3. Probable Cause

Probable cause is a relatively low standard; it exists when reasonably trustworthy information would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed and that the accused committed it. It is far less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Under § 54.02(j), the juvenile court must find probable cause that the respondent committed the alleged offense. In subsection (B)(i), the law also uses probable cause as a timing element—whether it existed before eighteen and whether “new evidence” later created it.

4. “Practicable to Proceed”

“Practicable” means “reasonably capable of being accomplished.” In this context, the question is whether, given the time available and the circumstances, it was realistically feasible for the State to initiate and pursue juvenile proceedings before the respondent turned eighteen.

5. “For a Reason Beyond the Control of the State”

This phrase requires the State to show that factors outside its control—such as late outcries, unforeseen forensic delays, or system-wide disruptions—made timely juvenile proceedings infeasible. Delays caused by the State’s own oversight, caseload, or strategic decisions typically count against the State.

6. “Due Diligence”

Under § 54.02(j)(4)(B), the State must show it acted with “due diligence”—meaning it took reasonable steps, under the circumstances, to investigate and pursue the case within the available time. Passive or unexplained delay undermines a due-diligence showing.

7. Interlocutory Appeal and Standard of Review

A juvenile transfer order is immediately appealable (an “interlocutory” appeal) under Texas law. Appellate courts:

  • review the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s findings for legal (and, in the courts of appeals, factual) sufficiency; and
  • review the ultimate decision to transfer for abuse of discretion.

A juvenile court abuses its discretion by misinterpreting or misapplying the law—even if its factual findings are otherwise supported.

VI. Conclusion

In the Matter of J.J.T. is a significant clarification of Texas juvenile transfer law. The Supreme Court of Texas holds that the “practicable to proceed” standard in Family Code § 54.02(j)(4)(A) is not dictated by the timing of probable cause. Instead, the statute directs juvenile courts to ask whether, considering reasons beyond the State’s control, it was realistically feasible to proceed in juvenile court before the respondent turned eighteen.

The decision:

  • rejects the court of appeals’ bright-line rule that pre-eighteen probable cause necessarily defeats good cause under subsection (A);
  • reaffirms the distinct role of subsection (B), which explicitly ties good cause to post-eighteen probable cause, new evidence, and due diligence;
  • warns juvenile courts against conflating (A) and (B) or cutting and pasting their language; and
  • emphasizes the fact-specific, discretionary nature of “practicability,” bounded by the requirement that reasons for delay be “beyond the control of the state.”

By remanding for a new hearing, the Court ensures that J.J.T. will receive a transfer determination under the correct legal framework. Going forward, J.J.T. will guide prosecutors, defense attorneys, and juvenile courts in structuring and litigating transfer motions in late-filed juvenile cases, especially those complicated by compressed timelines, complex investigations, and systemic disruptions such as the pandemic.

The broader principle emerging from this opinion is that the State’s obligation to move juvenile cases forward in a timely manner is genuine and judicially enforceable. Yet when serious offenses committed by juveniles cannot reasonably be addressed before age eighteen due to forces beyond the State’s control, § 54.02(j)(4)(A) still allows the justice system to respond in adult court. J.J.T. refines the boundary between those two outcomes.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Texas

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