Decoupling Possessory Delay from Subsequent Searches: The Fourth Circuit’s “Wrong-Sovereign” Principle in United States v. Krueger

Introduction

United States v. Andrew David Krueger, No. 24-4328 (4th Cir. Jul. 25, 2025), presented the Fourth Circuit with two familiar Fourth Amendment challenges: (1) whether evidence supporting a search warrant was “stale,” and (2) whether law-enforcement officers unreasonably delayed obtaining a warrant to search devices already in police custody. The case arose after Virginia officials seized Krueger’s electronic devices in 2019 based on suspected trafficking in child sexual-abuse material (“CSAM”), but federal agents did not seek their own search warrant for forensic copies of those devices until 2022.

Krueger claimed that (a) the eleven-month gap between observed illicit activity (January 2019) and the state seizure (November 2019) rendered the evidence “stale,” and (b) the three-year interval before federal agents obtained a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures. The district court rejected both arguments and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, but in doing so the appellate court articulated an important clarification: only the sovereign that actually seizes property can be held responsible for an unreasonable delay in seeking a search warrant. The delay by federal agents could not vitiate a seizure executed and maintained by the Commonwealth of Virginia.

Summary of the Judgment

Staleness Claim: The Fourth Circuit held that evidence of CSAM activity observed in January 2019 was not stale when the state warrant issued in November 2019. Applying the “collector inference” and the forensic recoverability of deleted digital files, the court found a substantial basis for probable cause.
Delay Claim: The court ruled that the three-year delay by federal officers in seeking their warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it did not extend Krueger’s seizure; the devices stayed in state custody irrespective of federal action. Thus, any unreasonable-delay argument lay against the state sovereign, not the federal government.
Disposition: The conviction and 78-month sentence were affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Bosyk, 933 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2019) – Approved the “collector inference” and found year-plus delays permissible in CSAM cases.
United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357 (4th Cir. 2010) – Recognized that collectors typically hoard CSAM and that forensic tools can retrieve deleted files, diminishing staleness concerns.
United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2015) – Warned that the collector inference requires evidence of interest in CSAM, not mere inadvertent viewing.
United States v. Ebert, 61 F.4th 394 (4th Cir. 2023) – Reaffirmed that digital evidence can remain accessible long after deletion.
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) – Established that a lawful seizure can become unreasonable if its duration is excessive.
United States v. Pratt, 915 F.3d 266 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Burgard, 675 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 2012); and United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2009) – Explained the timeline limits for “reasonable” delays between seizure and search.

Legal Reasoning

1. Staleness and Probable Cause

The Fourth Circuit employed a two-pronged approach to defeat the staleness argument:

Collector Inference: Repeated downloads/uploads over four days and use of the BitTorrent peer-to-peer network signified active, deliberate engagement, not accidental exposure. Therefore, it was reasonable to believe Krueger would retain CSAM for at least eleven months.
Forensic Persistence: Even if Krueger attempted deletion, modern forensic tools can recover wiped or residual data, a fact detailed in the affidavit. Thus, incriminating files—or their digital footprints—were still likely present in November 2019.

2. Unreasonable Delay & the “Wrong-Sovereign” Principle

The Fourth Amendment analysis turns on the possessory interest. Key steps in the opinion:

Krueger’s devices were seized by state officers under a state warrant. The seizure itself was never held unreasonable.
The devices remained in exclusive state custody. Federal agents merely borrowed forensic copies.
Because the duration of the seizure—and thus Krueger’s loss of possession—was controlled by the state, any delay by federal agents did not extend or worsen that seizure.
Therefore, suppressing evidence collected under a valid federal warrant would not remedy the alleged constitutional harm; the remedy, if any, lies against the state.

“Any purported ‘delay’ by police officers working in a federal capacity had no effect on the length of the seizure of Krueger’s devices by the state, and thus could not have caused or contributed to an unreasonable seizure of Krueger’s property.”

This reasoning effectively introduces a sovereign-specific accountability rule: the entity that maintains custody is the entity whose diligence (or lack thereof) matters for Fourth Amendment delay analysis.

Impact of the Judgment

Clarifies Sovereign Responsibility: Future defendants must direct unreasonable-delay claims at the custodian sovereign. Mixed federal–state investigations can no longer assume that later-in-time federal action cures—or taints—the earlier state seizure.
Reinforces Staleness Doctrine in Digital-CSAM Cases: The opinion cements that year-long gaps rarely defeat probable cause where (a) BitTorrent or comparable technology is used and (b) forensic recoverability is explained.
Operational Guidance for Task Forces: Joint task forces should delineate possession and evidentiary searches carefully. Federal agents who only examine copies may be insulated from delay challenges if the originals stay in state custody.
Strategic Considerations for Defense Counsel: Counsel must investigate which agency physically controls property. Suppression motions premised on delay must be aimed at that agency, and requests for property return should be promptly lodged to strengthen the possessory-interest argument.
Potential for Divergent Standards: States may face heightened scrutiny for prolonged custody, while federal investigators analyzing duplicates remain insulated—producing asymmetric procedural incentives.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Child Sexual-Abuse Material (CSAM): Current terminology replacing “child pornography” to emphasize the exploitative nature of the content.
BitTorrent Network: A peer-to-peer protocol allowing users to share files by downloading small pieces from multiple computers. Accessing CSAM via BitTorrent generally involves (1) installing a specialized client, (2) locating torrent files or magnet links, and (3) knowingly downloading illicit content—showing deliberateness.
Collector Inference: A judicial assumption—based on empirical observations—that individuals interested in CSAM tend to keep it long-term, supporting probable cause even after significant time lapses.
Staleness: In warrant law, information becomes “stale” when too much time passes between the observed criminal activity and the request for a warrant, undermining probable cause.
Forensic Copy / Imaging: An exact, bit-by-bit duplication of digital storage, preserving data for later analysis while maintaining the integrity of the original device.
Possessory Interest: The owner’s right to physical possession of property; seizures implicate this interest, and prolonged deprivation can be unreasonable.
Sovereign-Specific Analysis: The principle that each government entity (state or federal) is independently accountable for any constitutional violations stemming from its own actions.

Conclusion

United States v. Krueger reaffirms broad leeway for law enforcement in CSAM investigations regarding staleness and, more importantly, introduces a “wrong-sovereign” limitation on unreasonable-delay claims. The opinion teaches that:

Repeated BitTorrent activity plus forensic persistence of digital files suffices to keep probable cause alive for nearly a year—and probably longer.
Delay doctrines safeguard the possessory interest against the agency that actually holds the property. Investigative delay by a different jurisdiction, dealing only with copies, does not trigger suppression.

Going forward, courts, prosecutors, and defense attorneys must parse which sovereign controls seized property and tailor their constitutional analyses accordingly. The precedent simultaneously shields multi-jurisdictional investigations from certain suppression pitfalls and nudges defense strategy toward earlier, targeted challenges against the true custodian of seized evidence.