Death of a Legal Guardian as a Material Change Justifying Termination of Parental Rights on Modification of Disposition: Commentary on In re R.B.

1. Introduction

The decision in In re R.B., No. 24-312 (W. Va. Nov. 13, 2025), addresses a recurring but under-theorized problem in abuse and neglect jurisprudence: what happens when a child’s permanent placement, originally secured through legal guardianship, collapses because the guardian dies or becomes incapacitated. Specifically, may a circuit court, on a motion to modify disposition under West Virginia Code § 49-4-606(a), escalate to the most drastic remedy—termination of parental rights—even though the original disposition terminated only custodial rights and placed the child in a guardianship?

Chief Justice Wooton, writing for a unanimous Court (with Justice Bunn concurring separately), affirms a circuit court order that did exactly that. After the death of the child’s legal guardian, the circuit court:

• reopened disposition under § 49-4-606(a) based on a “material change in circumstances,”
• evaluated the mother again as a potential placement,
• found continuing, unresolved substance abuse and noncompliance, and
• modified disposition to terminate the mother’s parental rights so that the child could achieve permanency through adoption by relatives.

The decision is significant in at least three respects:

• It effectively confirms that the death (or equivalent incapacity) of a legal guardian is, by itself, a “material change of circumstances” sufficient to trigger modification under § 49-4-606(a).
• It clarifies that, once a case is properly reopened, the circuit court may—if statutory prerequisites are proven by clear and convincing evidence—move to a harsher disposition, including termination of parental rights.
• It reaffirms that the child’s best interests and need for permanency eclipse a parent’s preference for “less restrictive alternatives” once the “no reasonable likelihood of correction” threshold in § 49-4-604(c)(6) and (d) is met.

This commentary examines the opinion’s facts, the doctrinal framework, the precedents invoked, the Court’s reasoning, and its likely impact on future modification proceedings in abuse and neglect cases.

2. Summary of the Opinion

2.1 Parties and Procedural Posture

• Child: R.B., born in 2017.
• Petitioner: M.S., the biological mother.
• Respondent: West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS).
• Guardian ad Litem (GAL): Counsel appointed for R.B.
• Circuit Court: Kanawha County, Judge Carrie Webster.

The appeal challenges a May 6, 2024 dispositional order that:

• modified an earlier dispositional order which had terminated the mother’s custodial rights and placed the child in a legal guardianship, and
• now terminated the mother’s parental rights, paving the way for adoption.

2.2 Factual and Procedural Background

Initial involvement and first case (2017)

R.B. was born in 2017. That same year, DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging that the mother’s substance abuse and domestic violence impaired her ability to parent. That earlier case was ultimately dismissed after she completed an improvement period.

The 2020 petition and 2021 disposition

In February 2020, DHS again filed an abuse and neglect petition, alleging that:

• the mother had long-standing substance abuse problems, and
• there were multiple incidents of serious domestic violence, including an episode where she stabbed her partner and broke his tooth.

At adjudication, the mother stipulated that her substance abuse prevented her from being an appropriate parent. She was adjudicated an “abusing and neglecting” parent and was granted multiple post-adjudicatory improvement periods. She failed, however, to follow through with rehabilitative services and was largely absent from the case, including at disposition.

The circuit court’s April 2021 order found that:

• the mother had a “chronic on-going, unabated substance abuse problem,”
• she had “not made sufficient efforts to rectify the circumstances” leading to the petition,
• there was “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future,” and
• termination of her custodial rights was in the child’s best interests, with “no reasonable, available, less drastic alternatives.”

DHS placed R.B. in a legal guardianship. The mother did not appeal that 2021 dispositional order.

The guardian’s illness, death, and competing modification motions (2023)

By early 2023, the child’s guardian became gravely ill and was not expected to recover. In response:

• In March 2023, the mother moved to modify disposition to reinstate her rights, claiming:
  • completion of a drug rehabilitation program,
  • ongoing sobriety,
  • regular therapy, and
  • appropriate housing.
• After the guardian was moved to hospice, DHS filed its own motion to modify disposition, asking the court to place R.B. in DHS custody while it located a new placement.

The guardian died, and the circuit court:

• reopened the abuse and neglect case, and
• directed DHS to evaluate the mother as a possible placement.

Despite that opportunity, the mother’s participation was “sporadic.” She failed to appear for hearings in July and September 2023. In contrast, the child’s great aunt and uncle appeared, expressed a desire to adopt, and the court ordered DHS to pursue placement with them, including completion of the ICPC process because the relatives resided in Georgia.

Subsequent hearings and continuing substance abuse (late 2023–early 2024)

At a November 2023 review hearing, the mother did appear and candidly acknowledged a relapse but claimed a couple of months of sobriety. The court ordered her to submit to drug testing; she failed to comply, citing lack of transportation. She later completed a 28-day outpatient rehabilitation program in early 2024, but:

• in February 2024 she tested positive for methamphetamine, and
• she failed to maintain consistent contact with DHS or provide proof of stable housing or employment.

DHS motion to modify disposition to termination (March 2024)

In March 2024, DHS moved again to modify disposition, this time specifically asking to terminate the mother’s parental rights based on the recent positive drug screen and continuing noncompliance.

At the hearing on that motion:

• A DHS/CPS worker testified that the mother:
  • failed to comply with drug screening,
  • failed to maintain contact with DHS, and
  • failed to provide proof of appropriate housing or employment.
• The GAL supported termination, reporting that R.B. was thriving in the new placement with the great aunt and uncle.

The circuit court concluded that, even after four years, the mother remained unable to maintain sobriety and had not corrected the original conditions of abuse and neglect. The court found:

• no reasonable likelihood that the conditions could be substantially corrected in the near future, and
• that the child’s best interests—particularly permanency and stability—required termination of the mother’s parental rights so the child could be adopted.

The court thus modified the prior disposition and terminated parental rights. The mother appealed.

2.3 Issues on Appeal and Holding

The mother raised two main arguments:

1. The guardian’s death was not a “material change of circumstances” justifying a modification to a harsher disposition of termination.
2. Termination of her parental rights was not the least restrictive alternative and therefore was improper.

The Supreme Court of Appeals rejected both arguments and held:

• The death of the legal guardian was a material change in circumstances under § 49-4-606(a), requiring at least a new placement and supporting reopening of disposition.
• Once reopened, the circuit court properly considered the full range of dispositional options and, based on clear and convincing evidence, correctly found:
  • no reasonable likelihood that the mother could correct the conditions of abuse and neglect, and
  • that terminating parental rights was necessary for the child’s welfare and best interests.
• In these circumstances, the court was not required to pursue “less restrictive alternatives” before terminating rights.

The final disposition: the circuit court’s May 6, 2024 order terminating the mother’s parental rights was affirmed.

3. Precedents and Authorities Relied Upon

3.1 Standard of Review: McCormick v. Allstate Ins. Co. and In re S.W.

The Court repeats the familiar two-pronged standard of review from syllabus point 1 of In re S.W., itself quoting McCormick v. Allstate Ins. Co., 197 W. Va. 415, 475 S.E.2d 507 (1996):

"When this Court reviews challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court, a two-prong deferential standard of review is applied. We review the final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the circuit court's underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard."

This sets the tone: the Supreme Court will not reweigh evidence but will only correct clear factual error or legal abuse of discretion. That deference, combined with the strength of the circuit court’s factual record, heavily favors affirmance.

3.2 Modification of Disposition: In re S.W. and In re Cesar L.

West Virginia Code § 49-4-606(a) governs modification of dispositional orders. The Court relies on In re S.W., 236 W. Va. 309, 779 S.E.2d 577 (2015), to distill the statute’s requirements:

[Section 49-4-606(a)] "provides two prerequisites to modification of disposition. First, there must be a showing of material change in circumstances, and second, the alteration must serve the best interests of the child."

The Court also cites syllabus point 1 of In re Cesar L., 221 W. Va. 249, 654 S.E.2d 373 (2007), for the proposition that the statute’s plain language permits:

"a child, a child's parent or custodian, or the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources [now DHS] to move for a modification of the child's disposition where a change of circumstances warrants such a modification."

Together, S.W. and Cesar L. anchor the two-pronged test applied in R.B.:

1. Material change in circumstances, proven by clear and convincing evidence; and
2. Modification in the child’s best interests.

3.3 Best Interests as “Polar Star”: In re B.H., Katie S., Carter, Michael K.T., George Glen B. Jr., and Frances J.A.S.

The Court layers multiple authorities to reinforce that the best interests of the child govern all dispositional decisions:

• In re B.H., 233 W. Va. 57, 754 S.E.2d 743 (2014) (Syl. Pt. 4, in part):

  "The controlling standard that governs any dispositional decision remains the best interests of the child."

• In re Katie S., 198 W. Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996) (Syl. Pt. 3):

  "Although parents have substantial rights that must be protected, the primary goal in cases involving abuse and neglect, as in all family law matters, must be the health and welfare of the children."

• Carter v. Carter, 196 W. Va. 239, 470 S.E.2d 193 (1996) (Syl. Pt. 5, in part) and Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 182 W. Va. 399, 387 S.E.2d 866 (1989):

  "the best interests of the child is the polar star by which decisions must be made which affect children."

• In re George Glen B. Jr., 207 W. Va. 346, 532 S.E.2d 64 (2000):

  when an abuse and neglect petition is filed, the court has a duty to safeguard the child and provide for his or her best interests.

• In re Frances J.A.S., 213 W. Va. 636, 584 S.E.2d 492 (2003):

  [the best interests of the child] "has become the ultimate benchmark by which all custody decisions are appraised. While this Court has also observed that the rights of the parents are entitled to respect and protection, the rights of the children are paramount."

These authorities are not new, but by layering them, the Court underscores that, once a case is properly before it on modification, the child’s best interests and need for stability and permanency drive the choice of disposition—even when that means terminating the rights of a parent who seeks reinstatement.

3.4 Termination Standard and “Least Restrictive Alternative”: In re R.J.M. and In re C.L.

The mother’s “least restrictive alternative” argument is answered by two key precedents and the text of West Virginia Code § 49-4-604.

In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980) (Syl. Pt. 2) states:

"Termination of parental rights, the most drastic remedy under the statutory provision covering the disposition of neglected children, W. Va. Code [§ 49-4-604(c)(6) (2024)] may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood under W. Va. Code [§ 49-4-604(d)] that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected."

More recently, In re C.L., 249 W. Va. 95, 894 S.E.2d 877 (2023), elaborated on what § 49-4-604(c)(6) requires:

"The circuit court must make two separate findings: first that there is 'no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future,' and second, that termination 'is necessary for the welfare of the child[ren].' While it is true that '[t]he controlling standard that governs any dispositional decision remains the best interests of the child[ren,]' when considering termination under § 49-4-604(c)(6), the circuit court must properly make the first finding before it progresses to a best-interest analysis."

The R.B. Court applies this two-step framework: first assessing the likelihood of correction, then turning to best interests. Once it finds that the mother’s substance abuse is chronic and unresolved, and that she relapsed even while seeking modification, termination becomes legally available without any obligation to attempt additional “less restrictive” dispositions.

3.5 Prior Modification Cases with Harsher Outcomes: In re H.T. and In re J.P.

The Court notes it has “considered modification of dispositional orders on numerous occasions,” including where the modification resulted in a harsher disposition:

• In re H.T., 250 W. Va. 11, 902 S.E.2d 143 (2024): The Court affirmed a modification order that terminated parental rights after a prior, less drastic disposition under § 49-4-604(c)(5). This establishes that escalation to termination at modification is permissible when statutory criteria are met.
• In re J.P., No. 19-0472, 2020 WL 6542021 (W. Va. Nov. 6, 2020) (memorandum decision): The Court affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights upon the legal guardian’s motion to modify disposition where the mother’s mental health had deteriorated, leading to involuntary commitments and homelessness. That deterioration constituted a “material change of circumstances” justifying harsher disposition.

By citing these cases, the Court signals that In re R.B. fits comfortably within a line of authority holding that:

• modification proceedings are not limited to “softening” dispositions; and
• where a parent’s circumstances worsen (or remain chronically uncorrected), the court may move from guardianship or lesser dispositions to termination.

3.6 Statutory Framework: § 49-4-606 and § 49-4-604

The opinion relies heavily on two statutory provisions:

• West Virginia Code § 49-4-606(a) (Modification):

  "Upon motion of a child, a child's parent or custodian or the department alleging a change of circumstances requiring a different disposition, the court shall conduct a hearing . . . and may modify a dispositional order if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence a material change of circumstances and that the modification is in the child's best interests."

• West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) and (d) (Termination Standard):
  • § 49-4-604(c)(6) authorizes termination when:

    "there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future" and "termination is necessary for the welfare of the child."

  • § 49-4-604(d) defines:

    "'No reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected' means that, based upon the evidence before the court, the abusing adult or adults have demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or neglect on their own or with help."

The Court applies § 49-4-606(a) to justify reopening the case and considering a new disposition, then applies § 49-4-604(c)(6) and (d) to determine that termination is legally appropriate in light of the mother’s continued substance abuse and noncompliance.

3.7 Procedural Rules and Other References

• Rule 46, West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect: The Court notes that, consistent with § 49-4-606(a), Rule 46 allows modification:

  "upon a showing of a material change of circumstances" and "if, by clear and convincing evidence, it is in the best interest of the child."

• Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC): The Court mentions that an ICPC home study was required because the proposed adoptive relatives lived in Georgia. See W. Va. Code §§ 49-7-101 to -304 (2024). This ensures interstate placements meet both states’ standards.
• Agency restructuring and Attorney General substitution: A footnote explains the reorganization of the former Department of Health and Human Resources into, inter alia, the Department of Human Services, pursuant to W. Va. Code § 5F-1-2, and the substitution of the new Attorney General as counsel. This is procedural background, not central to the holding.

4. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.1 The Two-Pronged § 49-4-606(a) Test: Material Change + Best Interests

The Court’s analysis under § 49-4-606(a) tracks the two prerequisites articulated in In re S.W.:

1. Was there a material change in circumstances since the original disposition?
2. Is the proposed modification in the child’s best interests?

4.1.1 Material Change in Circumstances: Death of the Guardian

On the first prong, the Court treats the issue as effectively uncontested: it is “undisputed” that the material change was the guardian’s death. The opinion observes that:

"[T]he 'material change in circumstances' necessary for the modification of the dispositional order is the death of the guardian, a situation that, at a minimum, necessitated the appointment of a new guardian."

Thus, In re R.B. stands for the proposition that:

• when a legal guardian dies or becomes unable to care for the child, that fact alone is a qualifying material change in circumstances, and
• the court is therefore required to revisit the child’s disposition to secure a new permanency plan.

This principle is doctrinally important because many prior modification cases have focused on changes in the parent’s situation (improvement or deterioration). R.B. confirms that a dramatic change in the child’s placement—here, the loss of the legal guardian—is equally sufficient to reopen disposition.

4.1.2 Best Interests: Evaluating Termination vs. New Guardianship

On the second prong—best interests—the mother argued that the only modification required was appointing a new guardian for R.B., not terminating parental rights. In other words, the court could simply “swap out” one guardian for another and leave parental rights intact.

The Supreme Court rejects this narrow view of the court’s discretion. Once the case is lawfully reopened under § 49-4-606(a), the circuit court may consider any disposition authorized by § 49-4-604, including:

• continued guardianship,
• return of custody, or
• termination of parental rights,

subject to proof, by clear and convincing evidence, of the statutory predicates (e.g., “no reasonable likelihood,” necessity for child’s welfare).

The Court emphasizes that the “controlling standard” at this stage is the best interests of the child. Given:

• the mother’s positive methamphetamine test in February 2024,
• her long history of substance abuse dating back at least to 2017,
• her noncompliance with drug screens and lack of contact with DHS, and
• the child’s success and stability in the placement with the great aunt and uncle, who sought adoption,

the Court concludes that the child’s long-term safety, stability, and permanency would best be served by terminating parental rights so that adoption could proceed.

4.2 Application of the Termination Statute: § 49-4-604(c)(6) and (d)

To justify termination, the circuit court had to make the two findings required by § 49-4-604(c)(6) and In re C.L.:

1. That there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future; and
2. That termination is necessary for the welfare of the child.

4.2.1 “No Reasonable Likelihood” of Correction

The Court’s discussion of the first finding focuses on the chronic and ongoing nature of the mother’s substance abuse. Key points include:

• The original 2020 petition was based in part on her long-standing substance abuse, and she stipulated at adjudication that this impaired her parenting.
• The circuit court’s 2021 dispositional order already found:
  • “a chronic on-going, unabated substance abuse problem,”
  • failure to comply with services, and
  • no reasonable likelihood of correction “in the near future.”
• Four years later, during the reopened proceedings, she:
  • missed multiple hearings,
  • failed to consistently submit to drug screens,
  • failed to maintain contact with DHS or provide proof of stable housing or employment, and
  • tested positive for methamphetamine in February 2024—while her own motion to modify disposition was pending and after a 28-day outpatient program.

The Court characterizes this as a continuing pattern of inadequate capacity to address substance abuse—precisely the scenario captured by § 49-4-604(d)’s definition of “no reasonable likelihood” of correction:

"[B]ased upon the evidence before the court, the abusing adult or adults have demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or neglect on their own or with help."

The Court therefore holds that the circuit court was “wholly justified” in concluding that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions could be corrected in the near future.

4.2.2 Necessity for the Child’s Welfare and Best Interests

Having satisfied the first requirement, the circuit court could then consider whether termination was necessary for the child’s welfare, applying the overarching best-interests standard.

Here, the Court emphasizes:

• R.B.’s need for permanency and stability after years of uncertainty and changing placements;
• the child’s positive adjustment and well-being in the placement with the great aunt and uncle; and
• the relatives’ desire to adopt and provide a permanent, stable home.

Given these facts, the Court holds that termination was necessary to free the child for adoption and thus to secure the child’s long-term welfare. It explicitly frames permanency and stability as core components of the child’s best interests.

4.3 Rejecting the “Least Restrictive Alternative” Argument

The mother argued that the circuit court should have pursued less restrictive alternatives short of termination—presumably another guardianship or continued legal relationship without termination.

Relying on In re R.J.M., the Court reiterates that:

"Termination of parental rights, the most drastic remedy . . . may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood . . . that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected."

In other words, once no reasonable likelihood of correction is found under § 49-4-604(d), and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare, the statute and precedent do not require the court to cycle through intermediate options. The “least restrictive alternative” doctrine does not override the specific legislative judgment embedded in § 49-4-604(c)(6).

4.4 Deference to Circuit Court Fact-Finding

Finally, the Court’s application of the deferential standard of review is significant. The circuit court made explicit findings based on live testimony:

• CPS worker’s observations of ongoing noncompliance,
• the mother’s positive drug test, and
• the GAL’s report of the child’s thriving status in the relative placement.

Applying the “clearly erroneous” standard to these factual findings, and “abuse of discretion” to the ultimate dispositional choice, the Supreme Court finds no basis to disturb the circuit court’s judgment. This is particularly important for trial counsel to note: detailed, explicit findings and a clear evidentiary record strongly insulate dispositional decisions on appeal.

5. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

Several legal terms central to the opinion may be opaque to non-lawyers. The following brief explanations may aid understanding.

5.1 Abuse and Neglect Petition

A “petition” is the document DHS files in circuit court to start an abuse and neglect case. It alleges that a child has been abused or neglected as defined by statute (for example, due to substance abuse, domestic violence, or failure to provide basic needs).

5.2 Adjudication vs. Disposition

• Adjudication: The first major stage of the case, where the court decides whether the allegations are true—i.e., whether the parent is an “abusing” or “neglecting” parent. In R.B., the mother stipulated (admitted) at this stage that her substance abuse interfered with her parenting.
• Disposition: The stage following adjudication at which the court decides what to do about the child’s care and the parent’s rights (e.g., reunification, guardianship, termination of custody or parental rights). In 2021, the court terminated the mother’s custodial rights and placed the child in a guardianship.

5.3 Custodial Rights vs. Parental Rights

In West Virginia abuse and neglect cases, the court may:

• Terminate custodial rights – removing legal and physical custody (who the child lives with and who makes day-to-day decisions) while leaving some residual legal ties intact (e.g., potential future contact, rights relating to adoption decisions, etc.). This often coincides with placing the child in a legal guardianship.
• Terminate parental rights – fully and permanently severing the legal relationship between parent and child. This is the most drastic remedy and generally frees the child for adoption.

In R.B., the 2021 order terminated only custodial rights and created a guardianship; the 2024 modification terminated parental rights to permit adoption by relatives.

5.4 Legal Guardianship

A legal guardian is someone (often a relative or other responsible adult) who is given legal authority to care for the child and make decisions, while parental rights may or may not remain intact. Guardianship is usually viewed as a stable but somewhat less final arrangement than adoption. It often arises when the court wants to provide stability but is not yet ready to terminate parental rights, or the parent’s rights have been partially curtailed (e.g., custodial rights only).

5.5 Improvement Period

An “improvement period” is a court-supervised period during which the parent is given an opportunity to demonstrate an ability to correct the conditions of abuse or neglect—typically by:

• attending treatment (e.g., substance abuse, mental health),
• maintaining sobriety,
• participating in parenting classes, and
• complying with service plans.

Failure to meaningfully participate in or benefit from an improvement period often weighs heavily in favor of termination.

5.6 Modification of Disposition

After an initial dispositional order is entered, any party listed in § 49-4-606(a) (child, parent, custodian, DHS) can later ask the court to change that disposition if there has been a material change in circumstances. In R.B., both the mother and DHS filed motions to modify disposition after the guardian became gravely ill.

The court may modify only if:

• a material change is proven by clear and convincing evidence, and
• the proposed modification is in the child’s best interests.

5.7 “No Reasonable Likelihood” of Correction

This statutory phrase means more than “it will be hard” for the parent to change. It means that, based on all the evidence, the parent has shown an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or neglect even when given help and time—such as multiple improvement periods, services, and treatment opportunities.

In practical terms, it calls for a long-term, realistic assessment: Is there a believable path to the parent becoming safe and appropriate in a time frame that is compatible with the child’s need for permanency? If the answer, based on proven facts, is “no,” then termination can be considered.

5.8 Clear and Convincing Evidence

“Clear and convincing” is a standard of proof higher than preponderance (“more likely than not”) but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt” (used in criminal cases). It requires that the evidence make the key facts highly probable. In child welfare cases, both:

• the material change in circumstances (for modification), and
• the “no reasonable likelihood” and “necessity for welfare” findings (for termination)

must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.

5.9 Guardian ad Litem (GAL)

A GAL is an attorney appointed to represent the child’s best interests, independent of DHS or the parents. The GAL in R.B. supported termination, reporting that R.B. was thriving in the relatives’ home and that adoption would best serve the child’s welfare.

6. Potential Impact of In re R.B.

6.1 Clarification of What Qualifies as “Material Change”

By treating the guardian’s death as an undisputed “material change in circumstances,” In re R.B. effectively sets a clear precedent: when a child’s legal guardian dies or becomes unable to provide care, § 49-4-606(a) is triggered, and the court must revisit disposition. Practitioners can now confidently cite R.B. when seeking modification in similar circumstances.

6.2 Confirmation that Harsher Dispositions Are Available on Modification

Combined with In re H.T. and In re J.P., this case solidifies that modification proceedings are not limited to softening dispositions or returning children to parents. When statutory standards are met, courts may escalate to termination—even where the original disposition was limited to custodial rights termination or guardianship.

For parents and counsel, this underscores a critical practical point: a guardianship disposition that leaves parental rights technically intact is not a permanent shield against later termination. If, after a material change (like the guardian’s incapacity), the evidence shows chronic, uncorrected conditions, termination remains available.

6.3 Emphasis on Permanency and Stability as Best-Interest Components

The opinion’s focus on achieving permanency and stability for R.B.—especially through relative adoption—reinforces a central theme of modern child welfare law: children cannot wait indefinitely for parents to resolve long-standing issues. Once a child has found a stable, nurturing home and the parent remains unsafe or inconsistent, permanency may legitimately trump a parent’s desire for additional time.

6.4 Limits of the “Least Restrictive Alternative” Doctrine

In re R.B. reinforces that the “least restrictive alternative” principle is subordinate to the specific statutory language of § 49-4-604(c)(6) and (d). Once there is:

• no reasonable likelihood of correction, and
• termination is necessary for the child’s welfare,

the court is not required to try incremental steps (e.g., another guardianship, trial reunification) before terminating rights. This has real consequences for case planning and litigation strategies: counsel must focus first on whether the § 49-4-604(d) standard is met, not on insisting in the abstract on lesser alternatives.

6.5 Guidance for DHS and GAL Practice

For DHS and GALs, R.B. illustrates the kind of record necessary to support modification-to-termination:

• detailed documentation of missed hearings and missed drug screens,
• objective test results (e.g., positive methamphetamine test),
• reports on failure to maintain contact or to provide proof of housing/employment, and
• clear, supported testimony about the child’s adjustment and well-being in the proposed permanent placement.

Such a record, combined with explicit, statutory-based findings by the circuit court, will generally withstand appellate scrutiny.

6.6 Lessons for Parents Seeking Reinstatement

For parents whose rights have been partially curtailed (e.g., custodial rights only), the case drives home several practical lessons:

• Consistency matters: sporadic participation, missed hearings, or inconsistent compliance will severely undermine any attempt to regain custody or avoid termination.
• Substance abuse resolution must be durable: courts are understandably skeptical of short-term treatment success followed by immediate relapse, particularly when relapse occurs during active litigation over custody.
• Timing aligns with the child’s needs, not the parent’s: even genuine late progress may be insufficient if it comes after years of instability and repeated failures; the child’s need for permanency may prevail.

7. Conclusion

In re R.B. provides a clear and structured application of West Virginia’s child welfare statutes to a difficult but increasingly common problem: the failure of a previously stable guardianship placement due to the guardian’s death. The Supreme Court of Appeals holds that:

• the guardian’s death constitutes a material change in circumstances under § 49-4-606(a),
• once the case is reopened, the circuit court may consider the full range of dispositional options, including termination, and
• where the parent’s chronic substance abuse remains unresolved and the child’s best interests require permanency and stability, termination of parental rights is permissible and appropriate, without the need to explore additional “less restrictive” steps.

The opinion deepens and clarifies West Virginia jurisprudence in three ways:

1. It cements the principle that changes in a child’s placement (such as a guardian’s death) can be as legally significant for modification as changes in a parent’s condition.
2. It harmonizes § 49-4-606(a) with § 49-4-604(c)(6) and (d), confirming that termination on modification is available when statutory thresholds are met.
3. It reiterates, in robust terms, that the child’s best interests—especially the need for permanency—are the “polar star” guiding all dispositional and modification decisions.

Going forward, In re R.B. will likely be cited as authority whenever the collapse of a guardianship forces courts, DHS, and families back to the dispositional drawing board. Its core message is straightforward: when a child’s established placement fails and a parent remains unable to safely resume care despite years of opportunity, the law permits—and, indeed, often compels—the court to secure the child’s future through termination and adoption.