Dean v. Phatak and the Fifth Circuit’s Clarification of Fabrication Claims and Appellate Power in Qualified Immunity Appeals

I. Introduction

The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Dean v. Phatak, No. 24-20503 (Dec. 23, 2025), addresses a complex intersection of constitutional criminal procedure, civil rights liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the scope of appellate jurisdiction in interlocutory qualified immunity appeals. Written by Judge Don R. Willett, the opinion arises from a tragic event in 2007 and an exceptionally protracted civil rights lawsuit filed by Noel Dean after murder charges against him were dismissed mid-trial.

The case centers on an allegation that Assistant Medical Examiner Dr. Darshan Phatak fabricated the manner-of-death conclusion in an autopsy report (classifying a shooting as homicide rather than suicide), which the State then used to secure Dean’s arrest and indictment. Dean claims this constituted unconstitutional fabrication of evidence.

The appeal comes to the Fifth Circuit for the second time, again from a denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity. The panel:

Clarifies the limits and possibilities of appellate review in interlocutory qualified immunity appeals;
Systematically distinguishes three distinct “fabrication” theories under § 1983 (Fourth Amendment Franks, freestanding due process, and Brady-based theories);
Holds that the Fourth Amendment theory fails outright under existing Fifth Circuit precedent;
Holds that the district court applied the wrong mental state standard to the freestanding due process fabrication claim; and
Rejects the Brady-based theory for failure of the suppression element.

The opinion also sharply criticizes the district court’s mishandling and delay, underscoring the Supreme Court’s insistence that qualified immunity questions be resolved “at the earliest possible stage.”

II. Summary of the Opinion

The key holdings and rulings can be summarized as follows:

Appellate jurisdiction in interlocutory qualified immunity appeals: The Fifth Circuit holds that in such appeals it may determine, as a purely legal matter, that a plaintiff has not even alleged a particular necessary fact, and may treat that fact as absent, without transgressing Johnson v. Jones’s bar on appellate review of “evidence sufficiency.”
Three distinct fabrication theories: The court clarifies that fabrication claims can be structured under:
- Fourth Amendment (Franks / warrant clause);
- Freestanding due process (Napue-style false evidence / fabrication); and
- Brady-based suppression of evidence of fabrication.
The district court erred by blending these into a single undifferentiated “fabrication” standard.
Fourth Amendment (Franks) theory rejected: Under Fifth Circuit precedent (Hart v. O’Brien, Melton v. Phillips), a non-affiant official may be liable under Franks only if he either signed/presented the warrant application or provided information for the purpose of its inclusion in a warrant application. Dean never alleged, and the district court never found, that Dr. Phatak did either. The Fourth Amendment-based fabrication theory thus fails as a matter of law.
Freestanding due process fabrication theory remanded:
- The court reaffirms that such claims require a knowledge standard (intentional or knowing fabrication), not mere “deliberate indifference.”
- The district court applied a more lenient “deliberate indifference” / failure-to-take-precautions standard, contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s earlier instruction that Dean must show that Phatak “intentionally misstated his finding.”
- Because in an interlocutory appeal the Fifth Circuit cannot decide evidentiary sufficiency, it vacates and remands for the district court to decide whether a reasonable juror could find that Phatak knowingly misreported his own conclusion, as opposed to simply reaching a mistaken conclusion.
Brady-based theory rejected: Dean’s claim fails because he did not identify any evidence that Phatak actually suppressed. Brady does not impose an affirmative duty to investigate or discover exculpatory evidence the State does not possess.
Qualified immunity and “clearly established” law: The court rejects the argument (raised by Phatak and medical professional amici) that medical examiners are effectively insulated from due process fabrication claims. While an honest, mistaken medical opinion does not violate the Constitution, an intentional misrepresentation of one’s own finding (e.g., stating “I concluded it was a homicide” when one has not actually reached that conclusion) has long been clearly established as unconstitutional.
Disposition: The Fifth Circuit vacates the denial of summary judgment and remands for the district court to apply the correct intent standard to the freestanding due process fabrication claim, and to do so based on the actual summary-judgment record.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Tragedy and Autopsy

In July 2007, Noel Dean’s wife, Shannon, died from a gunshot wound to the head following a night of heavy drinking and a marital confrontation over an apparent affair. Dean called 911, was taken for questioning, and demonstrated three times to police how Shannon allegedly held the gun: with the handle pointed downward toward her feet.

The next day, Assistant Medical Examiner Dr. Darshan Phatak performed the autopsy. At the outset, a detective informed him that he believed Dean had murdered Shannon and emphasized that the orientation of the gun would be critical to assessing Dean’s story.

Initially, Phatak classified the manner of death as “pending” because he could not determine whether it was homicide or suicide. About a week later, during a meeting with the Chief Medical Examiner and the detective, Phatak concluded that the gun’s handle must have been pointing upward, toward the top of Shannon’s head, contrary to Dean’s account. Relying on his recollection of the autopsy and photographs, he did not re-check the gun against the wounds. He later reviewed Dean’s interview video, noted a “large discrepancy” between the medical evidence and Dean’s demonstration, concluded that Shannon was unconscious from intoxication at the time of the shooting, and signed an autopsy report classifying the death as “homicide.”

B. Criminal Proceedings and Autopsy Amendment

Relying in part on the homicide classification, the State obtained a warrant, arrested Dean, and secured a murder indictment. The first trial ended in a mistrial. At the second trial, Phatak testified that the gun’s handle was upward when the shot was fired.

Dean’s case dramatically shifted when Phatak’s supervisor, Dr. Wolf, prepared photographic overlays comparing the gun’s muzzle to Shannon’s head wound. Those overlays indicated that the handle pointed downward—as Dean had consistently stated—rather than upward. The autopsy report was amended from “homicide” to “undetermined,” and the State dismissed the charges mid-trial.

C. The Civil Rights Suit and First Appeal

After the criminal case ended, Dean brought a § 1983 action against Phatak and others (not at issue in this appeal), alleging that Phatak intentionally fabricated the original autopsy report. Phatak moved for summary judgment on, among other grounds, qualified immunity.

The district court denied summary judgment. On the first appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated, faulting the district court for relying on the complaint’s allegations instead of the summary judgment record. Critically, the court instructed that Phatak was entitled to summary judgment “unless a rational juror could find that [he] intentionally misstated his finding.”

D. Remand, Delay, and Second Appeal

On remand, the district court allowed supplemental briefing; Phatak submitted a brief, but Dean did not. The case then languished for nearly five years. Eventually, the defendants requested a scheduling conference. After further delay, the district court again denied summary judgment, concluding that a reasonable juror could find that Phatak “intentionally or with deliberate indifference” fabricated the report.

Phatak again appealed, arguing that:

The Fourth Amendment / warrant-based fabrication claim fails under Fifth Circuit precedent;
The district court applied the wrong mental state standard for any due process fabrication claim;
The Brady-based claim fails because no suppression occurred; and
He is entitled to qualified immunity.

Dean did not file a brief in this second appeal, but the Fifth Circuit, relying on the appellant’s brief and Dean’s district court filings, proceeded to decide the legal questions presented.

IV. Appellate Jurisdiction and the “Unalleged Fact” Holding

A. Collateral Order Doctrine and Qualified Immunity

The court first addresses its jurisdiction, anchored in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the collateral order doctrine from Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. Under Cohen, certain interlocutory orders are deemed “final” for appeal purposes if they:

Conclusive resolve the disputed question;
Resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits; and
Would be effectively unreviewable after final judgment.

In Mitchell v. Forsyth, the Supreme Court held that a denial of qualified immunity is an appealable collateral order—but only insofar as the appeal turns on a pure question of law. Later, Johnson v. Jones limited such appeals, holding that defendants cannot use interlocutory immunity appeals to relitigate the “evidence sufficiency” of factual disputes—i.e., what facts a party can or cannot prove at trial.

The Fifth Circuit, following its own en banc precedent in Kinney v. Weaver, reiterates that a qualified immunity summary judgment order contains two distinct determinations:

Whether, as a matter of law, the alleged conduct would violate clearly established law (a legal question); and
Whether the evidence creates a genuine dispute that the defendant engaged in that conduct (an evidentiary sufficiency question).

Under Mitchell and Johnson, the appellate court can review the first, but not the second.

B. New Clarification: Recognizing the Absence of a Factual Allegation

The novel jurisdictional point in this opinion concerns a threshold question: when a plaintiff has never asserted a necessary fact, may an appellate court in an interlocutory immunity appeal treat that fact as absent, or is that forbidden “evidence sufficiency” review under Johnson?

The panel answers that question explicitly for the first time in the Fifth Circuit: yes, the appellate court may treat such a fact as absent. The court distinguishes:

Evidence sufficiency: Where the plaintiff does allege a fact, and the question is whether the record contains sufficient evidence to support that fact. This is barred on interlocutory appeal under Johnson.
Factual assertion sufficiency: Whether the plaintiff has made a particular factual assertion at all—either in pleadings or in opposition to summary judgment, or as recognized in the district court’s order. Determining the absence of such an assertion is a legal question about the shape of the claim, not an evidentiary weighing.

The court emphasizes that this type of inquiry does not require it to decide “which facts a party may, or may not, be able to prove at trial.” Instead, it merely notes that no one has alleged the fact in question. That is sufficiently separate from the merits to be reviewed interlocutorily and avoids repetitive review later.

The court reinforces its approach by analogizing to the Second Circuit’s decision in Moore v. Andreno, where the district court granted summary judgment on an essentially one-sided record because the plaintiff did not respond at all. There, too, the appellate court could treat certain facts as undisputed.

The panel acknowledges that past Fifth Circuit formulations loosely spoke about whether a factual dispute “exists” as part of the “genuineness” inquiry. But those earlier uses of “exists,” the panel explains, focused on the evidentiary record, not on the parties’ failure to make a given factual contention. Thus they do not bar the more precise holding here.

The court notes one caveat: because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(3) allows district courts to consider uncited evidence in the record, there may be cases in which a district court, relying on such evidence, treats a fact as disputed even if a plaintiff has not expressly alleged it. In such cases the appellate court might need to treat the fact as “disputed” for jurisdictional purposes. But this is not such a case: neither Dean nor the district court ever asserted the missing fact at issue (that Phatak signed/presented the warrant or acted for the purpose of contributing to the warrant application).

This jurisdictional clarification is one of the opinion’s key precedential contributions: it refines the boundary between permissible and impermissible issues on interlocutory qualified immunity appeals.

V. The Court’s Taxonomy of Fabrication Claims

The court next turns to the substantive constitutional theories. It emphasizes that so-called “fabrication claims” are not monolithic; the “true nature of the claim matters,” and courts must be precise about the constitutional source of the right invoked.

The opinion sets out three distinct doctrinal pathways for a § 1983 “fabrication” claim:

Fourth Amendment (Franks v. Delaware): The Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause forbids officers from knowingly or recklessly including false, material statements in a warrant affidavit.
Freestanding Due Process Fabrication Claim: Under the Due Process Clause, there is a “right not to have [officials] deliberately fabricate evidence and use it to frame and bring false charges.” This stems from cases like Napue v. Illinois and their progeny, which condemn knowing use of false evidence.
Brady-Based Suppression of Evidence of Fabrication: Even if the underlying evidence is fabricated by someone else, officials who suppress exculpatory or impeachment evidence—such as proof that other evidence was fabricated—may violate Brady v. Maryland if the suppressed evidence is material.

The district court had treated these as a single blended “fabrication” standard. The Fifth Circuit holds that this was doctrinally incorrect: each path requires distinct elements and, crucially, different mental-state standards.

VI. The Fourth Amendment / Franks Theory

A. The Franks Standard and Its Extension

In Franks v. Delaware, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment is violated when:

An affiant knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, includes a false statement in a warrant affidavit; and
The false statement is necessary to the magistrate’s finding of probable cause.

Initially, Franks dealt only with the affiant. Fifth Circuit precedent, however, has extended its reach:

Hart v. O’Brien: A governmental official violates the Fourth Amendment by deliberately or recklessly providing false, material information for use in a warrant affidavit, even if he does not sign the affidavit.
Melton v. Phillips (en banc): Clarified that:
- An officer who provides information for the purpose of having it included in a warrant application may be liable under Franks; but
- An officer who does not provide information with that purpose may be liable only if he actually signed or presented the application.

Thus, in the Fifth Circuit, a non-affiant official can be liable under Franks only if he is:

A signer or presenter of the warrant application; or
Someone who provided information for the purpose of its inclusion in that application.

B. Application to Dean’s Fourth Amendment Claim

Dean never alleged that Phatak:

Signed or presented the warrant application; or
Prepared the autopsy report for the specific purpose of having it included in a warrant application.

He did not so allege in his complaint, his summary judgment response, or his submissions on remand after the first appeal. Likewise, the district court never made any finding or suggestion that these conditions were met.

Because of the jurisdictional holding discussed above, the Fifth Circuit treats these critical Franks-related facts as undisputedly absent. Under Hart and Melton, this is fatal to Dean’s Fourth Amendment theory. The court therefore rejects the Franks-based fabrication claim as a matter of law.

VII. Freestanding Due Process Fabrication Claim

A. Mental State Requirements: Knowledge vs. Deliberate Indifference

The opinion next addresses the freestanding due process fabrication theory—distinct from both the Fourth Amendment and Brady. These claims are rooted in the “rudimentary demands of justice” that forbid the knowing creation or use of false evidence in criminal proceedings.

The court explains how mental state requirements differ across the three fabrication paths:

Franks (Fourth Amendment): Requires that false statements be made “knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth.”
Brady-based claims: The constitutional violation itself does not require bad faith—Brady violations can be inadvertent—but some circuits demand culpability before imposing damages on individual defendants. The Fifth Circuit does not resolve that latter issue here.
Freestanding due process fabrication claims: These stem from Napue v. Illinois, which requires that the prosecution “knowingly” use or fail to correct false testimony. Thus a freestanding fabrication claim requires at least knowing or intentional fabrication, not mere negligence or deliberate indifference.

The Fifth Circuit’s own precedent in Brown v. Miller is instructive: the court held there that the “deliberate or knowing creation of a misleading and scientifically inaccurate” forensic report violates due process.

B. The Prior Mandate: “Intentionally Misstated His Finding”

In the first appeal in this very case, the Fifth Circuit had been explicit: Dean’s claim could only proceed if a reasonable juror could find that Phatak “intentionally misstated his finding.”

The distinction is crucial because the alleged falsity here is not in a “brute fact” (e.g., the presence of a particular wound), but in an opinion or conclusion: that the manner of death was homicide. The autopsy report, in relevant part, was a statement about what conclusion Phatak had reached.

That framing has a direct consequence: the only way that conclusion can be “knowingly false” is if Phatak did not actually reach that conclusion internally yet reported that he had. If he genuinely—albeit mistakenly—believed it was homicide at the time, then the report truthfully reflects his finding, and the error is at most negligent or reckless, not fabricated.

Hence the earlier mandate: unless a rational juror could find that Phatak intentionally misstated his own conclusion, he is entitled to qualified immunity.

C. District Court’s Error: Deliberate Indifference Standard

On remand, the district court stated that a reasonable juror could find that Phatak intentionally or with deliberate indifference fabricated the report. It then focused almost exclusively on what additional precautions Phatak should have taken (e.g., further comparisons between the gun and the wound) to verify his manner-of-death conclusion.

This was the wrong legal standard. “Deliberate indifference” is a familiar concept in § 1983 doctrine (e.g., in Eighth Amendment and some Fourteenth Amendment settings), but it is explicitly a lesser mental state than knowledge. As the Supreme Court has explained, deliberate indifference is satisfied by something less than acting “for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.”

By allowing liability on proof of deliberate indifference, the district court effectively reduced the intent requirement to a failure-to-take-precautions standard—contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s express direction and to the nature of Napue-based due process claims.

The court recognizes that the district court at one point used the phrase “intentional falsification,” but when read in context, it is clear the court was treating deliberate indifference and intentional falsification as interchangeable. That conflation is legal error.

D. Appellate Limits: Why the Fifth Circuit Must Remand

Although it identifies the legal error, the Fifth Circuit does not substitute its own evaluation of the record. Because this is an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity, Mitchell and Johnson forbid the court from deciding whether the record contains sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to find that Phatak actually lied about his conclusion.

Instead, the appellate court can only:

Correct the governing legal standard (requiring knowledge/intent, not deliberate indifference); and
Remand for the district court to apply that standard to the summary judgment record.

E. Rejection of the “Fourth Amendment Exclusivity” Argument

Phatak argued that, under Manuel v. City of Joliet, Dean’s claim must be analyzed exclusively under the Fourth Amendment, because the Fourth Amendment governs pretrial detentions. The panel rejects this, citing its own prior decision in Jauch v. Choctaw County:

Manuel does not hold that the Fourth Amendment is the only possible basis for pretrial detention claims;
Due process continues to apply to some pretrial deprivations, especially where the alleged misconduct is not simply an unlawful seizure but the use of fabricated evidence to frame a defendant.

Thus, the due process fabrication theory remains available even if the initial seizure was lawful under the Fourth Amendment.

F. Qualified Immunity and Medical Examiners

Phatak, supported by amici (AMA, Texas Medical Association, National Association of Medical Examiners, and College of American Pathologists), argued that there is no clearly established law that a medical examiner’s opinion can violate constitutional rights, at least where the opinion is an honest but mistaken medical judgment.

The court agrees that:

Medical examiners play a critical role in the criminal justice system and need room to exercise professional judgment; and
The Constitution does not require error-free investigations or perfect medical conclusions.

But the opinion draws a sharp line:

A medical examiner who states, “I have concluded that the death was a homicide,” when he has not in fact reached that conclusion, is not exercising medical judgment. He is stating a deliberate falsehood.

That kind of deliberate falsification is clearly established to be unconstitutional, as reflected in cases like:

Mooney v. Holohan and Giglio v. United States, condemning use of known false evidence;
Napue v. Illinois, forbidding the knowing use of false testimony;
Brown v. Miller, applying those principles to a deliberately misleading forensic report.

Thus, if the district court determines that the record would allow a finding that Phatak knowingly misrepresented his own conclusion in the autopsy report, qualified immunity is unavailable on the ground that the law was not clearly established.

VIII. The Brady-Based Theory

A. Elements of a Brady Claim

To state a Brady claim, a § 1983 plaintiff must show:

The existence of evidence favorable to the accused (exculpatory or impeaching);
Suppression of that evidence by the State; and

Materiality—i.e., a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

B. No Suppression by Phatak

Dean and the district court suggested that various investigative steps—had they been undertaken—might have yielded evidence tending to support Dean’s account (suicide) rather than Phatak’s initial homicide conclusion.

The Fifth Circuit rejects this as a basis for Brady liability. It reiterates a longstanding limitation: Brady does not impose an affirmative duty to discover exculpatory information that the State does not have. As the court quotes from prior Fifth Circuit precedent, Brady:

“… clearly does not impose an affirmative duty … to take action to discover information which [the state] does not possess.”

In other words, Brady addresses the suppression of favorable evidence already in the State’s possession, not the failure to search or investigate for potentially exculpatory material. Dean identified no exculpatory or impeachment evidence that Phatak actually had and concealed.

Because the “suppression” element fails, the Brady-based theory fails as a matter of law. The court therefore finds it unnecessary to reach the separate unsettled question whether an acquitted defendant (like Dean) may bring a Brady claim at all—a question left open for another day.

IX. The Court’s Critique of Delay and District Court Handling

The opinion closes with a pointed critique of the extreme delay in resolving the qualified immunity question. The timeline is stark:

Shannon’s death: July 2007;
Criminal charges dismissed: January 2011;
§ 1983 suit filed: January 2013;
First Fifth Circuit opinion: December 2018;
Second Fifth Circuit opinion: December 2025.

The panel reiterates that summary judgment is meant to ensure the “speedy and expeditious” disposition of cases lacking genuine fact disputes, and that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly stressed” the imperative of resolving immunity questions as early as possible.

Here, by:

First failing to consult the summary judgment record; and
Then, after nearly six years and a prior appellate mandate, applying the wrong legal standard,

the district court has effectively “grievously delayed—and thus denied” justice in this case, regardless of the ultimate merits.

X. Complex Concepts Simplified

For non-specialists, several concepts in the opinion may be opaque. The following brief explanations may help:

1. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity protects government officials from personal liability for damages under § 1983 unless:

They violated a constitutional right; and
The right was “clearly established” at the time, such that every reasonable official would have understood that the conduct was unlawful.

Courts are encouraged to decide qualified immunity early, often at the motion-to-dismiss or summary-judgment stage, to spare officials from the burdens of litigation where legal liability is not clearly established.

2. Collateral Order Doctrine

Normally, only final judgments (ending the entire case) are appealable. The collateral order doctrine allows appeals from a “small class” of interlocutory orders that conclusively resolve important issues separate from the merits and would be effectively unreviewable if parties had to wait for final judgment. Denials of qualified immunity fall into this category—at least to the extent they present legal questions.

3. Franks v. Delaware and Warrant Fabrication

Franks holds that the Fourth Amendment is violated when officers deliberately or recklessly lie in warrant affidavits, and those lies are necessary to the finding of probable cause. In such cases, the search or arrest may be unconstitutional, and civil liability can follow.

4. Napue, Giglio, and Freestanding Fabrication

Napue and Giglio stand for the proposition that due process is violated if prosecutors (or, by extension, state actors whose evidence they present) knowingly use false testimony or allow it to stand uncorrected. A “freestanding” fabrication claim under § 1983 extends that principle beyond trial testimony to knowingly fabricated forensic or investigative reports that are used to frame an innocent person.

5. Brady v. Maryland

Brady requires the prosecution to disclose evidence that is favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment. It does not require the State to go out and search for potentially exculpatory evidence it does not have; the duty is one of disclosure, not of investigation.

6. “Fabrication” vs. “Mistake”

A key conceptual distinction in this case:

Mistake: An official honestly reaches a wrong conclusion based on available information. This may be negligent, even grossly negligent, but it is not “fabrication” in the constitutional sense.
Fabrication: The official knowingly creates or reports false information—e.g., stating that he reached a certain conclusion when he knows he did not, or inventing facts that he knows are untrue.

7. Deliberate Indifference vs. Knowledge

“Deliberate indifference” means the official consciously disregards a substantial risk of harm; it is less demanding than actual knowledge or intent to cause harm. In this case, the Fifth Circuit holds that deliberate indifference is not enough to establish a freestanding due process fabrication claim, which requires knowing or intentional fabrication.

XI. Impact and Future Implications

A. For Qualified Immunity Appeals

The jurisdictional clarification regarding “unalleged facts” is particularly significant for future interlocutory appeals:

Defendants can argue not only that the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, do not amount to a constitutional violation, but also that the plaintiff has never even alleged a necessary fact (e.g., that a non-affiant provided information for inclusion in a warrant).
Appellate courts, in turn, may treat such absent allegations as legally dispositive, without impermissibly weighing evidence under Johnson.

This will likely sharpen plaintiffs’ pleading and summary-judgment strategies: they must clearly identify all factual predicates for each theory of liability, especially in cases involving Franks-type challenges or complex multi-theory fabrication claims.

B. For Fabrication Claims and Medical Examiners

The opinion has notable consequences for medical examiners and forensic professionals:

It confirms that they are not shielded from constitutional scrutiny merely because their work involves expert judgment. If they knowingly misrepresent their own findings, they can be liable under due process principles.
At the same time, the decision strongly underscores that honest, even grossly mistaken, opinions are not constitutionally actionable as fabrication. This “breathing room” is important to prevent over-deterring professional judgment.
Medical examiners and forensic scientists may wish to document more carefully the reasoning behind manner-of-death or causation conclusions to guard against later accusations that they never actually held the view reported.

C. For District Courts: Structuring Fabrication Analysis

The opinion offers a roadmap for district courts facing similar § 1983 “fabrication” suits:

Identify the specific constitutional basis (or bases) of the claim: Is the plaintiff alleging:
- A warrant-based Fourth Amendment violation under Franks (and its extensions like Hart and Melton)?
- A freestanding due process fabrication claim under Napue/Giglio-inspired doctrine?
- A Brady-based suppression of exculpatory or impeachment evidence?
Apply the correct mental state standard for each theory:
- Franks: knowing or reckless falsity;
- Freestanding due process fabrication: knowing or deliberate fabrication (not mere deliberate indifference);
- Brady: suppression regardless of bad faith (but possibly with an added culpability layer for damages, depending on circuit law).
Separate liability and clearly established law: Even if a constitutional violation is possible on the facts, ask whether the right was clearly established at the time.

D. For Brady Litigation

The opinion reaffirms an important limit on Brady claims: they do not encompass failures to investigate or generate exculpatory evidence not in the State’s possession. That has two implications:

Section 1983 plaintiffs who were acquitted or whose convictions were set aside must focus on actual suppression (non-disclosure) of existing evidence, rather than investigative omissions.
Litigants and courts must carefully distinguish between:
- Constitutional fabrication (knowingly false evidence);
- Constitutional suppression (failing to disclose favorable evidence possessed by the State); and
- Non-constitutional negligent or substandard investigation (failing to pursue leads or uncover additional evidence).

E. Systemic Implications: Delay and the Administration of Justice

While doctrinally focused, the court’s commentary on delay exposes a deeper systemic concern: complex civil rights cases—and immunity issues within them—can languish for years, undermining both deterrence and accountability. By emphasizing the duty to resolve qualified immunity questions swiftly, the opinion reinforces:

The Supreme Court’s view that immunity is not just a defense to liability but an immunity from suit; and
The need for disciplined summary-judgment practice by district courts, including:
- Grounding decisions in the actual summary-judgment record;
- Applying the correct legal standards; and
- Promptly addressing remanded issues after appellate guidance.

XII. Conclusion

Dean v. Phatak is a consequential Fifth Circuit decision in the law of fabricated evidence and qualified immunity. Its principal contributions include:

Clarifying that, in interlocutory qualified immunity appeals, appellate courts may treat unalleged but necessary facts as absent without trespassing on Johnson v. Jones’s bar on evidence-sufficiency review;
Distinguishing among three distinct fabrication theories—Fourth Amendment (Franks), freestanding due process, and Brady-based—and insisting that courts apply the correct, theory-specific mental-state standards;
Rejecting a Fourth Amendment (Franks) theory where the plaintiff never alleged that the medical examiner signed/presented the warrant or acted for the purpose of influencing a warrant affidavit;
Requiring knowledge or intent—not mere deliberate indifference—for freestanding due process fabrication claims, especially when the alleged falsity lies in a professional opinion rather than brute facts;
Affirming that deliberate misrepresentation by forensic professionals, including medical examiners, is clearly established as unconstitutional, while preserving broad protection for honest professional error; and
Narrowing Brady-based fabrication claims to actual suppression of existing evidence, not failures to investigate for exculpatory material the State does not possess.

Ultimately, the court vacates and remands because the district court applied the wrong intent standard and failed to follow the earlier appellate mandate. The case returns to the district court to answer a precise, fact-based question: does the record permit a reasonable jury to find that Dr. Phatak knowingly misrepresented his own conclusion in the autopsy report, rather than simply reaching a mistaken one?

Whatever the eventual outcome on remand, Dean v. Phatak will guide future courts in carefully parsing fabrication claims, applying qualified immunity in interlocutory appeals, and respecting the boundaries between honest professional error and unconstitutional deceit in the criminal justice process.