De Facto Officer Doctrine, Right to Travel, and Municipal Insurer Immunity in Jones v. City of Comanche

I. Introduction

The Tenth Circuit’s unpublished order and judgment in Jones v. City of Comanche, No. 25-6016 (10th Cir. Nov. 24, 2025), addresses a cluster of recurring themes in modern civil-rights and state-tort litigation:

Whether a police officer who has not properly executed the statutorily required oath of office can nevertheless validly exercise police powers, and whether constitutional or tort claims may be premised solely on that alleged defect.
Whether an individual’s federal constitutional “right to travel” exempts them from state vehicle registration laws, particularly where the individual asserts that their automobile is a private, non-commercial conveyance and thus not a “motor vehicle” within a federal statutory definition.
Whether a municipal insurer or risk pool—in this case, the Oklahoma Municipal Assurance Group (OMAG)—can be sued in tort for alleged “bad faith” denial of a claim, in light of Oklahoma’s Governmental Tort Claims Act (OGTCA).

Plaintiff–appellant Clayton Phillip Jones, proceeding pro se, sued the City of Comanche and OMAG in Oklahoma state court after his vehicle was impounded by a city police officer. The case was removed to federal court, where the district court dismissed:

All claims against the City with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and
The claims against OMAG without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).

Jones appealed. The Tenth Circuit, applying de novo review, affirmed in all respects.

Although styled as a nonprecedential “order and judgment,” this decision is citable for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. It provides a clear reaffirmation of:

The reach of the de facto officer doctrine under both federal and Oklahoma law.
The limits of the constitutional right to travel in the face of state licensing and registration regimes.
The breadth of immunity afforded to OMAG and similar entities under the OGTCA, particularly against “bad faith” insurance-type claims.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal on four principal grounds:

De facto officer doctrine bars claims based on lack of oath:
Jones argued that Officer Timothy McClinsey lacked lawful authority to impound his vehicle because he had not executed and filed the loyalty oath required by Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 36.1. The court held that, under both the federal and Oklahoma de facto officer doctrines, an officer who is acting under color of title and in actual possession of the office is treated as a valid officer for purposes of his official acts—even if his appointment or qualification is defective. Jones’s claims premised on McClinsey’s alleged lack of authority therefore failed to state any claim upon which relief could be granted.
Right to travel does not exempt from state registration laws:
Jones asserted that his privately owned, non-commercial car was not subject to Oklahoma registration requirements because he believed the term “motor vehicle” under federal law (18 U.S.C. § 31(6)) applied only to commercial vehicles. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, emphasizing that while there is a constitutionally protected right to travel (citing United States v. Guest), that right does not override states’ legitimate authority to impose licensing, registration, and safety regulations on drivers and vehicles (citing Delaware v. Prouse and United States v. Eckhart).
OMAG is immune from “bad faith” tort liability under the OGTCA:
Jones claimed OMAG wrongfully and in bad faith denied his insurance claim arising from the impoundment. The court held that under the OGTCA, OMAG operates as a public entity and is immune from liability for the tort of bad faith. By definition under Oklahoma law, “bad faith” conduct falls outside an employee’s “scope of employment,” and the OGTCA only waives immunity for conduct within the scope of employment. Relying on Board of County Commissioners v. Association of County Commissioners of Oklahoma Self-Insurance Group, 339 P.3d 866 (Okla. 2014), the court agreed that OMAG could not be sued for bad faith and affirmed dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Rule 12(b) procedures were properly applied to a pro se complaint:
The Tenth Circuit rejected Jones’s argument that dismissal was improper because defendants had not provided “verified” factual evidence. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion (and, here, a facial Rule 12(b)(1) challenge), the court accepts the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true and asks only whether they state a plausible legal claim. No evidentiary presentation was necessary; the complaints failed as a matter of law. The court also noted that, while pro se pleadings receive liberal construction, courts do not act as counsel for pro se litigants nor invent arguments on their behalf, citing Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer.

The court granted Jones’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal but denied his motion for judicial notice. The underlying merits dismissals remained intact.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Procedural Posture and Standard of Review

Jones filed his complaint in Oklahoma state court in October 2024. Defendants removed to the Western District of Oklahoma, then moved to dismiss under:

Rule 12(b)(6) – for failure to state a claim, and
Rule 12(b)(1) – for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (principally as to OMAG, based on immunity).

Jones responded, Defendants replied, and Jones filed a sur-reply and a motion for summary judgment. The district court:

Dismissed the claims against the City with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6);
Dismissed the claims against OMAG without prejudice under Rule 12(b)(1);
Denied Jones’s summary judgment motion; and
Denied the motion to strike the sur-reply as moot.

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reviewed both the 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo, citing Davis ex rel. Davis v. United States, 343 F.3d 1282, 1294 (10th Cir. 2003). Under Estate of Burgaz v. Board of County Commissioners, 30 F.4th 1181, 1185 (10th Cir. 2022), a complaint must allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. The court also applied the Rule 12(b)(6)-like standard for a facial 12(b)(1) challenge (Garling v. EPA, 849 F.3d 1289, 1293 n.3 (10th Cir. 2017)).

While recognizing that Jones was pro se and thus entitled to liberal construction, the court reiterated that this indulgence does not permit departure from the Federal Rules or convert the court into an advocate (Garrett, 425 F.3d at 840).

B. Claims Against the City and the De Facto Officer Doctrine

1. Plaintiff’s theory: No oath, no authority

Jones alleged that Officer Timothy McClinsey, a Comanche police officer, had not taken and filed the loyalty oath required by Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 36.1. He argued that this failure to execute the oath rendered the officer’s actions ultra vires, stripping him of authority, and thereby transforming the vehicle impoundment into a violation of both federal and state constitutional rights.

This kind of “oath defect” argument is not uncommon in pro se civil rights litigation. Plaintiffs sometimes contend that any technical irregularity in how an officer or public official was appointed or sworn in voids the official’s actions, and thus creates a basis for significant damages or structural relief. The Tenth Circuit squarely rejected that theory under the de facto officer doctrine.

2. Federal de facto officer doctrine

The court cited the Supreme Court’s formulation in Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180 (1995):

The federal de facto officer doctrine "confers validity upon acts performed by a person acting under the color of official title even though it is later discovered that the legality of that person's appointment or election to office is deficient."

The doctrine protects the public and the orderly functioning of government. Citizens are not required, nor generally permitted, to challenge each official’s technical qualification before obeying or being affected by official acts. As long as:

The official is in actual possession of the office, and
Acts under color of title,

their official acts remain valid in collateral proceedings, even if the official’s appointment was flawed.

The Tenth Circuit previously applied this principle in Horwitz v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 822 F.2d 1508, 1516 (10th Cir. 1987), upholding an immunity determination even where a public official had failed to subscribe to the required oath of office. This precedent directly undercuts Jones’s argument: lack of a properly subscribed oath does not nullify an official’s actions in a suit like this.

3. Oklahoma’s de facto officer doctrine

The court then looked to Oklahoma law, quoting State ex rel. Board of Regents v. McCloskey Bros., Inc., 227 P.3d 133, 147 (Okla. 2009):

"[W]here the functions of the office are exercised by one who was in the actual possession of it under color of title, even if the officer may not be properly qualified in accordance with the law, his or her acts will be upheld as valid and cannot be collaterally attacked."

The Tenth Circuit also pointed to Greenwood v. State, 299 P. 248, 250 (Okla. 1931), where an appointed special officer who failed to take an oath was nonetheless deemed a de facto officer whose acts remained valid.

Thus, under Oklahoma law, as under federal law, a defect in qualification (such as failing to file a loyalty oath) does not normally invalidate the officer’s acts when those acts are attacked collaterally in a subsequent civil suit.

4. Application to Officer McClinsey

The court observed that:

McClinsey was employed in a law enforcement position by the City of Comanche.
He exercised the functions of that position, including impounding vehicles for violations such as expired registration.
He did so under color of official title, in actual possession of the office.

Even accepting Jones’s factual allegation that the officer had not properly signed and filed the oath, McClinsey was, at a minimum, a de facto officer. Accordingly:

His actions in impounding Jones’s car were valid for purposes of this civil litigation.
Jones’s attempt to challenge the impoundment on the theory that the officer had no legal authority amounted to a prohibited collateral attack on a de facto officer’s qualification.

The Tenth Circuit thus agreed with the district court that the de facto officer doctrine “barred Jones from collaterally attacking McClinsey’s actions.” Because this doctrine foreclosed any claim based solely on the missing oath, the complaint against the City failed to state a plausible claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

The panel further noted in a footnote that, although the district court drew on both federal and state de facto officer doctrine, it need not resolve which body of law “controls” because the outcome was the same under either.

C. Right to Travel and State Vehicle Registration Requirements

1. Plaintiff’s theory: Non-commercial car outside “motor vehicle” laws

Jones argued that his personal automobile, a non-commercial vehicle used for private purposes, was not a “motor vehicle” subject to Oklahoma registration because:

He relied on 18 U.S.C. § 31(6), which defines “motor vehicle” as a carriage or contrivance “used for commercial purposes” on the highways, and
He asserted a federal constitutional right to travel that, in his view, exempted him from state vehicle registration requirements.

This line of reasoning commonly appears in “right to travel” or so-called “sovereign citizen” style arguments: the individual seeks to characterize themselves as a “private traveler” outside the scope of statutes allegedly aimed only at “commercial drivers” or “commercial traffic.”

2. The court’s rejection of the argument

The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument for multiple reasons:

Federal definition is context-specific and irrelevant to state registration obligations.
Section 31 of Title 18 is a definitional provision in the federal criminal code, used to define terms for particular federal offenses involving vehicles and aircraft. It does not govern state traffic regulation or licensing schemes. Oklahoma’s own statutes define what must be registered, and those state law definitions—not the narrow federal criminal definition—govern whether Jones’s car required registration.
Right to travel does not equal exemption from regulation.
The court acknowledged that there is a recognized constitutional “right to travel,” citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966). But this right protects interstate movement from unreasonable governmental interference; it does not create a categorical exemption from regulatory measures such as:
- Driver’s licensing
- Vehicle registration
- Vehicle inspections
- Safety regulations
These are long-established exercises of the states’ police power.
State safety interest and established precedent.
The court relied on Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658 (1979), which explicitly recognizes that states have a legitimate interest in ensuring highway safety, and that this interest supports enforcement of “licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements.” The court also cited its own precedent in United States v. Eckhart, 569 F.3d 1263, 1272 (10th Cir. 2009), which upheld Utah’s license plate statutes as not constitutionally burdensome.

In light of these authorities, the court held that Oklahoma’s vehicle registration requirements plainly apply to Jones’s privately owned automobile and that his federal right to travel does not relieve him of the obligation to comply. His allegations, even if accepted as true, failed to state a legal claim for a constitutional violation based on the impoundment for expired registration.

D. Claims Against OMAG and Immunity Under the OGTCA

1. OMAG’s status under the OGTCA

The Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 51, §§ 151–172, governs when and how the State, its political subdivisions, and their employees may be sued in tort. Section 152.1(A) provides:

"The state, its political subdivisions, and all of their employees acting within the scope of their employment, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions," are immune from tort liability, subject only to the specific waivers and conditions contained in the Act.

OMAG is an entity that operates under the OGTCA as a municipal insurer or self-insurance group for Oklahoma municipalities. The key point in this case is that, under Oklahoma law, OMAG enjoys the same immunity structure as other covered public entities.

2. Jones’s claim: Bad faith denial of insurance claim

Jones alleged that OMAG acted in bad faith in denying an insurance-type claim he submitted after his car was impounded. In ordinary private insurance law, a tort claim for “bad faith” handling or denial of a claim is sometimes recognized, especially in the context of first-party insurance contracts.

However, the question here was whether Oklahoma law, via the OGTCA, permits such a tort claim against OMAG.

3. Oklahoma Supreme Court precedent on bad faith and OMAG

The Tenth Circuit quoted and relied on Board of County Commissioners v. Association of County Commissioners of Oklahoma Self-Ins. Group, 339 P.3d 866, 870 (Okla. 2014). There, the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed whether a self-insurance pool (functionally analogous to OMAG) could be liable in tort for bad faith.

The Oklahoma court held that:

Under the OGTCA, employees and entities are only within the waiver of sovereign immunity when acting within the scope of employment.
“Bad faith” conduct—by its nature—is outside the scope of employment as defined in the Act.
Because the OGTCA does not waive immunity for conduct outside the scope of employment, there is no tort liability for bad faith against such entities.

The Tenth Circuit applied this reasoning to OMAG: any alleged “bad faith” conduct by OMAG’s employees would, as a matter of Oklahoma law, be outside their “scope of employment” for which the state has consented to suit. As a result, OMAG maintains immunity against bad faith tort claims.

4. Jurisdictional consequence: Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1)

Because the OGTCA structures a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, and bad faith claims fall outside that waiver, Oklahoma law affords no cause of action against OMAG for bad faith. The federal district court treated this immunity as a limit on subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the claims against OMAG without prejudice under Rule 12(b)(1).

The Tenth Circuit affirmed that jurisdictional dismissal, holding that:

OMAG is immune from liability for bad faith tort claims under Oklahoma law.
Jones’s complaint, even if factually true, could not surmount that immunity, so the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claim.

E. Motion to Dismiss Standards and Treatment of Pro Se Litigants

1. Facial 12(b)(1) versus 12(b)(6)

The court emphasized that this case involved a facial attack under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). In a facial attack:

The court assumes the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations.
The question is whether, as a matter of law, those facts state a claim within the court’s jurisdiction and upon which relief can be granted.
No evidentiary hearing or verified factual presentation is required at this stage.

Citing Garling v. EPA, the panel reiterated that in a facial jurisdictional challenge the standard is “patterned on Rule 12(b)(6).”

2. No need for “verified” evidence by defendants

Jones argued that the district court should not have granted dismissal because the defendants did not submit verified factual material. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument:

At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the court does not weigh evidence; it evaluates the legal sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations.
Likewise, in a facial Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court assumes the complaint’s facts are true and asks only whether jurisdiction exists in light of those allegations.
There is no requirement that the moving party present evidence unless the jurisdictional challenge is “factual,” i.e., disputing the truth of the jurisdiction-conferring facts.

Relying on Sutton v. Utah State School for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999), the court noted that the district court properly focused on the complaint’s legal plausibility, not evidentiary disputes.

3. Liberal construction but no advocacy for pro se litigants

The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its settled position—articulated in Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005)—that while pro se pleadings must be liberally construed, the court:

Cannot serve as attorney for the pro se party,
Will not construct legal arguments or search the record to salvage a deficient claim, and
Must still insist that pro se litigants comply with procedural and substantive law.

Jones’s filings, though to be viewed with some indulgence, did not approach the threshold of stating plausible legal claims in light of the controlling doctrines on de facto officers, vehicle registration, and OMAG immunity.

F. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion weaves together a series of precedents, each serving a specific role:

Davis ex rel. Davis v. United States, 343 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2003)
Reaffirmed for the standard of de novo review of both Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) dismissals, reinforcing the appellate court’s role in independently assessing legal sufficiency and jurisdiction.
Estate of Burgaz v. Board of County Commissioners, 30 F.4th 1181 (10th Cir. 2022)
Provides the modern articulation of the Rule 12(b)(6) “plausibility” standard in the Tenth Circuit, aligning with Twombly/Iqbal.
Garling v. EPA, 849 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2017)
Clarifies that a facial Rule 12(b)(1) attack uses the same assumption-of-truth approach as Rule 12(b)(6).
Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836 (10th Cir. 2005)
Key authority on the treatment of pro se litigants—liberal construction of pleadings but no role as de facto counsel.
Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177 (1995)
Supreme Court’s canonical articulation of the federal de facto officer doctrine: official acts remain valid even where an official’s appointment or qualification is defective.
Horwitz v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 822 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1987)
Tenth Circuit precedent directly holding that lack of a properly subscribed oath does not undercut the validity of a public official’s actions, reinforcing application of the de facto officer doctrine to cases like Jones’s.
State ex rel. Board of Regents v. McCloskey Bros., Inc., 227 P.3d 133 (Okla. 2009)
Oklahoma’s own formulation of the de facto officer doctrine; instrumental in showing that Oklahoma law rejects collateral attacks on an officer’s acts based on qualification defects.
Greenwood v. State, 299 P. 248 (Okla. 1931)
Earlier Oklahoma authority specifically involving failure to take an oath, providing direct historical support for treating such officers as de facto.
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966)
Recognized the constitutional right to travel but, as applied here, underscored its limits: it does not abrogate state powers to impose neutral, safety-oriented regulations on vehicles and drivers.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)
Central to the court’s analysis of state interests in vehicle regulation. It explicitly validates states’ use of licensing and registration requirements to promote road safety. The Tenth Circuit invoked this to dismiss the notion that private, non-commercial driving escapes regulatory oversight.
United States v. Eckhart, 569 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2009)
Confirms that state license plate statutes are not an unconstitutional burden on the right to travel. This binds the Tenth Circuit and directly forecloses Jones’s broader “right to travel” exemption argument.
Board of County Commissioners v. Association of County Commissioners of Oklahoma Self-Ins. Group, 339 P.3d 866 (Okla. 2014)
The cornerstone for the OMAG analysis. It held that "bad faith" actions are outside the scope of employment under the OGTCA and thus not subject to the Act’s limited waiver of immunity, effectively insulating entities like OMAG from bad faith tort claims.
Sutton v. Utah State School for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1999)
Clarifies that Rule 12(b)(6) inquiries focus on legal plausibility, not evidentiary disputes, supporting the district court’s decision to decide on the pleadings without requiring evidentiary submissions.

G. Impact and Implications

1. Oath-to-office challenges and law enforcement authority

This decision reinforces that:

Failure to execute or file an oath of office—while potentially an internal legal or disciplinary issue—will almost never support a private civil lawsuit challenging the validity of an officer’s actions.
The de facto officer doctrine functions as a powerful shield against collateral civil attacks on technical appointment or qualification defects.
Municipalities and officers can rely on this doctrine when confronted with suits premised solely on oath irregularities, at least within the Tenth Circuit and under Oklahoma law.

Future litigants attempting to invalidate arrests, citations, or impoundments based solely on alleged oath defects are likely to face swift dismissal.

2. “Right to travel” and “private vehicle” theories

The court’s treatment of Jones’s registration argument contributes to a growing body of authority rejecting attempts to:

Disentangle “traveling” from “driving” in a way that avoids licensing or registration requirements.
Use selective federal statutory definitions (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 31(6)) to escape state regulatory regimes.

Practically, the opinion confirms:

All drivers, including those using vehicles exclusively for personal and non-commercial purposes, are subject to Oklahoma’s vehicle registration and licensing laws.
The constitutional right to travel does not confer a right to use public roads in unlicensed or unregistered vehicles.

3. OMAG and the reach of OGTCA immunity

For practitioners, the opinion is significant in clarifying that:

OMAG, operating under the OGTCA, is treated for immunity purposes like other state or political subdivision entities.
Tort claims for “bad faith” handling of claims against OMAG are barred as a matter of Oklahoma law, because such conduct is outside the statutory “scope of employment.”
Federal courts will treat this as a jurisdictional bar, leading to Rule 12(b)(1) dismissals of state-law bad faith claims against OMAG when joined in federal civil-rights suits.

Future plaintiffs seeking to sue OMAG for bad faith should recognize that this avenue is essentially closed unless and until Oklahoma law is altered.

4. Pro se litigants and early dispositive motions

The decision also has pragmatic lessons for pro se litigants and courts:

Pro se plaintiffs cannot avoid dismissal by demanding evidentiary hearings or verified submissions at the pleadings stage.
Courts will freely dispose of legally deficient claims via Rule 12(b)(6) or facial Rule 12(b)(1) without converting to summary judgment.
Attempts to file sur-replies or early summary judgment motions that do not cure legal deficiencies are unlikely to forestall dismissal.

From a systemic perspective, this reinforces the role of early-motion practice in filtering out claims that rest on theories already foreclosed by established doctrine.

IV. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. De facto officer

A de facto officer is someone who:

Is in actual possession of a public office, and
Performs its duties under color of an official title,

but whose appointment or qualification is somehow technically defective (e.g., an oath not formally executed). The law treats the acts of such an officer as valid with respect to the public and third parties, to avoid chaos and uncertainty.

2. Collateral attack

A collateral attack is an attempt to challenge the validity of an official act or judgment in a new, separate proceeding, rather than through direct appeal or a designated statutory procedure. The de facto officer doctrine generally bars collateral attacks based solely on qualification defects.

3. Facial vs. factual jurisdictional challenge

Facial 12(b)(1) challenge:
Accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and asks whether, as a matter of law, the court has jurisdiction. No evidence is required.
Factual 12(b)(1) challenge:
Disputes the truth of the jurisdictional facts. The court may consider evidence outside the pleadings and need not assume the allegations are true.

In Jones, the challenge to OMAG’s susceptibility to suit was facial and purely legal: Oklahoma law, by definition, does not permit a bad faith tort claim against OMAG.

4. Right to travel

The right to travel generally protects:

Freedom to move from state to state,
Equal treatment among states for new residents, and
Protection from unreasonable burdens on interstate movement.

It does not mean that one is exempt from:

Driver’s license requirements,
Vehicle registration statutes, or
Other neutral safety regulations.

5. Scope of employment

Under the OGTCA, “scope of employment” refers to acts performed:

In good faith,
Within the duties of employment, and
Serving the employer’s interests.

“Bad faith” acts, by definition, fall outside that scope. This is crucial because Oklahoma only waives sovereign immunity for acts within the scope of employment. Hence, there is no waiver—and thus immunity remains—for bad faith torts against OMAG.

6. In forma pauperis

Proceeding in forma pauperis allows a litigant with limited financial resources to pursue an appeal without prepaying filing fees. Granting this status does not signal that the appeal has merit; it merely waives certain costs.

7. Nonprecedential order and judgment

A Tenth Circuit “order and judgment” designated as nonprecedential:

Is not binding precedent in future cases, except under doctrines like law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
May nevertheless be cited for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and Tenth Cir. R. 32.1.

Jones thus does not formally reshape Tenth Circuit law, but it does articulate how existing principles apply to a familiar pattern of claims.

V. Conclusion

Jones v. City of Comanche offers a concise but instructive application of several well-established doctrines:

The de facto officer doctrine prevents litigants from invalidating police actions based solely on technical defects in an officer’s oath or appointment.
The constitutional right to travel does not absolve drivers from obeying state vehicle registration and licensing laws, even when a vehicle is used solely for private, non-commercial purposes.
Under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act, public entities such as OMAG are immune from tort claims premised on “bad faith” conduct, because such conduct falls outside the statutory “scope of employment” for which immunity is waived.
Pro se litigants remain subject to the same pleading standards as represented parties; courts will dismiss complaints that fail to state legally cognizable claims, without evidentiary hearings, at the Rule 12 stage.

While nonprecedential, the decision solidifies the Tenth Circuit’s resistance to a recurring set of arguments—oath-of-office challenges, “private traveler” theories, and attempts to sue OMAG for bad faith—and will likely be cited frequently for its persuasive value in similar future cases.