De Facto Arrests and Stationhouse Transports: Swanson v. State and the Limits of Terry Stops for Evidence Collection

De Facto Arrests and Stationhouse Transports: Swanson v. State and the Limits of Terry Stops for Evidence Collection

I. Introduction

In Swanson v. State, decided on December 15, 2025, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed firearm convictions arising from a social-media-driven investigation and a warrantless DNA collection. The opinion substantially clarifies the boundary in Delaware law between:

  • a permissible investigatory detention (a Terry stop) under 11 Del. C. § 1902, and
  • a de facto arrest that requires probable cause.

The case addresses whether the police, acting on a social media video and a tip from a past-proven reliable confidential informant, could:

  1. stop and frisk the defendant on the street, and
  2. then, without probable cause, handcuff and transport him to the station for DNA testing as part of that same “investigatory detention.”

The Court held that:

  • the initial street stop and pat down were valid based on reasonable articulable suspicion;
  • the later handcuffed transport to the station and detention for DNA collection was “indistinguishable from a traditional arrest” and thus a de facto arrest;
  • that arrest was not supported by probable cause, because the State failed to sufficiently link the defendant to a gun found in a recycling bin 25–30 feet away; and
  • the resulting DNA evidence must be suppressed.

Because the conviction depended on the DNA evidence, the Court reversed without reaching Swanson’s separate claim concerning alleged inadequacies in the trial court’s voir dire into “victim bias.”

The decision is especially significant in three areas of Delaware criminal procedure:

  • Limits on stationhouse transports under Terry and § 1902;
  • Probable cause based on confidential informants’ tips, particularly when no officer ever personally observes the alleged firearm; and
  • The use of DNA and other biometric evidence collected during investigative detentions.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Social Media Video and CI Tip

On August 22, 2023, Wilmington Detective Anthony Lerro was conducting routine surveillance of social media when he viewed an Instagram Story featuring Marvin Swanson at 23rd and Jessup Streets. Swanson was identifiable by:

  • a white bucket hat,
  • a black “Rick and Morty” hoodie, and
  • ripped jeans.

After multiple viewings, Lerro believed that:

  1. Swanson mimed firing a gun with his hands, and
  2. lifted his hoodie to reveal what Lerro thought was a gun or magazine in his waistband, partially blocking a visible “Nike” logo.

About 25 minutes later, a past-proven reliable confidential informant (CI) texted Lerro:

  • a screen recording of the same Instagram video, and
  • the assertion that Swanson had a firearm in the video.

Roughly twenty minutes after that, the CI again contacted Lerro, saying:

  • he was now in the same area as Swanson;
  • Swanson was still in possession of a firearm; and
  • Swanson was wearing the same distinctive clothing, including the white bucket hat.

Lerro understood this to mean the CI had personally observed Swanson with a firearm at 23rd and Jessup.

B. Street Encounter and Discovery of the Gun

Within minutes, Lerro and other officers drove an unmarked police vehicle to 23rd and Jessup. As they approached, people on the street “called out” the police presence, which the officers testified often prompts individuals to discard contraband.

At the scene the officers observed:

  • Swanson, wearing exactly the clothing described by the CI and seen in the Instagram story, and
  • the CI also present in the area.

Investigator Linkhurst, believing Swanson to be unlawfully armed, conducted a pat down. No weapon was found on Swanson’s person.

The officers then searched the immediate surroundings, consistent with their experience that “call outs” give suspects time to dump weapons. In a recycling bin about 25–30 feet away, they found a loaded silver and black handgun with an extended magazine on top of other trash.

At that point, officers:

  • handcuffed Swanson,
  • placed him in the back of the police vehicle, and
  • decided to bring him to the station for DNA testing instead of formally arresting him on the spot.

Detective Lerro testified he believed he then had probable cause to arrest Swanson, but chose instead to obtain DNA to “confirm if [the gun] was, in fact, in his possession.”

C. Stationhouse Detention and DNA Collection

Because DNA swabs and kits were stored at the Wilmington Police Station, the officers transported Swanson—still handcuffed—to the station’s turnkey area. There, before officers raised the issue, Swanson volunteered to provide his DNA. Lerro testified that if Swanson had refused, he would have sought a search warrant for DNA.

At approximately 3:10 p.m.—about an hour after the initial street detention—Lerro swabbed Swanson’s cheeks. Swanson was then told he was free to leave. Subsequent laboratory analysis showed Swanson’s DNA matched DNA on the handgun recovered from the recycling bin.

Months later, on December 18, 2023, police arrested Swanson for:

  • Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (PFBPP), and
  • Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited (PABPP).

At his jury trial, Swanson was convicted of both charges.

D. Motion to Suppress and Superior Court Ruling

Swanson moved to suppress:

  • his DNA sample,
  • other items seized, and
  • any statements made at the station,

arguing that the stop and detention violated the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution.

The Superior Court denied the motion, holding:

  1. Officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop and detain Swanson under 11 Del. C. § 1902 based on the Instagram video and CI tip.
  2. The subsequent detention and transport were “reasonable, necessary, and related in scope to the investigation,” and thus remained a valid Terry stop.

The Superior Court expressly found Detective Lerro’s testimony credible that he saw a gun in the Instagram video—even though the judge personally could not discern a firearm on careful review.

E. Appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court

On appeal, Swanson raised two arguments:

  1. The trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because:
    • the Instagram video plus CI tip did not create reasonable articulable suspicion; and
    • even if the initial stop was valid, the handcuffed transport to the station for DNA testing was a de facto arrest unsupported by probable cause.
  2. For the first time on appeal, he contended the Superior Court’s voir dire failed to adequately probe whether prospective jurors had been victims of crimes, allegedly impairing his right to an impartial jury.

The State responded that:

  • the stop and detention were supported by reasonable articulable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances;
  • the transport to the station was a permissible, minimally intrusive extension of the Terry stop; and
  • even if the transport were deemed a de facto arrest, it was supported by probable cause once the firearm was found nearby.

The Supreme Court reversed based solely on the suppression issue and did not reach the voir dire question.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Delaware Supreme Court’s central holdings can be summarized as follows:

  1. Standard of Review: The Court applies a mixed standard—clear error for factual findings, de novo for legal conclusions and the application of law to facts in suppression rulings.
  2. Initial Street Detention Was a Valid Terry Stop:
    • Based on the CI’s past-proven reliability, the detailed clothing and location description, and corroboration on arrival, officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop and pat down Swanson.
    • The brief continued street detention while officers searched the nearby area for a discarded firearm was reasonably related in scope and minimally intrusive.
  3. Transport to the Station Was a De Facto Arrest:
    • Handcuffing Swanson, placing him in a police vehicle, transporting him to the station, and questioning him in the turnkey area before obtaining DNA was “in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest.”
    • This level of intrusion exceeded the bounds of a Terry stop under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 6, notwithstanding the two-hour detention period permitted by § 1902.
  4. No Probable Cause for Arrest:
    • Although the CI’s tip, standing alone, supported reasonable articulable suspicion, it did not supply probable cause absent corroboration of the assertion of illegality (actual firearm possession).
    • The discovery of a gun in a recycling bin 25–30 feet away—without any details in the tip about the weapon or independent evidence connecting Swanson to that gun—was insufficient to link Swanson to the firearm.
    • The record contained no observation of Swanson approaching or leaving the bin, nor any specific features tying the gun to the object allegedly seen by Lerro in the Instagram video.
    • Thus, the State failed to meet the higher probable cause threshold required to justify a warrantless arrest.
  5. Exclusionary Rule:
    • Because the de facto arrest was unconstitutional, the DNA sample and all derivative evidence had to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.
    • Without that evidence, the convictions could not stand; the Court therefore reversed the Superior Court’s judgment.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Doctrinal Framework

1. The Terry / Arrest Dichotomy and Delaware’s § 1902

The Court grounds its analysis in well-settled Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, echoed in Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution:

  • Terry v. Ohio: authorizes brief investigative detentions (“Terry stops”) based on reasonable articulable suspicion that a person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime.
  • Arrests: require probable cause to believe the person has committed a crime. These are more intrusive seizures.

Delaware codifies Terry principles in 11 Del. C. § 1902, which authorizes officers to:

  • stop a person in a public place on “reasonable ground to suspect” criminal activity,
  • demand identification and an explanation of actions,
  • detain the person for “further questioned and investigated” if the explanation is unsatisfactory, and
  • hold the person for up to two hours, after which he must be either released or formally arrested and charged.

But § 1902 is explicitly bounded by constitutional reasonableness: the statute does not create a blanket two-hour safe harbor. The detention must:

  • be “minimally intrusive”, and
  • remain “reasonably related in scope” to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place (citing Hicks v. State, Flowers v. State).

If the duration or level of force becomes unreasonable, what started as a Terry stop can ripen into a de facto arrest (see United States v. Sharpe, Flowers, Womack).

2. Stationhouse Transports as De Facto Arrests: Dunaway and Hayes

The Court relies heavily on two U.S. Supreme Court precedents addressing stationhouse detentions:

  • Dunaway v. New York:
    • Police took Dunaway from a neighbor’s home, transported him to the station, put him in an interrogation room, and questioned him, all without probable cause.
    • The Supreme Court held this seizure was “not even roughly analogous” to a limited Terry stop and was a full-scale arrest requiring probable cause.
    • It rejected the idea that labeling the detention something short of a formal “arrest” could sidestep the Fourth Amendment.
  • Hayes v. Florida:
    • Officers transported Hayes from his home to the station for fingerprinting with neither probable cause nor a warrant.
    • The Court held that forcibly moving a suspect from a place where he is entitled to be to the station for investigative purposes crosses the line into an arrest, again requiring probable cause or judicial authorization.
    • Hayes is especially relevant because it deals not with full custodial booking, but with an investigative trip solely for evidence collection (fingerprints).

The Delaware Supreme Court explicitly tracks Hayes: when the State removes a person by force or constraint to a station and detains him—even briefly—for investigative purposes without probable cause, the seizure is “sufficiently like an arrest” to invoke the probable cause requirement.

3. Delaware Cases Allowing Limited Transports under Terry

Delaware precedent had recognized narrow circumstances in which officers may move a suspect during a Terry stop without converting the detention into an arrest, where the move is:

  • reasonable and necessary, and
  • the least intrusive means to pursue a legitimate and time-sensitive investigative purpose.
Key examples:
  • State v. Kang (Super. Ct. 2001):
    • Suspected DUI driver was moved from a fatal accident scene to a nearby hospital for field sobriety tests.
    • The scene was dark, on an incline, crowded, and emotionally charged by the presence of a deceased passenger.
    • The court found the transportation reasonable and necessary, given safety concerns and the need to promptly assess blood alcohol levels, which would change over time.
  • State v. Biddle (Super. Ct. 1996), aff’d (Del. 1998) (Order):
    • Police transported a robbery suspect a short distance for a prompt “show-up” identification immediately after the crime; the victim could possibly identify the perpetrator.
    • This first, brief transport was held minimally intrusive and closely tailored to a pressing investigative need—an eyewitness’s fragile memory.
    • A subsequent transport to headquarters for fingerprinting was upheld on the separate ground that the suspect voluntarily consented to go.
  • State v. Matthews (Super. Ct. 2018):
    • Transporting a DUI suspect four blocks to the station due to weather and location concerns was deemed reasonable in order to safely and promptly investigate blood alcohol content.

From these cases, the opinion draws a limiting principle:

In the context of transport during a Terry stop, Delaware courts typically uphold movement only where: (1) there is a time-sensitive or evanescent evidentiary concern (e.g., blood alcohol, eyewitness memory); (2) the transport is relatively short and less intrusive than formal arrest; and (3) the suspect consents, or the movement is clearly necessary for safety or feasibility.

By contrast, Swanson involved an hour-long detention culminating in transport to the station for DNA collection, with no comparable exigency.

4. Informant Tips and the Reasonable Suspicion / Probable Cause Divide

A large part of the opinion addresses the different thresholds that an informant’s tip must meet to support:

  • reasonable articulable suspicion (for a Terry stop), versus
  • probable cause (for an arrest or search warrant).

Key U.S. Supreme Court authority:

  • Alabama v. White:
    • Reasonable suspicion can rest on information less reliable than that required for probable cause.
    • An anonymous tip can be elevated to reasonable suspicion if it accurately predicts future movements, suggesting “inside” knowledge.
  • Florida v. J.L.:
    • An anonymous tip that a young man in a plaid shirt at a bus stop had a gun was insufficient for even reasonable suspicion when police corroborated only identity and location, not illegality.
    • The Court emphasized that corroboration of identity alone—readily observable to any passerby—does not show knowledge of concealed criminal activity.
  • Adams v. Williams:
    • A known informant personally approached an officer and reported that a suspect in a particular car had a gun at his waist and narcotics.
    • The Court permitted a Terry stop because the informant was known, previously reliable, and appear in person, making him accountable and allowing immediate verification.

Delaware cases echo and refine these principles:

  • Purnell v. State:
    • A past-proven reliable CI reported that two men at a specific corner had guns and drugs and described their clothing.
    • Police saw Purnell matching the description at the stated location; this corroboration was sufficient for reasonable suspicion.
  • Miller v. State:
    • A CI predicted that two men would arrive at a specific place, at a specific time window, using a specific method (backing into one of four spots) to deliver heroin.
    • Police corroborated the time, location, and behavior, supporting reasonable suspicion.
  • LeGrande v. State and McKinney v. State:
    • Where police corroborated only identity and location—not the alleged illicit activity—CI tips were insufficient to establish probable cause.
    • Corroboration must extend to evidence of illegality, not merely who and where.
  • Cooper v. State (Cooper II) and related cases:
    • For probable cause, Delaware courts typically require:
      • a CI with a track record of reliability, and
      • independent police corroboration of criminal conduct (e.g., controlled buys, observations of drug dealing, discovery of contraband matching the tip).

Swanson places itself firmly within this line: it allows the reliable CI tip, corroborated by clothing and location, to support reasonable suspicion, but refuses to let that same constellation of facts, plus a nearby unlinked gun, suffice for probable cause.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Was the Continued On-Scene Detention Within the Scope of a Terry Stop?

After the initial pat down found no firearm on Swanson’s person, officers:

  • briefly detained him on the scene, and
  • searched the nearby area for a discarded gun.

Swanson argued that once the pat down yielded nothing, reasonable suspicion of firearm possession dissipated and the continued detention was unlawful.

The Court rejected that argument, applying the “scope” test from Hicks and Flowers:

  • The officers’ purpose—investigating potential unlawful firearm possession—was ongoing, and searching for a nearby discarded gun was directly related to that purpose.
  • The intrusion remained minimal: there is no indication that officers escalated force (e.g., they did not immediately handcuff Swanson, tackle him, or move him away from the scene at this stage).
  • The additional time on scene was brief.

Given the “call out” alerting people to police presence, it was reasonable for officers to infer Swanson could have ditched a gun in the immediate vicinity. Maintaining the status quo while they checked for that possibility stayed within the permissible scope of a temporary investigative detention.

2. Why the Stationhouse Transport Was a De Facto Arrest

The key inflection point is the decision to:

  • handcuff Swanson after locating the gun in the recycling bin,
  • place him in the back of the police vehicle, and
  • transport him to the police station for DNA collection.

The Court determined this was “indistinguishable from a traditional arrest”, for several reasons:

  • Degree of restraint: Swanson was handcuffed and confined in a police vehicle, then escorted into the station and held in the turnkey area.
  • Nature of location: Moving a suspect from a public place to a police station is a paradigmatic indicator of custody; this mirrors Dunaway and Hayes.
  • Lack of consent to the transport:
    • There is no evidence Swanson agreed to go to the station for DNA testing.
    • His later voluntary consent to be swabbed occurred after arrival at the station and does not retroactively legitimize the transport.
  • Investigative purpose, not exigency:
    • The officers moved Swanson purely to collect DNA evidence, not to prevent imminent danger or preserve evanescent evidence like blood alcohol content.
      • not time-sensitive in the same way; they can be obtained later with a warrant if probable cause develops.

Critically, at oral argument, the State could not meaningfully distinguish this detention from an arrest—a point the Court underscored in noting the State’s concession.

Because the quantum of liberty deprivation had plainly moved beyond a brief, minimally intrusive field inquiry, the Court held that the handcuffed transport and stationhouse detention constituted a de facto arrest. As such, it required probable cause, not merely reasonable suspicion.

3. Did the Officers Have Reasonable Articulable Suspicion for the Initial Stop?

Swanson challenged even the initial Terry stop, arguing the Instagram video plus CI tip did not provide reasonable suspicion.

The Court disagreed and (importantly for Delaware practice) did so without needing to decide whether the trial judge was correct to credit Lerro’s testimony that he saw a gun in the Instagram video. Instead, it grounded reasonable suspicion principally in the CI’s tip and its corroboration:

  • The CI was:
    • known personally to Lerro,
    • past-proven reliable (leading to five prior arrests), and
    • never previously inaccurate.
  • The CI:
    • provided a contemporaneous report of seeing Swanson with a firearm,
    • gave a detailed clothing description (white bucket hat, black Rick and Morty hoodie, ripped jeans), and
    • identified the specific location (23rd and Jessup).
  • Upon arrival, officers:
    • confirmed Swanson’s presence at that location,
    • confirmed he was wearing the precise outfit described, and
    • observed the CI also on the scene.

In line with Purnell, Miller, and Adams, the Court found that where:

  • a known, reliable informant directly reports criminal conduct, and
  • police confirm the suspect’s identity, clothing, and location as predicted,

officers may reasonably suspect that the suspect is engaged in the reported criminal activity, even before they personally see a weapon.

Thus, the pat down and brief on-scene detention were lawful under Terry and § 1902.

4. Did the Officers Have Probable Cause for Arrest Once the Gun Was Found?

The more demanding question was whether, at the time of the de facto arrest (handcuffed transport to the station), the officers had probable cause.

Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances known to officers would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe the suspect committed an offense. Under Stafford v. State, Juliano v. State, and Maryland v. Pringle, this is an objective standard focused on what the officers knew at the time.

Here, at the moment of arrest, officers knew:

  • Swanson was a “person prohibited” (i.e., barred from possessing firearms);
  • a trusted CI had reported seeing Swanson with a firearm in that area;
  • Swanson appeared at the scene in the exact clothing and location described; and
  • a loaded silver and black handgun with an extended magazine had been found in a recycling bin 25–30 feet away from Swanson, following a “call out.”

Why was this not enough for probable cause? The Court’s reasoning turns on two interrelated deficiencies:

  1. Insufficient corroboration of the CI’s assertion of illegality, as opposed to mere identity/location; and
  2. No evidentiary nexus between Swanson and the specific firearm found.

First, following LeGrande and McKinney, the Court held that corroboration must go to the alleged criminal conduct, not just who and where the suspect is:

  • Police confirmed that Swanson was at 23rd and Jessup in the described clothes; this corroborated identification.
  • But they did not personally observe Swanson holding, discarding, or otherwise interacting with any weapon.

Second, the discovery of a gun in a nearby recycling bin did not adequately connect Swanson to that specific firearm:

  • The CI’s tip did not include any details about:
    • the gun’s make, model, or color;
    • whether it had an extended magazine; or
    • how or where Swanson was carrying or storing it (on his person vs. stashed nearby).
  • There was no evidence in the record that:
    • officers saw Swanson approach or move away from the recycling bin, or
    • Swanson made any gesture suggesting he discarded an object.
  • Even assuming, arguendo, that the Instagram video showed something at Swanson’s waistband, Detective Lerro could not identify any distinctive features tying that object to the silver-and-black extended-magazine handgun found in the bin.

Where the alleged crime is possession by a person prohibited, the State must show some likelihood that the defendant actually possessed the gun in question. A prohibited person plus a nearby, unconnected gun does not automatically equal probable cause.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that the State had no more than the same level of suspicion that justified the initial stop: reasonable articulable suspicion, not the higher “fair probability” required for probable cause.

Because the transport was a de facto arrest, and because that arrest lacked probable cause, the DNA evidence (and its fruits) were obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 6 and had to be excluded.

C. Impact of the Decision

1. Limits on Stationhouse Transports Under § 1902 and Terry

Swanson sends a clear message: § 1902 does not authorize stationhouse transports for non-exigent investigative purposes on mere reasonable suspicion, particularly when the purpose is to gather biometric evidence (like DNA) that can be obtained later with probable cause and a warrant.

For law enforcement, this means:

  • Officers must distinguish between:
    • short, on-scene investigative detentions (pat downs, brief questioning, limited area searches), and
    • custodial transports to a station, even if not formally labeled “arrests.”
  • Moving a suspect to the station, especially in handcuffs, will usually be treated as an arrest unless:
    • the suspect clearly and voluntarily consents, or
    • there is a strong, objectively demonstrable necessity (e.g., safety hazards, unworkable conditions at the scene) coupled with a time-sensitive evidentiary need.

The opinion thus curtails any tendency to treat the two-hour limit in § 1902 as a blanket license for up to two hours of stationhouse-level custody on reasonable suspicion alone.

2. DNA and Other Biometric Evidence Collection

Although the case does not squarely resolve all questions about DNA collection, it strongly implies:

  • Police may not handcuff and transport a person to the station for the sole purpose of obtaining DNA under mere reasonable suspicion.
  • Absent exigent circumstances or valid consent at the scene, officers who want DNA must:
    • first develop probable cause, and
    • secure a warrant for the DNA sample or wait until the person is lawfully arrested on probable cause for some offense.

The Court also analogizes DNA to fingerprints in Davis v. Mississippi and Hayes, emphasizing that a suspect’s DNA profile, like his fingerprints, does not face immediate risk of destruction. This weakens any claim that “we needed to do it now” can justify intrusive stationhouse detentions on mere suspicion.

3. Refined Standards for CI-Based Probable Cause in Gun Cases

For firearm investigations, Swanson confirms and sharpens a key distinction:

  • A detailed tip from a past-proven reliable CI, corroborated as to identity, location, and clothing, can support a Terry stop.
  • However, for probable cause to arrest or search, officers generally must have:
    • corroboration of the CI’s assertion of illegality (e.g., seeing the suspect with the gun, seeing the suspect discard it, or finding a gun that matches specific descriptive details), or
    • other independent evidence linking the suspect to a specific firearm.

This is especially important where no officer ever personally sees the gun in the suspect’s possession. The opinion resists pressure to slide from “a little more than a hunch” into full probable cause merely because:

  • the suspect is a person prohibited, and
  • a gun is found somewhere in the vicinity.

4. Social Media Evidence and Officer Perception

Swanson also provides a subtle but important note about social media evidence:

  • The Superior Court found the detective “credible” in saying he saw a gun in the Instagram video, but the court itself could not discern a firearm in that video.
  • The Supreme Court avoided resolving that tension by showing that reasonable suspicion existed even without relying on Lerro’s claimed observation of a gun in the video.

This approach:

  • avoids elevating ambiguous or hard-to-discern video imagery into dispositive proof; and
  • signals that courts will critically examine officer “perceptions” of social-media imagery rather than simply deferring to them.

For future cases, this suggests that while social media can be a legitimate source of suspicion, courts will scrutinize how clearly it depicts alleged contraband or criminal conduct, rather than accepting subjective impressions at face value.

5. Practical Consequences for Prosecutions

Practically, Swanson has immediate and concrete implications:

  • Where key forensic evidence (like DNA) is the product of a stationhouse detention based only on reasonable suspicion, defense counsel will have a strong suppression argument grounded in this case.
  • Prosecutors will need to:
    • ensure that officers articulate how probable cause was established before any custodial transport, or
    • be prepared to rely solely on pre-transport evidence when the legality of the transport is doubtful.
  • Suppression of high-value forensic evidence can be case-dispositive, as it was here.

V. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

For non-specialists, several core concepts in the opinion merit brief explanation.

1. Terry Stop vs. Arrest

  • Terry Stop (Investigatory Detention):
    • A brief stop and limited detention for investigative purposes.
    • Requires reasonable articulable suspicion—specific, articulable facts suggesting criminal activity, plus rational inferences.
    • Must be short in duration, limited in scope, and minimally intrusive.
  • Arrest:
    • Taking a person into custody so that he may answer for a crime (Delaware law definition).
    • Requires probable cause to believe the person committed a crime.
    • Often involves handcuffing, transport to a station, booking, and more significant restraints on movement.

A de facto arrest occurs when the intrusion is effectively that of an arrest, even if the police do not use the label “arrest” or complete formal booking.

2. Reasonable Articulable Suspicion vs. Probable Cause

  • Reasonable Articulable Suspicion:
    • A lower standard than probable cause.
    • Requires more than a mere hunch, but less than a preponderance of the evidence.
    • Permits stops, pat downs, and brief on-scene investigation.
  • Probable Cause:
    • A higher standard; there must be a “fair probability” that a crime has been or is being committed by the suspect.
    • Supports arrests, search warrants, and more intrusive searches/seizures.

Informant tips can contribute to both, but the level of corroboration and reliability required for probable cause is significantly higher.

3. Confidential Informants and Corroboration

A confidential informant (CI) provides information to police that is not publicly disclosed. Courts assess:

  • Reliability / veracity: Has the CI provided accurate information in the past?
  • Basis of knowledge: How does the CI know what he claims? Personal observation? Hearsay?
  • Police corroboration:
    • Does independent police work confirm facts suggesting criminality (e.g., contraband, suspicious behavior),
    • or merely confirm readily observable things like identity and location?

Corroboration that goes only to who the suspect is and where he is, without confirming the alleged illegal conduct, is usually insufficient for probable cause, though it may be enough for reasonable suspicion.

4. The Exclusionary Rule

The exclusionary rule bars the government from using evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment or its state constitutional analogs. This includes:

  • Direct evidence obtained during an unlawful search or seizure (e.g., Swanson’s DNA sample), and
  • Sometimes, derivative evidence that is the “fruit of the poisonous tree” (e.g., test results from that DNA sample).

Here, because the de facto arrest was unconstitutional, the DNA collection and resulting match to the handgun were inadmissible, mandating reversal.

VI. Conclusion: The Significance of Swanson v. State

Swanson v. State is a notable Delaware Supreme Court decision that:

  • Reaffirms that Terry stops under § 1902 must remain limited in scope and intrusiveness; officers cannot convert a stop into a stationhouse detention and still label it “investigatory.”
  • Clarifies that handcuffed transport to a police station for evidence collection (here, DNA) is generally a de facto arrest requiring probable cause, absent consent or compelling necessity.
  • Refines Delaware’s CI jurisprudence by insisting that:
    • past-proven reliability and corroboration of identity and location suffice for reasonable suspicion but
    • do not, without more, establish probable cause—especially in gun-possession cases where the link between the suspect and the weapon is tenuous.
  • Highlights the proper role of the exclusionary rule: when police exceed constitutional bounds in pursuit of evidence—even powerful forensic evidence like DNA—the State may lose the benefit of that evidence entirely.

In practical terms, the case serves as a warning against:

  • using § 1902 as a springboard to stationhouse-level custodial detentions without the requisite probable cause; and
  • short-circuiting the warrant process for biometric evidence under the guise of continued “investigatory” detention.

Going forward, Swanson will likely be cited as leading authority in Delaware on:

  • what types of movement and restraint transform a Terry stop into an arrest, and
  • what level of corroboration a CI-based firearm investigation must have before it can support probable cause—especially where no officer ever personally sees the weapon in the suspect’s possession.

By carefully delineating these boundaries, the Court preserves both effective law enforcement and the core constitutional principle that serious intrusions on liberty—like stationhouse detentions—require the solid grounding of probable cause, not simply reasonable suspicion bolstered by convenience.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

Judge(s)

Valihura J.

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