Danville Christian Academy v. Beshear: Supreme Court Clarifies Application of Neutral Laws to Religious Institutions

Introduction

In the landmark case Danville Christian Academy, Inc., et al v. Andy Beshear, 141 S. Ct. 527 (2020), the Supreme Court of the United States addressed critical issues surrounding the intersection of public health measures and religious freedoms. The case arose amidst the COVID-19 pandemic when Governor Andy Beshear of Kentucky issued a temporary school-closing order affecting all K–12 schools, including religious institutions. Danville Christian Academy, a private religious school, challenged the order, arguing that it disproportionately targeted religious education and infringed upon constitutional rights.

Summary of the Judgment

On December 17, 2020, the Supreme Court denied the application for a preliminary injunction sought by Danville Christian Academy and other religious schools against Governor Beshear's school-closing order. This order mandated the closure of in-person instruction in all K–12 schools until the holiday break. While the District Court had granted relief to the religious schools, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stayed that injunction pending appeal. The Supreme Court's denial effectively upheld the Sixth Circuit's stay, allowing the temporary school closures to remain in effect. Importantly, the denial was issued without a full majority opinion, but was accompanied by notable dissenting opinions from Justices Alito and Gorsuch.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment references several pivotal cases that have shaped the Court's approach to balancing religious freedoms against neutral, generally applicable laws:

Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990): This case established that neutral laws of general applicability do not violate the Free Exercise Clause, even if they incidentally burden religious practices.
PIERCE v. SOCIETY OF SISTERS, 268 U.S. 510 (1925): Affirmed the rights of parents to direct the education of their children, striking down an Oregon law that mandated public schooling.
WISCONSIN v. YODER, 406 U.S. 205 (1972): Held that the state could not compel Amish parents to send their children to public schools beyond eighth grade.
CHURCH OF LUKUMI BABALU AYE, INC. v. HIALEAH, 508 U.S. 520 (1993): Emphasized that constitutional protections cannot be circumvented by splitting regulations into multiple ordinances.

Additionally, the dissent references Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, which underscores the Court's stance against unconstitutional executive actions, even if they are temporary.

Legal Reasoning

The majority's decision hinged on the neutrality and general applicability of Governor Beshear's order. By treating secular and religious schools equally, the order ostensibly did not target religious institutions specifically. Consequently, under the precedent set by Employment Division v. Smith, the Court presumed that the law was constitutional, applying a rational basis review.

However, the dissenting opinions challenged this notion by arguing that the aggregation of the Governor's executive orders resulted in discriminatory effects against religious schools. Justice Gorsuch, in his dissent, contended that considering the orders in isolation ignored the broader context in which secular institutions like restaurants and gyms remained open. Justice Alito echoed this sentiment, emphasizing that the timing and cumulative impact of the orders warranted a re-examination under stricter scrutiny, especially given the "hybrid" nature of the claims involving both free exercise and parental rights in education.

The dissenters also highlighted procedural concerns, noting that the applicants had acted promptly and that the Court should not defer relief solely based on the imminent expiration of the order.

Impact

This judgment reinforces the principle that neutral and generally applicable laws are permissible even if they incidentally impact religious practices, aligning with the Smith precedent. However, the dissent signals a potential shift or at least hints at internal Court divisions regarding how such laws are interpreted when they intersect with other fundamental rights, like parental control over education.

Moving forward, religious institutions may face challenges in litigating against neutral public health measures unless they can demonstrate a more direct or intentional targeting. Additionally, the dissent's arguments may influence future cases, potentially encouraging a re-examination of the standards applied to neutral laws affecting religious entities, especially in contexts where multiple rights are implicated.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Neutral and Generally Applicable Laws

A law is considered neutral if it does not target a specific religion or religious practice and generally applicable if it applies to all similarly situated entities without distinction. Under Employment Division v. Smith, such laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, even if they incidentally burden religious practices, provided there is a legitimate governmental interest behind the law.

Preliminary Injunction

A preliminary injunction is a temporary court order that prevents a party from taking a particular action until a final decision is made in the case. In this context, the religious schools sought to stop the enforcement of the Governor's school-closing order while the legal challenge was ongoing.

Hybrid Claims

Hybrid claims involve allegations that a law or action infringes upon more than one constitutional right simultaneously. In this case, the plaintiffs argued that the school closures violated both their Free Exercise rights and the parental right to direct their children's education, potentially triggering a higher level of scrutiny.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's decision in Danville Christian Academy v. Beshear underscores the judiciary's cautious approach to balancing public health directives with religious freedoms. While affirming the principle that neutral and generally applicable laws are permissible, the dissenting voices within the Court highlight ongoing debates about the extent to which such laws should be scrutinized when they intersect with fundamental rights. This case serves as a precedent for future litigation involving religious institutions and public policies, emphasizing the need for a nuanced analysis that considers both the letter and the broader implications of governmental actions.

Moving forward, stakeholders in the legal and educational sectors will closely monitor how similar cases are adjudicated, especially in scenarios where executive orders or public health measures may disproportionately affect religious organizations. The balance between governmental authority and constitutional protections remains a dynamic and evolving landscape, with Danville Christian Academy v. Beshear contributing a significant chapter to this ongoing discourse.