Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date: October 14, 2025

Case: United States v. Kalib Tucker, No. 24-4088

Panel: Judges Nalbandian (author), Mathis, and Ritz

Disposition: Affirmed (conviction and sentence)

Publication Status: Not recommended for publication

Introduction

This unpublished Sixth Circuit decision addresses two core questions at the intersection of federal sentencing and firearms law. First, it considers whether the district court committed procedural or substantive error in imposing an above-Guidelines sentence for a felon-in-possession conviction. Second, it evaluates an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) in light of the Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Williams (2024), which crafted an individualized, “dangerousness”-based framework for adjudicating such claims under the Supreme Court’s historical-tradition methodology.

Defendant-appellant Kalib Tucker pleaded guilty under § 922(g)(1) after officers found a loaded Glock, ammunition, a speed loader, and illegal drugs in his residence while he was on state parole. The district court varied upward from a stipulated Guidelines offense level of 17 to 21 and imposed 57 months, citing Tucker’s rapid post-release recidivism, contraband, pretrial detention misconduct, and risk to the community. On appeal, Tucker argued procedural and substantive unreasonableness and raised a late-breaking constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1), which he framed as as-applied under Williams. The Sixth Circuit rejected all arguments, affirmed the sentence, and clarified how Williams operates in practice: where a defendant’s record contains crimes against the person and similar violent or dangerous offenses, those convictions are “practically dispositive” of dangerousness, and courts need not weigh factors such as youth at the time of prior crimes, time spent incarcerated, or the nonviolent nature of the instant § 922(g)(1) offense.

Summary of the Opinion

• Procedural reasonableness: Reviewed for plain error because defense counsel failed to lodge specific objections under Bostic at sentencing. The district court adequately explained its reasons for the upward variance, explicitly discussed multiple § 3553(a) factors, and filed a written statement of reasons (SOR) as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). No procedural error, let alone plain error.
• Substantive reasonableness: Reviewed for abuse of discretion. The district court reasonably weighed deterrence and public protection against Tucker’s mitigation (difficult upbringing, mental health, family obligations). An above-Guidelines sentence is not presumed unreasonable; no abuse of discretion found.
• Second Amendment challenge (as-applied): Reviewed for plain error. Applying United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024), the panel held Tucker’s violent criminal history—drive-by shooting (felonious assault) and a home invasion with repeated punches (burglary and a crime against the person)—made him a “dangerous” felon. That history is “practically dispositive” under Williams; the court need not consider Tucker’s age when he committed the prior crimes, his time in prison, or the nonviolent nature of the present offense. The as-applied challenge fails.
• Ineffective assistance of counsel: Not addressed on direct appeal; the proper vehicle is a § 2255 motion because the record wasn’t developed for this claim.

Factual and Procedural Background

Prior convictions: Tucker’s criminal history includes multiple violent felonies. In 2014, he fired several shots into an occupied Akron home (gang-related drive-by) and separately forced entry into a residence and repeatedly punched the victim. He served eight years for crimes related to the shooting and a concurrent three-year term for the burglary.

New offense: Released from prison in January 2023, Tucker drew supervision attention when a parole officer found a photo he uploaded showing a firearm in his pocket. A search uncovered a loaded Glock, ammunition, a speed loader, fentanyl pills, psilocybin mushrooms, and marijuana. He served a 270-day state prison sanction for parole violations; upon release, federal authorities arrested him for the felon-in-possession offense.

Pretrial detention misconduct: The district court noted repeated institutional misconduct: insubordination; obscuring the cell window with a sheet; smoking unknown substances; and masturbating while staring at a female officer.

Plea and Guidelines: Tucker pleaded guilty under Rule 11(c)(1)(B). The government stipulated to a Guidelines offense level of 17 but explicitly reserved that the court would decide the sentence. The court tentatively estimated a 27–33 month range, warned that this was not final, and later notified the parties that it was considering an upward departure/variance.

Sentence: After hearing mitigation, the court found an upward variance warranted, emphasizing rapid recidivism, in-custody misconduct, dangerousness, and the presence of fentanyl and a speed loader. It varied from offense level 17 to 21 and imposed 57 months, explaining its reasons on the record and in a written SOR.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

• United States v. Adams, 873 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 2017): Instructs courts to review procedural reasonableness first before substantive reasonableness.
• United States v. Johns, 65 F.4th 891 (6th Cir. 2023): Confirms abuse-of-discretion as the ordinary standard for reasonableness review.
• United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2004): Requires district courts to elicit objections after pronouncing sentence; failure to make specific objections triggers plain-error review on appeal.
• United States v. Johnson, 627 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2010): A general objection is insufficient; lack of specificity means plain error governs.
• United States v. Bauer, 82 F.4th 522 (6th Cir. 2023): Articulates the four-part plain-error test.
• Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007): A district court satisfies procedural reasonableness by considering the parties’ arguments and providing a reasoned basis under § 3553(a).
• United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018): Upholds upward variances based on public protection, deterrence, and seriousness; shows the type of explanations that suffice.
• United States v. Mitchell, 107 F.4th 534 (6th Cir. 2024): Endorses upward variances grounded in possession of narcotics, criminal history (including juveniles), and poor institutional adjustment.
• United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2007): No presumption of unreasonableness for above-Guidelines sentences.
• United States v. Sweeney, 891 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 2018): District courts need not refute mitigation point-by-point if they conduct a meaningful sentencing hearing.
• United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024): Holds § 922(g)(1) facially constitutional but allows as-applied challenges; sets out a historical “dangerousness” framework focusing on the individual’s record, with crimes against the person and dangerous crimes like burglary often dispositive.
• United States v. Bacon, 884 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2018): Applies plain-error review to unpreserved constitutional claims.
• United States v. Pedroza-Orengo, 817 F.3d 829 (1st Cir. 2016) and United States v. Vázquez-Martínez, 812 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2016): Suggest harmlessness where the court thoroughly explains reasons in open court despite written SOR issues.
• United States v. Padilla, 2023 WL 8108463 (9th Cir. Nov. 22, 2023): Acknowledges plain-error review for a missing SOR, though details of preservation timing remain murky.
• United States v. Ferguson, 669 F.3d 756 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Burrell, 114 F.4th 537 (6th Cir. 2024); United States v. Walden, 625 F.3d 961 (6th Cir. 2010): Reiterate that ineffective-assistance claims generally proceed via § 2255 because the trial record is underdeveloped on direct appeal.

Legal Reasoning

1) Procedural Reasonableness

Standard of review: Plain error, due to non-specific objections post-sentencing under the Bostic colloquy.

Adequacy of explanation: The district court articulated concrete reasons for moving from offense level 17 to 21 and imposing 57 months. It cited Tucker’s rapid return to crime post-release, possession of fentanyl and a speed loader, sustained in-custody misconduct, and risk to the community. It also emphasized the need for specific deterrence—impressing upon Tucker the need to follow rules. Under Rayyan and Rita, that level of explanation suffices.

Consideration of § 3553(a) factors: The court explicitly discussed deterrence and public protection, weighed mitigation (trauma, addiction, mental-health needs, family ties), and addressed disparity. It found that a within-Guidelines sentence would be “woefully inadequate.” This is squarely within a district court’s discretion.

Written Statement of Reasons (SOR): The court filed an SOR as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), echoing the on-the-record reasons (quick reoffending, fentanyl and speed loader, custodial misconduct). The panel noted an open question: how to preserve a challenge to a missing or inadequate SOR when the document issues after the sentencing hearing. While this case did not require resolution (because an SOR was filed), the panel flagged that the typical Bostic approach may be ill-fitted to post-hearing documents. The opinion also observed that any error may be harmless where the court provides a comprehensive oral explanation.

Bottom line: No procedural error, much less a plain one.

2) Substantive Reasonableness

Standard of review: Abuse of discretion. Above-Guidelines sentences are not presumed unreasonable (Bolds).

Weighing of factors: Tucker urged greater emphasis on his youth, trauma, mental health, and educational deficits. The district court acknowledged those but explained why deterrence and public protection predominated, given his violent record, contraband, and misconduct. Under Sweeney, the court was not required to refute each mitigation argument point-by-point. The variance was substantively reasonable.

3) Second Amendment (As-Applied Challenge to § 922(g)(1))

Standard of review: Plain error (claim not raised below).

Framework: Williams reaffirmed § 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional but recognized as-applied challenges where historical tradition indicates individual disarmament should be limited to persons adjudged “dangerous.” It directed courts to consider a defendant’s specific characteristics and entire record, identifying:

• Crimes against the person (e.g., murder, rape, assault, robbery)—“all but dispositive” of dangerousness.
• Crimes posing a significant threat of danger (e.g., burglary)—often sufficient to justify disarmament.

Application to Tucker: Tucker’s drive-by shooting (felonious assault) and home invasion with physical assault (burglary plus a crime against the person) place him squarely within the “dangerous” category. The panel underscored that, under Williams, it “doesn’t demand” consideration of mitigating temporal or situational factors like youth at the time of the prior offenses, time in prison, or the fact that the instant § 922(g)(1) offense was nonviolent. Those arguments therefore did not disturb the as-applied outcome.

Holding: No plain error; § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Tucker.

4) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The panel declined to address ineffective assistance premised on counsel’s failure to raise the as-applied challenge under Williams. Consistent with Ferguson, Burrell, and Walden, such claims generally should be brought via a § 2255 motion to allow record development.

Impact

• Second Amendment litigation under Williams: This opinion operationalizes Williams by emphasizing that violent prior felonies—especially crimes against the person and burglary—are “practically dispositive” of dangerousness. Defendants with similar records will face steep odds on as-applied § 922(g)(1) challenges. Mitigating considerations like youth at offense, years served, or nonviolent nature of the current gun possession do not need to be weighed in the constitutional analysis.
• Sentencing practice and upward variances: The case reinforces that upward variances may rest on a mix of rapid recidivism, possession of dangerous contraband (e.g., fentanyl, speed loader), and in-custody misconduct, provided the court articulates how those facts serve § 3553(a) aims (deterrence, public protection, seriousness).
• Preservation pitfalls and SOR issues: The panel’s footnote hints at a developing procedural issue: how to preserve challenges to the written SOR given its post-hearing issuance. Practitioners should consider timely, post-judgment objections or motions to correct/amend the record to avoid plain-error constraints on appeal.
• Institutional misconduct as a sentencing factor: Poor “institutional adjustment” remains a permissible and weighty sentencing consideration in the Sixth Circuit (Mitchell), bolstering upward variances when paired with other aggravators.
• Unpublished but persuasive: Though not precedential, the opinion will likely be cited for its clear application of Williams and its practical guidance on sentencing explanations and SOR compliance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness:
  • Procedural asks “Did the court follow the right steps?” (calculate Guidelines, consider § 3553(a), explain the sentence, address key arguments).
  • Substantive asks “Is the result reasonable?” (Did the court weigh the factors within its discretion without overemphasizing/underemphasizing any to an unreasonable degree?).
• Plain-Error Review: Applied when an issue wasn’t properly preserved. The appellant must show (1) error, (2) that is clear/obvious, (3) affecting substantial rights (typically outcome-determinative), and (4) seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
• Variance vs. Departure:
  • Departure uses Guidelines-based departure provisions.
  • Variance relies on § 3553(a) to deviate from the advisory range. Courts sometimes use the terms loosely; what matters is that the court explains its reasoning under § 3553(a).
• § 3553(a) Factors (selected): Nature/circumstances of the offense; history and characteristics of the defendant; need for deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation; kinds of sentences available; Guidelines; policy statements; avoiding unwarranted disparities.
• Statement of Reasons (SOR): 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) requires courts to state reasons in open court and, for sentences outside the Guidelines range, provide specific written reasons on the SOR form. This aids appellate review and transparency.
• As-Applied vs. Facial Challenges:
  • Facial challenges attack a statute in all its applications (Williams says § 922(g)(1) survives).
  • As-applied challenges contest the statute as applied to a particular person, here under the historical-tradition test focusing on “dangerousness.”
• Dangerousness under Williams: Historical tradition supports disarming individuals who are dangerous. Crimes against the person (assault, robbery) and dangerous crimes like burglary are strong indicators—often dispositive—of dangerousness for § 922(g)(1) purposes.

Unresolved Questions and Practice Pointers

• Preserving SOR Challenges: The panel questioned how Bostic applies when the SOR issues post-hearing. To avoid plain-error review, consider:
  • Promptly reviewing the SOR upon docketing and filing a motion to supplement, correct, or object in the district court; and
  • Documenting any divergence between oral reasons and the SOR or any omissions.
• Building (or attacking) an As-Applied Record under Williams:
  • Defense: Develop robust evidence countering “dangerousness” (e.g., long-standing rehabilitation, nature/circumstances of prior convictions, expungements or set-asides where applicable, absence of interpersonal violence if true). Be mindful that crimes against the person and burglary carry outsized weight.
  • Prosecution: Emphasize violent priors, temporal proximity of recidivism, and any facts showing risk (e.g., speed loaders, narcotics, custodial misconduct) to align with historical disarmament traditions as framed by Williams.
• Sentencing Explanations: District courts should tie aggravating facts to specific § 3553(a) needs (deterrence, protection, seriousness) and note consideration of mitigation to ensure robustness against procedural and substantive challenges.
• Ineffective Assistance Claims: Reserve for § 2255 unless the record is fully developed on direct appeal; frame the prejudice theory with how the omitted argument would likely have changed the outcome under the applicable standards.

Conclusion

United States v. Tucker is a pointed application of the Sixth Circuit’s emerging Second Amendment framework post-Williams and a reaffirmation of standard sentencing principles. On the firearms front, the court underscores that violent felonies—especially crimes against the person and burglary—are powerful, often outcome-determinative signals of “dangerousness,” rendering as-applied § 922(g)(1) challenges non-starters for defendants with such records; courts need not weigh youth, incarceration length, or the nonviolent character of the current § 922(g)(1) offense to reject the challenge.

On sentencing, the opinion reinforces that upward variances are sustainable where the district court provides a clear, § 3553(a)-anchored explanation that accounts for both aggravation (quick recidivism, contraband including fentanyl, custodial misconduct, community risk) and mitigation (trauma, mental health, family ties). The panel’s footnote sensitizes practitioners to an underexplored preservation issue regarding the written SOR—encouraging prompt post-judgment action in the district court when necessary.

Key takeaways:

• Violent priors (crimes against the person, burglary) are “practically dispositive” of dangerousness under Williams; as-applied § 922(g)(1) challenges will rarely succeed in such cases.
• Upward variances stand when tied to concrete facts and § 3553(a) goals, even where the plea contemplated a lower offense level.
• Specific, contemporaneous objections remain critical; absent them, plain-error review is a high bar—and SOR challenges may require proactive, post-hearing preservation steps.
• Ineffective-assistance claims are better litigated via § 2255 to allow record development.

Although nonprecedential, Tucker offers persuasive guidance for district courts crafting reasoned upward variances and for litigants navigating post-Williams Second Amendment challenges to the felon-in-possession statute.