Dangerousness, Not Disability: Sixth Circuit Reaffirms Williams—Felon-in-Possession Ban Constitutional As Applied Despite Paraplegia; No Remand Needed; Modest Upward Variance Upheld

Introduction

In United States v. Darell Wm. Craft, Jr. (6th Cir. Oct. 10, 2025), a Sixth Circuit panel (Judges Nalbandian, Mathis, and Ritz; opinion by Judge Mathis) affirmed the denial of a Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and upheld an above-Guidelines sentence. The decision applies and clarifies the Circuit’s post-Bruen framework from United States v. Williams, holding that although felons are among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment, Congress may disarm individuals who are dangerous, and that a defendant bringing an as-applied challenge bears the burden to show he is not dangerous. The panel also rejected procedural and substantive sentencing challenges to an 88-month sentence, finding no reversible error under plain-error review and concluding that a modest (13%) upward variance was justified by the defendant’s criminal history and supervision failures.

The case arose from a July 2023 traffic stop in Benton Harbor, Michigan, where officers discovered a loaded handgun under a passenger seat in a car driven by Craft—then a felon and on state probation. Craft moved to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds; the district court denied the motion, he pleaded guilty, and the court imposed a sentence 10 months above the top of the advisory Guidelines range. On appeal, Craft raised a facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1), and argued that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed in full.

Second Amendment: Relying on Williams, the court rejected Craft’s facial challenge and his as-applied challenge. The panel held that, although felons are within “the people” protected by the Second Amendment, § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to “dangerous” individuals. Craft bore the burden to show he was not dangerous and failed to meet it given his criminal history (including second-degree home invasion and aggravated assault), his post-paralysis resisting-and-obstructing convictions, his possession of a loaded firearm, and the fact he committed the federal offense mere months into state probation. The court declined to remand for a “dangerousness” hearing where the record already demonstrated dangerousness.
Procedural reasonableness: Because defense counsel objected only in general terms at sentencing, plain-error review applied. The district court mistakenly described Craft’s recent attempted resisting-and-obstructing conviction as a felony (it was a misdemeanor), but the error did not affect substantial rights because the court’s rationale turned on recidivism and the proximity of the federal offense to the start of probation, not on whether the probation was for a felony or misdemeanor. The district court adequately explained the upward variance by addressing the § 3553(a) factors, especially the need to protect the public and deter an offender with a poor supervision record.
Substantive reasonableness: The 88-month sentence—13% above the 63–78 month range—fell within the district court’s broad discretion. The court provided a compelling justification for the variance by identifying features not fully captured by the Guidelines, including Craft’s repeated noncompliance with supervision and rapid recidivism. The panel emphasized deference to the district court’s weighing of § 3553(a) factors and rejected arguments premised on the absence of firearm-related prior convictions or on prior lenient state sentences.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008): Recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms while acknowledging that the right is not unlimited. The Sixth Circuit uses Heller’s framework to accept the legitimacy of disarming some categories of individuals consistent with history and tradition.
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): Established the historical tradition test: contemporary firearm regulations must be consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The panel applies Bruen but, importantly, through the lens of Williams’s “dangerousness” synthesis.
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024): Clarified that modern laws need not be “historical twins”; it is sufficient that they are analogous and comport with the principles underlying the Second Amendment. This supports viewing § 922(g)(1) as permissible when targeted at dangerous persons.
United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024): The controlling Sixth Circuit authority. It: (1) holds § 922(g)(1) facially constitutional; (2) recognizes felons are among “the people,” yet may be disarmed if dangerous; (3) places the burden on an as-applied challenger to show he is not dangerous; and (4) instructs courts to examine the “entire criminal record.” Williams is dispositive here: Craft’s facial challenge fails, and his as-applied challenge falters because his record evidences dangerousness.
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990): Identifies burglary of a dwelling as inherently dangerous because it creates a risk of violent confrontation; the panel uses Taylor to reason that Michigan second-degree home invasion (equivalent to burglary) is a crime indicating dangerousness.
United States v. Gibbs, 626 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 2010): Equates Michigan second-degree home invasion with burglary, enabling the court to treat Craft’s 2013 conviction as a paradigmatic dangerous offense.
United States v. Robinson, 2025 WL 2105111 (6th Cir. July 28, 2025): Characterizes Michigan aggravated assault as a dangerous crime because it involves serious bodily injury or need for immediate medical treatment, reinforcing that Craft’s 2016 conviction evidences dangerousness.
United States v. Poe, 2025 WL 1342340 (6th Cir. May 8, 2025): “A loaded gun is inherently dangerous.” This underscores the seriousness of the instant offense.
United States v. White, 2025 WL 2060869 (6th Cir. July 23, 2025): Supports resolving as-applied challenges without remand where the record suffices to show dangerousness.
Sentencing authorities: Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (procedural and substantive review; deference); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (explanation duty); United States v. Dexta, 470 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2006) (factor-by-factor not required); United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) and United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2004) (preservation via post-sentencing “Bostic question”); United States v. Simmons, 587 F.3d 348 (6th Cir. 2009) (general objection triggers plain-error review); Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503 (2021) (plain-error standard); United States v. O’Lear, 90 F.4th 519 (6th Cir. 2024) (obvious-error threshold); United States v. Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d 748 (6th Cir. 2020) (variance justification and “mine-run” cases); United States v. Lee, 974 F.3d 670 (6th Cir. 2020) (criminal history and relationship to instant offense); United States v. Dunnican, 961 F.3d 859 (6th Cir. 2020) (deference); United States v. Lynde, 926 F.3d 275 (6th Cir. 2019) (broad discretion); United States v. Mitchell, 107 F.4th 534 (6th Cir. 2024) (modest upward variance); United States v. Brown, 828 F. App’x 256 (6th Cir. 2020) (unreasonable doubling from top of range); United States v. Israel, 662 F. App’x 382 (6th Cir. 2016) (considering past leniency); United States v. Small, 988 F.3d 241 (6th Cir. 2021) (lack of deterrence); United States v. Tristan-Madrigal, 601 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Boucher, 937 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Adkins, 729 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2013).

Legal Reasoning

The opinion proceeds in two steps: the Second Amendment challenge and sentencing review.

On the Second Amendment, the panel anchors its analysis in Williams. First, it rejects the facial challenge because Williams already held § 922(g)(1) facially constitutional. Second, for the as-applied challenge, the opinion adopts Williams’s dangerousness framework: felons are within “the people,” but historical tradition permits disarming dangerous individuals. The challenger bears the burden to show he is not dangerous, and the court must consider the person’s entire record.

Applying that test, the court catalogs Craft’s history: a 2013 Michigan second-degree home invasion (treated as burglary under Gibbs; burglary is “dangerous” under Taylor), a 2016 aggravated assault (dangerous due to serious injury under Robinson), and 2023 convictions for attempted resisting and obstructing police. Critically, the latter occurred after a 2018 incident that left Craft partially paralyzed. The court draws an inference that paralysis does not negate Craft’s dangerousness, noting his continued willingness to resist officers (including removing a taser during the encounter) and his commission of the instant federal offense mere months after receiving state probation. The loaded nature of the firearm further supports dangerousness (Poe).

Craft urged remand for a dangerousness hearing (noting the district court ruled before Williams). The panel declined, citing White and similar cases, because the existing record sufficed to decide the as-applied issue. That choice reflects a pragmatic application of Williams: appellate courts may affirm as-applied denials without additional fact-finding where the record already demonstrates dangerousness.

On sentencing, the panel divides its analysis between procedural and substantive reasonableness. Because defense counsel objected generally to the “upward variance” and the refusal to adjust downward due to disability, but did not identify a specific procedural defect when prompted by the Bostic question, plain-error review applies to procedural claims (Simmons; Vonner; Bostic).

The court acknowledges one clear factual misstatement: the district court described the most recent state conviction (attempted resisting and obstructing) as a felony, when it is a misdemeanor under Michigan law. But the error did not affect substantial rights (Greer) because the court’s reliance was not on the felony label; rather, it was on the fact that Craft violated the law “a scant four months” into probation and had a persistent pattern of noncompliance. The panel also holds that the district court adequately explained the upward variance: it treated the Guidelines as an “initial benchmark,” discussed the nature and seriousness of the offense, emphasized Craft’s recidivism and poor supervision performance, and articulated the need to protect the public and deter future crime (Rita; Dexta; Nunley). Under O’Lear’s plain-error standard, the explanation was not “obviously” deficient.

Substantively, the panel affords due deference to the district court’s weighing of § 3553(a) factors (Gall; Dunnican; Lynde). It recognizes that there is no presumption against outside-Guidelines sentences (Tristan-Madrigal), but the greater the variance, the more compelling the justification required (Perez-Rodriguez). Here, the 13% variance was modest (cf. Mitchell’s description of a 24% variance as modest) and supported by factors not fully captured in the Guidelines: immediate recidivism after lenient state treatment, repeated failures on supervision, and a pattern of lawbreaking that posed a risk to public safety. The panel rejects Craft’s argument that the absence of prior firearm-related convictions undermines the variance; the court may consider the relationship between his recidivism and the instant offense (Lee; Dunnican). It also dismisses the claim that the sentence’s length relative to prior state sentences renders it unreasonable; prior leniency that failed to deter can justify a stiffer federal sentence (Israel; Small). By contrast with Brown—where the sentence doubled the high end of the range without adequate justification—the district court here provided a tailored, case-specific rationale tied to § 3553(a).

Impact

Although the opinion is designated “Not Recommended for Publication,” it offers significant guidance within the Sixth Circuit’s Williams framework and for federal sentencing practice:

As-applied Second Amendment challenges face a high bar: Williams places the burden on the defendant to show non-dangerousness, and Craft illustrates the kinds of facts that will defeat that showing: violent priors (burglary-equivalent, aggravated assault), resistance to law enforcement, possession of a loaded firearm, and noncompliance with supervision—especially when the federal offense occurs soon after probation begins.
Physical disability, standing alone, is insufficient: The panel’s reasoning makes clear that a physical impairment (here, paraplegia) does not, by itself, negate a finding of dangerousness. Post-disability conduct evidencing aggression or disregard for law enforcement can be decisive.
No automatic remand for “dangerousness hearings” post-Williams: Where the record is sufficient to assess dangerousness, the Sixth Circuit may resolve as-applied challenges without remand (White).
Preservation matters at sentencing: General objections to a sentence’s reasonableness preserve substantive claims but not specific procedural complaints. Under Bostic/Simmons, lack of specificity triggers plain-error review, making reversal difficult absent outcome-changing error.
Harmless misstatements when immaterial: A district court’s erroneous label (felony vs. misdemeanor probation) will not warrant reversal if the court’s rationale does not depend on the error and the outcome likely would have been the same.
Modest upward variances are sustainable with case-specific reasons: Sentences modestly above the Guidelines can be affirmed where the court explains how the case differs from the “mine-run,” particularly with recidivism and supervision failures not fully captured by the range.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Facial vs. as-applied challenge: A facial challenge claims a law is unconstitutional in all applications; an as-applied challenge claims it is unconstitutional as applied to the specific defendant’s circumstances. Williams forecloses facial attacks on § 922(g)(1) in the Sixth Circuit; only as-applied challenges remain viable, and they turn on the defendant’s record.
Dangerousness framework (post-Williams): The court assumes a felon is within the Second Amendment’s scope but asks whether historical tradition supports disarming the person because he is dangerous. The defendant must prove he is not dangerous, considering his entire criminal history and behavior.
Historical analogies (Bruen/Rahimi): Modern laws need not perfectly mirror historical statutes; they must be consistent with historical principles—here, the longstanding tradition of disarming dangerous persons.
Plain-error review: Applied when a procedural objection is not specifically preserved. The appellant must show (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights (a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the error), and (4) seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Bostic question: At the end of sentencing, the judge asks whether there are any objections not previously raised. To preserve issues for appeal, counsel must state specific objections. General statements (e.g., “the sentence is unreasonable”) are insufficient for procedural claims.
Guidelines and variances: The Sentencing Guidelines provide an advisory range. A “variance” is a sentence outside that range based on statutory sentencing factors (§ 3553(a)). Larger variances require more robust justifications, and courts must explain how the case differs from the typical “mine-run” governed by the Guidelines.

Conclusion

United States v. Craft reinforces the Sixth Circuit’s Williams model for assessing § 922(g)(1) challenges: felons remain within the Second Amendment’s ambit, but Congress may disarm dangerous individuals; the defendant bears the burden to show he is not dangerous; and courts may resolve that question on the existing record without remand where the evidence of dangerousness is clear. The decision also underscores the practical hurdles to overturning sentences on procedural grounds absent specific preservation and outcome-changing error, and it confirms that modest upward variances are sustainable when anchored in case-specific reasons—especially recidivism and supervision failures not fully captured by the Guidelines.

Although non-precedential, Craft offers a detailed roadmap for litigants. For would-be as-applied challengers, it signals that physical disability or the absence of prior firearm-specific convictions will rarely suffice to establish non-dangerousness when the broader record shows violent conduct, resistance to law enforcement, loaded-firearm possession, and disregard for court supervision. For sentencing practice, it reiterates the importance of precise objections, careful fact-finding, and thorough yet focused explanations tethered to § 3553(a).

Note on Precedential Status

The opinion is designated “Not Recommended for Publication,” limiting its precedential force within the Circuit. It is, however, a clear application of controlling, published Sixth Circuit authority (Williams) and Supreme Court precedent (Heller, Bruen, Rahimi), and thus is likely to be persuasive in similar cases.