Dangerous-Persons Framework for Firearm Disarmament: Affirmation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) under Bruen in United States v. Williams

Introduction

This commentary examines the Sixth Circuit’s April 17, 2025 opinion in United States v. Raphael Jermaine Williams, Jr., No. 24-1409, which addressed whether a federal prohibition on firearm possession by felons—18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)—comports with the Second Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. The appellant is the United States government; the appellee is Raphael Williams, Jr., a young Michigan resident convicted of multiple felonies and alleged to have violated his probation by possessing a loaded firearm. The district court dismissed the indictment under Bruen’s “history and tradition” test, and the government appealed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding § 922(g)(1) constitutional both facially and as applied to Williams, consistent with this Court’s intervening decisions in United States v. Erick Williams and United States v. Goins.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel, sitting per curiam (Judges Cole, McKeague, and Ritz), reviewed de novo the district court’s dismissal of the indictment. It concluded that under Bruen and subsequent Sixth Circuit precedents, Congress may disarm “dangerous persons,” and Williams’s record amply demonstrated dangerousness:

Williams’s 2022 Michigan convictions included assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer (a crime against the person), receiving and concealing a stolen vehicle, malicious destruction of police property, and fleeing and eluding an officer (a crime against public safety).
He was serving probation—under a firearms ban—when he brandished weapons on social media and stored a loaded Glock .40 caliber pistol within reach of a child.
The Sixth Circuit’s decisions in Erick Williams and Goins establish that felons who have committed violent or dangerous offenses, especially while on probation, are appropriately disarmed under § 922(g)(1).

Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The opinion rests primarily on three decisions:

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022): Established the “history and tradition” test for evaluating firearm regulations against the Second Amendment. Courts must determine whether a challenged regulation aligns with historical analogues from the founding era forward.
United States v. Erick Williams (6th Cir. 2024): Held § 922(g)(1) constitutional on its face and as applied to individuals who are “dangerous people.” It requires an individualized, fact-specific inquiry into dangerousness, focusing on violent or threatening conduct and permitting courts to consider a defendant’s entire criminal record without a jury hearing.
United States v. Goins (6th Cir. 2024): Reinforced that persons in active probation—subject to firearm bans—may be temporarily disarmed consistent with historical practice, especially when their prior crimes and probation violations reflect continued danger.

Legal Reasoning

The Sixth Circuit applied Bruen’s historical-tradition framework through the lens of its own dangerous-persons jurisprudence:

The government may criminalize firearm possession by persons whose records and circumstances demonstrate dangerousness.
Violent crimes against persons (e.g., assaulting an officer) are “self-evident” indicators of danger; crimes like fleeing and eluding also create substantial risk to public safety.
Probationary firearm bans have historical analogues in early American practice, where capacity to obtain firearms was temporarily curtailed for those demonstrating dangerous conduct.
A defendant challenging § 922(g)(1) “as applied” bears the burden of proving he is not dangerous. Williams failed to overcome the presumption of dangerousness triggered by his felonies, probation violation, and social-media posts.

Impact

This decision solidifies the Sixth Circuit’s two-step approach to Second Amendment challenges post-Bruen:

Step One: Ask if the regulated activity falls within the Amendment’s plain text (it does, here, self-defense and weapon possession).
Step Two: If so, determine whether the government’s regulation is consistent with the nation’s historical firearms regulation tradition—The Sixth Circuit channels this inquiry through the “dangerous persons” exception.

Lower courts in the Sixth Circuit will now routinely apply Erick Williams and Goins to uphold § 922(g)(1) when defendants have violent or dangerous records or violate probationary firearm bans. Defendants seeking to challenge § 922(g)(1) must mount a specific showing of non-dangerousness, rather than mount broad facial attacks.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Bruen’s “History and Tradition” Test: Court must find a historical analogue (from colonial times through 19th-century state laws) for modern gun regulations to be constitutional.
“Facial” vs. “As Applied” Challenges: A facial challenge argues that a law is always unconstitutional in every application; an as-applied challenge says it’s unconstitutional in the specific defendant’s circumstances.
“Dangerous Person” Exception: Certain groups—e.g., felons, those adjudicated mentally ill, or those under restraining orders—may be disarmed based on history and tradition because they pose a risk to public safety.
De Novo Review: The appeals court re-examines the legal question from scratch without deferring to the district court’s conclusions on constitutionality.

Conclusion

United States v. Williams reaffirms that § 922(g)(1) survives Second Amendment scrutiny when applied to individuals with dangerous records. Building on Bruen, Erick Williams, and Goins, the Sixth Circuit confirms a framework under which felons—particularly those who commit violent offenses or violate probationary firearm bans—may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of regulating arms. This decision guides future litigants and lower courts: to prevail on an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1), a defendant must present persuasive, individualized evidence that he poses no risk to public safety.