Daker v. Owens: Mootness of Interlocutory Appeals and Merger of Preliminary Injunction Orders into Final Judgment

Introduction

Waseem Daker, a Georgia state prisoner serving a life sentence, filed a civil rights suit in 2014 challenging various conditions of his confinement and related practices. Over the ensuing years, Daker—proceeding pro se—submitted numerous motions for injunctive relief, including requests for special food trays during religious observances, expanded law‐library access, photocopying, release from segregation, and protection of his beard from forced shaving. In March 2021, the district court denied these motions. Daker appealed those interlocutory orders to the Eleventh Circuit. While that appeal was pending, the district court dismissed Daker’s entire case with prejudice for willful refusal to comply with monetary‐sanction orders. The Eleventh Circuit then faced the threshold question whether Daker’s interlocutory appeals remained justiciable once the underlying action was finally terminated.

Summary of the Judgment

On March 11, 2025, a per curiam Eleventh Circuit panel dismissed Daker’s interlocutory appeal as moot. The court held that once a district court enters final judgment—especially a dismissal with prejudice—the interlocutory appeal of any preliminary injunction or similar orders “merges” into the final judgment and loses its independent basis for appeal. Because Daker’s suit was ended by a final merits decision, his challenges to the separate injunctive‐relief orders no longer presented a live case or controversy under Article III. The panel relied on established Eleventh Circuit precedent to confirm that interlocutory appeals of preliminary‐injunction rulings become moot when the underlying dispute culminates in final judgment.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Burton v. State of Ga. (953 F.2d 1266 (11th Cir. 1992)): Held that interlocutory appeals of preliminary‐injunction rulings merge into final judgment and become moot once that judgment is entered.
Barfield v. Brierton (883 F.2d 923 (11th Cir. 1989)): Explained that an appeal from final judgment draws into question all prior non‐final orders, obviating separate interlocutory review.
Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist. (549 U.S. 1262 (2007)): Supreme Court dismissal of interlocutory injunction appeals once final judgment is entered.
English v. City of Gainesville (75 F.4th 1151 (11th Cir. 2023)): Emphasized the circuit’s threshold duty to confirm appellate jurisdiction and live controversies.
Bourgeois v. Peters (387 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2004)): Defined mootness as absence of a live dispute capable of resolution.
Brooks v. Ga. State Bd. of Elections (59 F.3d 1114 (11th Cir. 1995)): Clarified exceptions to mootness, including “capable of repetition yet evading review” and preservation of the status quo.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeded in three steps:

Jurisdiction and Mootness Doctrine: Article III limits federal adjudication to live “cases” and “controversies.” Mootness is a jurisdictional bar that must be addressed first.
Merger of Interlocutory Orders: Eleventh Circuit practice holds that an interlocutory appeal from a preliminary‐injunction order becomes moot when the district court later enters a final judgment on the merits or otherwise disposes of the case. The appeals statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), grants immediate appealability for preliminary injunctions—but that right vanishes if the underlying action is terminated.
Application to Daker’s Case: Daker’s final dismissal with prejudice occurred while his interlocutory appeal was pending. Because the district court’s final judgment subsumed all prior non‐final rulings, the Eleventh Circuit no longer had a live issue to resolve regarding the earlier denials of injunctive relief.

3. Impact

The Daker decision reaffirms and clarifies the merger doctrine in the Eleventh Circuit. Key takeaways include:

Interlocutory appeals of preliminary‐injunction determinations cannot be unmoored from the ultimate outcome of the case.
Parties must be prepared to raise all relevant issues in a single appeal from final judgment if they wish their interlocutory objections to be considered on the merits.
Pro se litigants, in particular, should recognize that piecemeal appeals of injunctive orders risk mootness if their broader case ends before appellate resolution.

More broadly, the decision underscores judicial economy by preventing duplicative appellate proceedings and ensuring that courts focus on fully resolved disputes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mootness: The doctrine that federal courts can only decide active controversies. If intervening events make it impossible for a court to grant any effective relief, the case is moot and must be dismissed.
Preliminary Injunction: A temporary court order that maintains the status quo or prevents harm while the case proceeds to a final decision.
Interlocutory Appeal: An appeal of a non‐final order. Normally disfavored except in certain circumstances, such as preliminary‐injunction rulings under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
Merger Doctrine: The principle that interlocutory appeals of injunctions “merge” into the final judgment and lose their distinct appealability once the case concludes.

Conclusion

Daker v. Owens reaffirms the Eleventh Circuit’s consistent approach to interlocutory appeals of preliminary‐injunction orders. By holding such appeals moot upon entry of a final judgment, the court streamlines appellate review and prevents fragmentation of litigation. Litigants must therefore preserve their injunctive concerns for appeal from final judgment or risk forfeiting appellate review of those issues. This ruling preserves judicial resources, deters piecemeal appeals, and upholds Article III’s case‐or‐controversy requirement.