D.V. v. Texas DFPS: When the State Unequivocally Withdraws a Termination Request, Termination Is Off the Table

I. Introduction

In D.V. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the Supreme Court of Texas squarely confronted a recurring but under-theorized problem: what happens when the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) tells the trial court at a parental-rights termination trial that it is not seeking termination, yet the court terminates anyway?

Mother D.V. (“Mother”) faced termination of her parental rights to her child, E.D., after DFPS intervened due to her violent behavior and drug use. Although DFPS’s live pleadings still asked the court to terminate both parents’ rights, the Department’s designated representative testified twice, in clear and direct terms, that DFPS sought to restrict Mother’s rights, not terminate them. DFPS’s counsel never corrected or repudiated those statements. Nonetheless, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights, and the court of appeals affirmed.

The Supreme Court reversed, announcing a significant procedural protection in parental-termination cases: when DFPS (including its designated representative) unequivocally states on the record that it is not seeking termination and never repudiates that position, a trial court may not terminate parental rights. The opinion reframes how abandonment of claims operates in this exceptionally sensitive area of law, emphasizing the uniquely protected status of parental rights and the corresponding obligations on the State and trial courts.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Underlying facts

Mother had a history of violent incidents and drug use. After she allegedly assaulted her ex-boyfriend and one of her other two children, DFPS removed E.D. and filed a petition seeking to terminate both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. Over time, DFPS’s position changed as to Father: by trial, DFPS wanted him appointed as E.D.’s permanent sole managing conservator. Yet DFPS never amended its live pleadings, which still requested termination of both parents’ rights.

At trial, no one treated the live pleadings as a full reflection of DFPS’s actual litigation posture. Everyone proceeded as though Father’s rights were not at issue; DFPS supported Father as the permanent sole managing conservator. The real dispute concerned Mother’s status and the extent of her ongoing rights, if any, to E.D.

B. The videoconference trial before the associate judge

The district court referred the case to an associate judge, who conducted a bench trial by videoconference. DFPS had designated its caseworker as its representative at trial under Texas procedural rules for non-natural parties.

On the second trial day, DFPS’s counsel elicited the critical testimony from the caseworker:

Q. … What is the Department's recommendation [to] the Court today?

A. The Department is seeking to limit and restrict [Mother]'s rights, and give permanent managing conservatorship of [E.D.] to [Father], and to limit [Mother]'s rights to parent non-conservator with no visitation and contact.

The representative’s answer, framed as “the Department is seeking…”, squarely described DFPS’s position as to Mother and made no mention of termination. Mother’s counsel, understandably seeking clarity, followed up on cross-examination:

Q. And [the Department] is not seeking to terminate [Mother]'s rights, but to ask the Court to name her as a parent non-conservator?

A. Correct.

Nobody objected. DFPS’s counsel did not attempt to correct, qualify, or retract these statements, nor did DFPS later say, “We are still seeking termination.”

C. Other trial participants’ positions

The Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) volunteer, who represents the child’s best interests (but is not a party), recommended termination of Mother’s rights. DFPS asked:

Q. … And what is CASA's recommendation to the Court for [E.D.]'s best interest?

A. CASA believes it's in [E.D.]'s best interest for Mother's rights to be terminated and for there to be [joint managing conservatorship] with Dad and Grandpa, with Dad being the primary on that.

E.D.’s attorney ad litem—charged with representing the child’s legal interests—concluded closing argument by stating:

Your Honor, I think the Department has met its burden as far as termination… However, if the Court is not inclined to terminate [Mother]'s parental rights, then I would request the Court name her a non-possessory conservator.

Mother herself testified that she wanted at least visitation and ideally custody restored, and she expressly asked the court not to terminate her parental rights.

DFPS, notably, made no opening statement and no closing argument. Mother’s counsel closed by “ask[ing] the Court not to terminate [Mother]’s rights.” Immediately after the attorney ad litem finished, the associate judge announced that Mother’s parental rights were terminated and Father was appointed sole managing conservator. A final judgment followed.

D. De novo review, court of appeals, and issue preserved

Mother sought a de novo hearing in the referring district court. Initially, the district court refused; the court of appeals reversed and remanded for that de novo hearing. On remand, Mother advanced several arguments against termination, but only one was preserved for further appellate review:

The associate judge lacked the authority to terminate [Mother]'s constitutionally protected parental rights when the Department affirmatively abandoned its pleading for termination at trial.

The referring district court nevertheless adopted the associate judge’s ruling, and Mother appealed again. The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed in a published decision, 716 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024).

The court of appeals acknowledged that parties can abandon pleadings “by a stipulation,” such as a concession by a party or attorney in a judicial proceeding. Relying on In re I.L. and In re J.M., it held that stipulations must be interpreted in light of the “language used and the surrounding circumstances,” including pleadings, evidence, and “the attitudes of the parties.” Under that “contextual” approach, the court concluded that the caseworker’s statements did not unequivocally abandon DFPS’s request for termination, particularly given:

• the CASA volunteer’s recommendation of termination,
• the attorney ad litem’s statement that DFPS had “met its burden” on termination,
• the presentation of evidence supporting termination,
• Mother’s own plea not to terminate, and
• the fact that the statements came from DFPS’s representative, not its counsel.

Mother petitioned for review. The Supreme Court granted and reversed.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Supreme Court of Texas announced a clear and narrow rule tailored to parental-rights termination cases:

“In parental-termination cases, a court may not terminate parental rights in the face of an unequivocal and unrepudiated statement made by someone speaking on the department’s behalf that withdraws termination as a requested form of relief.”

Key elements of the Court’s holding include:

• Parties can abandon claims for relief, including termination, not only through formal amendment but also by stipulation or express concessions during trial.
• DFPS’s designated representative—formally appointed to be the Department’s “face” at trial—may, when speaking for the Department, state positions that bind DFPS in the litigation context.
• Here, the representative’s testimony that DFPS “is not seeking to terminate [Mother]’s rights” and instead was seeking to limit her to non-conservator status “with no visitation and contact” was unequivocal and unambiguous.
• Because DFPS’s counsel never corrected or repudiated that statement, the Department abandoned its request for termination as to Mother. Once abandoned, termination could not lawfully be ordered on DFPS’s claim.
• The court of appeals’ reliance on a “totality of the circumstances” to dilute the effect of this unequivocal statement was “inadequate—or at least incomplete—in parental-termination cases” given the unique constitutional and statutory protections governing such proceedings.

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and the portion of the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights. Importantly, it did not simply remand for a new trial. Instead, it rendered judgment, consistent with DFPS’s expressed position at trial, that Mother be appointed a parent non-conservator (or non-possessory conservator) with no visitation or contact, subject to the district court’s task of entering a judgment consistent with that outcome and resolving any remaining issues.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. The constitutional status of parental rights

The Court anchored its reasoning in a long line of cases recognizing parental rights as fundamental, constitutionally protected interests that occupy a special position in civil law.

• Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1976).
  The Court quoted Wiley’s famous formulation: actions severing the parent-child relationship “can never be justified without the most solid and substantial reasons,” and proceedings that “permanently sunder” those ties must be “strictly scrutinized.” Wiley also recognized a strong presumption that “the best interest of a minor is usually served by keeping custody in the natural parents,” and observed that the parent-child relationship is of “constitutional dimensions.”
• In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. 2012), quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
  Citing E.R. and Santosky, the Court reiterated that termination proceedings “encumber[] a value ‘far more precious than any property right’ and [are] consequently governed by special rules.” Those special rules include heightened evidentiary standards and procedural safeguards not applicable in ordinary civil cases.
• Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. 1985).
  Holick required “clear and convincing evidence” as a constitutional prerequisite for involuntary termination. The Court noted that this standard has been codified in Texas Family Code § 161.001(b).
• In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2019).
  N.G. underscores the “elevated standard of appellate review” applicable to termination findings, particularly under predicate grounds that carry collateral consequences. The Court cited N.G. to emphasize that parental-rights termination cases are not treated as run-of-the-mill civil disputes on appeal.
• Legate v. Legate, 28 S.W. 281 (Tex. 1894).
  One of the earliest Texas cases on parental rights, Legate stated: “[T]he law presumes that the best interest of the child will be subserved by allowing it to remain in the custody of the parents….” The Court invoked Legate to support the long-standing presumption against unnecessary intrusions into the parent-child relationship.

B. Flexibility of procedure in custody/termination cases

• Leithold v. Plass, 413 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. 1967).
  The Court quoted Leithold’s observation that “[t]echnical rules of practice and pleadings are of little importance in determining issues concerning the custody of children.” While procedure still matters, Leithold teaches that rigid adherence to “technical” procedural concepts must be tempered by the realities and stakes of child-related cases.

C. Abandonment of claims and stipulations

• Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 301 and 165.
  Rule 301 limits judgments to relief “supported by the pleadings.” Rule 165 expressly permits abandonment of claims and defenses: “A party who abandons any part of his claim or defense, as contained in the pleadings, may have that fact entered of record, so as to show that the matters therein were not tried.”
• Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Great Western Drilling, Ltd., 574 S.W.3d 882 (Tex. 2019).
  Pathfinder holds that stipulations can narrow the issues: “[w]hen parties stipulate that only certain questions will be tried, all others are thereby waived.” This principle undergirds the Court’s approach: DFPS’s clear statement that it was not seeking termination functioned like a stipulation removing termination from the case.
• In re Shaw, 966 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.).
  The Court expressly endorsed Shaw’s conclusion that courts may not order termination when DFPS “has stipulated that it is not seeking that relief.” Shaw provided a close analogue, elevating abandonment/stipulation doctrine into the termination context.
• In re N.H., No. 02-22-00157-CV, 2022 WL 4374638 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 22, 2022, no pet.).
  In N.H., a private provider testified that DFPS was not seeking termination as to one child and, in that narrow context, “effectively served as the Department’s agent.” The Supreme Court analogized N.H. to this case but pointed out that D.V. is even clearer: here the declarant was DFPS’s formally designated representative.
• In re I.L., 580 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, pet. dism’d), and In re J.M., 352 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.).
  These cases, cited by the court of appeals, involve interpreting stipulations by looking at the language used and the surrounding circumstances, including pleadings and parties’ attitudes. The Supreme Court did not reject these cases outright, but found the “totality of the circumstances” approach inadequate—without additional safeguards—when applied to parental-termination litigation.

D. Notice, service plans, and clarity of stakes

• In re A.L.R., 646 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. 2022).
  In A.L.R., a service plan described court-ordered requirements as “requested tasks,” which the Court held did not adequately alert the parent to their mandatory nature. That service plan could not support termination. D.V. invokes A.L.R. to highlight the importance of clarity in informing parents about what is required of them and what is at stake, reinforcing why DFPS must be equally clear when it abandons the ultimate remedy of termination.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. The unique nature of parental-termination cases

The Court begins its analysis by stressing that this is not simply a generic civil-procedure dispute. While the mechanics involve abandonment of claims and the effect of pleadings versus trial conduct, the Court insists that parental-termination cases are different in kind from ordinary civil litigation.

Drawing from Wiley, E.R., Holick, N.G., Santosky, and Legate, the Court emphasizes:

• Parental rights are a fundamental constitutional interest.
• Termination “permanently sunders” the parent-child relationship.
• Special rules govern termination, including:
  • a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof;
  • heightened appellate review of factual sufficiency;
  • strong presumptions favoring preservation of the natural parent-child relationship; and
  • appointment of counsel to indigent parents, which is “practically unheard of in civil litigation.”

Because of these special rules and the extraordinary stakes, the Court holds that procedural doctrines—even those familiar in contract, tort, or commercial cases—must be applied with caution and adjusted for the context. The Court explicitly reserves for another day the broader question of how to evaluate abandonment in “typical” civil cases, acknowledging that the totality-of-the-circumstances approach might suffice in some other settings. In termination cases, however, that approach is “inadequate—or at least incomplete.”

B. General civil-procedure principles: abandonment and stipulations

On the general procedural question, the Court aligns with settled rules:

• Judgment cannot be granted on a claim that has been abandoned (Tex. R. Civ. P. 301, 165).
• Claims can be abandoned formally via amended pleadings or informally by stipulation or express statements limiting the issues for trial (Pathfinder).

Thus, if a party stipulates that it no longer seeks a particular form of relief, the court cannot grant that relief. This rule is not unique to termination cases; the distinctiveness comes in how strongly the Court applies it once an unequivocal abandonment has occurred.

C. Interpreting DFPS’s designated representative’s testimony

The Supreme Court then analyzes the precise language of DFPS’s representative:

“The Department is seeking to limit and restrict [Mother]’s rights… and to limit [Mother]’s rights to parent non-conservator with no visitation and contact.”

and, on cross-examination:

Q. “[The Department] is not seeking to terminate [Mother]’s rights, but to ask the Court to name her as a parent non-conservator?”

A. “Correct.”

The Court makes several key points:

• The representative’s words “bear only one meaning”: DFPS was not seeking termination of Mother’s rights, but was instead seeking non-conservator status with no visitation or contact.
• The testimony was elicited by DFPS’s own counsel in response to questions about “the Department’s recommendation,” not the caseworker’s personal opinion.
• DFPS’s counsel never walked back, contradicted, or clarified this testimony, even after Mother’s counsel reinforced it on cross-examination.

Against this backdrop, the Court rejects the court of appeals’ conclusion that the statements could not be interpreted as an unequivocal abandonment. They were unequivocal on their face; the only question is whether anything else in the record could displace their plain meaning.

D. Why the “context” does not overcome the clear withdrawal

The court of appeals and DFPS argued that various aspects of the trial context showed that DFPS had not really abandoned termination. The Supreme Court addresses each in turn and finds them insufficient.

1. CASA and attorney ad litem’s positions

Both CASA and the child’s attorney ad litem favored termination. The attorney ad litem even stated that “the Department has met its burden as far as termination.”

The Supreme Court responds that what matters is whether DFPS is seeking termination, not whether other participants believe DFPS could obtain termination. CASA and the attorney ad litem are not parties controlling the State’s claims for relief. Their recommendations cannot resurrect a remedy DFPS has explicitly renounced.

2. Presentation of evidence supporting termination

The court of appeals reasoned that introducing evidence supporting termination is “inconsistent with abandoning the request for termination.”

The Supreme Court acknowledges that, in some cases, presenting exclusively termination-related evidence might raise questions about whether an abandonment is genuine. But in this case, the evidence “equally supported” the alternative relief DFPS expressly sought—limiting Mother to non-conservator status with no visitation. The Court adds that even if evidentiary choices created some tension with the representative’s statement, they “could not overcome the clear statement given the important interests at stake.”

3. Mother’s counsel asking the court not to terminate

DFPS argued that Mother’s counsel would not have asked the court not to terminate if termination was no longer “on the table.” The Court rejects this inference:

• Mother’s counsel could reasonably assume that, despite DFPS’s withdrawal, the court might nevertheless consider termination—but that does not transform an abandoned claim back into a live one.
• It would be “bizarre” to treat a parent’s plea not to terminate as reviving termination as an available remedy when DFPS itself has withdrawn it.
• The Court observes that counsel might have been relying, explicitly or implicitly, on the legal proposition that termination was unauthorized after DFPS’s abandonment.

4. Statements from a representative rather than counsel

The court of appeals and DFPS placed weight on the fact that the abandonment came from DFPS’s representative, not its attorney. The Supreme Court rejects any categorical rule limiting abandonment to counsel’s statements:

• DFPS had formally designated the representative under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 267 and Texas Rule of Evidence 614. The point of such a designation is to give a non-human entity a human “face” at trial who may testify about, and express, its position.
• In N.H., a private provider could “effectively serve as the Department’s agent” for purposes of announcing DFPS’s position; a fortiori, a formally designated representative can do so.
• Even if one demanded that counsel be involved in abandonment, that requirement was met: DFPS’s counsel elicited the testimony, endorsed it by silence, and never corrected it.

The Court carefully cabins its holding: it does not decide when or whether a designated representative can “bind” DFPS in other contexts (such as settlement, waiver of sovereign immunity, or policy-making). The holding is intentionally limited to parental-termination proceedings, where presumptions “have always disfavored termination.”

5. The live pleadings still requested termination

DFPS argued that its live pleadings continued to seek termination, so there was no abandonment. The Court finds this unpersuasive for two reasons:

• Abandonment necessarily presupposes that a claim was previously pleaded; a live pleading is a starting point, not an insulator against abandonment.
• More damningly, the same live pleading still requested termination of Father’s rights, even though DFPS openly advocated for Father to be the permanent sole managing conservator. No one disputed that DFPS had, in fact, abandoned that termination request as to Father. It would be inconsistent to insist that the pleading precluded abandonment as to Mother when it clearly did not as to Father.

The Court notes that a pleading requesting termination:

• provides vital notice to parents of the gravity of the stakes, and
• triggers key protections such as the right to appointed counsel under Family Code § 107.013(a).

But once DFPS determines that termination is no longer appropriate, “we must expect the department to acknowledge as much.” Termination is “always the last resort,” and abandonment of that remedy “should not be met with skepticism” as if DFPS could not really mean it.

E. The new rule: unequivocal withdrawal binds unless clearly repudiated

Synthesizing its analysis, the Court articulates the governing rule for future cases:

“We hold that an unequivocal assertion by the department—including its designated representative—that it does not seek termination constitutes withdrawal of a request for that relief unless clearly repudiated.”

Key aspects of this rule:

• Unequivocality: The statement must be clear and unambiguous that DFPS is not seeking termination.
• Speaker: The assertion may come from DFPS itself, its counsel, or its formally designated representative speaking for DFPS in the litigation.
• Repudiation requirement: If the statement is inaccurate or mistaken, DFPS must promptly and clearly repudiate it—by correcting the witness, reasserting its claim to the court, or otherwise unambiguously clarifying that termination remains sought.
• Timing: The Court strongly implies that repudiation must come “rapid[ly]” given the gravity of the proceedings, though it does not set an exact temporal rule.

The Court uses vivid language to emphasize the seriousness of such misstatements:

• If the State intends to seek termination, a contrary statement “should be a blaring klaxon alerting the department to the need for instant correction.”
• Because DFPS made “no effort at correction” here, the Court “take[s] it at its word” and treats termination as abandoned.

F. Application to this case and disposition

Applying the rule:

• DFPS’s representative gave an unequivocal statement that DFPS was not seeking termination of Mother’s rights.
• DFPS’s counsel elicited that testimony and never corrected or disavowed it.
• No other party (including Father) sought termination of Mother’s rights in their pleadings.

Accordingly:

• The termination claim as to Mother was abandoned.
• The associate judge and district court lacked authority under Rule 301 to enter judgment terminating Mother’s rights on a claim that was no longer part of the case.
• The court of appeals erred in affirming termination based on a “totality of the circumstances” reading that diluted DFPS’s clear withdrawal.

On remedy, Mother asked the Supreme Court to render judgment appointing her as a parent non-conservator or non-possessory conservator. The Court notes that this is “precisely what” DFPS’s representative told the trial court DFPS wanted. The Supreme Court therefore:

• reverses the court of appeals’ judgment,
• reverses the portion of the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s rights,
• renders judgment that Mother be appointed as parent non-conservator (or non-possessory conservator) consistent with DFPS’s position, and
• remands to the district court to enter a judgment consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision and to resolve any remaining issues, with authority to conduct additional proceedings as needed.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. For DFPS litigation practices

This decision will likely have immediate and concrete effects on how DFPS conducts termination litigation:

• Greater care in witness preparation.
  DFPS must ensure its designated representatives and caseworkers clearly understand the Department’s actual litigation position. A misstatement such as “we are not seeking termination” can now, absent swift correction, legally withdraw the termination claim.
• More active participation by counsel.
  DFPS’s counsel can no longer remain silent when a representative’s statements conflict with pleadings. The opinion strongly implies an expectation that counsel will:
  • object or correct in real time,
  • clarify on redirect examination, and/or
  • use opening or closing arguments to reassert that termination is sought if that is indeed DFPS’s position.
• Encouragement to genuinely use alternatives to termination.
  The Court emphasizes that termination is the “last resort” and that DFPS should not be met with skepticism when it abandons termination in favor of less drastic alternatives. This may embolden DFPS to adjust its goals mid-case—e.g., to long-term conservatorship without termination—without fear that trial courts will “second-guess” that change by terminating anyway.

B. For trial courts in termination cases

Trial judges must now treat DFPS’s on-the-record statements about the scope of relief as binding, absent clear repudiation:

• If DFPS states unequivocally that it is not seeking termination and does not promptly correct that statement, the trial court may not order termination—even if:
  • termination remains in the live pleadings,
  • the evidence would support termination, or
  • CASA or the attorney ad litem strongly urge termination.
• Trial courts cannot “restore” termination as an option based on contextual factors once DFPS has, in effect, stipulated that termination is not being sought.
• The opinion implicitly cautions courts against sua sponte granting termination simply because the evidence might justify it when no party is currently seeking that relief.

C. For parents and their counsel

The decision strengthens parents’ procedural protections in several ways:

• Reliance on DFPS’s in-court representations.
  Parents can justifiably rely on DFPS’s in-court statements about whether termination is at stake. If DFPS says, “We are not seeking termination,” parents need not assume that termination remains available simply because the original petition requested it.
• Strategy and preservation.
  Counsel for parents should:
  • ensure the record clearly reflects any abandonment of termination,
  • object if the trial court appears poised to terminate despite such abandonment, and
  • raise abandonment as a specific ground in any de novo hearing, post-judgment motion, or appeal, as Mother did here.

D. For CASA and attorneys ad litem

While CASA volunteers and children’s attorneys ad litem remain free—and obligated—to advocate for what they believe is in the child’s best interest, this case clarifies that they cannot, by their recommendations alone, maintain termination as a live remedy when DFPS has withdrawn it and no other party seeks it.

Their advocacy must therefore be calibrated to the actual issues remaining in the case. For example, if DFPS abandons termination, CASA and the attorney ad litem can:

• argue about the conditions of conservatorship,
• recommend specific visitation restrictions or supervision, and
• address potential future modification if circumstances change,

but cannot preserve termination as a remedy where no party is actively seeking it.

E. For broader Texas civil-procedure doctrine

More broadly, D.V. underscores two important themes in Texas jurisprudence:

• Context-sensitive application of procedural rules.
  The Court is explicit: doctrines like abandonment, stipulations, and the effect of pleadings may operate differently when fundamental constitutional interests are at stake. The decision reinforces a willingness to modulate general civil-procedure rules in light of substantive rights.
• Binding effect of trial-level concessions.
  The opinion serves as a reminder that what parties say in open court—especially when speaking for institutional entities—can narrow or eliminate claims, even without formal amendment of pleadings. Lawyers and agencies must treat such statements with the same care they would give to formal pleadings.

VII. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Termination of parental rights vs. restriction of conservatorship

Under Texas law, termination of parental rights is the most drastic intervention the State can impose. It:

• completely severs the legal relationship between parent and child;
• extinguishes most parental rights and responsibilities (with some exceptions, such as potential duty to pay accrued child support); and
• clears the way for adoption by others.

By contrast, the Family Code allows courts to impose less extreme measures such as:

• Appointment of a “sole managing conservator” (here, Father), who exercises primary parental authority; and
• Appointment of a “non-possessory” or “parent non-conservator” parent, who may retain certain residual rights or none, depending on the order, but whose role is sharply curtailed or effectively suspended.

In D.V., DFPS’s trial position was to ask the court to appoint Father as sole managing conservator and to make Mother a parent non-conservator with no visitation or contact. That is still a severe restriction, but crucially, it does not permanently extinguish the legal parent-child relationship. Future modification is at least theoretically possible if circumstances dramatically change, whereas termination forecloses that route.

B. “Clear and convincing” evidence

“Clear and convincing evidence” is an intermediate standard of proof higher than the ordinary “preponderance of the evidence” used in civil cases. It requires a degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations.

In termination cases, Texas law requires clear and convincing evidence on:

• at least one statutory ground for termination (e.g., endangerment, abandonment, failure to complete service plan), and
• that termination is in the child’s best interest.

Although D.V. is not about the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court’s repeated references to this standard highlight the heightened scrutiny and care required whenever termination remains a potential outcome.

C. Abandonment of claims and stipulations

In civil litigation, a “claim” or “cause of action” asserted in pleadings can effectively disappear from the case in several ways:

• Formal abandonment through amended pleadings that omit the claim.
• Informal abandonment via:
  • stipulations limiting the issues for trial (e.g., “the only issues to be tried are liability and causation, not damages”);
  • explicit concessions in open court (e.g., “we are no longer pursuing our fraud claim”); or
  • trial conduct plainly inconsistent with continuing to seek that form of relief.

Once a claim is abandoned, a court cannot grant relief on it. D.V. applies this familiar rule to the context of termination: DFPS’s unequivocal statement that it “is not seeking to terminate” operates as an abandonment that binds the court, unless DFPS clearly repudiates it in time.

D. Designated representatives and “The Rule”

In Texas, non-natural parties (corporations, governmental entities, etc.) may designate a representative to be present in the courtroom even when other witnesses are excluded under “The Rule” (Texas Rule of Evidence 614). Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 267 similarly contemplates such representatives.

The representative’s functions include:

• serving as the “face” of the entity at trial,
• assisting counsel, and
• testifying about the entity’s knowledge, records, and positions.

D.V. recognizes that, at least in the narrow context of parental-termination cases, a designated representative’s clear articulation of “the Department’s” position can:

• bind DFPS for purposes of what relief it seeks, and
• effectively operate as a stipulation, especially when elicited and left uncorrected by counsel.

E. Associate judges and de novo hearings

Family courts in Texas often use associate judges to handle heavy dockets, particularly in child-protection matters. Associate judges conduct hearings and trials and issue proposed findings and recommendations. Parties may then seek a de novo hearing before the referring district court, which effectively re-tries the issues.

In D.V., Mother successfully obtained a de novo hearing, but the referring district court still adopted the original termination. The Supreme Court’s decision thus reinforces that even after de novo review, legal errors—such as terminating rights on a claim that DFPS has abandoned—remain subject to correction on appeal.

VIII. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and Broader Significance

D.V. v. Texas DFPS establishes an important procedural and substantive protection in Texas parental-termination law:

• Core rule: If DFPS, including through its designated representative, makes an unequivocal statement in court that it is not seeking termination of a parent’s rights, and does not clearly repudiate that statement, the termination remedy is no longer legally available in that case.
• Binding effect: Neither the presence of termination language in the live pleadings, nor the presentation of evidence that might support termination, nor the recommendations of CASA or an attorney ad litem, can override DFPS’s clear abandonment.
• Contextual limitation: The rule is anchored in the unique constitutional status of parental rights, the “special rules” governing termination, and long-standing presumptions in favor of maintaining the parent-child relationship.
• Practical consequences: DFPS must carefully coordinate its litigation posture with its trial representatives; trial courts must refrain from granting termination if DFPS withdraws that request; and parents, CASA, and ad litems must frame their advocacy around the issues actually left in the case.

Ultimately, the opinion reaffirms that termination of parental rights is a remedy of last resort that cannot be imposed casually, procedurally, or by default. When the State tells a court—plainly and without later correction—that it is not seeking to sever the legal bond between parent and child, the court must respect that limitation. Termination is too grave a step to rest on ambiguous or internally inconsistent signals from the government that seeks it.