Introduction

In Georgiou v. Sacred Patriarchal & Stravropegial Orthodox Monastery of St. Irene Chrysovalantou (2025 NY Slip Op 05668, Appellate Division, Second Department, Oct. 15, 2025), the Second Department delivers a comprehensive pleading-stage roadmap for Child Victims Act (CVA) litigation against institutions. The court simultaneously reaffirms the constitutionality of the CVA’s claim-revival provision under the New York Constitution’s Due Process Clause, and draws a sharp doctrinal line between (a) vicarious liability for an employee’s sexual assault under respondeat superior—which generally fails absent scope-of-employment allegations or nonconclusory ratification—and (b) direct institutional negligence (negligent hiring, retention, and supervision) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), which may proceed if adequately pled.

The plaintiff, Andrew Georgiou, alleges he was sexually abused by an employee of the monastery between 1974 and 1980. He sued under the CVA (CPLR 214-g), which revives previously time-barred claims by child sexual abuse survivors. The Supreme Court, Queens County (Love, J.), dismissed Georgiou’s “sexual abuse and battery” claim against the monastery but allowed claims for negligent supervision, negligent retention, IIED, and punitive damages to proceed. Georgiou appealed the dismissal; the monastery cross-appealed the denial of dismissal of the remaining claims and challenged the CVA’s constitutionality. The Second Department affirmed in full.

Summary of the Opinion

• Vicarious liability (respondeat superior/ratification) for sexual assault: Dismissal affirmed. Sexual assault by an employee is ordinarily outside the scope of employment and not in furtherance of the employer’s business. Conclusory ratification allegations are insufficient to keep such claims against the employer alive.
• Negligent hiring/retention/supervision: Dismissal properly denied. The complaint sufficiently alleges that the monastery knew or should have known of the employee’s propensity for abuse, satisfying pleading standards at the CPLR 3211(a)(7) stage.
• Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED): Dismissal properly denied. Allegations that the monastery knew of prior abuse of another child yet continued to give the abuser access to children plausibly allege conduct “so outrageous” as to be intolerable, satisfying IIED elements at the pleading stage.
• Punitive damages: Demand preserved at the pleading stage; dismissal properly denied.
• CVA claim-revival constitutionality: The CVA’s revival of previously time-barred claims is constitutional under the state Due Process Clause, as it is a “reasonable response to remedy an injustice” under the controlling test.
• Standard of review: On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, pleadings are liberally construed, allegations accepted as true, and plaintiffs receive every favorable inference—applied throughout to uphold the surviving claims.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Respondeat superior and scope of employment:
  • Rivera v State of New York, 34 NY3d 383, 389–391: An employer may be vicariously liable for employee torts—including intentional torts—only if committed within the scope of employment and in furtherance of the employer’s business. The court relied on Rivera to confirm that sexual assaults are generally outside the scope and not in furtherance of the employer’s purposes, defeating respondeat superior.
  • Judith M. v Sisters of Charity Hosp., 93 NY2d 932, 933, and N.X. v Cabrini Med. Ctr., 97 NY2d 247, 251: Even intentional torts can be vicariously imputed if the conduct is generally foreseeable and a natural incident of employment, but these cases underscore that sexual assaults typically fail that test.
  • Nevaeh T. v City of New York, 132 AD3d 840, 843: Reinforces that assaults not in furtherance of the employer’s business fall outside respondeat superior liability.
• Ratification:
  • Bryant v City of New York, 188 AD2d 445, 446, and Geiss v Weinstein Co. Holdings, LLC, 383 F Supp 3d 156, 172 n 9 (SDNY): Conclusory assertions of ratification are insufficient. The Second Department applied this principle to reject plaintiff’s bare claim that the monastery ratified the abuser’s conduct.
• Negligent hiring/retention/supervision:
  • Belcastro v Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, N.Y., 213 AD3d 800, 801; Novak v Sisters of the Heart of Mary, 210 AD3d 1104, 1105–1106: An employer can be liable if it knew or should have known of the employee’s propensity for the harmful conduct. Applied to hold the complaint sufficiently pled institutional knowledge or constructive knowledge.
  • Davila v Orange County, 215 AD3d 632, 635; Sullivan v St. Ephrem R.C. Parish Church, 214 AD3d 751, 752; Sullivan v Port Washington Union Free Sch. Dist., 213 AD3d 966, 967: Such negligence claims need not be pled with heightened specificity. This eased the pleading burden at the 3211(a)(7) stage.
• Intentional infliction of emotional distress:
  • Klein v Metropolitan Child Servs., Inc., 100 AD3d 708, 710 (elements of IIED: extreme/outrageous conduct; intent or reckless disregard; causation; severe emotional distress).
  • Howell v New York Post Co., 81 NY2d 115, 122; Banschick v Johnson, 222 AD3d 608, 610; Ratto v Oliva, 195 AD3d 870, 873: “So outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree” standard. This established the threshold the complaint met by alleging continued access to children despite knowledge of prior abuse.
  • Eskridge v Diocese of Brooklyn, 210 AD3d 1056, 1058; Novak v Sisters of the Heart of Mary, 210 AD3d at 1106: CVA-era precedents allowing IIED claims to proceed where institutions knowingly enabled continued access to victims.
• Pleading standard on a motion to dismiss:
  • Mera v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 220 AD3d 668, 668–669; Mikoma Elec., LLC v Otek Bldrs., LLC, 233 AD3d 856, 858: Liberal construction, accept allegations as true, every favorable inference—used to sustain negligence and IIED claims.
• CVA claim-revival due process:
  • CPLR 214-g; S.H. v Diocese of Brooklyn, 205 AD3d 180, 184; Anonymous v Castagnola, 210 AD3d 940, 941: Explains the CVA’s revival window for time-barred child sexual abuse claims.
  • Matter of World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 30 NY3d 377, 400: The governing “reasonable response to remedy an injustice” test for revival statutes under state due process. The Court applies this to uphold the CVA.
  • Spira v National Council of Young Israel, 231 AD3d 987, 988; Rubin v Poly Prep Country Day Sch., 227 AD3d 741, 742; Schearer v Fitzgerald, 217 AD3d 981, 983: Recent appellate decisions upholding the CVA’s constitutionality, reflecting statewide consensus. The court follows this line to reject the monastery’s due process challenge.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis turns on careful distinction of liability theories and on the forgiving pleading standard at the motion-to-dismiss stage:

• Respondeat superior and ratification: The court recognized that while employers can be vicariously liable for intentional torts that are “generally foreseeable and a natural incident of the employment,” sexual assault by an employee is typically neither in furtherance of the employer’s business nor within the scope of employment. The plaintiff’s allegation that the monastery “ratified” the abuse was deemed conclusory; absent specific facts showing knowing acceptance or adoption of the wrongful conduct, ratification cannot rescue a vicarious liability theory. The “sexual abuse and battery” claim against the monastery was therefore properly dismissed.
• Negligent hiring/retention/supervision: In contrast to vicarious liability, direct negligence theories focus on the institution’s own conduct—its hiring, monitoring, and retention decisions. The complaint alleged the monastery knew or should have known of the abuser’s propensity based on knowledge of another child’s abuse, yet continued to allow access to children. Because such negligence claims do not require heightened specificity and because all reasonable inferences favor the plaintiff at this stage, the claims were sufficiently pled to proceed.
• Intentional infliction of emotional distress: The IIED claim satisfies the pleading requirements where the complaint alleges the monastery had knowledge of prior abuse and nonetheless permitted ongoing access. Under Howell and its progeny, this alleged conduct is plausibly “so outrageous” as to be intolerable, at least sufficient to survive a 3211(a)(7) motion. The court cites analogous CVA-era cases (Eskridge, Novak) to support this pleading sufficiency.
• Punitive damages: Although punitive damages are a remedy rather than an independent cause of action, the court affirmed the denial of the request to strike the punitive damages demand. That outcome reflects that, at the pleading stage, allegations of egregious or reckless institutional conduct can support potential punitive exposure, subject to proof.
• CVA due process challenge: Applying the New York Court of Appeals’ “reasonable response to remedy an injustice” test from the World Trade Center litigation, the Second Department joined the growing line of cases upholding the CVA as constitutional. The Legislature’s decision to reopen time-barred claims of child sexual abuse reasonably addresses the well-documented injustice caused by short limitation periods and delayed reporting by survivors. The court explicitly cites recent Appellate Division decisions (Spira, Rubin, Schearer) confirming this result.

Impact and Significance

• Doctrinal clarity for CVA institutional claims: This decision cements a consistent pleading-stage framework in the Second Department:
  • Vicarious liability for sexual assault under respondeat superior is typically unavailable absent extraordinary, specifically pleaded circumstances (e.g., facts showing the assault was within the scope of employment or a properly pled ratification).
  • Direct negligence theories—negligent hiring, retention, and supervision—frequently proceed based on allegations of actual or constructive knowledge of an employee’s propensity for abuse, with no heightened pleading requirement.
  • IIED remains viable where plaintiffs allege that institutions knowingly allowed abusers continued access to children, exposing them to further harm.
• Constitutionality of the CVA: The decision adds to the robust appellate consensus upholding CPLR 214-g under the state Due Process Clause. Defendants in the Second Department face an increasingly steep uphill climb challenging the CVA’s revival window on constitutional grounds.
• Punitive damages posturing: The affirmation that punitive damages demands may survive at the pleading stage signals ongoing exposure for institutions where complaints plausibly allege reckless disregard or willful indifference to known risks of abuse.
• Pleading strategy for plaintiffs: The opinion highlights the importance of alleging institutional knowledge (actual or constructive) of prior misconduct or propensity, and specific access-control failures. Conclusory ratification claims will not suffice; direct negligence and IIED theories are the primary vehicles for institutional liability at early stages.
• Defense strategy for institutions: Motions to dismiss should focus on knocking out respondeat superior claims and challenging IIED as insufficiently “outrageous” where the complaint lacks specific knowledge-based allegations. Constitutional challenges to the CVA are unlikely to succeed in light of the settled appellate landscape.
• Sector-wide implications: The decision affects religious organizations, schools, youth-serving nonprofits, and other institutions facing revived claims. It underscores the necessity of historical investigations, document preservation, and early evaluation of knowledge-based negligence exposure.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Child Victims Act (CVA) and CPLR 214-g: A New York law that temporarily re-opened the statute of limitations for civil claims based on child sexual abuse, allowing survivors to sue even if the normal filing deadlines had passed. Courts assess its constitutionality under state due process using a “reasonable response to remedy an injustice” test.
• CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss: A request to throw out a case because the complaint fails to state a legal claim. At this stage, courts accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and give plaintiffs every fair inference.
• Respondeat superior: A doctrine making employers automatically responsible for some acts of employees if those acts are within the scope of employment and in furtherance of the employer’s business. Sexual assaults by employees are usually outside that scope.
• Ratification: An employer’s acceptance or approval of an employee’s wrongful act after the fact. To plead ratification, plaintiffs must allege specific facts showing the employer knowingly adopted or benefitted from the act; mere conclusory statements are insufficient.
• Negligent hiring/retention/supervision: Claims that an employer failed to use reasonable care in hiring, overseeing, or retaining an employee, particularly where the employer knew or should have known of the employee’s dangerous propensities.
• Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED): A claim for extreme and outrageous conduct intended to cause, or done with reckless indifference to causing, severe emotional distress. Allegations that an institution knowingly allowed a known abuser continued access to children may meet this threshold at the pleading stage.
• Punitive damages: A monetary award intended to punish particularly egregious conduct and deter future misconduct. Not a separate cause of action, but a potential remedy if the evidence ultimately supports it.
• “Reasonable response to remedy an injustice” test: The New York standard for determining whether a statute that revives expired claims is constitutional. If the Legislature’s revival of claims is a reasonable way to address a recognized injustice, the statute satisfies state due process.

Conclusion

Georgiou v. St. Irene Monastery is a significant, clarifying decision at the pleading stage for CVA-era institutional liability. It underscores that while employers will rarely face vicarious liability for an employee’s sexual assault absent scope-of-employment or well-pleaded ratification, plaintiffs can proceed on direct negligence (hiring, retention, supervision) and IIED theories where they plausibly allege institutional knowledge of an employee’s propensity and continued access to children. The court’s adherence to a liberal CPLR 3211(a)(7) standard and its reaffirmation of the CVA’s constitutionality under the “reasonable response to remedy an injustice” test signal a mature and stable appellate approach in the Second Department.

The key takeaways are threefold: (1) the CVA’s revival window remains firmly constitutional in New York; (2) institutional liability will turn on allegations of knowledge and control rather than on vicarious liability for the underlying assault; and (3) IIED and punitive damages remain viable at the pleading stage where complaints describe knowing indifference to credible abuse risks. Together, these points will shape litigation strategies and settlement dynamics in revived child sexual abuse cases across the state.

Case Information

• Court: Appellate Division, Second Department
• Date: October 15, 2025
• Case: Georgiou v. Sacred Patriarchal & Stravropegial Orthodox Monastery of St. Irene Chrysovalantou
• Slip Opinion: 2025 NY Slip Op 05668
• Lower Court: Supreme Court, Queens County (Love, J.)
• Disposition: Order affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from; no costs or disbursements