Curtilage Requires Proof: Indiana Supreme Court Limits As‑Applied Attacks on the One‑Acre Homestead Cap

Introduction

In Tulsi Sawlani, M.D., et al. v. Lake County Assessor (Indiana Supreme Court, Oct. 7, 2025), the Court confronted a constitutional challenge to Indiana’s homestead property tax cap as implemented by statute. Article 10, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution caps a taxpayer’s liability for “[t]angible property, including curtilage, used as a principal place of residence” at one percent of gross assessed value. The implementing statute, however, limits the “homestead” to the dwelling and the immediately surrounding real estate “not exceeding one (1) acre,” which in practice confines the one‑percent cap to a single acre even when an owner’s residential lot is larger.

The Sawlanis own a 3.981‑acre residential parcel in a gated community. For 2019, the assessor granted one acre the homestead treatment (1% cap) and assessed the remaining 2.981 acres at the 3% rate applicable to non‑residential property. The taxpayers did not dispute valuation; instead, they argued the statutory one‑acre limit was unconstitutional as applied because their curtilage extends beyond one acre under the Constitution’s “including curtilage” language.

The Tax Court agreed that the Constitution does not impose a fixed acreage limit and remanded for a case‑by‑case curtilage determination. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that, even assuming curtilage can exceed one acre, the taxpayers failed to meet their burden to prove the additional acreage is curtilage. The Court therefore avoided deciding whether the one‑acre cap is constitutional and directed entry of judgment for the Assessor.

Summary of the Opinion

Justice Goff, writing for a unanimous Court, reaffirmed core doctrines of constitutional adjudication: statutes carry a presumption of constitutionality; challengers bear the burden of proof; and courts will choose interpretations that uphold statutes when reasonably available. Although the parties debated the meaning of “curtilage” in Article 10, Section 1—including dictionary definitions, Fourth Amendment analogs, and out‑of‑state property‑tax cases—the Court ultimately held that the Sawlanis’ evidence was insufficient to establish that more than one acre of their property functions as curtilage.

The Court emphasized that:

The statutory one‑acre homestead limit remains operative unless a challenger proves that additional acreage is constitutionally protected as curtilage.
Privacy preferences, a gated community with a guard, and the presence of trees without a distinct enclosing boundary do not by themselves establish curtilage.
Even applying the familiar factors from United States v. Dunn (a Fourth Amendment case) by analogy, the record lacked evidence that the excess acreage is “intimately associated with the home” such that it should be treated as the home itself.

Because the taxpayers did not carry their burden, the Court reversed the Tax Court and remanded with instructions to affirm the Indiana Board of Tax Review’s decision upholding the assessor’s application of the one‑acre homestead cap.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

The Court’s reasoning rested on bedrock principles and a selective engagement with authorities on “curtilage”:

Presumption and standard of review:
- State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Town of St. John, 702 N.E.2d 1034 (Ind. 1998): Establishes de novo review on constitutionality and the canon favoring constitutional interpretations when reasonably available.
- Horner v. Curry, 125 N.E.3d 584 (Ind. 2019): Confirms de novo review for constitutional questions.
- Whistle Stop Inn, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 51 N.E.3d 195 (Ind. 2016) and Paul Stieler Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Evansville, 2 N.E.3d 1269 (Ind. 2014): Reiterate the presumption of constitutionality and the challenger’s burden.
- Members of Medical Licensing Board of Indiana v. Planned Parenthood of Great Northwest, Hawaii, Alaska, Indiana, Kentucky, Inc., 211 N.E.3d 957 (Ind. 2023): Notes that if a statute has at least one constitutional application, a facial challenge fails—underscoring why the case proceeded as an as‑applied challenge.
Constitutional interpretation methodology:
- Holcomb v. Bray, 187 N.E.3d 1268 (Ind. 2022); Hoagland v. Franklin Township Community School Corp., 27 N.E.3d 737 (Ind. 2015); Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213 (Ind. 2013); Embry v. O’Bannon, 798 N.E.2d 157 (Ind. 2003); City Chapel v. South Bend, 744 N.E.2d 443 (Ind. 2001): Articulate the Indiana Supreme Court’s textualist approach, emphasizing the common understanding of constitutional framers and ratifiers.
“Curtilage” authorities:
- United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987): Provides the four‑factor framework used in the Fourth Amendment context to assess whether an area is curtilage. The Court did not adopt Dunn as binding in the tax context but applied it by analogy to show the taxpayers’ proof was lacking.
- United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759 (E.D. Mich. 2013): Shows that a gated community does not make all included land curtilage per se.
- Out‑of‑state property‑tax cases cited by the taxpayers (Bullis School, Inc. v. Appeal Tax Court for Montgomery County, 114 A.2d 41 (Md. 1955); McTague v. Monroe Township, 1 N.J. Tax 66 (N.J. Tax Ct. 1980); Solebury Township Board of Supervisors v. Bucks County Board of Assessment and Revision of Taxes, 1966 WL 226518 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1966)): Illustrate that in some jurisdictions, curtilage for tax purposes may extend beyond one acre. The Indiana Supreme Court treated these as informative but not controlling, and in any event unnecessary to decide given the evidentiary shortfall.

Legal Reasoning

The Court structured its analysis around two pillars: (1) the demanding burden on a party bringing an as‑applied constitutional challenge; and (2) constitutional avoidance—resolving the case without deciding the underlying constitutional meaning when a narrower ground suffices.

First, the Court underscored that Indiana statutes are presumed constitutional and that challengers bear a heavy burden to prove unconstitutionality beyond reasonable doubt. Crucially, when two reasonable interpretations exist, courts must select the one preserving the statute. This doctrinal frame predisposes courts to resolve disputes on narrow, nonconstitutional grounds when possible.

Second, although both parties made forceful merits arguments about the meaning of “curtilage” in Article 10, Section 1—ranging from dictionary definitions (some positing no fixed size) to the contemporaneous legislative history of the 2008/2010 property‑tax cap amendment (emphasizing “homestead” and the voter‑facing ballot language), and to analogies from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—the Court found it unnecessary to declare whether the Constitution allows the Legislature to limit the homestead to one acre.

Instead, the Court evaluated the taxpayers’ proof against the kind of factors courts typically consider when determining whether land is “intimately associated with the home” such that it should be treated as the home itself. Even applying the Dunn factors by analogy, the record was deficient:

Proximity to the home: The record did not show how the extra acreage is functionally used in close proximity to the dwelling in a way that merges it with the home’s domestic life.
Enclosure: There was no fence enclosing the Sawlanis’ parcel, and the trees retained for privacy did not create a distinct boundary around the lot. The broader community fence and guardhouse do not convert all land within the subdivision into curtilage.
Nature of use: The taxpayers asserted a general desire for privacy but did not present evidence of domestic uses—such as maintained yards, play areas, gardens, patios, pools, or outbuildings—across the additional acreage demonstrating it functions as part of the home.
Steps to protect from observation: Beyond scattered trees and the community’s gate, there were no specific, parcel‑level measures (e.g., fencing, hedges, signage) evidencing an expectation of privacy over the entire parcel akin to that enjoyed within the home.

Given these gaps, the Court held the taxpayers did not prove that more than one acre of the parcel is curtilage. That failure to satisfy the evidentiary burden meant the as‑applied constitutional claim failed, allowing the Court to reverse without construing “curtilage” definitively for tax‑cap purposes or passing on the validity of the statutory one‑acre limit as a general matter.

Notably, while the Court referenced the Dunn framework, it expressly refrained from adopting Dunn as the dispositive test for property‑tax curtilage in Indiana. It used Dunn only to demonstrate that, even under a framework favorable to the taxpayers’ theory, the proof would still fall short.

Impact and Implications

The decision sets several practical and doctrinal markers for Indiana property‑tax law.

1) Heightened evidentiary demands for as‑applied challenges

Taxpayers with parcels larger than one acre who seek to bring as‑applied constitutional challenges to the homestead cap must present concrete, parcel‑specific evidence that additional acreage functions as curtilage:

Documented domestic uses (lawns and maintained grounds intimately associated with the dwelling, children’s play areas, patios, gardens, pools, sheds or outbuildings serving residential purposes).
Physical demarcations (fencing, hedges, walls) enclosing or clearly separating the curtilage from surrounding land.
Proximity and integration (how the additional areas are used day‑to‑day as extensions of the home’s living space, not merely as buffer or aesthetic space).
Privacy measures (steps to shield the area from observation beyond generalized subdivision controls).

Mere preferences for privacy, being in a gated community, or the presence of trees without definable boundaries will not suffice.

2) Narrow holding preserves the statutory framework—at least for now

The Court did not opine on whether “curtilage” in Article 10, Section 1 can exceed one acre for tax‑cap purposes or whether the statutory one‑acre homestead limit is fully consistent with the Constitution. Those issues remain open. Practically, this means:

The one‑acre homestead cap in Indiana Code § 6‑1.1‑12‑37(k)(1) continues to govern assessments, unless and until a taxpayer proves, on an individualized record, that additional acreage must be treated as curtilage.
Courts may continue to resolve many challenges on sufficiency‑of‑evidence grounds without reaching the constitutional issue.

3) The Tax Court’s “case‑by‑case” approach remains unresolved

The Tax Court had endorsed case‑by‑case curtilage determinations for parcels exceeding one acre. The Supreme Court neither adopted nor rejected that approach; it simply found the record inadequate here. Future decisions may clarify whether a formal test (Dunn‑like or otherwise) governs curtilage in the property‑tax context.

4) Strategic guidance for litigants and assessors

For taxpayers:

Build a robust factual record at the administrative level (before the Property Tax Assessment Board of Appeals and the Indiana Board of Tax Review): photographs, surveys, maintenance logs, HOA documents, witness testimony about usage, and evidence of physical boundaries.
Connect additional acreage to specific domestic activities and expectations of privacy as part of daily living, not merely aesthetic or speculative privacy buffers.

For assessors:

Apply the statutory one‑acre limitation in the first instance and evaluate curtilage claims skeptically, focusing on demonstrable domestic use and enclosure.
Develop checklists or guidance keyed to proximity, enclosure, usage, and privacy steps to foster consistent, defensible determinations.

5) Legislative and policy considerations

The opinion surfaces a latent tension between the Constitution’s reference to “curtilage” and the statute’s one‑acre homestead limit. The Assessor’s argument that voters ratified a “homestead” concept aligned with the one‑acre limit (given ballot language and near‑simultaneous enactments) remains plausible but untested in a merits holding. The General Assembly could:

Clarify the statutory definition of homestead to address how, if at all, curtilage beyond one acre may be recognized for cap purposes; or
Codify administrable factors and evidentiary thresholds to guide boards and courts, reducing litigation costs and uncertainty.

Until then, litigation will likely focus on facts rather than constitutional text.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Curtilage: The area immediately surrounding a home that is intimately tied to the home’s domestic life—yards, enclosed grounds, and structures that function as part of the residence. It is not simply any land owned with the house; it turns on use, proximity, and enclosure.
Homestead (for Indiana tax purposes): The dwelling plus the land immediately surrounding it, but by statute capped at “not exceeding one (1) acre.” Taxes on the homestead are effectively limited to one percent of gross assessed value via credit.
As‑applied versus facial challenge: An as‑applied challenge argues a statute is unconstitutional in the specific circumstances of the challenger. A facial challenge asserts the statute is unconstitutional in all or most of its applications. Because many Indiana lots are under one acre, a facial challenge to the homestead cap would fail; thus taxpayers proceeded as applied.
Presumption of constitutionality and burden of proof: Indiana statutes are presumed valid. The challenger must produce convincing evidence to overcome that presumption. Doubts are resolved in favor of the statute.
Constitutional avoidance: Courts avoid deciding constitutional questions when a case can be resolved on narrower, nonconstitutional grounds, such as insufficient evidence.
Dunn factors (from Fourth Amendment law): A nonexclusive framework to assess curtilage: proximity to the dwelling; whether the area is within an enclosure; the nature of uses; and steps taken to protect the area from observation. Helpful by analogy but not definitively adopted here for tax cases.

Conclusion

Sawlani v. Lake County Assessor establishes a clear, practical rule for Indiana taxpayers: to win an as‑applied constitutional challenge to the one‑acre homestead cap, you must prove—with concrete, parcel‑specific evidence—that your additional acreage functions as curtilage intimately associated with the home. Generalized preferences for privacy, subdivision gates, and scattered trees do not suffice.

The Indiana Supreme Court deliberately left unresolved the larger constitutional question—whether Article 10’s reference to “curtilage” allows taxpayers to extend the one‑percent cap beyond one acre and, if so, under what test. By reversing on evidentiary grounds, the Court preserved the existing statutory framework while signaling that any future constitutional challenge will rise or fall on a meticulous factual showing that additional land is used as part of the home itself.

In the broader legal landscape, the decision reinforces the stringent presumption favoring statutory validity, the judiciary’s preference for constitutional avoidance, and the premium placed on well‑developed administrative records. For now, Indiana’s one‑acre homestead cap remains intact in practice, and taxpayers seeking more favorable treatment must marshal detailed evidence of curtilage beyond that acre.