Cunningham v. Cunningham (R.I. 2025): Supreme Court Affirms Family Court’s Power to Impose Rule 11 Sanctions and Attorneys’ Fees for Motions Seeking Unauthorized Modification of an Incorporated-but-Not-Merged Marital Settlement Agreement

1. Introduction

In Sharon L. Cunningham v. Kieran G. Cunningham, No. 2024-242-Appeal (R.I. July 17 2025), the Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed a Family Court order that sanctioned the former husband (Kieran) and required him to reimburse the former wife (Sharon) $6,125 in attorneys’ fees. The sanction stemmed from post-divorce motions in which Kieran asked the Family Court to facilitate an inspection and appraisal of the former marital home—an act the Family Court interpreted as an effort to modify the parties’ marital settlement agreement (MSA), which had been incorporated but not merged into the final judgment of divorce.

The principal questions on appeal were:

• Whether the Family Court abused its discretion in awarding Rule 11 sanctions and attorneys’ fees.
• Whether, assuming sanctions were proper, the $6,125 fee award was excessive.

The Supreme Court summarily affirmed, holding that: (1) the amended motion was, in substance, an impermissible attempt to secure judicial modification of the MSA; (2) bringing such a motion violated Rule 11 because it was not “warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for its extension”; and (3) the fee award was supported by an uncontested affidavit and fell within the hearing justice’s discretion. Justice Robinson dissented, warning that the decision departs from the “American Rule” by treating ordinary legal error as sanctionable conduct.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court (Suttell, C.J.) held:

1. Kieran’s amended motion to inspect and appraise constituted a de facto request to change contractual rights fixed by an incorporated-but-not-merged MSA—relief the Family Court lacks authority to grant absent mutual consent of the parties.
2. Because the motion was not “well-grounded in fact” or law, it violated Rule 11 of the Family Court Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure, justifying a monetary sanction equal to Sharon’s reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in responding to the motion.
3. The $6,125 fee, supported by an independent affidavit from a Rhode Island attorney and discounted for counsel’s tardiness, was reasonable; no abuse of discretion occurred.

Accordingly, the order was affirmed; the matter was remanded to the Family Court. Justice Robinson dissented, contending that the majority’s analysis strays from the American Rule and that mere legal error should not trigger fee-shifting.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• McCollum v. McCollum, 287 A.3d 26 (R.I. 2023) and America Condo. Ass’n v. Mardo, 140 A.3d 106 (R.I. 2016)—restated the “American Rule” and set the two-step review (legal basis → abuse of discretion) for fee awards. The Court relied on these cases for its standard of review.
• Heal v. Heal, 762 A.2d 463 (R.I. 2000)—defined circumstances under which Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed in domestic-relations cases. The majority imported these standards, stressing that lawyers are charged with knowing whether a “claim is without merit or is intended to harass.”
• Rule 11, R.I. Fam. Ct. R. Dom. Rel. P.—the central doctrinal hook; the opinion quotes the rule verbatim, focusing on the certification that motions be “warranted by existing law.”
• Gorman v. Gorman, 883 A.2d 732 (R.I. 2005)—held that once an MSA is incorporated but not merged, it becomes a separate contract that the Family Court cannot unilaterally modify. This precedent made it clear that Kieran’s motion asked for relief the court could not grant.
• Dissent’s authorities: Quill Co. v. A.T. Cross (American Rule), Dauray v. Mee, Clean Harbors, etc. The dissent marshalled these cases to argue against fee-shifting, but the majority implicitly found the “Rule 11 misconduct” exception dispositive.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Court

1. Characterisation of the Motion – Despite cosmetic changes in the “amended” motion, the hearing justice and the Supreme Court treated the substance rather than the label: Kieran still sought court-supervised steps (inspection/appraisal) geared toward a private buy-out not contemplated in the contract. This, the Court said, was asking the Family Court to alter rights under an MSA it had no power to modify.
2. Rule 11 Violation – By filing a motion that a “reasonable inquiry” would reveal to be legally unsupported, Kieran and his counsel breached Rule 11’s certification. The Court emphasised that the MSA nowhere gives Kieran a unilateral appraisal right; thus the motion was not “well-grounded.”
3. Sanction Selection – Rule 11 expressly authorises the court to shift “reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fee.” Because Sharon incurred extra legal work solely to fend off an improper motion, a fee award equal to that incremental cost was appropriate, not punitive.
4. Quantum of Fees – Applying standard Rhode Island jurisprudence (attorney-expert affidavit; Rule 1.5 factors), the hearing justice accepted $6,125 as reasonable. The Supreme Court deferred under the abuse-of-discretion standard.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Judgment

• Clarifies Sanction Exposure in Domestic Litigation – Litigants and counsel in Rhode Island Family Court now have explicit notice that filing motions that implicitly require modification of an incorporated-but-not-merged MSA—without the other party’s consent—can trigger Rule 11 fee-shifting.
• Reinforces Contractual Autonomy of Incorporated-but-Not-Merged MSAs – The decision fortifies Gorman: the Family Court lacks jurisdiction to adjust those agreements, and attempts to enlist the court’s equitable powers may be sanctionable.
• Discourages ‘End-Run’ Tactics – Parties cannot couch an impermissible modification request as a discovery motion (here, Rule 34). The Court’s willingness to look past form to substance signals that creative pleading will not shield counsel from sanctions.
• American Rule Exception Clarified – By affirming the fee award under Rule 11, the Court illustrates that misconduct-based exceptions override the default “each side bears its own fees” principle. Future litigants will confront a lower threshold for sanctions when filing motions unsupported by existing law.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Incorporated but Not Merged MSA – The agreement is mentioned in, and made part of, the divorce judgment, but it remains an independent contract. The Family Court can enforce it (as a contract) but cannot change its terms without mutual consent.
• Rule 11 Certification – Each time a lawyer signs a motion, he/she is certifying that:
  1. The filing is factually supported.
  2. It is legally supported or there is a good-faith argument to change existing law.
  3. It is not filed for an improper purpose (harassment, delay, etc.).
  Violation can yield sanctions, including paying the opponent’s fees.
• American Rule – In the United States, parties ordinarily pay their own legal fees. Exceptions arise by statute, contract, or court rule (e.g., Rule 11) when misconduct or bad faith is involved.

5. Conclusion

Cunningham v. Cunningham establishes a critical admonition for Rhode Island domestic-relations practitioners: motions that, in substance, seek judicial alteration of an incorporated-but-not-merged marital settlement agreement—without statutory or contractual footing—expose the movant to Rule 11 sanctions and fee-shifting. The decision reinforces contractual autonomy post-divorce, harmonises Family Court practice with broader civil-procedure sanction principles, and delineates the boundary between permissible advocacy and sanctionable conduct. While the dissent cautions against over-broad encroachment on the American Rule, the majority’s ruling signals that Rhode Island courts will not tolerate pleadings lacking a sound legal basis in this sensitive arena.