Cumulative Sentencing Enhancements for Strangulation and Life-Threatening Injury under U.S.S.G. §2A2.2

Introduction

United States v. Chavez, 24-2090 (10th Cir. April 1, 2025), addresses whether two U.S. Sentencing Guidelines enhancements— one for causing permanent or life-threatening bodily injury and another for strangling an intimate partner—impermissibly “double count” the same underlying conduct. Theodore Ian Chavez, IV, convicted of assault by strangulation of his intimate partner under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(8) and acquitted of a separate substantial-injury charge, received a seven-level enhancement for a life-threatening injury and a three-level enhancement for strangulation. He appealed, arguing the Guidelines did not contemplate stacking enhancements for the same act. The Tenth Circuit, examining the text of U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 and binding precedent, affirmed the district court, clarifying that these enhancements are both expressly cumulative and conceptually distinct.

Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court’s sentence. It held:

Section 2A2.2(b) of the Guidelines expressly authorizes cumulative adjustments for bodily injury (up to seven levels) and strangulation (three levels), capped collectively at 12 levels.
Under the plain-language rule, when the Guidelines “require the court to use a factor more than once,” those directions must be followed (citing United States v. Duran, 127 F.3d 911 (10th Cir. 1997)).
The three-part “double counting” test from United States v. Rucker, 178 F.3d 1369 (10th Cir. 1999), was not met because: (1) the enhancements are expressly cumulative; (2) they do not necessarily overlap in every case; and (3) they serve different purposes.
The enhancement for a life-threatening injury punishes the gravity of harm; the enhancement for strangulation punishes the dangerous mode of assault against an intimate partner. They are thus distinct.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

United States v. Duran, 127 F.3d 911 (10th Cir. 1997): Established that the Guidelines must be applied according to their clear text, even if a factor appears more than once.
United States v. Rucker, 178 F.3d 1369 (10th Cir. 1999): Articulated the three-part test for impermissible double counting—(a) necessary overlap, (b) indistinctness, and (c) identical purposes.
United States v. Checora, 175 F.3d 782 (10th Cir. 1999): Confirmed that challenges to Guidelines applications are reviewed de novo when preserved.
United States v. Fredette, 315 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2003): Clarified that overlap alone is insufficient; mutual implicature of both enhancements must be shown.
United States v. Browning, 252 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2001): Held that a double-counting claim requires a demonstration of necessary overlap “in every conceivable instance.”

2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeded in two steps:

Plain-Language Application: Section 2A2.2(b) contains a capping clause—“the cumulative adjustments from application of subdivisions (2), (3), and (4) shall not exceed 12 levels.” The Supplement to Appendix C (Amendment 781) confirms that enhancements for weapon use, bodily injury, and strangulation were designed to co-occur without producing an unbounded increase. Thus the text compels stacking.
Rucker Test Application:
- Overlap: Strangling under § 2A2.2(b)(4) includes attempted strangulation, which may produce no injury. Conversely, a non-intimate victim could sustain a life-threatening injury without implicating the intimate-partner enhancement.
- Indistinctness: The enhancements do not always co-occur—attempted strangulation yields the three-level enhancement without bodily-injury points; other assaults can produce injury without the special intimate-partner adjustment.
- Purpose: The bodily-injury enhancement reflects harm severity, whereas the strangulation enhancement reflects particular dangerous conduct against a protected class. These rationales differ.

3. Impact

This decision has several consequences:

It provides clarity for sentencing courts applying U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2—enhancements for life-threatening injury and strangulation of an intimate partner may be stacked, subject to the 12-level cap.
It limits double-counting challenges in aggravated assault cases involving specialized conduct and harm measures.
It reinforces the principle that the Sentencing Commission’s explicit text governs, reducing the scope for judicial second-guessing of enhancement structures.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Double Counting: Applying two or more sentence enhancements to punish the same element of conduct or harm more than once. The Tenth Circuit uses a three-part test to identify impermissible double counting.
Sentencing Enhancement: An increase in a defendant’s offense level based on specific factors such as the nature of the injury, use of a weapon, or special victim status. Higher offense levels translate to longer sentences within the Guidelines range.
U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2: The Guideline provision for aggravated assault. It sets a base offense level and lists specific offense characteristics (weapon use, degree of injury, strangulation, victim relationship) with prescribed level increases.
Rucker Test: A framework requiring that for enhancements to be impermissibly double counted: (1) they necessarily overlap, (2) they are indistinct, and (3) they serve identical purposes. All three must be met.

Conclusion

United States v. Chavez crystallizes the principle that when the Sentencing Guidelines explicitly authorize cumulative enhancements, a court must apply them—even if the underlying conduct implicates multiple provisions. The decision affirms that enhancements for permanent or life-threatening bodily injury and for strangling an intimate partner under § 2A2.2 are both textual and conceptual complements, not impermissible double counting. This ruling will guide sentencing judges in domestic and other assault cases, reinforcing strict adherence to the Guidelines’ plain language and the careful distinction of enhancement rationales.