Cumulative Rule 11 Errors—Including a Misstated Appeal Waiver—Invalidate Guilty Plea and Waiver: United States v. Ponce (4th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

In United States v. Abisail Ramirez Ponce, No. 23-4611 (4th Cir. Aug. 25, 2025) (unpublished), the Fourth Circuit vacated a conviction and remanded because the district court’s Rule 11 colloquy failed in multiple, compounding ways. Although the defendant did not object at the plea hearing, the panel majority (Judge Gregory, joined by Judge Wilkinson) concluded that the plea and the appeal waiver were not knowing and voluntary and that enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice. Judge Richardson dissented, maintaining that the defendant did not meet the prejudice showing required on plain-error review.

The case arose from a federal drug prosecution in the Eastern District of North Carolina. Ponce was indicted on two counts related to methamphetamine trafficking. He entered a plea agreement to Count Three (distribution and aiding and abetting), with Count One dismissed. The agreement contained a broad appeal waiver. The district court accepted the plea and later sentenced Ponce to 240 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. On appeal, Ponce challenged the adequacy of the Rule 11 colloquy and the enforceability of his appeal waiver.

The core issues were:

Whether the district court’s plea colloquy satisfied Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11’s mandatory advisements.
Whether the appeal waiver was knowing and voluntary given the colloquy and the totality of circumstances.
Whether unpreserved Rule 11 errors warranted vacatur under plain-error review.

Although unpublished and therefore non-binding in the Fourth Circuit, the decision delivers a detailed reminder: cumulative Rule 11 omissions and misstatements—especially about the scope of an appeal waiver—can invalidate both the plea and the waiver even on plain-error review.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fourth Circuit vacated Ponce’s conviction and sentence and remanded, holding that his guilty plea and appeal waiver were not knowing and voluntary.
The district court understated the scope of the appeal waiver by saying Ponce waived only his right to appeal the conviction, not the conviction and sentence, contrary to Rule 11(b)(1)(N).
Additional mandatory Rule 11 advisements were omitted, including the right to counsel at every stage, the right to plead not guilty, the right to compulsory process and the privilege against self-incrimination (addressed only obliquely), the requirement to confirm the plea was not induced by force or promises, the possibility of imprisonment for supervised-release violations, the risk of perjury, potential restitution, and the court’s obligations regarding the Sentencing Guidelines and § 3553(a) factors.
While some omissions might be harmless in isolation, the combination created a reasonable probability that Ponce would not have pleaded guilty, satisfying the prejudice standard under United States v. Dominguez Benitez.
Given these defects, enforcing the appeal waiver would be a miscarriage of justice.
Dissent: Judge Richardson agreed there were Rule 11 errors but would have affirmed because Ponce did not carry his burden to show the errors affected his substantial rights under plain-error review.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

United States v. Kemp, 88 F.4th 539 (4th Cir. 2023) and United States v. Taylor-Sanders, 88 F.4th 516 (4th Cir. 2023): These cases reiterate Rule 11’s purpose: ensuring a defendant understands the nature of the charges, penalties, and rights waived by pleading guilty. Ponce’s majority opinion invokes this grounding to frame the district court’s obligations.
United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621 (4th Cir. 2016): Cited for the baseline requirement that the district court must ensure the defendant understands the nature of the charge, mandatory minimums, maximum penalties, and waived rights.
United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621 (4th Cir. 2010): A key appellate-waiver case. It emphasizes that to be knowing and voluntary, a court must specifically question the defendant about the waiver under Rule 11(b)(1)(N) or the record must otherwise show the defendant understood its significance. Ponce uses Manigan to underscore the centrality of a correct, complete waiver explanation.
United States v. Smith, 134 F.4th 248 (4th Cir. 2025): The court analogizes to Smith in finding that misstating a waiver as covering only the conviction, and not the sentence as well, is insufficient and undercuts the waiver’s validity. Ponce extends that concern, concluding the misstatement is one of several errors that, cumulatively, invalidate both the waiver and the plea.
United States v. McGrath, 981 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532 (4th Cir. 2012): These decisions approve looking to the totality of circumstances—e.g., whether the defendant reviewed the agreement with counsel, had time to consult, and the defendant’s background and experience. Ponce emphasizes that the district court did not probe these factors, weakening any inference of understanding derived from the written agreement.
United States v. King, 91 F.4th 756 (4th Cir. 2024): Addresses several of the specific Rule 11 advisements (e.g., supervised-release consequences, guideline calculations, § 3553(a)). Ponce cites King to illustrate concrete omissions here.
United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004): Governs the prejudice showing for unpreserved Rule 11 errors: the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea. The Ponce majority applies Dominguez Benitez and finds this standard satisfied by the cumulative weight of the omissions and misstatements.

Legal Reasoning

The majority proceeds in two related steps: validating the challenge to the appeal waiver and assessing the plea’s validity under Rule 11.

Appeal waiver not knowing and voluntary: The court reviews waiver validity de novo under the totality of circumstances. Rule 11(b)(1)(N) requires the court to personally inform and confirm the defendant understands the terms of any appellate/collateral-attack waiver. The district court wrongly told Ponce he was waiving only the right to appeal his conviction, not his sentence. That misstatement minimized the waiver’s scope and violated Rule 11. Manigan and Smith make clear that such an error undermines a finding that the waiver was knowing and voluntary, absent other record assurances. Here, the court also failed to verify that Ponce discussed the agreement with counsel or understood its terms, further eroding the waiver’s validity.
Plea not knowing and voluntary: Rule 11 demands a thorough colloquy. The court omitted or inadequately conveyed multiple mandatory advisements, including:
- Right to counsel at every stage (Rule 11(b)(1)(D)).
- Right to plead not guilty (Rule 11(b)(1)(B)).
- Right to compulsory process and the privilege against self-incrimination (Rule 11(b)(1)(E)); the court only said counsel could present witnesses and that Ponce could testify or not, which is not a full statement of these rights.
- Verification that the plea was not induced by force, threats, or promises (Rule 11(b)(2)).
- Supervised-release consequences, including additional prison for violations; risk of perjury for false statements; potential restitution; and the court’s duties to calculate and consider the Guidelines and § 3553(a) (Rule 11(b)(1)(A), (H), (K), (M)).
The district court also did not review the offense elements on the record, instead referring Ponce to the plea agreement’s description. While not always fatal if the record shows understanding, the court here did not ask whether Ponce read and discussed the agreement with counsel.
Cumulative-error prejudice under Dominguez Benitez: The majority recognizes that certain omissions might be harmless in isolation or mitigated by the written agreement. But it emphasizes that Rule 11’s function is to “apprise the defendant in a single place” of the rights retained and waived. The sheer number and significance of the omissions, coupled with the misstatement about the appeal waiver’s scope, create a reasonable probability that Ponce would not have pleaded guilty had he been properly advised. That showing satisfies the substantial-rights prong of plain-error review.
Miscarriage of justice and remedy: Because the waiver and plea were unknowing and involuntary, enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage of justice. The court vacates the judgment and remands, stating Ponce is entitled to plead anew.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although unpublished, the decision is likely to be cited for its practical, step-by-step application of Rule 11 and for its embrace of a cumulative-error approach in the Rule 11 context.

For district courts: Ponce underscores the importance of a complete, on-the-record colloquy. Bench “checklists” are not bureaucratic niceties; they are constitutional safeguards. Courts should:
- Accurately describe the scope of any appeal and collateral-attack waiver, expressly including the sentence if the waiver so provides.
- Individually address each mandatory Rule 11 advisement, including supervised-release consequences, perjury risk, potential restitution, and guideline/§ 3553(a) considerations.
- Confirm non-coercion (no force, threats, or improper promises) and the defendant’s understanding of the nature of the charges.
- Verify that the defendant has read and discussed the plea agreement with counsel and understands its terms.
- Be especially meticulous where an interpreter is used, given potential language and comprehension barriers.
For prosecutors: Expect heightened scrutiny of appellate waivers. Where a colloquy misstated a waiver’s scope or omitted core advisements, the government may face challenges to both waiver enforcement and plea validity—even without contemporaneous objection. Prosecutors may wish to propose a set of standard Rule 11 questions for the court or request curative follow-up if an omission occurs.
For defense counsel: Ponce provides a roadmap for challenging defective colloquies. Counsel should preserve objections where possible, but even unpreserved claims can prevail if cumulative omissions are substantial. Counsel should also ensure the record reflects that the defendant reviewed and understood the plea agreement with counsel.
For appellate courts: The decision exemplifies how to apply Dominguez Benitez in a cumulative fashion. It also connects waiver validity (reviewed de novo) to the underlying Rule 11 colloquy, illustrating why a flawed colloquy can defeat both the waiver and the plea.
For future cases: Expect litigants to rely on Ponce to argue that multiple, compounding Rule 11 errors—especially those touching core constitutional rights and the scope of appellate waivers—justify vacatur under plain-error review. Conversely, the dissent’s emphasis on individualized prejudice will inform government arguments resisting vacatur when the record contains other indicia of understanding.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 11 colloquy: A required, in-court dialogue between the judge and the defendant to ensure the plea is informed and voluntary. The judge must explain certain rights and consequences and confirm understanding.
Appeal waiver: A plea-agreement term by which a defendant gives up the right to appeal the conviction and/or sentence and sometimes to file collateral attacks (like § 2255 motions). It must be explained accurately and accepted knowingly.
Plain-error review: When a party did not object in the trial court, the appellate court asks whether there was (1) error, (2) that is plain (clear), (3) that affected substantial rights (a reasonable probability of a different outcome), and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Dominguez Benitez prejudice standard: For unpreserved Rule 11 errors, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have pleaded guilty.
Miscarriage of justice: A doctrine allowing courts to refuse to enforce an appeal waiver even if it appears otherwise valid, where doing so would be fundamentally unfair—such as when the plea or waiver was not knowing and voluntary.
Compulsory process and confrontation: The right to call witnesses in one’s favor and to confront adverse witnesses. Pleading guilty waives the trial-based exercise of these rights.
Privilege against self-incrimination: The right not to be forced to testify against oneself. Pleading guilty necessarily involves admitting guilt and waives the right to insist on proof beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.
Supervised release consequences: A convict remains under court supervision after prison. Violations can lead to additional prison time—something Rule 11 requires judges to explain.
Sentencing Guidelines and § 3553(a): The court must calculate the guideline range and consider statutory factors (like the offense’s nature, deterrence, and the defendant’s history) before imposing sentence. Defendants must be told the court will do so.

Dissent’s Perspective

Judge Richardson would have affirmed, agreeing errors occurred but faulting the defendant’s showing under Dominguez Benitez. In his view, the record did not establish a reasonable probability that the plea decision would have been different absent the errors. This highlights an enduring tension in Rule 11 cases: when does a set of omissions cross the line from harmless to prejudicial in the plain-error setting? The majority’s approach is more receptive to cumulative-error prejudice where multiple core advisements are missing or misstated.

Conclusion

United States v. Ponce is a forceful reminder that Rule 11 is not a formality. The district court’s misstatement of the appeal waiver’s scope and its failure to deliver several core advisements rendered both the waiver and the plea unknowing and involuntary. Applying Dominguez Benitez, the Fourth Circuit concluded there is a reasonable probability Ponce would not have pleaded guilty had he been properly advised. While unpublished, the opinion offers a clear, practical template: courts must address each mandatory Rule 11 component on the record, ensure accurate explanation of any appeal waiver, and verify the defendant’s understanding in a way that does not rely exclusively on the written plea agreement. The broader significance lies in its cumulative-error analysis, which will influence how courts and litigants assess prejudice from multiple Rule 11 deficiencies going forward.