Cumulative Inconsistencies Sustain Adverse Credibility; General Country Reports Alone Cannot Support CAT Relief

Introduction

In Md. Sundor Ali v. Bondi, No. 24-3867 (6th Cir. Oct. 20, 2025) (not recommended for publication), the Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review from a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision upholding an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) adverse credibility determination and rejecting applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The petitioners—Bangladeshi nationals led by principal applicant Md. Sundor Ali—claimed persecution by the ruling Awami League due to Ali’s membership in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

The case turns on familiar but consequential doctrines in asylum adjudication: the deference owed to IJ credibility findings; the permissibility of relying on cumulative, even “minor,” inconsistencies (including demeanor-based concerns) under the REAL ID Act’s “totality of the circumstances” framework; the limited probative force of generalized country conditions for CAT absent particularized risk; and the requirement to exhaust procedural due process claims before the agency.

Summary of the Opinion

• The court affirmed the BIA’s reliance on the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, holding it was supported by substantial evidence given multiple inconsistencies in Ali’s testimony and contradictions with documentary exhibits.
• The court agreed that country-condition reports describing generalized political oppression in Bangladesh did not, standing alone, compel CAT relief, particularly where the personal account was found not credible.
• The panel declined to consider a procedural due process claim (that the IJ unfairly treated Ali’s clarifying questions as evasive) because petitioners failed to exhaust that argument before the BIA.
• Accordingly, the petition for review was denied in full.

Detailed Analysis

Procedural Posture and Standards of Review

After entering the United States in September 2022 and being served with Notices to Appear under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), Ali filed an I-589 seeking asylum, withholding, and CAT relief. The IJ denied the application, principally on adverse credibility grounds. The BIA affirmed, citing totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. On petition for review, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s opinion as the final agency decision and considered the IJ’s reasoning insofar as adopted. See Turcios-Flores v. Garland, 67 F.4th 347, 353 (6th Cir. 2023).

The adverse credibility finding was reviewed under the highly deferential substantial evidence standard—treated as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Marouf v. Lynch, 811 F.3d 174, 180 (6th Cir. 2016). As the panel noted, “an adverse credibility finding is usually fatal,” Rubio-Mauricio v. Barr, 782 F. App’x 444, 446–47 (6th Cir. 2019), because the applicant’s testimony often is the linchpin of the protection claim.

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Outcome

• Koulibaly v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 613, 620 (6th Cir. 2008): Requires IJs to articulate “specific reasons” for adverse credibility determinations. The IJ here did so—identifying contradictions about whether a local Awami League figure (Hiron Mia) was present at alleged assaults, whether a written Bengali personal statement existed, whether Ali’s father-in-law had been attacked, and basic facts about the LDP’s size and political status.

• Bi Qing Zheng v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 287, 295–96 (6th Cir. 2016): Confirms that inconsistencies need not go to the heart of the claim and that an adverse credibility finding can likewise doom CAT when both claims rest on the same discredited narrative. The court drew directly on this to reject the petitioners’ attempt to wall off CAT from the credibility ruling.

• Berri v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 390, 395 (6th Cir. 2006): Cumulative effect of even “minor” inconsistencies can support an adverse credibility determination. The IJ and BIA emphasized the systemic nature of contradictions across Ali’s account.

• Abdulahad v. Holder, 581 F.3d 290, 294–95 (6th Cir. 2009): Appellate deference to IJ demeanor findings. The IJ characterized Ali’s demeanor as evasive and nonresponsive; the Sixth Circuit cautioned deference to such on-the-record observations.

• Mardusha v. Mukasey, 303 F. App’x 245, 250 (6th Cir. 2008): Documentary evidence that contradicts testimonial claims can undercut credibility. The newspaper article Ali proffered reported the persecutor’s presence at the attack, clashing with Ali’s hearing testimony.

• Luna-Romero v. Barr, 949 F.3d 292, 297 (6th Cir. 2020): Corroboration must compel a conclusion of credibility to overturn an adverse finding; the medical discharge here did not link hospitalization to political assault.

• Mapouya v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 396, 415 (6th Cir. 2007): CAT relief can rest on reliable independent evidence even if asylum testimony is disbelieved. The Sixth Circuit recognized this proposition but found petitioners lacked the requisite particularized evidence.

• Marqus v. Barr, 968 F.3d 583, 587, 590 (6th Cir. 2020): CAT requires a particularized and likely threat of torture with government involvement or acquiescence; generalized reports do not establish a personal risk. This framed the insufficiency of petitioners’ country reports.

• Bonilla-Cruz v. Bondi, 2025 WL 488765, at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 13, 2025): Reiterates that generalized country conditions cannot, without more, satisfy CAT’s particularized risk requirement. The court cited this to underscore why petitioners’ country materials were inadequate.

• Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006) and Mazariegos-Rodas v. Garland, 122 F.4th 655, 666 (6th Cir. 2024): Require exhaustion of correctable procedural errors (including due process claims) before the BIA; failure to do so waives the issue on petition for review. This disposed of petitioners’ fairness argument about the IJ’s handling of clarifying questions.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) Adverse Credibility: Totality of Circumstances and Cumulative Inconsistencies

The IJ grounded the adverse credibility finding in several concrete contradictions and demeanor observations:

• Whether local Awami League chairman Hiron Mia was present at the December 2021 and February 2022 attacks. Ali’s testimony said no, but his personal statement and the newspaper report indicated presence; he alternately claimed the events occurred “by order” of Mia but without Mia’s presence.
• The existence of a written Bengali personal statement. The English statement represented it had been drafted in English from Ali’s verbal Bengali; Ali later claimed to have reviewed a Bengali written version at home, without a plausible foundational explanation. The IJ viewed this as undermining the reliability of the core narrative.
• Whether Ali’s father-in-law was attacked. Ali first said both in-laws were attacked; later, he acknowledged his father-in-law was deceased at the time.
• Basic LDP facts. Ali asserted LDP membership near two million and that it was the “main opposition,” but petitioners’ own country materials identified the BNP as the primary opposition, and LDP’s size as orders of magnitude smaller.

The IJ additionally observed that Ali was “repeatedly evasive” and “nonresponsive,” particularly under adverse questioning, and that counsel’s own characterizations (“hopeless” witness; “his own worst enemy”) reinforced concerns. The BIA affirmed based on the “totality of the circumstances,” and the Sixth Circuit found no basis to disturb those findings under the substantial evidence standard.

2) Treatment of Corroboration

The court approved the IJ’s treatment of corroboration:

• Newspaper article: Instead of bolstering Ali’s account, it said Hiron Mia was present at the February attack, further contradicting Ali’s testimony and deepening credibility concerns.
• Medical records: They confirmed a brief hospitalization spanning February 21–23, 2022, and listed symptoms, but they did not attribute the injuries to a political assault or otherwise corroborate the persecutory nexus.

Given the contradictions and the limited probative value of the medical records, the court concluded that the corroboration did not compel a contrary finding on credibility.

3) CAT Relief Requires Particularized, Credible Proof

Petitioners argued the IJ improperly “collapsed” CAT into the asylum analysis. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that CAT may be established independently by reliable evidence even when asylum testimony is disbelieved (Mapouya), but held that principle did not aid petitioners here. Their CAT claim was based on the same discredited facts as asylum (Bi Qing Zheng), and their generalized country-condition reports did not show a particularized likelihood of torture with government involvement or acquiescence (Marqus; Bonilla-Cruz). With the personal, individualized evidence found not credible, the record lacked the necessary predicate for CAT.

4) Procedural Due Process: Exhaustion and Waiver

Petitioners contended the IJ told Ali to seek clarification if confused yet later construed his clarifications as evasiveness, denying him fair process. The Sixth Circuit did not reach the merits because petitioners failed to exhaust this “correctable procedural error” before the BIA, and the government raised the exhaustion defect. Under Sterkaj and Mazariegos-Rodas, the claim was therefore waived on petition for review.

Documentary Evidence and Translation Pitfalls

A critical credibility fracture concerned the “Bengali” personal statement. The English statement on file expressly represented it was drafted in English from Ali’s verbal statements in Bengali. Ali later testified he reviewed a written Bengali version at home and noticed that the English translation erroneously said the persecutor was present. The IJ found this implausible and unsupported by foundation (no original Bengali document, no translator affidavit, and no coherent explanation of when or by whom a Bengali version was created).

This episode is a potent reminder that translation errors, while not uncommon, require contemporaneous, verifiable documentation—ideally a certified translation, the original-language text in the record, and a sworn translator declaration identifying the source, method, and any errata. Absent such foundations, a claimed translation “error” may itself erode credibility.

Demeanor Findings and Appellate Deference

The IJ noted Ali’s evasiveness, slowed responses, and nonresponsiveness, and rejected counsel’s suggestion that “sleep deprivation” explained the difficulties—particularly where counsel explicitly declined a continuance and the IJ observed Ali appeared awake. These observations received appellate deference under Abdulahad. While demeanor should be weighed cautiously, IJs are uniquely positioned to assess a witness’s responsiveness during real-time questioning.

The Role of Country-Conditions Evidence in CAT Claims

The court reaffirmed a stringent CAT standard:

• Generalized reports of political oppression in Bangladesh do not establish that this applicant faces a “particularized and likely” threat of torture.
• CAT also requires government involvement or acquiescence; broad references to police corruption or partisan bias must still be tied to the applicant’s individualized risk.
• When an applicant’s personal narrative is disbelieved and there is no independent, credible evidence linking the applicant to a realistic risk, country reports alone are insufficient to compel relief.

Impact and Practice Implications

Although unpublished, the opinion consolidates several entrenched Sixth Circuit doctrines that will shape advocacy and adjudication:

• Credibility will turn on the totality of the record. Contradictions across testimony, affidavits, and third-party documents—even if each is “minor”—can summate into a fatal credibility deficit. Prepare meticulously to ensure consistency across every iteration of the narrative.
• Demeanor matters. Counsel should consider seeking a continuance if fatigue, illness, or interpretation issues impair a witness; declining to do so may undercut later fairness or memory arguments.
• Translation demands rigor. If the core narrative originates in a non-English language, file the source-language statement, a certified translation, and a translator declaration. If an error is discovered, promptly submit a corrected translation with an explanation and corroborating affidavits.
• Corroboration can be double-edged. Third-party media or medical records that diverge from a witness’s account can deepen credibility concerns. Vet such documents against the testimony before offering them.
• CAT requires particularization. To sustain CAT independent of a discredited asylum narrative, practitioners need individualized, credible evidence: e.g., police reports with verifiable details, affidavits from witnesses with first-hand knowledge, targeted threats naming the applicant, or evidence of prior torture with government involvement.
• Exhaust or forfeit. Procedural due process complaints about IJ conduct (e.g., handling of clarifying questions, interpretation, evidentiary rulings) must be raised before the BIA to preserve them for judicial review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Adverse credibility: An IJ’s finding that a witness’s account is not trustworthy. Under the REAL ID Act’s totality standard, inconsistencies, implausibilities, and demeanor can all justify this finding—even if inconsistencies do not go to the “heart” of the claim.
• Substantial evidence review: A deferential appellate standard. The court does not reweigh evidence; it asks whether any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach the opposite conclusion. If not, the agency’s finding stands.
• Asylum vs. withholding vs. CAT:
  • Asylum: Requires a “well-founded fear” of persecution on a protected ground; it has a lower standard of proof and is discretionary.
  • Withholding: Requires showing it is “more likely than not” that life or freedom would be threatened on account of a protected ground; it is mandatory if proven.
  • CAT: Requires showing it is “more likely than not” the applicant would be tortured by or with the acquiescence of a public official; no nexus to a protected ground is required, but the government-involvement element is crucial.
• Particularized risk (CAT): Evidence must focus on the individual applicant’s realistic likelihood of torture—not merely general conditions.
• Government acquiescence (CAT): Includes willful blindness or failure to intervene by public officials—not just direct perpetration.
• Exhaustion: Petitioners must present procedural objections to the BIA to preserve them for judicial review; otherwise, they are waived.
• Derivative beneficiaries: Spouses and children listed on an asylum application depend on the principal applicant’s success; an adverse credibility finding against the principal typically defeats derivative claims as well.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Md. Sundor Ali v. Bondi reinforces a cluster of settled principles that govern protection claims in this Circuit. First, adverse credibility findings—especially when grounded in multiple, record-supported inconsistencies and demeanor—are extraordinarily difficult to overturn on substantial evidence review. Second, purported corroboration that contradicts testimony can erode rather than bolster credibility. Third, CAT claims cannot be salvaged by generalized country reports once the applicant’s personal narrative is disbelieved; independent, particularized, and credible evidence is required. Finally, procedural fairness arguments must be exhausted before the BIA or they will be deemed waived.

Even as an unpublished disposition, the opinion is a clear signal to practitioners: prepare thoroughly for consistency across testimony and documentation, attend carefully to translation accuracy and evidentiary foundations, build CAT claims with individualized risk evidence, and preserve all procedural issues in the administrative appeal. On these records and under these standards, the court’s denial of the petition was the predictable outcome.