Introduction

In United States v. Kordell Travis, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a 160-month sentence imposed after application of the two-level dangerous-weapon enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). The case arises from an Appalachian Narcotics Investigation Task Force probe into a drug trafficking organization in eastern Kentucky. Travis pleaded guilty to distributing 50 grams or more of methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) after a series of controlled buys, and the district court applied the firearm enhancement based on confidential informant reports and the recovery of a Glock handgun with an extended magazine after a high-speed chase one week after the last controlled buy.

On appeal, Travis challenged (1) the application of § 2D1.1(b)(1), arguing the government’s proof did not establish the required connection between the firearm and the drug offense, and (2) the substantive reasonableness of his within-Guidelines sentence. The Sixth Circuit, applying deferential standards of review, rejected both arguments and affirmed.

Although designated “Not Recommended for Publication,” the opinion offers a clear and practical reaffirmation for district courts in the Sixth Circuit: cross-corroborated confidential informant accounts, combined with a near-in-time seizure of a matching firearm, can satisfy the government’s initial burden for the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement; and within-Guidelines sentences remain strongly presumed reasonable when the district court addresses and weighs the § 3553(a) factors, even in “close call” cases.

Summary of the Opinion

• Firearm enhancement: The court held that the district court did not clearly err in applying the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). The government satisfied its initial burden by a preponderance of the evidence that Travis possessed a firearm during the commission of the drug offense, based on:
  • Two confidential informants, each with a “drug relationship” with Travis (one spanning roughly 40 buys over nearly two years), who independently described him as carrying a black Glock-style pistol; one specified an extended magazine; and
  • Law enforcement’s recovery of a black Glock with an extended magazine that Travis threw from his vehicle during a high-speed chase about a week after the last controlled buy.
  The district court expressly characterized it as a “fairly close call” but emphasized cross-corroboration, the duration of the informants’ interactions with Travis, the specificity of the weapon, and the near-in-time seizure. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit was not left with the “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake occurred.
• Substantive reasonableness: The Sixth Circuit held the within-Guidelines 160-month sentence is entitled to a presumption of reasonableness, which Travis did not overcome. The district court considered the § 3553(a) factors, including his traumatic upbringing and mental-health mitigation, and it explained why those considerations had only a “fairly modest” effect on the ultimate sentence. The appellate court declined to reweigh the factors.
• Disposition: The judgment and sentence were affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. West, 962 F.3d 183, 187 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1485 (6th Cir. 1996)):
  • Sets the two-step framework for § 2D1.1(b)(1): the government must prove by a preponderance that (1) the defendant actually or constructively possessed the weapon, and (2) the possession occurred during the commission of the offense. If met, a rebuttable presumption arises that the weapon was connected to the offense.
  • Influence here: The Sixth Circuit applied this framework, endorsing the district court’s finding that informant accounts plus a matching recovered firearm sufficed to establish possession during the drug offense for enhancement purposes.
• United States v. Histed, 93 F.4th 948, 958 (6th Cir. 2024):
  • Clarifies the burden-shifting: once the government meets its initial showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that it is “clearly improbable” the weapon was connected to the offense.
  • Influence here: The panel acknowledged the presumption and concluded Travis failed to rebut it with evidence showing a “clearly improbable” connection.
• United States v. McCloud, 935 F.3d 527, 530–31 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Ellis, 938 F.3d 757, 761 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Vasquez, 352 F.3d 1067, 1070 (6th Cir. 2003)):
  • Define “clear error” review of the district court’s factual findings. A finding is clearly erroneous only if, on the entire record, the appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
  • Influence here: The court expressly noted the “close call” characterization by the district court but concluded the record did not compel a definite and firm conviction of error, emphasizing appellate deference to plausible factual determinations at sentencing.
• United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2018); United States v. Axline, 93 F.4th 1002, 1008 (6th Cir. 2024); United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc); United States v. Ely, 468 F.3d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 2006):
  • Rayyan explains substantive reasonableness challenges (too long/too short) and the abuse-of-discretion standard.
  • Axline emphasizes that sentences must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” given § 3553(a)’s purposes.
  • Vonner establishes a presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences.
  • Ely cautions that appellate courts will not reweigh § 3553(a) factors differently from the district court.
  • Influence here: Together, they underpin the court’s conclusion that a within-Guidelines sentence—imposed after due consideration of a defendant’s mitigating background—will be upheld absent a clear misapplication or failure to consider salient factors.

Legal Reasoning: How the Court Reached Its Decision

1. Evidence supporting the enhancement:
   • Two confidential informants independently reported that Travis routinely carried a black Glock-style pistol; one added the firearm had an extended magazine. Both had firsthand, ongoing drug interactions with Travis (one reportedly near forty buys over two years), which bolstered reliability and the nexus to the offense conduct.
   • Law enforcement recovered a black Glock with an extended magazine that Travis threw from his vehicle during a high-speed chase approximately a week after the last controlled buy—matching the informants’ descriptions and timing closely aligned with the trafficking activity under investigation.
   • The government introduced a photograph of the firearm and pursuit footage. The district court credited this evidence, expressly noting cross-corroboration, the length of the informants’ dealings with Travis, the specificity of the firearm description, and the seizure’s temporal proximity to the controlled buys.
2. Application of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) standard:
   • The court reiterated that the government’s initial burden is preponderance of the evidence that the defendant possessed a weapon during the commission of the offense. The possessory link does not require the firearm to be seized at the precise moment of a drug transaction; rather, the question is whether the possession occurred during the drug offense and is sufficiently connected to it.
   • Upon that showing, a rebuttable presumption arises that the firearm was connected to the offense; the defendant must then produce evidence showing a “clearly improbable” connection.
   • Travis did not dispute possession of the firearm; he argued lack of connection. The court found the informants’ “drug relationships” with Travis, the detailed matching description, and the near-in-time seizure adequate to sustain the connection.
3. Deferential appellate posture:
   • Because the district court’s finding rested on credibility judgments and documentary corroboration, the appellate court reviewed only for clear error. The court acknowledged the district judge’s “fairly close call” but held the record supported the finding, defeating any claim of clear error.
4. Substantive reasonableness of the sentence:
   • The court applied the presumption of reasonableness to the within-Guidelines sentence. The district court expressly considered the § 3553(a) factors, including Travis’s difficult upbringing and trauma. It explained why those factors merited only a “fairly modest” effect on the sentence given the seriousness of the offense, criminal history (category IV), and need for deterrence.
   • On appeal, Travis essentially asked the Sixth Circuit to reweigh the factors. Under Ely and Rayyan, that is beyond the scope of review absent an abuse of discretion—which the court did not find.

Impact and Practical Implications

• Firearm enhancement litigation:
  • The opinion underscores that corroborated confidential informant accounts—especially from informants with established “drug relationships” with the defendant—combined with the near-in-time recovery of a matching weapon can meet the government’s initial burden for § 2D1.1(b)(1), even if the gun is not seized during a controlled buy.
  • Specificity matters. Descriptions such as make, color, and the presence of an extended magazine can significantly strengthen the nexus between the gun and the drug offense.
  • Temporal proximity matters. A short interval (here, about a week between the last controlled buy and gun recovery) can suffice to show possession “during the commission of the offense,” particularly in ongoing trafficking schemes.
  • Clear-error deference is decisive in “close call” disputes: where the district court articulates plausible reasons for crediting the government’s account and the record contains corroboration, reversal will be unlikely.
• Sentencing reasonableness:
  • This case reaffirms the strong presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences and the limited scope of appellate review. Defendants challenging substantive reasonableness must identify more than disagreement with the district court’s weighing of mitigating factors.
  • Mitigation must be presented with concrete supporting evidence and clear arguments at sentencing. Appellate courts look for neglected or misapplied factors, not an alternative balancing of acknowledged considerations.
• Evidentiary practice at sentencing:
  • While not expressly discussed, the opinion exemplifies sentencing’s permissive evidentiary standards: courts may rely on agent testimony recounting informant statements when sufficiently corroborated and reliable. Defense counsel should be prepared to challenge the reliability and specificity of such accounts and to offer countervailing evidence if available.
• Persuasive but non-binding:
  • The opinion is not recommended for publication and therefore is non-precedential within the Sixth Circuit. It remains persuasive authority reflecting current doctrine and its application to typical drug-and-gun scenarios.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1):
  • Adds two offense levels if a “dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed” during a drug offense. It reflects the increased dangerousness of drug trafficking when firearms are present.
• Preponderance of the evidence:
  • The government’s burden at sentencing. It means “more likely than not”—a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
• Actual vs. constructive possession:
  • Actual possession means having physical control over the firearm. Constructive possession means having the power and intention to exercise control over it, even if not physically holding it.
• “During the commission of the offense”:
  • In drug trafficking cases, this includes the timeframe of the offense conduct. Ongoing schemes and near-in-time possession can suffice to link the firearm to the drug offense.
• Rebuttable presumption and “clearly improbable”:
  • Once the government shows possession during the offense, the law presumes the firearm is connected to the offense. The defendant can overcome this only by showing it is “clearly improbable” the gun was connected—an intentionally demanding standard.
• Clear error vs. abuse of discretion:
  • Clear error applies to factual findings (e.g., whether a gun was possessed in connection with the offense). The appellate court will not reverse unless firmly convinced a mistake was made.
  • Abuse of discretion applies to the overall sentence. A within-Guidelines sentence is presumed reasonable; overturning it requires showing the district court ignored key factors, misapplied the law, or imposed a sentence that is plainly excessive in light of § 3553(a).
• § 3553(a) factors:
  • Statutory considerations for sentencing, including the nature and circumstances of the offense, history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for deterrence and protection of the public, the kinds of sentences available, advisory Guidelines, and the need to avoid unwarranted disparities.

Practice Notes

• For the government:
  • Build the nexus with specific, cross-corroborated details (make/model, extended magazine, habitual carry) from informants who directly participated in drug transactions with the defendant.
  • Emphasize temporal proximity and any visual or physical evidence (photos, videos, recovered items) that align with informant accounts.
• For the defense:
  • To rebut the presumption, develop evidence showing it is clearly improbable the firearm related to the offense—e.g., alternate ownership or purpose, lack of temporal/spatial proximity to drug activity, or credible evidence the gun was unrelated to trafficking.
  • Challenge the reliability and specificity of informant statements; seek inconsistencies, motives to fabricate, or lack of corroboration. Offer competing evidence where possible.
  • On substantive reasonableness, preserve concrete § 3553(a) arguments and compelling evidence at sentencing. On appeal, identify overlooked factors or clear misapplications rather than reweighing.

Conclusion

United States v. Kordell Travis reinforces two enduring principles in Sixth Circuit sentencing law. First, for the § 2D1.1(b)(1) firearm enhancement, the government’s initial burden may be satisfied by corroborated informant accounts and the near-in-time recovery of a matching weapon, even where no gun is seized during a controlled buy; once met, the “clearly improbable” standard places a heavy rebuttal burden on the defendant. Second, within-Guidelines sentences carry a robust presumption of reasonableness: where the district court addresses the § 3553(a) factors—including mitigation—and explains its balancing, the appellate court will not reweigh them.

While nonprecedential, the decision provides a practical, fact-sensitive roadmap for applying the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement in drug trafficking cases and signals continued deference to district court sentencing judgments in the Sixth Circuit, particularly when the record reflects careful consideration of the evidence and sentencing factors in a close case.