Crosby v. Warden ADX: Particularity Requirements for § 2241 Habeas Challenges to First Step Act Time Credits

I. Introduction

The Tenth Circuit’s nonprecedential order and judgment in Crosby v. Warden ADX, No. 25‑1215 (10th Cir. Nov. 19, 2025), sits at the intersection of two important strands of federal law:

The procedural rules governing federal habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241; and
The Bureau of Prisons’ implementation of the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”) time‑credit regime, particularly as it affects prisoners with high recidivism risk scores.

Gregory D. Crosby, a federal inmate at the Administrative Maximum facility (ADX) in Florence, Colorado, filed a pro se habeas petition under § 2241. He complained that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) was not applying an “exemption clause” under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4) and BOP Program Statement 5410.01 (PS 5410.01) to allow his FSA time credits to be recognized or reviewed, despite his alleged satisfaction of the policy’s criteria. He framed this as a violation of his due process rights.

The Tenth Circuit did not decide whether Crosby is substantively entitled to the exemption or to any particular use of his FSA time credits. Instead, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of his amended § 2241 petition—without prejudice—because it failed to satisfy the pleading requirements in Rules 2(c)(1) and 2(c)(2) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (the “Habeas Rules”), applied via Rule 1(b).

In doing so, the court reinforced an important procedural threshold: even in the context of complex, evolving FSA time‑credit litigation, and even for pro se litigants, habeas petitions must:

Identify clearly the specific federal right allegedly violated; and
Set out concrete, nonconclusory facts showing how the respondent’s acts or omissions violated that right.

Without that level of particularity, the court will not order the government to respond, and the petition will be screened out under Habeas Rule 4.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Crosby filed a § 2241 petition alleging that the BOP and the warden were refusing to apply an “exemption clause” relating to his First Step Act time credits. He asserted that they were not following their own policy—PS 5410.01—and that this failure violated his due process rights. The magistrate judge found the original petition unclear, provided guidance, and allowed amendment.

In his amended petition, Crosby:

Named only the warden (as directed);
Reasserted a single claim: “Exemption Clause[:] Denied FSA Time Credit Applied per 18 U.S.C. § 36[324](d)(4)”; and
Alleged that unit staff had not submitted his exemption requests or given him documentation required by policy, yet explicitly stated that he was “not arguing nothing about going into prerelease.”

The magistrate judge concluded that it was still unclear:

What federal right Crosby claimed had been violated; and
What specific actions or failures by the warden constituted the violation.

The magistrate recommended dismissal for failure to comply with Habeas Rules 2(c)(1)–(2). The district court adopted that recommendation and dismissed without prejudice.

On appeal, Crosby argued that the district court had misunderstood him and that “Section (C)(2)” actually referred to a provision within PS 5410.01, connected to 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(c)(2), which governs when high- or medium-risk inmates’ FSA time credits may be applied to prerelease custody. He maintained that his position was simple: he met the policy’s requirements and thus was entitled to review and potentially an exemption.

The Tenth Circuit, reviewing de novo under Habeas Rule 4, affirmed:

It held that the petition did not satisfy Habeas Rules 2(c)(1) and (2), which require a habeas petitioner to (a) specify all grounds for relief and (b) state the facts supporting each ground with particularity.
The court relied on Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005), to emphasize that petitions must plead facts pointing to a “real possibility of constitutional error,” and on Ruark v. Gunter, 958 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1992), to characterize Crosby’s filing as composed of “naked allegations” not cognizable in habeas.
It noted an internal inconsistency: Crosby repeatedly disclaimed any request for prerelease custody, while the exemption provision he invoked (via § 523.44(c)(2) and PS 5410.01) deals expressly with applying FSA time credits toward prerelease custody. That inconsistency made it especially difficult to discern his theory of relief.
The court rejected Crosby’s reliance on several out‑of‑circuit cases (Fontanez, Tyler, and Nicoletti) as inapposite because they concerned different aspects of the FSA time‑credit regime.

Ultimately, the court did not reach the merits of any alleged entitlement to an exemption under PS 5410.01 or the FSA. It concluded only that Crosby failed to plead a cognizable habeas claim with sufficient factual and legal clarity, and it affirmed dismissal without prejudice. It also granted Crosby leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Setting: A High‑Security Inmate and First Step Act Credits

Crosby is a federal inmate housed at the United States Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum (ADX) in Florence, Colorado, within the BOP’s North Central Region. He alleges that since the FSA’s enactment, the BOP has assessed him as a “high” recidivism risk under PATTERN, the BOP’s risk assessment tool.

Under the First Step Act:

“Eligible” inmates can earn time credits by completing evidence‑based recidivism‑reduction programming and productive activities, 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A); and
Those credits can, in principle, be applied to accelerate transfer to prerelease custody (e.g., a halfway house, home confinement) or to supervised release, subject to statutory and regulatory criteria in 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g) and 28 C.F.R. §§ 523.42, 523.44.

Crucially, prisoners convicted of certain offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D) are ineligible to earn FSA time credits at all. The opinion notes that Crosby did not claim that his conviction made him ineligible to earn credits, suggesting that his dispute concerned the use or application of credits, not eligibility to accrue them.

B. The Original § 2241 Petition

Crosby’s original pro se § 2241 petition named both the warden and the BOP as respondents. He identified a single claim: “Denial of F.S.A. Time Credit per Exemption Clause 18 USC 3632(d)(4).”

He alleged:

He had been trying to get his FSA time credits applied via the “exemption clause” in § 3632(d)(4) applicable to “a high recidivism inmate” and via BOP Program Statement 5410.01.
Respondents were “not applying their own policy” and had “failed to act” on his requests.
This failure allegedly violated his due process rights.
BOP officials continually used his “past history” to maintain his high‑risk designation without explaining why, and they were not applying either the statute or PS 5410.01 properly.
He requested an order to show cause why respondents were not reviewing his request to have his FSA credits applied under § 3632(d)(4).

The magistrate judge observed that:

Under the FSA, eligible inmates may earn credits regardless of recidivism risk; but
To have those credits applied toward prerelease custody or early supervised release, an inmate must satisfy additional requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g) and 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(c)–(d).

It appeared to the magistrate judge that Crosby was contesting his inability to have credits applied because of his high-risk score. But the petition did not clearly identify:

What specific federal right he believed was being violated; or
What specific acts or omissions by the named respondents constituted that violation.

Citing Habeas Rules 2(c)(1)–(2), the magistrate judge held that Crosby had not provided the requisite specificity and gave examples of possible claims Crosby might have intended. The judge then allowed Crosby to file an amended petition and instructed him to name only the warden as the respondent.

C. The Amended Petition

Crosby filed an amended § 2241 application naming only the warden. He framed his claim as:

“Exemption Clause[:] Denied FSA Time Credit Applied per 18 U.S.C. § 36[324](d)(4).”

The amended petition included several critical statements:

He asserted that his “due process rights” were being violated “per [§] 3632(d)(4).”
Yet he added in a footnote that he was “not arguing nothing about going into prerelease.”

He alleged:

Prison officials “have not submitted [his] requests” for an “exemption.”
He had not received “the proper documentation as the policy requires.”
“The policy is not doing what it [is] suppose[d] to” do.
Respondent never gave him documentation showing that “the proper documentation was submitted to (NCRO) on the exemption clause.”

Crosby then referred to what he characterized as “§ 3632(d)(4) subsection (C)(2),” explaining that under this “subsection”:

He was allowed to “make a request under (C)(2) by submitting a BA0148 Inmate Request To Staff during [his] regularly schedule[d] program review.”
His “Unit Manager will submit a request along with the Unit Team recommendation to the warden or designee for final decision.”

He claimed to have met “each one of the requirement[s]” of PS 5410.01 and summed up his claim as simply: “review him for exemption per [§] 3632(d)(4) and the BOP policy.”

D. Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation

In a second review, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the amended application. Key points included:

The court again liberally construed Crosby’s filings, treating them as possibly claiming that despite his high recidivism score he should have his FSA credits applied to his sentence.
However, it remained “unclear what [he] alleges that the Respondent did (or did not do) that violated his federal rights.”
His references to “subsection (C)(2) of § 3632(d)(4)” and to a BA0148 form were confusing because § 3632(d)(4)(C) has no “(2)” and does not mention a BA0148.
The magistrate judge observed that “the only avenue for a high recidivism inmate to have FSA time credits applied to his sentence is to get specific approval by the warden” under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(i)–(ii).
Thus, as best the court could “decipher,” Crosby might be arguing that he should be able to submit a petition to the warden for application of his credits toward prerelease custody or supervised release.
But Crosby had explicitly said he was “not arguing nothing about prerelease,” making it “unclear what his habeas claim [was] challenging.”
There was no indication that he had actually “successfully petitioned the Warden for approval” or that he met the statutory or regulatory criteria for such approval.

E. Objections and Additional Information

Crosby objected to the recommendation and attached a copy of PS 5410.01. In his objections, he asserted:

He requested FSA credit‑related review under PS 5410.01 in October 2023, May 2024, and November 2024.
His Unit Team never provided documentation that those requests were submitted to “NCRO,” which he described as one of the “Respondents.”
He completed an “NRDAP program” in January 2025, presumably to bolster his claim that he was engaging in recidivism‑reduction programming.
The “respondents continue[] to violate[] his constitutional right per due process clause by not giving him the appropriate relief per [§] 3632(d)(4)(C)(2).”
He reiterated that he was not asking “for no transfer” or “to go into prerelease,” but only to be “review[ed] per policy under the exemption clause [of] [§] 3632(d)(4) and [PS] 5410.01.”

The district court concluded that even in light of these objections, Crosby “continue[d] to provide vague and conclusory allegations that his due process rights were violated because he was not reviewed properly for [FSA] time credits.” The court overruled the objections, adopted the recommendation, and dismissed the amended petition without prejudice.

F. Issues on Appeal

On appeal, Crosby argued that:

The district court had “totally misconstrue[d]” his claims.
His reference to “Section (C)(2)” was not to the statute but to PS 5410.01, which incorporates 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(c)(2).
His amended application “showed exactly what he was stating and what his claim was”—namely, that if certain policy requirements are met, he may be granted an exemption and that the BOP had refused to process him accordingly.

He also cited three cases—Fontanez v. Rardin (6th Cir.), Tyler v. Garrett (8th Cir.), and Nicoletti v. Bayless (4th Cir.)—to support the general propriety of § 2241 FSA credit‑related habeas challenges.

IV. Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. The Habeas Rules: Rules 1(b), 2(c), and 4

The court relied centrally on the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts:

Rule 1(b) allows these rules to be applied to other habeas proceedings, such as those under § 2241. The magistrate judge had invoked Rule 1(b) to apply Rules 2 and 4 to Crosby’s § 2241 petition.
Rule 2(c)(1)–(2) provides that a habeas petition must:
- “specify all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner” (2(c)(1)); and
- “state the facts supporting each ground” (2(c)(2)).
Rule 4 authorizes summary dismissal:
“If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.”

The Tenth Circuit construed the district court’s action as a Rule 4 dismissal after preliminary screening. That characterization dictated the standard of review.

2. Standard of Review: Boutwell v. Keating

Relying on Boutwell v. Keating, 399 F.3d 1203, 1211 (10th Cir. 2005), the court held that because Crosby’s habeas claims were dismissed under Rule 4, it would review de novo—meaning it would independently examine the sufficiency of the petition without deference to the district court’s legal conclusions.

3. Pro Se Litigants: Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer

The court cited Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005), both to:

Affirm that pro se filings are afforded liberal construction; but
Emphasize that courts cannot act as a litigant’s advocate and that pro se litigants must “follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.”

This dual principle frames the court’s approach: it reads Crosby’s filings generously but still insists on compliance with core pleading rules.

4. Pleading Particularity and “Real Possibility of Constitutional Error”: Mayle v. Felix

The Supreme Court’s decision in Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005), plays a prominent role in the Tenth Circuit’s analysis. Mayle interpreted Rule 2(c) and underscored the need for habeas petitions to be more than skeletal:

Petitions must “plead with particularity” to help the district court decide whether to require the respondent to “show cause why the writ should not be granted,” 545 U.S. at 656 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2243).
The petition is expected to allege “facts that point to the real possibility of constitutional error,” id. at 655 (citation to Rule 4 advisory note).

The Tenth Circuit applies these principles to Crosby’s petition: simply asserting that “respondents are not following their policy” or that “due process has been violated” is insufficient without facts concretely showing:

What constitutional right is implicated (e.g., a liberty interest in earlier release); and
What precisely the respondent did or failed to do that infringed that right.

5. “Naked Allegations” Not Cognizable: Ruark v. Gunter

The court adopts language from Ruark v. Gunter, 958 F.2d 318, 319 (10th Cir. 1992), to characterize Crosby’s factual showing as “naked allegations,” which are “not cognizable” in habeas. Ruark is a longstanding Tenth Circuit precedent for the proposition that bare, conclusory assertions cannot support habeas relief.

6. Statutory and Regulatory Context: §§ 2241, 3624(g), 3632(d)(4); 28 C.F.R. §§ 523.42, 523.44; PS 5410.01

The opinion situates Crosby’s claims in the FSA framework:

28 U.S.C. § 2241: The habeas statute allowing prisoners to challenge the “execution” of a federal sentence (e.g., credit calculations, BOP’s use of time credits), as opposed to the underlying conviction or sentence, which is typically challenged via § 2255.
18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4): Governs earning of time credits through recidivism‑reduction programs and productive activities, and provides that such credits:
“shall be applied toward time in prerelease custody or supervised release.”
via clause (C), with transfer being subject to eligibility criteria under § 3624(g).
18 U.S.C. § 3624(g): Sets requirements for transferring an inmate to prerelease custody or supervised release based, in part, on time credits and recidivism‑risk levels.
28 C.F.R. § 523.42: Addresses which inmates are “eligible” to earn FSA time credits, confirming that inmates are generally eligible regardless of risk scores unless disqualified under § 3632(d)(4)(D).
28 C.F.R. § 523.44: Governs the application of earned FSA time credits. The opinion focuses on:
- § 523.44(b)(1): Incorporating the statutory requirement that credits equal the remainder of the term (for certain transfers); and
- § 523.44(c)(2): Providing that high or medium‑risk inmates may have credits applied toward prerelease custody if they meet specified conditions.
PS 5410.01: A BOP Program Statement interpreting and implementing the FSA time‑credit rules, including commentary that:
- High- and medium‑risk inmates are “exceptions to the routine application” of § 523.44(c).
- The warden will consult with the Regional Director before approving an inmate under § 523.44(c)(2), and the Regional Director may grant exemptions consistent with the BOP’s Directive Management Manual.
- Inmates should initiate certain requests using a “BP‑A0148, Inmate Request to Staff” form.

The Tenth Circuit carefully reconstructs what Crosby likely meant by “Section (C)(2)” and “BA0148”: it ties them to § 523.44(c)(2) and the Program Statement’s commentary, rather than to § 3632(d)(4) itself, which has no “(C)(2)” and no BA0148 requirement.

7. Out-of-Circuit FSA Cases: Fontanez, Tyler, and Nicoletti

Crosby cited three recent out‑of‑circuit decisions, but the Tenth Circuit found them inapposite:

Fontanez v. Rardin (6th Cir. 2025) and Tyler v. Garrett (8th Cir. 2024):
- Both concerned an inmate’s eligibility to earn FSA time credits.
- Crosby, by contrast, did not allege that he is barred from earning credits; his complaint concerned how they might be applied or whether he was being considered under an “exemption.”
Nicoletti v. Bayless (4th Cir. 2025):
- Involved application of FSA time credits, but the particular issue was whether the BOP properly declined to apply them because the inmate’s credits did not “equal the remainder of his sentence,” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A).
- The Tenth Circuit noted that Crosby never alleged that his earned time credits equal the remainder of his sentence, a requirement echoed in 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(b)(1).

Thus, even assuming those cases were correctly decided, they did not remedy Crosby’s core defect: failure to plead a clear, factually supported habeas ground.

B. The Court’s Application of These Principles

1. Characterizing the Dismissal as a Rule 4 Screening

The Tenth Circuit first clarified that it was reviewing a Rule 4 screening dismissal. That matters because:

The district court did not dismiss based on, for example, exhaustion, mootness, or an adverse merits determination.
Instead, it concluded—at the threshold—that even if all of Crosby’s allegations were taken as true and liberally construed, his petition did not state a cognizable habeas claim.

Under Boutwell, its review is de novo, allowing it to independently examine whether the petition “plainly” fails to entitle the petitioner to relief.

2. The Particularity Requirement Under Habeas Rule 2(c)

The heart of the decision lies in the application of Rule 2(c)(1)–(2) as interpreted in Mayle v. Felix:

The court acknowledges Crosby’s references to due process and to PS 5410.01’s exemption procedures.
But it notes that he fails to:
- Identify with precision the ground for relief (e.g., “I have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in X, and the BOP’s failure to do Y under statutory/regulatory/policy framework violates due process”); and
- Provide detailed facts supporting that ground (dates, actions or inactions by the warden, what procedures were denied, what statutory or regulatory criteria he met, etc.).

Instead, the court sees only general grievances:

That “they did not submit” his requests;
That he did not receive “proper documentation”; and
That “the policy is not doing what it is supposed to.”

These allegations, without more, do not “point to the real possibility of constitutional error.” They do not, for example, set up a straightforward due process theory along the lines of:

“I have earned sufficient time credits to qualify for prerelease custody under § 3624(g) and § 523.44, the BOP has arbitrarily refused to consider me for such placement despite its own criteria, and this arbitrary refusal deprives me of a liberty interest without process.”

Nor do they clearly challenge a specific, identifiable BOP decision to deny an exemption or to misinterpret PS 5410.01.

3. The Inconsistency About Prerelease Custody

A key problem highlighted by the court is Crosby’s insistence that he is “not arguing nothing about going into prerelease” and “not asking . . . to go into prerelease,” contrasted with:

His reliance on 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(c)(2), which governs application of time credits “toward prerelease custody”; and
PS 5410.01’s description of high- and medium‑risk inmates as “exceptions” to the “routine application” of § 523.44(c), and the ability of the Regional Director to grant exemptions within that framework.

The court reasoned that because the exemption Crosby invokes exists only in relation to the application of credits to prerelease custody, it is difficult to understand what legal interest he believes is being violated if—by his own account—he is not asking for prerelease custody or transfer.

This inconsistency undermines both:

The clarity of the right he claims (is it a right to be reviewed for prerelease custody, to be reviewed under a policy for its own sake, or something else?); and
The identification of a cognizable habeas claim, which must generally implicate the fact or duration of custody, not simply dissatisfaction with internal paperwork or review processes divorced from any effect on confinement.

4. Mapping “Section (C)(2)” and BP‑A0148 to the Regulation and Policy

The court does Crosby the favor of reconstructing his references to “Section (C)(2)” and “BA0148”:

It recognizes that § 3632(d)(4)(C) has no subsection “(2)”; therefore, Crosby must have meant § 523.44(c)(2), which is quoted and discussed in PS 5410.01.
It reads “BA0148 Inmate Request To Staff” as the BP‑A0148 form referenced in the Program Statement as the vehicle for initiating an exemption request.

Even with this generous reconstruction, however, the court finds that Crosby’s allegations remain too vague and conclusory. He does not:

Precisely state what he asked for on those forms;
Identify any response or formal decision by the warden (or Regional Director); or
Explain how any refusal or failure to act violated a particular statutory, regulatory, or constitutional entitlement.

Thus, the problem is not merely confusion about labels; it is a deeper lack of factual and legal specificity.

5. Characterizing the Petition as “Naked Allegations”

After laying out this context, the court concludes that Crosby’s factual assertions amount to “naked allegations,” citing Ruark. That label signals:

The allegations are broad, unsubstantiated assertions rather than detailed accounts of specific wrongful acts.
They do not, even if true, necessarily show an entitlement to the writ of habeas corpus.

In other words, a federal court cannot be compelled to order a “show cause” response from the government merely because a prisoner:

Invokes constitutional language like “due process” and “rights”; and
Alludes to BOP policies and FSA provisions, without connecting them coherently to the deprivation of a liberty interest or concrete statutory entitlement.

6. Limits of the Opinion: No Substantive Ruling on FSA or PS 5410.01

Notably, the Tenth Circuit does not decide:

Whether BOP’s interpretation of § 3624(g), § 3632(d)(4), or § 523.44 is correct; or
Whether PS 5410.01 is consistent with the FSA; or
Whether, in the abstract, a prisoner may have a cognizable due process claim based on BOP’s handling of FSA time credits or of exemption requests for high‑risk inmates.

The entire decision turns on pleading sufficiency. This is both a limitation and a lesson: Crosby may potentially be able to frame a viable claim, but the Tenth Circuit requires a clear articulation of the claim and its factual basis before it will engage with those underlying FSA issues.

C. Impact and Implications

1. Practical Guidance for Future § 2241 FSA Time‑Credit Petitions

For prisoners in the Tenth Circuit (and for district courts dealing with § 2241 petitions), Crosby offers concrete procedural lessons:

Identify the precise legal basis of the claim.
- If the claim is statutory (e.g., “BOP is misapplying § 3624(g) or § 523.44”), say so explicitly.
- If it is constitutional (e.g., “denial of a liberty interest in earlier release without due process”), identify the specific liberty interest and the process allegedly denied.
Connect the facts to the relief sought.
- Specify what relief the petitioner wants: earlier release, transfer to prerelease custody, recalculation of sentence, or simply a particular type of review.
- Explain how the BOP’s action (or inaction) directly affects the duration or fact of confinement.
Align the claim with the regulatory framework actually invoked.
- If relying on § 523.44(c)(2), acknowledge that it concerns prerelease custody, and explain how the petitioner qualifies (or is wrongly denied qualification) for such custody.
- Avoid disavowing the very consequence (e.g., prerelease) that the regulation or policy addresses.
Include nonconclusory factual detail.
- Dates and contents of requests or BP‑A0148 forms;
- Specific responses from staff, the warden, or the Regional Director;
- Documentation (if any) showing denial or failure to process; and
- Concrete allegations that necessary criteria (e.g., number of credits, risk reductions, programming completed) were met.

2. Program Statements and Habeas Corpus

The opinion implicitly raises, though does not resolve, broader questions about the role of BOP Program Statements like PS 5410.01 in habeas litigation:

Program Statements are internal BOP policy documents; they do not carry the same legal status as statutes or duly promulgated regulations.
While many courts allow prisoners to challenge agency action that allegedly conflicts with binding statutes or regulations, noncompliance with internal policy alone may not always create a cognizable liberty interest.
Crosby sidesteps that issue by stopping at the pleading stage, but its insistence on clarity underscores that:
- A prisoner invoking a Program Statement should explain how that policy implements or reflects underlying statutory or regulatory rights; and
- Simply alleging “they didn’t follow their policy” will rarely suffice for habeas relief unless connected to a recognized liberty interest.

3. High‑Risk PATTERN Inmates and Exemptions

Crosby is representative of a broader group: high‑risk inmates who have earned FSA time credits but face restrictions on how those credits may be used because of their PATTERN scores.

The opinion highlights:

That all eligible inmates can earn FSA time credits regardless of their PATTERN risk level (absent statutory disqualifying offenses); but
That application of those credits toward prerelease custody for medium- and high‑risk inmates is subject to more stringent conditions and sometimes requires specific approval by the warden and consultation with the Regional Director.

By reconstructing PS 5410.01’s exemption mechanism, the court acknowledges that:

There is a structured process (requests via BP‑A0148, unit team recommendations, warden approval, and possible Regional Director exemption) for high‑risk inmates to seek application of credits.
However, access to that process, or dissatisfaction with its implementation, must be presented in a tightly framed habeas claim to be justiciable.

4. Persuasive but Not Binding Precedent

The panel explicitly notes that its order and judgment is “not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.” It may, however, be cited for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

In practice, that means:

District courts in the Tenth Circuit are not legally required to follow Crosby, but they are likely to view it as a helpful guide for screening FSA‑related § 2241 petitions.
Litigants can cite it to show how another panel has treated practically identical pleading issues, especially concerning FSA time‑credit challenges framed under due process and BOP policy.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What is a § 2241 Habeas Petition?

In federal practice:

28 U.S.C. § 2255 is generally used to challenge the validity of a federal conviction or sentence (e.g., “my sentence is illegal” or “my conviction violates the Constitution”).
28 U.S.C. § 2241 is typically used to challenge the execution of a sentence (e.g., “the BOP miscalculated my release date,” “they are unlawfully denying me credits,” or “they are holding me in the wrong conditions when the sentence says otherwise”).

Because Crosby is challenging how the BOP treats his FSA time credits—rather than his underlying conviction—§ 2241 is the appropriate vehicle in principle.

2. First Step Act Time Credits, Eligibility, and Application

Under the First Step Act:

Earning Credits:
- Eligible inmates earn time credits by participating in recidivism‑reduction programs or “productive activities.”
- Certain serious offenses (listed at § 3632(d)(4)(D)) disqualify inmates from earning such credits at all.
Applying Credits:
- Credits can be applied to place inmates in prerelease custody (halfway houses, home confinement) or supervised release earlier than they otherwise would be.
- This application is regulated by § 3624(g) and 28 C.F.R. § 523.44, which impose requirements regarding:
  - Number of credits earned (sometimes needing to equal the remainder of the sentence);
  - Risk levels under PATTERN;
  - Time left on the sentence; and
  - Warden or Regional Director approvals for certain risk categories.

Many disputes, including Crosby’s, involve confusion or disagreement over how and when the BOP must apply earned credits, not whether the inmate can earn them in the first place.

3. PATTERN and High‑Risk Inmates

PATTERN (Prisoner Assessment Tool Targeting Estimated Risk and Needs) is the BOP’s risk‑assessment tool, used to categorize inmates as:

Minimum risk;
Low risk;
Medium risk; or
High risk.

Risk level affects:

Eligibility for certain benefits; and
How FSA credits may be applied.

High‑ and medium‑risk inmates often face stricter conditions and require more approvals for prerelease placements, which is why PS 5410.01’s discussion of an “exemption” for such inmates is significant.

4. BOP Program Statements

Program Statements (like PS 5410.01) are internal BOP policy manuals that:

Interpret statutes and regulations;
Set detailed procedures for staff and inmates (e.g., filing forms, conducting reviews); and
Do not themselves have the same legal status as statutes or regulations, though they may be relevant to demonstrating how the BOP understands and applies federal law.

In habeas litigation, they are frequently cited to show whether the BOP is implementing Congressional and regulatory directives correctly, but a bare claim that “BOP violated its own Program Statement” usually must be linked to:

Either a violation of the Constitution (e.g., due process); or
Or a violation of a statute or regulation that the Program Statement purports to implement.

5. Habeas Rules 2(c) and 4, and “Naked Allegations”

Habeas Rule 2(c) requires:

A listing of all grounds for relief; and
Facts in support of each ground.

Habeas Rule 4 allows dismissal if, from the face of the petition, the court can see that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. Together, they mean:

A petition must be more than a list of legal buzzwords.
It must state enough specific facts so that the court can see:
- What exactly the petitioner is complaining about; and
- Why, if the allegations are true, the law would entitle the petitioner to some form of relief.

“Naked allegations” are statements that are:

Vague (“they violated my rights”);
Conclusory (“they are not following the law”); and
Unaccompanied by any concrete factual detail.

Such allegations are not enough to obtain a “show cause” order in habeas.

6. Precedential Effect, Law of the Case, Res Judicata, and Collateral Estoppel

The opinion explicitly states that it is “not binding precedent,” except under certain doctrines:

Law of the case: Within the same litigation, once a court has decided an issue, that decision generally governs later stages of the case.
Res judicata (claim preclusion): Final judgments can bar later lawsuits between the same parties on the same claim.
Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion): Final judgments can preclude relitigation of specific issues that were actually litigated and decided.

Outside those contexts, the opinion may be cited as persuasive authority under the federal and local rules governing citation of unpublished opinions.

VI. Conclusion: Significance of Crosby v. Warden ADX

Crosby v. Warden ADX does not transform the law of the First Step Act or the rights of high‑risk inmates. Its significance lies elsewhere: it underscores, in the FSA context, a bedrock principle of habeas practice.

To bring a successful § 2241 petition—especially in the increasingly complex territory of FSA time credits and BOP implementation—a prisoner must:

Frame a cognizable habeas claim that relates to the fact or duration of custody (e.g., earlier release, transfer to prerelease custody), not simply dissatisfaction with internal procedures or documentation;
Clearly identify the source of the legal right invoked—statutory, regulatory, or constitutional; and
Plead with specificity the facts that show how the respondent has violated that right, avoiding “naked allegations” and internal inconsistencies.

For Crosby, the combination of:

Vague claims about due process;
Conflation of statute and Program Statement (“§ 3632(d)(4)(C)(2)”);
Failure to tie his allegations to a recognized liberty interest; and
Disavowal of prerelease custody while invoking a provision that exists only in connection with prerelease custody

proved fatal at the pleading stage. The Tenth Circuit did not foreclose all potential relief; it affirmed a without-prejudice dismissal, leaving open the possibility that Crosby—or similarly situated inmates—might articulate a more detailed, coherent, and legally grounded habeas claim in the future.

In that sense, Crosby serves as both a caution and a roadmap: it cautions that courts will not sift through opaque filings to construct habeas arguments for prisoners, but it also suggests what must be done—factually and legally—to bring First Step Act time‑credit disputes within the zone of cognizable, well‑pleaded § 2241 claims.