Criminal Trespass on Public Property and Limits of Discretion in State v. Bundy

Introduction

State v. Bundy (Idaho Supreme Court, April 1, 2025) clarified the reach of Idaho’s misdemeanor criminal trespass statute when applied to public property, as well as the constitutional constraints on legislative and administrative actors who revoke access to state‐owned premises. Ammon Edward Bundy—known nationally for high‐profile standoffs over federal land policy—was arrested twice inside the Idaho State Capitol after refusing to obey orders to leave the Lincoln Auditorium and, later, public hallways. He was convicted of misdemeanor trespass and resisting or obstructing arrest in two consolidated cases (Docket Nos. 50333 & 50715). Bundy challenged his convictions on grounds that the trespass statute and the related one‐year ban notice were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, that the statute did not apply to public property, and that statutes conferring authority on the Speaker of the House and the Department of Administration’s Director violated separation of powers and granted “unbridled discretion.” The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed, upholding the convictions and setting important precedent on public‐property trespass and executive/legislative discretion.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court unanimously affirmed the district court’s upholding of Bundy’s misdemeanor convictions in both appeals. It held:

The criminal trespass statute (I.C. § 18-7008) applies to both private and public real property.
The statute was not unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous as applied to Bundy’s conduct, even though it uses terms like “remains” and “permission.”
The statute was not overbroad as applied, because it regulates non‐expressive conduct (physical presence after lawful notice) rather than protected speech.
House Rule 63 and I.C. §§ 67-1602, 67-1603 do not vest “unbridled discretion” in the Speaker of the House or the Administration Director; both operate under clear statutory bounds and may be checked by appeal or rulemaking procedures.
Those statutes do not violate the separation of powers: they allocate space management responsibilities within branches without delegating core legislative lawmaking power to another branch.
Bundy’s arrests were lawful, so his passive resistance did not entitle him to acquittal on resisting/obstructing charges.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

State v. Korsen (2003): Held the pre-2018 trespass statute was neither vague nor overbroad when applied to non-expressive conduct in a government office.
Pentico I & II (Idaho Ct. App. 2011, 2015): Upheld trespass convictions based on violation of a ban notice, not speech content.
State v. Clark (2016): Adopted Pentico’s reasoning, reaffirming that misdemeanor trespass targets conduct, not speech.
State v. Cook (2019): Articulated the two‐part test for as-applied vagueness challenges: fair notice and unbridled law enforcement discretion.
Various vagueness/overbreadth decisions: Freitas, Kelley, Burke, and U.S. Supreme Court rulings on nondelegation and free speech limits (Skilling, Smith v. Goguen).
Bedke v. Ellsworth (2021): Confirmed that I.C. § 67-1602(3) authorizes legislative presiding officers to allocate and manage certain Capitol spaces without violating separation of powers.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning centered on well-established principles of statutory interpretation and constitutional doctrine:

Plain-Language Construction: I.C. § 18-7008 describes trespass as entering or remaining on “real property of another” without permission. “Real property” encompasses public and private lands. The quoted permissions exception (subsection 6(a)(i)) expressly contemplates public spaces “open to the public.”
Vagueness (As-Applied): Bundy failed both limbs of an as-applied vagueness test. The statute and the one-year ban notice clearly informed him that, once the Lincoln Auditorium was closed, his staying put would constitute trespass. Law enforcement discretion was guided by the Speaker’s order and statutory definitions.
Overbreadth: The statute targets conduct (unauthorized physical presence), not speech. Doctrines protecting expressive activity do not shield Bundy here, as the Court reaffirmed in Clark and Pentico.
Unbridled Discretion: Only law enforcement discretion to arrest is subject to vagueness scrutiny. House Rule 63 and I.C. §§ 67-1602/1603 delegate management roles (not lawmaking) to legislative officers and the Administration Director. Their authority is cabined by statutory language, appeals, and rulemaking requirements.
Separation of Powers: No impermissible delegation of core legislative power occurred. The challenged statutes assign administrative responsibilities—space allocation, maintenance, and rulemaking—without allowing creation or repeal of laws.
Resisting/Obstructing: With lawful underlying trespass arrests, Bundy’s passive resistance (going “limp” and requiring officers to carry or wheel him out) supported misdemeanor resisting/obstructing convictions.

3. Impact

State v. Bundy provides clear guidance on several fronts:

Affirms that Idaho’s criminal trespass statute reaches public as well as private real property.
Reinforces that trespass prosecutions focus on unauthorized presence, not content of speech or expressive conduct.
Clarifies that facility‐management powers granted by statute or legislative rule—House Rule 63, I.C. §§ 67-1602–1604—do not amount to unconstitutional nondelegation or unbridled discretion.
Confirms law enforcement may act on clear orders from property‐control authorities, subject to statutory constraints.
Provides precedent for resisting/obstructing charges in cases of passive but deliberate noncompliance with lawful orders.

Complex Concepts Simplified

As-Applied Vagueness – A law may be clear in general but unclear in particular cases. A defendant must show it didn’t give fair notice of prohibited conduct or left officers free to decide enforceability on a whim.
Overbreadth – Laws that regulate speech can be struck if they sweep too widely. A trespass law aimed at conduct (unauthorized presence) is not overbroad simply because someone in that place might also talk.
Unbridled Discretion – When a law gives police no standards for arrest, it risks arbitrary enforcement. Here, statutory and rule-based controls guided police action.
Separation of Powers (Nondelegation) – The legislature cannot hand its lawmaking power to others. Assigning administrative duties (e.g., space allocation, signage, trespass notices) is not lawmaking.
Passive vs. Active Resistance – Even nonviolent, silent refusal to comply with a lawful order can obstruct official duties and support resisting/obstructing charges.

Conclusion

State v. Bundy cements the principle that Idaho’s criminal trespass laws apply equally on public and private property and that procedural safeguards—statutory definitions, notice requirements, rulemaking, and appeal rights—prevent vagueness, overbreadth, and unlawful delegation of power. Public officials may revoke access to state‐controlled spaces under clear statutory authority, and law enforcement may enforce those revocations against noncompliant persons. Bundy’s convictions for trespass and resisting/obstructing were therefore properly affirmed, providing valuable guidance for future cases involving public‐property access and enforcement discretion.