Criminal Penalties under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1) Apply Regardless of Admission Status

Introduction

This case commentary examines the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. John Doe (No. 22-14307, 11th Cir. May 21, 2025), where the court resolved an issue of first impression: whether the criminal‐penalty provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1)—which punishes a noncitizen who “willfully fails or refuses to depart” following a final removal order “by reason of being a member of any of the classes described in section 1227(a)”—applies only to noncitizens lawfully admitted to the United States. The parties are the United States (plaintiff-appellee) and John Doe (defendant-appellant), a noncitizen apprehended on recurring immigration violations and charged with three counts of failing to depart after final removal orders.

Key issues:

• Statutory construction of 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1) and its reference to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a).
• Whether “classes described in section 1227(a)” inherit the prefatory requirement that the alien be “in and admitted to the United States.”
• Impact of the 1996 IIRIRA reform on criminal removal penalties.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. It held by plain‐text analysis that § 1253(a)(1) does not incorporate the prefatory phrase “in and admitted to the United States” from § 1227(a). Rather, § 1253(a)(1) reaches any noncitizen subject to a final removal order “by reason of being a member of any of the classes described” in the numbered subsections of § 1227(a)(1)–(6), regardless of whether that person ever obtained lawful admission. Consequently:

• The district court properly refused Doe’s jury instruction requiring proof of admission.
• The district court properly denied Doe’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the ground he was never lawfully admitted.
• Doe’s convictions on three counts of violating § 1253(a)(1) were affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Zuniga-Arteaga, 681 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2012) – De novo review of statutory interpretation.
• Garcon, 54 F.4th 1274 (11th Cir. 2022 en banc) – Start with plain language.
• Nesbitt, 945 F.3d 1355 (11th Cir. 2022) – End analysis if text is unambiguous.
• Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1994) & Shular, 589 U.S. 154 (2020) – Rule of lenity applies only if statutory ambiguity persists.
• Fourco Glass Co., 353 U.S. 222 (1957) – Revising and consolidating statutes does not imply substantive change absent clear expression.
• Bamfield, 328 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2003) – Criminal “failure‐to‐depart” offense survived IIRIRA renumbering.

Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory Text
§ 1253(a)(1) penalizes willful failure to depart after a final removal order “by reason of being a member of any of the classes described in section 1227(a).” Section 1227(a) begins with the single‐sentence prefatory clause, “[a]ny alien … in and admitted to the United States shall be removed if the alien is within one or more of the following classes of deportable aliens:” followed by numbered subsections (1)–(6), each stating “[e]ach class is deportable.” The court held that the term “classes described in section 1227(a)” unambiguously refers to the numbered subsections and does not import the prefatory “in and admitted” limitation. 2. Grammar and Canons
The phrase “in and admitted to the United States” is a postpositive modifier that grammatically attaches to the nearest referent—“any alien”—not to the plural “classes.” Had Congress intended to limit § 1253(a)(1) to admitted aliens, it would have said so explicitly or used the admission‐linked definition found in § 1229a(e)(2). 3. Statutory Context and IIRIRA History
The 1996 IIRIRA consolidated exclusion and deportation into “removal” but left intact pre‐IIRIRA criminal penalties for failing to depart under final orders formerly labeled deportation orders. Congress renumbered § 1252(e) as § 1253(a)(1) and updated terminology, but did not narrow the classes subject to criminal sanction. Definitions in § 1229a(e) apply only to the removal process (§ 1229a–1229b) and cannot rewrite § 1253(a)(1). 4. Rule of Lenity
Because the statute is unambiguous under plain‐text and contextual analysis, the rule of lenity does not apply.

Impact

• Enforcement Broadening: Immigration authorities can charge failure‐to‐depart offenses against any noncitizen subject to removal orders tied to § 1227(a) classes, regardless of admission status.
• Clarity in Statutory Drafting: Future legislative amendments must clearly state any admission requirements for criminal sanctions.
• Criminal vs. Civil Distinction: Reinforces that civil removal standards and criminal penalties operate under distinct statutory regimes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Removal vs. Deportation vs. Exclusion – Prior to 1996, “deportation” applied to aliens who had “entered” (lawfully or not), and “exclusion” to those who had not. The IIRIRA unified both under “removal.”
• Admission – A lawful entry after immigration inspection and authorization. § 1101(a)(13)(A).
• Deportable – A term carried over from the pre‐IIRIRA era to denote membership in a class making an admitted alien removable under § 1227(a)(1)–(6). It does not itself import an admission requirement into § 1253(a)(1).

Conclusion

United States v. Doe cements that criminal liability under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1) hinges solely on membership in the classes enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)–(6), not on whether a noncitizen was ever lawfully admitted. By reaffirming plain‐text interpretation and respecting Congress’s post‐IIRIRA preservation of criminal penalties, the decision provides clear guidance to courts and practitioners: failure‐to‐depart offenses reach all noncitizens facing removal for § 1227(a) grounds, closing any geographic or status‐based loopholes in criminal enforcement.