I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the First Circuit’s unpublished per curiam decision in In re: Paul S. Hughes, No. 23-8029 (1st Cir. Nov. 18, 2025), a reciprocal attorney discipline proceeding arising from a Massachusetts state-court disbarment.

Attorney Paul S. Hughes, who specialized in representing homeowners in post-fire insurance disputes, had been disbarred in Massachusetts for misusing client funds held in his IOLTA (Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts) account. When the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit initiated reciprocal discipline proceedings, Hughes—appearing pro se—argued that the federal court should impose a lesser sanction than disbarment. His theory was not that the misconduct findings were wholly wrong (he did not dispute that he misused client funds), but that the Massachusetts sanction was unfairly aggravated because bar counsel allegedly presented, and knowingly relied upon, false testimony from two affected client couples.

The First Circuit rejected those arguments and imposed the same sanction of disbarment, emphasizing:

• the strong presumption in favor of imposing discipline “similar to that imposed in the state court” in reciprocal proceedings;
• the clear-and-convincing burden on the disciplined attorney to show that similar discipline is unwarranted; and
• the very limited circumstances in which a federal court will second-guess a state court’s disciplinary findings, especially where alleged “false testimony” amounts to nothing more than a credibility dispute that the state tribunal already resolved.

Although the opinion is designated “Not for Publication in West’s Federal Reporter,” it is doctrinally important. It reaffirms and sharpens the First Circuit’s approach to:

• Reciprocal discipline based on state disbarments;
• The weight given to state fact-finding and credibility determinations; and
• The treatment of allegations that state bar counsel suborned perjury in disciplinary proceedings.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Hughes’s Practice and the Massachusetts Disbarment

Hughes’s practice centered on representing homeowners in negotiations with insurance companies after catastrophic property damage, such as house fires. The Massachusetts disciplinary proceedings focused on his handling of insurance settlement funds for two separate client couples, all of which were supposed to be held in his IOLTA account pending disbursement.

1. The first couple: wrongful withdrawals and delayed restitution

For the first couple:

• Hughes received insurance settlement funds and deposited them into his IOLTA trust account.
• He then withdrew approximately $139,000 more than he was entitled to as a fee.
• When the clients later attempted to use the settlement funds to pay off the mortgage on their damaged home so they could purchase a new house, there were insufficient funds in the IOLTA account.
• Hughes ultimately obtained a family loan to reimburse the clients, but the delay caused them to:
  • lose certain real estate purchase opportunities; and
  • incur an additional $8,000 in mortgage interest.

The Board of Bar Overseers (“Board”) also found that, at the time Hughes withdrew the clients’ funds from the IOLTA account, he had not yet informed them that a settlement had been reached, and they had never endorsed an insurance check. That conclusion rested on the clients’ testimony.

Hughes disputed this aspect of the evidence:

• He produced a check bearing what he claimed were the couple’s endorsements, arguing that this proved they knew about and consented to the settlement.
• He also argued that the couple’s testimony about wanting to buy a new house was false. In his telling, they initially intended to rebuild their damaged home and only decided to purchase a new house after he had already returned the misused funds.
• Thus, he maintained, no actual harm resulted from the delay in returning the settlement funds.

2. The second couple: misspent funds and contested “additional fees”

For the second couple:

• The insurer sent a settlement check for $376,000, which went into Hughes’s IOLTA account.
• Hughes misspent $35,750 of those funds.
• After bar counsel commenced an investigation, Hughes paid the couple a check for $22,219.

The discrepancy between the $35,750 in misspent funds and the $22,219 ultimately paid was explained, by Hughes, as representing additional fees for:

1. representing the couple in a lawsuit against the insurance company; and
2. assisting them in selling their damaged home and purchasing a new one.

To support his position that the clients had agreed to these additional charges, Hughes pointed to:

• a purported “full accounting” of his fees he claimed to have sent them;
• their acceptance of the final $22,219 check; and
• a letter to bar counsel, which the couple allegedly authored, stating that Hughes’s summary of charges was accurate.

The couple, however, testified:

• they did not understand that Hughes was paying them less than the amount he had misspent;
• they had not seen a summary of charges; and
• Hughes himself had provided the language included in the letter to bar counsel.

The Board rejected Hughes’s justifications and found that:

1. The couple had not agreed that Hughes would perform the additional real estate transactional work; and
2. The lawsuit against the insurer was part of the original representation, governed by a preexisting agreement under which Hughes would receive only a 5% contingency fee from the settlement.

B. Hughes’s Legal Theories in the Massachusetts Proceedings

Throughout the state proceedings, Hughes did not dispute that he had misused client funds. His argument focused instead on:

• The alleged overstatement of harm to the clients; and
• The purportedly fraudulent or perjured testimony that, in his view, led the single justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) to treat his conduct as more egregious than it truly was.

The SJC single justice who ordered disbarment:

• found that Hughes’s conduct “caused harm” to the first couple by frustrating their attempts to purchase a new home; and
• found that he “failed to make full restitution” to the second couple, as he still owed them the difference between the $35,750 misspent and the $22,219 payout.

Hughes contended that both of these “aggravating” findings resulted from bar counsel’s knowing use of false testimony. He also raised due process and credibility concerns before the SJC single justice, who rejected them as essentially a dispute over witness credibility, noting that the Board’s findings were supported by the record.

Importantly, Hughes did not appeal the single justice’s disbarment order to the full SJC, even though such review was available under Massachusetts procedure.

C. Initiation of Reciprocal Discipline in the First Circuit

Following the Massachusetts disbarment, the First Circuit issued an Order to Show Cause why similar reciprocal discipline should not be imposed in that court. Reciprocal discipline is a mechanism by which federal courts generally mirror attorney discipline imposed by state courts, unless certain narrow exceptions apply.

In responding to the First Circuit’s Order, Hughes renewed his central argument: the Massachusetts process was corrupted because bar counsel knowingly used perjured testimony to portray his misconduct and its consequences as far more serious than the truth would support. On that basis, he urged the First Circuit to impose a lesser sanction than disbarment.

III. Summary of the First Circuit’s Opinion

The First Circuit, in a per curiam decision by Judges Aframe, Lipez, and Howard, rejected Hughes’s arguments in full and ordered his disbarment from practice before the court.

The court’s reasoning proceeded in three main steps:

1. Restatement of the reciprocal discipline framework. Citing In re Oliveras López de Victoria, 561 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2009), and In re Williams, 398 F.3d 116 (1st Cir. 2005), the court reaffirmed that it will ordinarily impose discipline “similar to that imposed in the state court,” subject to four narrow exceptions grounded in due process, infirmity of proof, grave injustice, or a determination that different discipline is warranted.
2. Rejection of Hughes’s perjury and due process arguments. The court held that Hughes had not come close to establishing that bar counsel had suborned perjury, nor that the state proceedings were constitutionally defective in notice, opportunity to be heard, or integrity of the evidentiary record. It emphasized that the Massachusetts Board’s hearing committee was the sole judge of witness credibility, that the SJC single justice had considered and rejected Hughes’s credibility-based challenges, and that the record contained evidence supporting the state findings of client harm and incomplete restitution.
3. Imposition of reciprocal disbarment. Finding that none of the exceptions to reciprocal discipline had been established by clear and convincing evidence, the court imposed disbarment from practice before the First Circuit and ordered its opinion forwarded to the SJC.

The practical holding: An attorney disbarred by a state court will almost certainly be disbarred by the First Circuit as well, unless he or she can present very strong, clearly documented proof of serious procedural unfairness or evidentiary breakdown in the state proceedings. Mere disagreements about witness credibility or alleged factual errors will not suffice.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. In re Oliveras López de Victoria, 561 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2009)

Oliveras López de Victoria is the First Circuit’s leading modern case articulating the structure of reciprocal discipline in that court. It reaffirms that, in general, the federal court will impose discipline that is “substantially similar” to that imposed by the state court, subject to specified exceptions.

The Hughes panel quotes Oliveras for the proposition that:

“[D]iscipline similar to that imposed in the state court will be imposed in a reciprocal proceeding.”

and for the principle that:

“the state court’s substantive findings ordinarily are entitled to a high degree of respect,” and the burden rests with the challenging party to show “by clear and convincing evidence, that the imposition of substantially similar discipline is unwarranted.”

Thus, Oliveras supplies both:

• the presumption in favor of similar discipline; and
• the burden and standard of proof—clear and convincing evidence—resting on the attorney who seeks to avoid or mitigate reciprocal discipline.

The Hughes opinion does not innovate on this framework but applies it strictly, underscoring how difficult it is for an attorney to meet this burden, particularly where the alleged infirmity in the state proceeding is essentially a disagreement over how credibility disputes were resolved.

2. In re Williams, 398 F.3d 116 (1st Cir. 2005)

Williams is an earlier First Circuit decision that, in turn, relies on the court’s local attorney discipline rules and ultimately on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46 (1917). It enumerates four exceptions under which a federal court may decline to impose reciprocal discipline:

1. The state procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a denial of due process;
2. There was such an infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct that the federal court cannot, consistent with its duty, accept the state’s conclusion;
3. Imposition of substantially similar discipline would work a grave injustice;
4. The misconduct established is deemed by the federal court to warrant different discipline.

These four exceptions—recited again in Hughes—are the central doctrinal tool in reciprocal discipline analysis. In effect, they codify the Supreme Court’s approach in Selling: a federal court is not absolutely bound by a state disbarment, but it will not re-litigate the case absent clear evidence of serious structural or evidentiary defects.

In Hughes, all of Hughes’s arguments are repackaged and evaluated through this four-part lens. The court’s bottom line is that his complaints—disputes about who was telling the truth and about the SJC’s weighing of the evidence—do not fit any of the four exceptions.

3. In re Hayes, 112 F.4th 61 (1st Cir. 2024)

Hayes is another First Circuit reciprocal discipline case involving Massachusetts proceedings. In Hughes, the court cites Hayes for two propositions about Massachusetts’s disciplinary structure:

• Under S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8(5)(a), the Board’s hearing committee is the “sole judge of the credibility of the testimony”.
• The SJC will not reject a finding unless “it can be said with certainty that the finding was wholly inconsistent with another implicit finding.”

This is significant for Hughes’s allegations of perjury. If the hearing committee is the authorized tribunal to judge credibility, and the SJC defers to those findings absent clear internal inconsistency, then federal courts are even less likely to disturb those credibility determinations in reciprocal proceedings.

In short, Hayes reinforces that under Massachusetts law, credibility assessments in bar discipline cases are entrusted to specialized fact-finding bodies, and the federal courts will not casually second-guess those judgments.

4. United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2000)

The First Circuit’s citation to Zichettello serves a more general evidentiary point:

“discrepancies in the evidence do not . . . establish that the government offered perjured testimony, knowingly or not.”

By invoking this Second Circuit criminal case in a bar discipline context, the First Circuit underlines a key doctrinal theme: inconsistencies, conflicts, or contradictions in evidence are common and are to be resolved through ordinary fact-finding and credibility judgments; they do not by themselves demonstrate perjury, much less deliberate subornation of perjury by counsel.

That principle is fatal to Hughes’s core theory. Even if there were documentary evidence or prior statements that cast doubt on aspects of the clients’ testimony, the proper way to handle that is through cross-examination and credibility assessment—not by treating any discrepancy as proof of bar counsel’s misconduct.

B. Legal Reasoning of the First Circuit

1. Framework: Selling / Williams / Oliveras and the heavy burden on the respondent

The court begins from the well-settled federal rule—rooted in Selling v. Radford—that a federal court:

• gives great respect and deference to a state court’s disciplinary findings;
• will normally impose substantially identical discipline unless exceptional circumstances under the four Williams factors are proven; and
• places the burden on the disciplined lawyer to show by clear and convincing evidence that reciprocal discipline is unwarranted.

This is more than a simple presumption; in practical terms it creates a rebuttable but robust default rule that state disbarment = federal disbarment, barring substantial proof of serious flaws in the state process.

2. Hughes’s theory reframed under the Williams exceptions

Hughes’s arguments can be mapped onto the Williams exceptions as follows:

• He claimed that bar counsel suborned perjury by presenting false testimony to exaggerate the egregiousness of his misconduct—invoking the “infirmity of proof” exception (and, indirectly, due process).
• He implied that the sanction of disbarment was a “grave injustice” because it rested on false aggravating findings (client harm and incomplete restitution).
• By urging a lesser sanction, he essentially argued the fourth exception: that “the misconduct established is deemed by the [federal] Court to warrant different discipline.”

The court rapidly concludes that he has not established any of these.

3. The perjury allegation: from “subornation” to “credibility dispute”

The panel candidly notes that:

“If Hughes had established that bar counsel had suborned perjury by offering the couples’ false testimony to make his conduct appear more aggravating than it was, we might have serious questions about the appropriate sanction to impose.”

This is important: the court acknowledges that proven subornation of perjury in a state disciplinary proceeding could, in principle, trigger the infirmity-of-proof or grave-injustice exceptions and justify either refusing reciprocal discipline or imposing a different sanction.

However, the court immediately follows with the conclusion:

“But Hughes has not come close to making such a showing or even establishing that there was any infirmity in the proof presented to support his disbarment.”

Why not?

• Under S.J.C. Rule 4:01, the Board’s hearing committee is the sole judge of credibility. The committee credited the clients’ testimony and rejected key elements of Hughes’s.
• The SJC single justice reviewed those findings and explicitly rejected Hughes’s perjury theory as a “dispute over witness credibility” in which the Board’s conclusions were supported by the record.
• The record included not only the clients’ testimony, but also evidence about Hughes’s lack of candor, which gave the state tribunal grounds to question the reliability of his own testimony and documentary evidence.

Thus, when Hughes came to the First Circuit, he was essentially asking a federal appellate tribunal to re-weigh credibility determinations that had been made by the designated state fact-finders and affirmed by the SJC. The First Circuit categorically refused to do so, emphasizing that federal courts in reciprocal discipline proceedings are not a forum for collateral relitigation of fact questions already adjudicated in state disciplinary proceedings.

4. No due process violation: full opportunity to present and contest evidence

Turning to due process, the court observes that:

• There is no suggestion that Hughes was denied the opportunity to testify;
• There is no indication that he was restricted in his ability to cross-examine or impeach the client witnesses; and
• His due process-based objections to the allegedly false testimony were expressly considered and rejected by the SJC single justice.

The First Circuit therefore concludes that there was no “procedure . . . so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process,” borrowing the precise language of the first Williams exception.

Hughes also argued that he was prevented from litigating, in a separate SJC proceeding, his challenge to the fairness of the original state disciplinary hearing. The First Circuit dismisses this as irrelevant to the reciprocal discipline analysis:

“Hughes’ arguments about the application of state procedures for bringing a separate challenge to the fairness of his state disciplinary hearing has no apparent connection to whether this Court should impose reciprocal discipline based on the SJC’s disbarment finding.”

In other words, the reciprocal discipline inquiry looks to the fairness of the original proceeding that produced the disciplinary judgment, not to subsequent collateral state processes that the attorney might have wished to invoke. Since Hughes did get to argue his due process and credibility issues to the SJC single justice, and since he chose not to pursue a further appeal within the state system, the First Circuit sees no constitutional shortfall.

5. No “grave injustice” and no basis for different discipline

Finally, the court implicitly rejects any claim that reciprocal disbarment would result in a “grave injustice” or that the misconduct warrants a lesser sanction. The underlying misconduct—misuse of substantial client funds in trust, belated and incomplete restitution, and lack of candor—normally warrants disbarment under both state and federal standards.

Because:

• Hughes conceded the basic misuse of funds;
• the SJC found actual harm to at least one set of clients and incomplete restitution to another; and
• there was no convincing evidence of perjury or prosecutorial-type misconduct;

the First Circuit saw no room to say that a different, lesser sanction was required. To the contrary, it expressly notes that it has “no reason” to accept Hughes’s theory that bar counsel engaged in misconduct.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Reinforced deference to state bar disciplinary findings

In re Hughes reinforces an already strong message in federal law: federal courts very rarely disturb state disciplinary judgments in reciprocal proceedings. The opinion underscores:

• The limited scope of federal review in reciprocal discipline: it is not an appeal, rehearing, or de novo examination; it is a collateral, highly deferential inquiry into whether the state process was fundamentally fair and reliable.
• The centrality of state fact-finders’ credibility assessments. Where the Board’s hearing committee and the SJC have credited state witnesses and discredited the attorney, the First Circuit will not second-guess those judgments absent truly extraordinary showings of fraud or structural defect.

2. High bar for alleging perjury or misconduct by bar counsel

The decision also serves as a cautionary message to disciplined attorneys:

• Allegations that bar counsel “suborned perjury” or knowingly presented false testimony must be backed by specific, compelling, and independently verifiable proof.
• Merely pointing to contradictions between documents and testimony, or between different witnesses’ accounts, will almost always be treated as a garden-variety credibility conflict, not evidence of systemic fraud.
• As Zichettello underscores, “discrepancies in the evidence” are not per se proof of perjury, let alone proof that counsel knew of and encouraged perjury.

In practical terms, this raises the threshold for attorneys who hope to avoid reciprocal discipline by asserting that their state disbarment was procured through false testimony. Without sworn recantations, documentary proof of fabrication, or clear evidence of collusion, such claims will ordinarily fail.

3. Importance of exhausting state remedies

Hughes’s decision not to appeal the SJC single justice’s order to the full SJC further weakens his posture in the federal proceeding. While the First Circuit does not explicitly premise its holding on failure to exhaust, the background principle of comity is clear:

• Federal courts expect lawyers to fully utilize available state appellate or review processes before asking a federal court to depart from the state outcome.
• Where the state’s highest court (or its single-justice delegate) has already considered and rejected the very due process or credibility arguments now being made federally, the federal court will treat those challenges as thoroughly adjudicated and presumptively valid.

4. Practical guidance for future reciprocal discipline litigants

From a pragmatic standpoint, In re Hughes offers practical lessons:

1. Focus on structural defects, not factual disputes.
   Attorneys seeking to avoid reciprocal discipline should concentrate on structural due process failures (e.g., lack of notice, inability to obtain counsel, conflicts of interest, refusal to allow key evidence) rather than a rehash of witness credibility disputes.
2. Gather objective, independent evidence of misconduct.
   If alleging that bar counsel knowingly used perjured testimony, the respondent must marshal objective evidence (e.g., recantations, official documents definitively contradicting testimony, admissions by counsel, or other incontrovertible proof) rather than relying solely on their own testimony and interpretation of events.
3. Document and fully pursue state remedies.
   Any alleged procedural or evidentiary errors should be:
   • clearly preserved in the record of the state proceedings; and
   • pursued through all available state review channels (including appeals to the full state supreme court, where available).
   A later federal challenge is far more persuasive when the attorney can show that state tribunals refused to correct or even consider serious defects.

V. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Reciprocal Discipline

Reciprocal discipline is the practice by which one court or jurisdiction imposes discipline on an attorney based on discipline already imposed elsewhere. For example:

• If a lawyer is disbarred by a state supreme court, federal courts in that region will typically initiate reciprocal proceedings to determine whether that lawyer should also be disbarred from federal practice.
• The goal is to promote consistency, protect the public, and avoid a situation where an attorney deemed unfit in one jurisdiction continues to practice unimpeded in another.

However, reciprocal discipline is not automatic. Under Selling and its progeny, including Williams and Oliveras, the federal court must ask whether:

1. the state proceedings were fundamentally fair (due process);
2. the proof of misconduct was reliable (no infirmity of proof);
3. imposing similar discipline would be unjust; or
4. different discipline is appropriate for the established misconduct.

B. IOLTA (Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts)

An IOLTA account is a pooled trust account in which attorneys hold client funds that are small in amount or held for a short duration such that it would not be economically feasible to maintain separate interest-bearing accounts for each client. The key principles are:

• The money in an IOLTA account belongs to clients, not to the lawyer.
• The lawyer must not use client funds for personal or business purposes.
• Even temporary “borrowing” from client funds is treated as misuse or conversion, and is among the most serious forms of professional misconduct.

In Hughes, the misuse of IOLTA funds (approximately $139,000 for one couple and $35,750 for another) is the core misconduct that led to state disbarment and reciprocal federal disbarment.

C. Subornation of Perjury

Subornation of perjury occurs when a lawyer procures, induces, or knowingly uses false testimony. It is a grave ethical and, potentially, criminal offense.

To show that bar counsel “suborned perjury,” it is not enough to prove that:

• a witness’s testimony was inaccurate or contradicted by other evidence; or
• the fact-finder made an error in whom to believe.

Instead, one must show that:

• the witness actually lied under oath (perjury); and
• counsel knew or had strong reason to know that the testimony was false and nonetheless used it strategically.

In Hughes, the First Circuit emphasizes that ordinary discrepancies in evidence do not amount to proof of perjury, let alone proof that bar counsel knowingly relied on such perjury.

D. Clear and Convincing Evidence

Clear and convincing evidence is a mid-level standard of proof—higher than “preponderance of the evidence” but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

To meet this standard, the evidence must:

• produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction in its truth; and
• be strong, cogent, and highly persuasive.

In reciprocal discipline, the First Circuit requires the disciplined lawyer to show by clear and convincing evidence that imposing similar discipline is unwarranted. Allegations of error, speculation, or conflicting testimony fall well short of this standard unless supported by robust, objective corroboration.

VI. Conclusion: Significance of In re Hughes in the Broader Legal Landscape

In re Hughes is doctrinally consistent with, and reinforces, longstanding federal law on reciprocal attorney discipline. Even as an unpublished decision, it carries practical significance for lawyers facing discipline in multiple forums.

The key takeaways are:

1. The presumption of reciprocal discipline is powerful.
   When a state’s highest court has disbarred an attorney, the First Circuit will presumptively do the same. Only compelling evidence of fundamental unfairness or serious evidentiary breakdown will alter that outcome.
2. Credibility disputes stay in the state forum.
   Federal courts in reciprocal discipline proceedings will not re-try credibility issues already heard and resolved by state disciplinary bodies. Conflicting testimony, disputed documents, and factual disagreements belong in the state proceedings and appeals, not in the federal reciprocal forum.
3. Allegations of perjury and bar counsel misconduct require more than contradictions.
   To persuade a federal court that state bar counsel engaged in subornation of perjury, a disciplined lawyer must present clear and convincing evidence of actual perjury and counsel’s knowledge. Mere discrepancies in evidence are legally insufficient.
4. Due process requires opportunity, not a particular outcome.
   Hughes had notice of the allegations, an opportunity to be heard, and the ability to present evidence and challenge witnesses. The fact that the Board and SJC resolved the facts against him does not constitute a violation of due process.
5. Misuse of client funds remains among the most serious violations.
   The underlying misconduct—substantial misuse of client settlement funds held in trust—almost invariably warrants disbarment, particularly when the misuse causes concrete harm and is accompanied by incomplete restitution or questionable candor. Federal courts will not lightly deviate from that norm.

In sum, In re Hughes crystallizes a central lesson for the bar: reciprocal discipline is not a second bite at the apple. It is a narrow, deferential review designed to ensure that the state process met minimum standards of fairness and reliability. Lawyers who wish to avoid the career-ending consequence of federal disbarment must make their strongest factual, evidentiary, and procedural challenges in the state disciplinary system itself, not in collateral federal proceedings after the fact.