Crawford v. Mississippi: Supreme Court Declines to Resolve Retroactivity of McCoy v. Louisiana; Sotomayor Dissent Urges Retroactive Application on Collateral Review

Introduction

In Crawford v. Mississippi, No. 25-385 (25A378), decided October 15, 2025, the Supreme Court denied both a stay of execution and a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by death-row inmate Charles Ray Crawford. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, dissented. The dissent spotlights a pivotal and unresolved constitutional question: whether the Sixth Amendment rule announced in McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (2018)—prohibiting defense counsel from conceding guilt over a client’s explicit objection—applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.

The factual backdrop is stark. At Crawford’s 1993 capital murder trial, defense counsel repeatedly conceded that Crawford killed the victim and mounted an insanity defense, despite Crawford’s express, contemporaneous instructions to maintain his innocence and force the State to prove every element. Post-McCoy, Crawford sought state postconviction relief in Mississippi, arguing that his counsel’s concessions violated his autonomy under the Sixth Amendment and that the violation is structural error mandating reversal. The Mississippi Supreme Court denied relief and issued a death warrant, reasoning that the claim was procedurally barred and, critically, that McCoy does not apply retroactively. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to intervene. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent argues the Court should have stayed the execution and granted review to resolve a split on McCoy’s retroactivity, which determines whether Crawford lives or dies.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court, without opinion, denied the application for a stay of execution and denied certiorari. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent contends:

The Court has jurisdiction to review because the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision rests on a federal retroactivity determination and thus does not rest on adequate and independent state grounds. The state court’s reliance on McCoy’s non-retroactivity is intertwined with federal law, and its brief mention of delay is not an independent, clear state-law basis.
The case satisfies the criteria for a stay under Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895 (1983): there is a reasonable probability of certiorari, a significant possibility of reversal, and certain irreparable harm absent a stay.
There is a lower-court division on whether McCoy applies retroactively on collateral review. Some courts treat McCoy as an application of existing Sixth Amendment autonomy principles (and thus retroactive); others treat it as a new, nonretroactive procedural rule.
On the merits, if McCoy is retroactive, Crawford’s trial plainly violated McCoy: counsel conceded the “what” (that Crawford committed the acts) despite Crawford’s persistent, explicit insistence on maintaining innocence.
Mississippi’s argument that an insanity defense avoids a “concession of guilt” fails, because the Sixth Amendment protects a defendant’s objective to assert innocence—not merely to seek an acquittal by any available theory—and because “not guilty” and “not guilty by reason of insanity” are materially different outcomes.
Although Crawford raised his McCoy claim years after McCoy was decided, Mississippi’s own postconviction law does not impose a deadline for successive petitions grounded in intervening decisions; thus, delay does not justify denying a stay in a capital case.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The dissent weaves together jurisdictional, retroactivity, and Sixth Amendment autonomy precedents to show both why review is proper and why the merits favor Crawford.

McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (2018): The cornerstone. McCoy holds that defense counsel may not concede guilt over the defendant’s “express and unequivocal” objection. Such a violation is structural error not subject to harmless-error review. Justice Sotomayor frames McCoy as applying long-established autonomy principles to a particular trial scenario—making it an “old” rule for retroactivity purposes.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983): These decisions underscore that, because the defendant bears the personal consequences of conviction, certain fundamental choices are reserved to the defendant: whether to plead guilty, waive jury trial, testify, take an appeal, and even represent oneself. McCoy, the dissent argues, simply extends this autonomy to the defendant’s objective to maintain innocence at trial.
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966), and Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 382 n.10 (1979): Additional anchors for the principle that the accused—not counsel—is the “master” of the defense’s objectives.
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 177 (1990) (plurality), Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 100 (1993), and Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 214–218 (1988): These cases establish that retroactivity is a question of federal law, not state law. They bolster the dissent’s view that Mississippi’s reliance on nonretroactivity is a federal determination, undermining any assertion that the state ground is “adequate and independent.”
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–1041 (1983): The “plain statement” rule. If a state court’s decision is not clearly based on independent state grounds, the Supreme Court may review it. The Mississippi court’s brief order, in the dissent’s view, did not plainly rest on independent state law but instead turned on a federal retroactivity assessment.
Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 347–348 (2013), and Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255, 273 (2021): Framework for retroactivity on collateral review. New substantive rules apply retroactively; new procedural rules do not (after Edwards, no “watershed” exception remains). Old rules—applications of existing principles—apply retroactively. The dissent positions McCoy as an “old” rule.
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895 (1983): The stay standard. The dissent applies it to show that Crawford merits a stay pending review.
United States v. Read, 918 F.3d 712, 719–721 (9th Cir. 2019): Rejects the argument that pursuing an insanity defense avoids a McCoy violation. The dissent uses Read to rebut Mississippi’s claim that no “concession of guilt” occurred.
Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. 226, 242 (2025): Cited for the adequate-and-independent state grounds doctrine. The dissent invokes Glossip to frame the jurisdictional analysis.
Bell v. State, 66 So. 3d 90, 93 (Miss. 2011): Mississippi authority recognizing no time limit for successive postconviction applications premised on intervening decisions. This undermines reliance on delay to deny relief.
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 422 (1995): Emphasizes the heightened “painstaking care” required in capital cases. The dissent closes by invoking this admonition.

Legal Reasoning

1) Jurisdiction and Adequate and Independent State Grounds

The Supreme Court avoids reviewing state-court judgments resting on adequate and independent state grounds. Independence requires that the state-law ground not depend on or be intertwined with federal law, and this must be clear on the face of the opinion. The Mississippi Supreme Court denied Crawford’s claim as barred unless McCoy qualified as an intervening decision, and then concluded that McCoy “should [not] be given retroactive effect.” Whether a constitutional decision of the U.S. Supreme Court applies retroactively is itself a question of federal law. As a result, the state court’s reasoning is intertwined with federal doctrine, defeating independence.

The state court also noted Crawford’s seven-year delay in raising McCoy, but the dissent emphasizes that Mississippi law imposes no time limit for successive petitions that fall within statutory exceptions, including intervening decisions, and the state court did not clearly ground its decision exclusively on delay. Under Michigan v. Long, absent a clear statement identifying an adequate and independent state ground, the Supreme Court may review. On this record, the dissent concludes jurisdiction exists.

2) The Stay Standard

Barefoot v. Estelle requires: (a) a reasonable probability that certiorari would be granted; (b) a significant possibility of reversal; and (c) a likelihood of irreparable injury without a stay. The dissent argues these criteria are satisfied:

Reasonable probability of certiorari: The retroactivity of McCoy on collateral review is an important, unresolved constitutional issue with a developing split. The Court often grants certiorari in capital cases even without a split.
Significant possibility of reversal: Mississippi, in the Supreme Court, concedes that McCoy is retroactive because it applied existing law. If so, Crawford’s trial record shows a straightforward McCoy violation, which is structural error requiring reversal.
Irreparable injury: Execution is the paradigmatic irreparable harm, especially where a meritorious constitutional claim remains unadjudicated.

3) Retroactivity: Is McCoy an “Old” Rule?

Under Chaidez and Edwards, a decision applies retroactively on collateral review if it (i) is an “old” rule—merely an application of existing constitutional principles to new facts—or (ii) is a new substantive rule. New procedural rules do not apply retroactively after Edwards abolished the “watershed” exception.

The dissent contends McCoy is not a new procedural rule, but an application of longstanding Sixth Amendment autonomy doctrine. The line of cases—Faretta (personal right to self-representation), Jones (fundamental decisions reserved to the defendant), Brookhart (consent to critical choices), Gannett (defendant as “master” of the defense)—establishes that the defendant sets the objectives of representation. McCoy extended this principle to the context of a lawyer’s concession of guilt at trial over the defendant’s objection. Moreover, a pre-McCoy consensus in lower courts and the ABA Model Rules (Rule 1.2(a)) recognized the client’s control over objectives, including maintaining innocence. That backdrop supports treating McCoy as applying existing law, and therefore as retroactive on collateral review.

The dissent also notes a split: some courts (e.g., In re Smith, Cal. App.; Jan G., Conn. Super. Ct.) treat McCoy as retroactive; Mississippi treated it as nonretroactive; and the Fourth Circuit has suggested it “might” be a new rule, without deciding the issue (Smith v. Stein).

4) The Merits: A Clear McCoy Violation

McCoy forbids counsel from overriding a defendant’s explicit, unequivocal decision to maintain innocence. Crawford’s letters and in-court statements show a sustained insistence on innocence and on holding the State to proof beyond a reasonable doubt for each element. Yet counsel told the venire and jury that “the ‘what’ is not going to be very much in question,” repeated at opening and closing that Crawford committed the acts, and pursued an insanity defense.

Mississippi’s contention that an insanity defense does not concede guilt is, in the dissent’s view, a “hair-splitting” argument rejected by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Read. The constitutional right recognized in McCoy protects the defendant’s choice of objective—to assert innocence—not merely to obtain a technical acquittal through insanity. Moreover, “not guilty” differs profoundly from “not guilty by reason of insanity”: the former exonerates; the latter entails commitment to a psychiatric facility. The choice between freedom and confinement is quintessentially the defendant’s to make. On these facts, the McCoy violation is plain and structural; harmless-error analysis does not apply.

5) Timeliness and Mississippi Postconviction Law

Although Crawford raised his McCoy claim seven years after McCoy was decided, Mississippi law recognizes no time limit for successive postconviction petitions that qualify for statutory exceptions such as intervening decisions. The Mississippi Supreme Court (Bell v. State) has granted relief on petitions filed years after the intervening decision. Given that posture, delay should not foreclose relief—particularly in a capital case, where the Court’s “painstaking care” is paramount (Kyles).

Impact

A. On Sixth Amendment Autonomy and Trial Strategy

If McCoy is ultimately deemed retroactive nationwide, a class of convictions could be vulnerable where trial counsel conceded guilt over the defendant’s objection. This is especially salient in cases where counsel sought to pivot to insanity or partial-responsibility theories despite a client’s instruction to deny guilt. Defense counsel must secure the client’s informed, explicit consent before adopting any trial strategy that undermines the client’s objective of maintaining innocence. Failure to do so risks structural error and automatic reversal.

B. On Postconviction Litigation and Finality

Retroactive application would open postconviction avenues for defendants whose direct appeals predated McCoy, potentially including capital cases. Courts would confront records from older trials to determine whether the defendant’s objection was “express and unequivocal” and whether counsel’s statements crossed the line into concession. States may respond by tightening procedural rules, but where state decisions turn on federal retroactivity, federal review remains available.

C. On Federal–State Review Dynamics

The dissent’s jurisdictional analysis underscores that state procedural rulings intertwined with federal retroactivity questions invite federal oversight. State courts that resolve postconviction petitions by declaring a Supreme Court decision nonretroactive are, effectively, making a federal-law determination subject to U.S. Supreme Court review unless they clearly rest the judgment on independent state grounds.

D. On Capital Case Administration

The Court’s denial leaves an acknowledged split unresolved in a context with immediate life-or-death consequences. The dissent highlights the Court’s practice of granting certiorari in capital cases on important questions even absent a split, suggesting that failure to intervene in Crawford may signal a narrower appetite for last-minute warrants-based stays—even where a structural error claim with significant merit exists. States may see this as an invitation to press timeliness arguments, but the dissent’s reliance on Mississippi’s own law cautions against equating delay with default where “intervening decision” exceptions exist.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Collateral review vs. direct appeal: Direct appeal is the first review after conviction; collateral review (e.g., habeas, postconviction relief) occurs after the conviction is final, often raising constitutional claims not fully addressed on direct review.
Retroactivity: Whether a new court decision applies to convictions already final. Under current doctrine, (i) new substantive rules apply retroactively; (ii) new procedural rules do not; (iii) decisions that merely apply existing principles (“old” rules) apply retroactively.
New vs. old rule: A decision is “new” if it breaks new ground or imposes a result not dictated by precedent. It is “old” if it applies existing principles to different facts.
Substantive vs. procedural rule: Substantive rules alter the scope of criminal liability or punishment; procedural rules regulate the manner of determining guilt. Only the former apply retroactively; the “watershed” exception for procedural rules no longer exists (Edwards v. Vannoy).
Structural error: A fundamental defect affecting the framework of the trial (e.g., denial of counsel, biased judge). Structural errors require automatic reversal; courts do not ask whether the error was harmless.
Adequate and independent state grounds: The U.S. Supreme Court will not review a state judgment that clearly rests on state law independent of federal law and that is adequate to support the judgment. If the state-law ground is intertwined with federal issues or unclear, federal review may proceed.
Intervening decision exception (Mississippi): A state postconviction mechanism allowing successive petitions when a new decision intervenes. According to Bell v. State, Mississippi imposes no fixed time limit for such petitions.
“Not guilty” versus “not guilty by reason of insanity” (NGRI): A general acquittal ends the criminal case; an NGRI verdict typically entails involuntary commitment to a psychiatric facility. Choosing between these outcomes is part of the defendant’s control over the objectives of the defense.

Conclusion

Crawford v. Mississippi presents a stark, consequential question: does McCoy v. Louisiana apply retroactively on collateral review, such that defendants whose convictions became final before 2018 may obtain relief for counsel’s concession of guilt over their express objection? The Supreme Court declined to answer, denying a stay and certiorari. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent argues that the Court had jurisdiction, that the case satisfies the stay criteria, that lower courts are divided, and that Mississippi now concedes McCoy’s retroactivity. On this view, McCoy is an application of established Sixth Amendment autonomy principles; consequently, Crawford’s record reveals a structural error requiring automatic reversal.

The decision not to grant review sets no binding precedent, but it leaves unresolved a pressing split with immediate consequences for capital and non-capital defendants alike. The dissent’s analysis offers a clear doctrinal path: treat McCoy as retroactive, recognize the defendant’s exclusive authority over the objective of maintaining innocence, and enforce that autonomy through structural-error review. Until the Court resolves the retroactivity question, outcomes will vary across jurisdictions, and defendants asserting core autonomy claims may face execution or prolonged incarceration without the benefit of a nationally uniform rule.