Crandall v. McDonough: Confirming that District Courts Lack Jurisdiction over Stand-Alone Whistleblower Protection Act Claims

1. Introduction

In Kenneth Crandall v. Denis McDonough, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed whether a federal district court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a Whistleblower Protection Act (“WPA”) claim brought without an accompanying discrimination allegation. The appellant, Kenneth R. Crandall — a former Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) employee turned whistleblower — alleged violations of the WPA, the Privacy Act, the First Amendment, and other statutory provisions after the VA’s Chief Counsel denied his application to become an accredited VA claims agent. The District Court dismissed the amended complaint. On appeal, the Third Circuit largely affirmed, but clarified an important jurisdictional point relating to WPA claims.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Whistleblower Protection Act Claim: The Third Circuit held that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Congress channeled WPA disputes through the Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”) and the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”), with judicial review only in a court of appeals. Therefore, the claim had to be dismissed without prejudice.
• Privacy Act Claims: Dismissal affirmed. Crandall failed to plead facts showing that any alleged Privacy Act violation caused the denial of his claims-agent application or resulted in actual damages.
• First Amendment / Bivens: Leave to amend properly denied. The Supreme Court has never recognized a Bivens remedy for First Amendment retaliation, and Egbert v. Boule (2022) counsels strongly against extending Bivens.

3. In-Depth Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Elgin v. Department of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1 (2012) — reaffirmed that district courts generally lack jurisdiction over federal personnel actions covered by the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), including the WPA framework.
• Perry v. MSPB, 582 U.S. 420 (2017) — clarified that “mixed” cases (personnel action + discrimination) may be filed in district court; by negative implication, “pure” WPA claims may not.
• Jonson v. FDIC, 877 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2017) & Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2008) — treated similarly channeled review under the CSRA and reinforced jurisdictional boundaries.
• Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) & Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) — set the plausibility pleading standard applied to Privacy Act allegations.
• Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004) — held that a Privacy Act plaintiff must show actual damages.
• Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022) — rejected Bivens extension to First Amendment retaliation, limiting potential amendments.
• Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 1999) — required jurisdictional dismissals to be without prejudice.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory Channeling under the CSRA/WPA
   • 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214 & 1221 obligate federal whistleblowers to seek corrective action at OSC and appeal to the MSPB.
   • Judicial review lies exclusively in the regional circuit (here, the Third Circuit) after MSPB final action (§ 7703(b)(1)(B)).
   • District courts gain jurisdiction only when the personnel claim is “mixed” with allegations under a federal anti-discrimination statute (§ 7703(b)(2)) — a condition absent in Crandall’s pleading.
   • Consequently, the District Court never had authority; dismissing for failure to state a claim was technically incorrect. The Court of Appeals modified the dismissal to reflect lack of jurisdiction.
2. Pleading Deficiencies in Privacy Act Claims
   • To recover money damages, a plaintiff must allege (i) an “adverse effect”, (ii) causation between the violation and the effect, (iii) intentional or willful conduct, and (iv) actual damages.
   • Crandall’s complaint did not plausibly connect the maintenance of his emails in a VA system of records to the denial of accreditation. The chain of causation was missing.
3. No Viable First Amendment Cause of Action
   • § 1983 applies to state actors, not federal officials; the proper route against federal actors would be a Bivens-type claim.
   • Post-Egbert, new Bivens extensions are “nearly impossible”. The alleged retaliation context is far afield from the three recognized Bivens contexts (Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment violations). Hence any amendment would be futile.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Decision

Although marked “Not Precedential,” the opinion offers authoritative guidance within — and likely beyond — the Third Circuit:

• WPA Practice: Counsel must direct stand-alone WPA claims through OSC/MSPB. Filing in district court risks dismissal for want of jurisdiction, albeit without prejudice.
• Pleading Standards: The case is yet another reminder that Privacy Act plaintiffs must specifically link alleged record-keeping violations to tangible harm.
• Bivens Doctrine: The Court’s quick rejection of a potential First Amendment Bivens remedy underscores the Supreme Court’s near-closure of that pathway.
• Remedial Strategy: Plaintiffs should evaluate whether their disputes are “mixed” (including statutory discrimination claims) if they wish to remain in district court.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

5. Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s opinion in Crandall v. McDonough clarifies — in emphatic terms — that federal district courts do not possess jurisdiction over free-standing WPA claims. Litigants must exhaust the OSC/MSPB pipeline and, if necessary, proceed directly to the court of appeals. Additionally, the decision reiterates the stringent causation and damages requirements for Privacy Act suits and demonstrates the continued reluctance to expand Bivens remedies post-Egbert. Practitioners should heed these jurisdictional and pleading lessons to avoid procedural pitfalls in future whistleblower and privacy litigation.