1. Introduction

This case arises from a default divorce. After thirteen years of marriage and one child, Jenna Tabakman left the marital home to live with her parents. Gary Tabakman filed for divorce. After unsuccessful attempts at personal service, the trial court authorized alternative service, and the process server posted the citation and papers on the front door of Jenna’s parents’ home.

Jenna did not file an answer before the default hearing at which the judge orally rendered judgment. After learning about the default, Jenna promptly retained counsel and—critically—filed an answer and a motion for new trial before the trial court signed the default divorce decree. The trial court nevertheless signed the decree and later denied the new-trial motion. The court of appeals affirmed, focusing on the first Craddock element (intentional or consciously indifferent failure to answer).

The Supreme Court’s key issue was whether Jenna was entitled to a new trial under the equitable Craddock test, particularly where she claimed she did not receive the posted citation and did not know alternative service had occurred.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court reversed. It held that Jenna satisfied all three elements of the Craddock test and was entitled to a new trial.

The Court further held Jenna “set up” a meritorious defense (a reimbursement claim) and established the absence of undue delay or injury, while Gary’s asserted harms were too generalized to defeat the third element.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

The opinion is explicitly doctrinal: it situates the case within modern default-judgment policy and then applies the settled Craddock framework, clarifying how that framework operates when service is effected by posting.

• Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc.
  The foundational test. The Court applied the classic three elements and reaffirmed that when all are met, the new trial “must be granted.” The opinion’s novelty is not a new test, but a clarifying application: lack of awareness of alternative service and non-receipt of a posted citation can satisfy element one.
• In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC
  Used to frame the policy backdrop: default judgments are “greatly disfavor[ed],” doubts are resolved against the party who secured the default, and adversarial testing is preferred because it promotes accurate outcomes and judicial integrity. This policy framing supports a generous application of Craddock where actual notice is credibly absent.
• In re Marriage of Williams
  Cited for the proposition that a defendant may rely on the equitable Craddock doctrine to set aside a default judgment, including in family-law contexts.
• In re R.R.
  Supplies the three-part formulation and the “controversion” concept for the first element: the defendant meets the burden when her factual assertions (if true) negate intent/conscious indifference and are not controverted by the plaintiff. The Court used R.R. as a gatekeeping rule: the dispositive question was whether Gary actually controverted Jenna’s asserted lack of notice—not whether service was technically proper.
• Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Drewery Constr. Co.
  This was the Court’s main analog. It emphasized the “overarching question” (“Why did the defendant not appear?”) and the idea that if the answer is “Because I didn’t get the suit papers,” the default “generally must be set aside.” The Court extended the “lost citation” reasoning to posted-service situations: people may not know how they failed to receive papers; that is often inherent in the claim of non-receipt.
• Smith v. Babcock & Wilcox Constr. Co.
  Reinforces that conscious indifference is more than mere negligence. The Court used this to underscore that imperfect conduct (or mistakes) does not equal “did not care.”
• Milestone Operating, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp.
  Provides the principle that the controlling fact is the “absence of an intentional failure to answer rather than a real excuse for not answering.” This supports the Court’s acceptance of Jenna’s explanation (including a mistaken belief about personal service) as enough to defeat conscious indifference.
• Sutherland v. Spencer
  Cited for the forgiving standard that “some excuse, although not necessarily a good one,” can suffice; also for recognizing that misplacing/forgetting a citation can satisfy element one. The Court reasoned that non-receipt after posting is at least as compelling as forgetting papers that were actually received.
• Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Moody
  Supports the proposition that a mistake of law can satisfy the first Craddock element. Here, Jenna’s belief that papers would be personally served—even though alternative service is permitted—was treated as a legally cognizable “mistake” rather than indifference.
• Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm'n v. Sierra Club
  Used to define a “citation” as the instrument that commands the defendant to answer and warns about default consequences. This definitional move is central to the Court’s distinction: knowing a lawsuit exists is not the same as knowing you have been served with a citation that triggers a duty to answer.
• Wilson v. Dunn
  The Court relied on this for a bright-line principle: absent service, waiver, or citation, “mere knowledge of a pending suit does not place any duty on a defendant to act.” This undercut the court of appeals’ reliance on evidence that Jenna knew Gary had filed for divorce.
• State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Costley
  Clarifies the nature of alternative service: it may show “how and when service was executed,” but it is “no evidence” of when the defendant received actual notice. This was decisive against Gary’s argument that proof of proper posting, by itself, “controverted” Jenna’s claim that she did not receive the papers.
• Red Bluff, LLC v. Tarpley and Cliff v. Huggins
  Both reinforce the broader distinction between constructive mechanisms (presumptions, rule-based notice, proof of mailing/posting) and actual receipt/actual knowledge, and how those concepts operate once opposing evidence is introduced. The Court invoked these to show why service proof does not automatically defeat a defendant’s claim of non-receipt for Craddock purposes.
• Walker v. Baptist St. Anthony's Hosp.
  Cited twice. First, to justify limited discussion of an issue (service validity) that the Court concluded did not warrant reversal. Second, to support reaching unaddressed issues (judicial economy) and deciding the remaining Craddock elements rather than remanding for the court of appeals to do so.
• Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma
  Controlled the second and third elements. It reiterates that the defendant need only “set up” a meritorious defense (prima facie, without weighing controverting evidence), and that once a defendant alleges no injury and offers mitigation (e.g., paying costs), the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show injury.
• Dir., State Emps. Workers' Comp. Div. v. Evans
  Defines “injury” under element three: generalized hardship or expense is not enough; the plaintiff must show disadvantage in presenting the merits at the new trial. This narrowed the field of cognizable “harm” Gary could rely upon.
• In re Marriage of Sandoval
  Used to rebut the idea that reopening issues will necessarily destabilize a divorce decree: allowing litigation of a separate-property claim “will not upset the underlying divorce, custody, support, or division of the community assets.” This supported the conclusion that the new trial would not cause the sort of injury Craddock addresses.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Element One: “Not intentional or the result of conscious indifference.”
The Court identified the central analytical error below: collapsing (i) knowledge that a divorce case has been filed with (ii) knowledge that a citation has been served (particularly via alternative service). The Court treated citation service—because it commands an answer and warns of default—as the key trigger for the duty to respond.

Jenna’s showing satisfied the Craddock standard in three reinforcing ways:

• Mistake rather than indifference: Jenna believed she would be served in person and waited for that; a mistake of law can still negate conscious indifference (Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Moody).
• Non-receipt of the posted citation: she testified she did not receive, see, or learn of the posting—supported by her father’s testimony describing the conditions at the home and the lack of any notice from security or contractors.
• Prompt appearance upon learning of the default: she filed an answer before the judge signed the default decree, bolstering the inference that she “did care” and was not choosing to ignore the case.

(b) What counts as “controverting” the excuse?
The Court drew an important line: evidence that the process server complied with an alternative-service order proves execution of service, but does not prove the defendant received actual notice of the citation. Under In re R.R., Jenna’s element-one facts had to be “controverted” to defeat her showing; proof of posting did not controvert her claim of non-receipt because alternative service is designed for situations where actual notice may be impractical to demonstrate.

The Court also corrected the court of appeals’ suggestion that Gary told Jenna about the citation: the record showed general discussions about the divorce and service, but not that Jenna was told—before alternative service—that a citation had been served by posting (or what the content/timing of any “citation” discussion actually was).

(c) Element Two: “Set up a meritorious defense.”
Applying Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, the Court emphasized the low threshold: Jenna needed to allege facts that would constitute a defense and provide prima facie support; she did not need to win a “mini-trial” on the merits or defeat Gary’s controverting evidence at this stage. Her reimbursement claim (community reimbursing separate estate for down payment funds) supported by testimony and documents satisfied this requirement, notwithstanding the community-property presumption in TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.003.

(d) Element Three: “No delay or injury.”
Jenna alleged no undue injury and offered to proceed promptly and mitigate costs (including paying reasonable costs incurred to obtain the default). Under Dolgencorp, the burden shifted to Gary to show injury. His asserted harms (fees in managing the community estate, the home sale, and claimed strain on the child from undoing possession/custody provisions) were insufficient because they did not show prejudice to presenting the merits at a new trial as required by Dir., State Emps. Workers' Comp. Div. v. Evans. The Court also relied on In re Marriage of Sandoval to illustrate that litigating separate-property issues need not destabilize the core divorce/custody framework.

3.3 Impact

The opinion’s practical significance is concentrated in the first Craddock element and in what qualifies as “controversion” in alternative-service defaults:

• Clarification in alternative-service defaults: Proof that posting occurred (and that service was “proper”) does not, by itself, negate a defendant’s Craddock excuse of non-receipt/non-awareness of service. Plaintiffs seeking to uphold a default may need evidence bearing on actual notice (or admissions/other facts showing awareness of service), not just the return of service.
• Stronger distinction between lawsuit awareness and citation awareness: The Court reinforced that knowing “a divorce was filed” does not equate to knowing the duty-triggering citation was served—especially where the defendant reasonably expects personal service.
• Incentive for prompt post-default appearance: While not a formal element, Jenna’s quick action and filing an answer before the decree was signed strengthened the inference of mistake rather than indifference; litigants and courts may treat such timing as powerful corroboration.
• Family-law defaults: The Court implicitly discourages “brittle finality” in default divorces where property characterization and custody/possession orders are entered without adversarial testing, aligning family-law defaults with the broader anti-default policy stated in In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Default judgment: A judgment entered because one side (usually the defendant) did not file the required response or appear, so the court hears only the plaintiff’s side.
• Craddock test: A three-part equitable test Texas courts use to decide whether to set aside a default judgment: (1) no intentional/consciously indifferent failure to answer, (2) a meritorious defense is “set up,” and (3) granting a new trial will not cause undue delay or injury.
• “Conscious indifference”: Not mere negligence. In this context it means the defendant knew she was sued and effectively did not care enough to respond.
• Alternative service (posting): When personal delivery is unsuccessful, the court may authorize service by another method reasonably likely to provide notice (here, posting papers on a door). It proves the method was performed, but does not necessarily prove the defendant actually saw the papers.
• “Citation” (Texas practice): The official notice commanding the defendant to answer and warning that failure to answer can result in default judgment.
• “Set up a meritorious defense”: The defendant does not have to prove she will win—only present a legally valid defense supported by enough evidence to show it is plausible (prima facie).
• Rendition vs. signing: A judge can orally “render” a judgment in court, and later sign the written decree. Here, Jenna appeared and filed an answer after oral rendition but before the written decree was signed; the Court treated her prompt appearance as supporting her lack of indifference.
• Community-property presumption and reimbursement: Texas generally presumes property acquired during marriage is community property. A reimbursement claim seeks repayment to one marital estate (e.g., a spouse’s separate estate) for contributions benefiting another estate (e.g., the community).

5. Conclusion

Jenna Tabakman v. Gary Tabakman reinforces Texas’s strong anti-default policy while sharpening how Craddock applies to alternative service. The Supreme Court held that a defendant’s credible, supported claim of non-receipt and non-awareness of a posted citation can satisfy the first Craddock element even when the defendant knew a lawsuit had been filed. Proof that alternative service was executed does not automatically “controvert” a claimed lack of actual notice for Craddock purposes. Coupled with the Court’s reaffirmation that meritorious defenses need only be “set up” and that “injury” requires prejudice to merits presentation, the decision makes new trials more attainable where default judgments rest on constructive service but the defendant promptly appears and seeks adjudication on the merits.