Courts May Enforce Shutdown-Era Benefit Orders by Compelling Full SNAP Funding from Lawful Transfer and Contingency Sources

Introduction

This appeal arises from an unprecedented posture at the intersection of appropriations law, administrative law, and emergency equitable relief. During a federal government shutdown that began on October 1, 2025, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced it would issue no Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits for November to the approximately 42 million Americans who rely on them. A broad coalition of nonprofits, local governments, a union, and a food retailer sued, seeking to require USDA to use congressionally-provided SNAP contingency funds and other USDA transfer authority to keep food benefits flowing.

The district court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) on October 31, 2025, offering USDA two compliance paths: (1) fully fund November benefits using contingency funds plus available USDA transfer authority (including Section 32 funds via 7 U.S.C. § 2257), or (2) pay timely partial benefits using the contingency funds, while resolving administrative hurdles expeditiously and by a hard November 5 deadline. USDA chose partial payments but failed to ensure timely disbursement. On November 6, the district court enforced its earlier TRO and ordered USDA to pay full November benefits by November 7 using Section 32 and contingency funds; in the alternative, the court also entered a second TRO based on likely arbitrary-and-capricious decisionmaking.

USDA sought a stay pending appeal. The First Circuit (Rikelman, J.) denied a stay as to the enforcement order and stayed the duplicative second TRO so long as the enforcement order remains operative. The opinion squarely centers stay analysis on compliance with the district court’s initial TRO, rather than on abstract reviewability or deference doctrines, and emphasizes the immediate, concrete harms of halting food aid to tens of millions.

Summary of the Opinion

Appealability: Although labeled TROs, the district court’s November 6 orders had the practical effect of preliminary injunctions—triggering interlocutory appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
Stay framework: Applying the four-factor test (likelihood of success; irreparable injury to movant; injury to other parties; public interest), the court held USDA did not carry its burden to justify the “extraordinary” remedy of a stay.
Pivot to enforcement: The government’s briefing largely attacked the second TRO on APA reviewability grounds (invoking Lincoln v. Vigil), but the First Circuit focused on the enforcement order—which remedied noncompliance with the October 31 TRO. Because USDA neither appealed nor sought modification of that original TRO and failed to comply with its conditions, the government did not make a strong showing of likely success on the merits.
Compliance failure: USDA knew weeks in advance that partial payments would be technically challenging and slow, took no preparatory steps, and nevertheless chose the partial-payment option that the court permitted only if benefits were disbursed by November 5—conditions the agency did not meet.
Remedial authority: District courts have broad discretion to enforce their orders. Requiring full November SNAP funding using statutory contingency funds and lawful transfer authority (including the Section 32 fund via § 2257) was an appropriate enforcement remedy here.
Harms and public interest: The government’s asserted harm—speculative downstream pressure on Child Nutrition Programs if Section 32 is tapped—did not outweigh the immense, immediate harm to 42 million SNAP beneficiaries (including 14 million children) of missing food assistance as winter approaches.
Disposition: Stay denied as to the enforcement order; the duplicative second TRO is stayed while the enforcement order remains in force.

Analysis

Statutory and Regulatory Framework

SNAP entitlement: Benefits “shall be furnished to all eligible households.” 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a). States administer eligibility and benefit levels; the federal government funds benefits. Id. § 2020(a).
Appropriations and contingency funds: Congress annually appropriates SNAP funds, and also places “contingency funds” in reserve “for use only in such amounts and at such times as may become necessary to carry out program operations.” Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-42; Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025, Pub. L. No. 119-4.
Shortfall management: USDA must “limit the value” of SNAP issuances to the available appropriation, 7 U.S.C. § 2027(b), and follow procedures for reduced payments, 7 C.F.R. § 271.7 (including timely state notice and reduction formulas).
Transfer authority: 7 U.S.C. § 2257 permits USDA to use up to seven percent of annual appropriations for “miscellaneous expenses” interchangeably within the Department, and to exceed that threshold “in cases of extraordinary emergency.” USDA conceded it had legal authority to fund November SNAP by drawing on Section 32 funds (7 U.S.C. § 612c) via § 2257.

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579 (2018) and Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981): Support the “practical effect” doctrine—orders functionally equivalent to injunctions are appealable under § 1292(a)(1). Here, billions of dollars and food access for millions made the TROs practically injunctive.
Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974): Reinforces that adversarial proceedings and the gravity of consequences can render TROs akin to preliminary injunctions.
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009): Articulates the four-factor stay test and makes clear a stay is not a matter of right. The First Circuit applies Nken’s framework, stressing the primacy of likelihood of success.
Akebia Therapeutics, Inc. v. Azar, 976 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 2020): Confirms that if likelihood of success is weak, other factors “are of little consequence.” This proves decisive as USDA fails to show likely success against the enforcement order.
Rhode Island v. Trump, 155 F.4th 35 (1st Cir. 2025) and New York v. Trump, 133 F.4th 51 (1st Cir. 2025): Emphasize the extraordinary nature of stays and the movant’s burden; the court cites them for standards and allocation of burdens.
American Public Health Ass’n v. NIH, 145 F.4th 39 (1st Cir. 2025) and Does 1–3 v. Mills, 39 F.4th 20 (1st Cir. 2022): Reiterate stay factors and the movant’s duty to frame issues—here, USDA misframed by focusing on merits rather than compliance.
Harvey v. Johanns, 494 F.3d 237 (1st Cir. 2007) and Becky’s Broncos, LLC v. Town of Nantucket, 138 F.4th 73 (1st Cir. 2025): Provide standards of review for enforcement orders—abuse of discretion for the remedy, clear error for factual findings.
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978): Courts are not limited to issuing injunctions and “hoping for compliance”; enforcement authority is robust.
Faigin v. Kelly, 184 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 1999): The issuing court has particular competence to determine whether its order has been obeyed.
Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow Commc’n Lab’ys, Inc., 305 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Kemp v. Peterson, 940 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1991): Underscore broad discretion to craft enforcement remedies.
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944): Equitable relief should be tailored to the necessities of the case—supporting the district court’s shift from partial to full funding as a practical enforcement measure.
Dep’t of Educ. v. California, 604 U.S. 650 (2025) (per curiam): Recognizes potential irreparable harm from loss of funds. The First Circuit distinguishes USDA’s showing as speculative and far in the future compared to immediate deprivation of food.
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993): Often invoked for the proposition that an agency’s allocation of lump-sum appropriations is committed to agency discretion and unreviewable. The First Circuit acknowledges the government’s “serious argument” under Lincoln but finds it irrelevant to the enforcement order analysis because the remedy flowed from noncompliance with a prior order, not from merits adjudication of an allocation decision.

Legal Reasoning

Appealability under § 1292(a)(1): The court first confirms jurisdiction. Given the high-stakes and immediacy—either billions must be disbursed or tens of millions go without food—the TROs’ practical effect is injunctive, making them appealable.
Framing of the stay analysis: The panel stresses that it “relies on the parties to frame the issues,” but it will evaluate the actual orders at issue. USDA’s briefing targets the second TRO’s legal merits under the APA. The court instead evaluates the enforcement order, which did not turn on APA reviewability but on USDA’s failure to comply with the court’s October 31 TRO.
Likelihood of success on the merits (the most important factor):
- USDA’s concessions: USDA concedes it may use SNAP contingency funds to pay partial benefits and that it has legal authority, via § 2257, to tap the Section 32 fund to fully fund November SNAP. Section 32 holds more than $23 billion; roughly $4 billion would close November’s gap.
- October 31 TRO’s conditional choice: The district court offered USDA a choice—full funding (including Section 32) by November 3, or partial funding using contingency funds with expedited resolution of technical hurdles and a hard November 5 disbursement date.
- Noncompliance: USDA took no preparatory steps for partial payments in the weeks before the TRO, despite knowing about potential shortfalls by October 10 and the novelty and difficulty of partial issuance. It did not timely generate reduction tables or resolve state-facing systems changes. After the TRO, USDA chose the partial-payment route but admitted many states could not deliver benefits in November; disbursement deadlines were missed.
- Enforcement remedy: Given foreseeable and realized noncompliance, the district court exercised its broad enforcement authority to require full funding using Section 32 plus contingency funds by November 7. The First Circuit emphasizes that enforcing compliance with previously ordered conditions falls squarely within trial courts’ equitable powers (Hutto; Hecht).
- USDA’s briefing gap: USDA dedicates only “at most, three sentences” to the enforcement order and does not meaningfully contest the district court’s noncompliance finding or the propriety of the enforcement remedy. Because the stay standard’s first factor requires a “strong showing” of likely success and the record shows no abuse of discretion, the factor decisively favors appellees.
Irreparable harm to the government: USDA claims tapping $4 billion from Section 32 could pressure Child Nutrition Programs (CNP) later in 2026 absent supplemental appropriations. The First Circuit views this as speculative and temporally remote compared to the immediate harm of missed SNAP benefits. The panel also notes that the district court credited evidence that CNP would remain funded at least through May 2026 even after a $4 billion transfer.
Harm to others and public interest: The harms to SNAP beneficiaries are immediate, concrete, and massive: 42 million individuals, 14 million children, and vulnerable populations like pregnant women and the elderly would miss essential food assistance. Declarations highlighted choices between “heat or eat,” skipped meals, and detrimental health and developmental effects. The public interest overwhelmingly favors uninterrupted access to food. By contrast, the government “understandably” offered no serious argument that a stay would not substantially injure others.
Remedial tailoring: The court recognizes the district court’s equitable duty to “mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case.” Given USDA’s noncompliance and the life-sustaining nature of SNAP, a full-funding order to effectuate the earlier TRO fell within that discretion.
Second TRO: Because the enforcement order provides the operative relief, the First Circuit stays the duplicative second TRO while the enforcement order remains in effect, leaving the APA merits questions (including Lincoln v. Vigil arguments) for another day.

What This Opinion Does—and Does Not—Decide

Decides: District courts may enforce a shutdown-era TRO that required timely partial benefits by compelling full funding when the agency knowingly chose an unworkable path and missed court-imposed deadlines. On a stay motion, the focus is on compliance with the prior order and the propriety of the enforcement remedy, not abstract agency discretion.
Does not decide: Whether agency decisions to draw from Section 32 via § 2257 are categorically unreviewable under Lincoln v. Vigil; whether USDA’s underlying choice not to fully fund was arbitrary and capricious; or broader constitutional limits under the Appropriations Clause. The panel explicitly brackets these issues because the enforcement order resolves the immediate dispute.

Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

Enforcement authority in benefit programs: The opinion powerfully reaffirms trial courts’ authority to enforce time-sensitive injunctions with practical, remedial directives when an agency’s chosen compliance path proves illusory. In programs like SNAP where monthly cycles are crucial, equity demands timeliness; enforcement can escalate to full funding if partial funding conditions are unmet.
Shutdown playbooks and contingency planning: Agencies now have clear notice that they must operationalize partial-payment protocols in 7 C.F.R. § 271.7 early, including performing reduction calculations and communicating with states. Failure to prepare cannot be used to justify missed benefits or to evade TRO conditions.
Use of contingency and transfer funds: While the court avoids ruling on merits, it accepts—based on USDA’s concessions—the availability of SNAP contingency funds during a lapse and USDA’s legal capacity to use § 2257 to draw on Section 32 for SNAP during an “extraordinary emergency.” Future shutdown litigation will likely invoke this opinion when arguing that these funds constitute “available” resources for equitable enforcement.
Stay practice and litigation strategy: The government’s strategic misstep—focusing on APA reviewability rather than enforcement noncompliance—proved fatal. Movants seeking a stay must directly engage with the actual order under review, the standard of review (abuse of discretion for enforcement), and the factual record of compliance efforts.
Balancing immediate humanitarian harms against speculative fiscal harms: The public interest calculus here places heavy weight on imminent deprivation of food for millions. Agencies asserting fiscal harms must present concrete, near-term impacts; generalized predictions of downstream budgetary pressure months hence will carry less weight than imminent threats to health and subsistence.
Signals for future merits litigation: Although reserved, the court’s framing hints at skepticism toward post-hoc invocations of agency discretion where an agency first disclaims lawful funding avenues (contrary to past practice), then reverses position, yet fails to execute either path in a timely way. If merits reach appellate review, decisionmakers will likely scrutinize the consistency and candor of agency rationales (including shifts between “no authority” and “authority but imprudence”).

Complex Concepts Simplified

TRO vs. Preliminary Injunction: A TRO is typically short-term emergency relief. But if a TRO, after adversarial proceedings, has major, immediate consequences akin to an injunction, appellate courts treat it as appealable under § 1292(a)(1).
Stay Pending Appeal: A request to pause the lower court’s order while the appeal proceeds. It is “extraordinary” relief, not automatic. The movant must show a strong likelihood of success on the merits plus favorable balance of harms and public interest.
Enforcement Order: When a court finds a party failed to comply with its prior order, it can issue an enforcement order—tailored measures to ensure compliance. Courts have broad discretion here, especially where noncompliance was foreseeable and preventable.
Contingency Funds: Specific pots of money Congress sets aside for emergencies to keep program operations running when regular appropriations fall short. Here, SNAP had roughly $6 billion in contingency funds at issue.
Section 32 and § 2257: Section 32 (7 U.S.C. § 612c) is a longstanding fund primarily supporting commodity purchases and child nutrition. Section 2257 allows USDA to transfer up to 7% of appropriations across certain budget lines, and more in “extraordinary emergency.” USDA conceded it could legally use § 2257 to draw on Section 32 to fund SNAP.
“Committed to Agency Discretion” (APA § 701(a)(2)): A narrow exception where courts lack meaningful standards to review an agency choice. Lincoln v. Vigil is a leading case. The First Circuit flags the argument but deems it irrelevant to enforcing compliance with the district court’s prior order.
Irreparable Harm: Harm that cannot be remedied by later money damages. For stay purposes, near-term, concrete harms (e.g., hunger) are weightier than speculative, long-term budgetary concerns.
Practical Effect Test: Even if an order is labeled a TRO, if it functions like an injunction (e.g., mandates or prohibits actions with significant immediate effects), it is treated as such for appealability.

Conclusion

Rhode Island State Council of Churches v. Rollins is not a final word on the merits of agency authority to reprogram funds in a shutdown. Instead, it is a muscular reaffirmation of judicial enforcement power and disciplined stay analysis. The First Circuit holds that when an agency knowingly chooses a compliance path that cannot meet court-imposed deadlines and fails to take available preparatory steps, a district court may enforce its earlier order by compelling full funding through lawful contingency and transfer mechanisms. On a stay motion, the government must confront that enforcement posture head on—showing both compliance and an abuse of discretion in the chosen remedy. USDA did neither.

The decision’s practical effect is immediate: November 2025 SNAP benefits must be fully paid. Its legal resonance is broader. Agencies operating safety-net programs during appropriations lapses must plan early, execute partial-payment protocols timely, and expect courts to prioritize imminent human needs over speculative fiscal tradeoffs. While leaving APA reviewability for later proceedings, the First Circuit sets a clear lodestar for emergency relief: courts may fashion and enforce equitable remedies sufficient to keep life-sustaining statutory benefits flowing when the government fails to meet its obligations.