Introduction

In this expedited memorandum decision, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted a writ of prohibition to the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS), blocking enforcement of an administrative order entered by the Circuit Court of Randolph County (Hon. David H. Wilmoth). The circuit court had directed DHS to keep the West Virginia Children's Home—a century-old juvenile residential facility—open indefinitely despite DHS’s announced plan to close it due to high operating costs and substantial safety and maintenance needs.

The dispute presented a fundamental separation-of-powers question: may a circuit court, via an administrative order in pending juvenile matters, compel an executive agency to continue operating a specific state facility, effectively dictating how the agency fulfills its statutory obligations to provide juvenile placements and services? The West Virginia high court answered “no,” holding that placement discretion vested in courts does not include the power to create or mandate the continued operation of a particular facility. That authority lies with the executive branch. The Court therefore prohibited enforcement of the circuit court’s order as beyond its legitimate powers.

Parties:

• Petitioner: State of West Virginia ex rel. West Virginia Department of Human Services (represented by Attorney General John B. McCuskey, Deputy Attorney General Director Steven R. Compton, and Assistant Attorney General Kristen E. Ross)
• Respondent: The Honorable David H. Wilmoth, Judge of the Circuit Court of Randolph County (represented by Teresa J. Lyons)

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court granted DHS’s petition for a writ of prohibition and barred enforcement of the circuit court’s administrative order requiring DHS to keep the Children’s Home open. The Court:

• Applied the prohibition framework under West Virginia Code § 53-1-1 and the five-factor test from State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, emphasizing the “clear error as a matter of law” factor.
• Characterized the circuit court’s administrative order as sounding in mandamus but concluded mandamus was unavailable because DHS has no nondiscretionary duty to keep that specific facility open, and mandamus cannot prescribe the manner of executive action.
• Clarified that while circuit courts determine juvenile placements, their choices must be made from available options; courts cannot create or compel the operation of a placement that does not exist.
• Held that the circuit court’s order intruded upon executive functions in violation of the separation-of-powers provision (W. Va. Const. art. V, § 1).
• Found the remaining Hoover factors supported issuing the writ given the absence of an adequate remedy by appeal and the significant, not readily correctable prejudice to DHS.

Bottom line: Circuit courts may select among available placements for juveniles, but they cannot compel the executive branch to operate a specific facility; an administrative order attempting to do so is clearly erroneous and in excess of judicial power.

Factual and Procedural Background

The West Virginia Children's Home, located in Randolph County and more than a century old, had capacity for no more than seven male juveniles, with only two residents by late October 2024. DHS advised that annual operating costs approximated $1.7 million and a recent study identified $7.8 million in safety and maintenance work needed to bring the building up to code.

On November 19, 2024, DHS announced the facility would close effective December 31, 2024. DHS arranged transitions for staff, provided required cancellation notices to on-call nursing contractors, and planned to move the two remaining juveniles to alternative placements after their semester’s end.

On December 9, 2024, the circuit court issued an “Administrative Order,” entered across multiple juvenile cases (and later in a separate non-juvenile proceeding), directing the Children’s Home to remain open “to receive placement of and provide housing, care, treatment, education, safety and other required and necessary services to the juveniles of this State” until “adequate and appropriate housing and treatment” existed statewide. The order did not cite a specific legal source for this authority beyond general references to the juvenile code (W. Va. Code ch. 49).

DHS petitioned for a writ of prohibition on December 11, 2024. The Supreme Court stayed the administrative order on December 26, 2024 and granted expedited consideration. Without oral argument, the Court issued this memorandum decision granting prohibition, with mandate to issue forthwith.

Detailed Analysis

1) The Extraordinary Remedy: Prohibition and the Hoover Framework

West Virginia Code § 53-1-1 authorizes writs of prohibition as a matter of right for usurpation or abuse of power where an inferior court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or has exceeded its legitimate powers. When a court has jurisdiction but allegedly exceeds its powers, the Court applies the five-factor test from State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger (1996):

• No other adequate means to obtain relief (such as direct appeal)
• Irreparable prejudice not correctable on appeal
• Clear legal error in the challenged order
• Oft-repeated error or persistent disregard of law
• New and important problems or issues of first impression

The Court reiterated that these are guidelines and not all factors must be satisfied, but “clear error as a matter of law” is given substantial weight. Here, the Court found clear legal error in the circuit court’s encroachment on executive authority and therefore issued the writ. It also found the other factors supported prohibition: appeal was inadequate because the order’s duration was indefinite and interwoven with multiple juvenile matters; the prejudice to DHS would be substantial (re-staffing, re-contracting, $1.7 million annual operating costs, and nearly $8 million in capital safety work).

2) The Order “Sounds in Mandamus” and Fails as Such

The Supreme Court reasoned that the administrative order functioned like mandamus—compelling DHS to perform an asserted statutory duty. But mandamus lies only to enforce a nondiscretionary duty where the petitioner has a clear legal right, a corresponding duty rests on the respondent, and no adequate alternative remedy exists (Freeland v. Marshall (2023); Greenbrier County Airport Auth. v. Hanna (1967); Lawson (1932)).

The Court concluded:

• DHS does not have a nondiscretionary duty to keep this particular Children’s Home open. While DHS has obligations concerning juvenile care and custody, the choice of how to meet those obligations—including which facilities to operate—is within executive discretion.
• Even when a duty exists, “mandamus is never employed to prescribe in what manner [a governmental agency] shall act” (Affiliated Construction Trades Foundation v. Vieweg (1999), Syl. Pt. 6, in part).
• The circuit court acted sua sponte; no party sought mandamus in a proper procedural posture.

Thus, to the extent the administrative order operated as mandamus, it was improper.

3) Placement Authority Versus Facility Creation: The Court’s Use of Precedent

The circuit court relied on jurisprudence recognizing a judge’s authority to determine juvenile placements. The Supreme Court, however, distinguished between choosing among existing placements and creating or compelling a placement that does not exist.

• State ex rel. WVDHHR v. Frazier (1996). The circuit court cited Syllabus Pt. 3 for the proposition that “it is the court’s responsibility to determine the placement” of adjudicated delinquents. The Supreme Court emphasized the remainder of Frazier: courts make placement decisions with DHS’s assistance by selecting from “placements and services available both in and out of the community.” Frazier also underscores that it is the executive branch’s responsibility “to construct or establish the necessary in-state facilities for juvenile care and treatment.” Nothing in Frazier permits a court to order placement in a shuttered facility or to command the executive to operate a specific facility.
• State ex rel. Pressley Ridge v. WVDHHR (2016). Pressley Ridge reaffirms a court’s authority “to make facility-specific decisions concerning juvenile placements,” but adds a critical limit: “the executive branch has authority to enter into contracts with providers, the terms of which should not be dictated by the courts” (quoting Ohl v. Egnor (1997), Syl. Pt. 3). This decision directly contradicts any judicial attempt to dictate the operation or contracting necessary to keep a specific facility open.
• State ex rel. WVDHHR v. Bloom (2022). Bloom expresses concern about limited emergency housing for children but does not authorize courts to cure such systemic shortages by ordering the creation or continuation of facilities “by judicial fiat.”

Collectively, these precedents confirm a structural division of labor: circuit courts select appropriate placements for juveniles; the executive (here, DHS) creates, maintains, and contracts for the array of options from which those selections can be made.

4) Separation of Powers: The Core Holding

The Court grounded its decision in Article V, Section 1 of the West Virginia Constitution: the legislative, executive, and judicial departments are “separate and distinct,” and no branch may exercise powers properly belonging to another. This principle “is not merely a suggestion; it is part of the fundamental law of our State and, as such, it must be strictly construed and closely followed” (State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin (1981), Syl. Pt. 1, in part).

Citing In re Goldston (2021) (and Dostert (1980)), the Court reiterated: “No Judge should take unto himself activities or functions which are delegated to other branches of the government.” By ordering DHS to continue operating a specific facility indefinitely, the circuit court intruded on executive policymaking, budgeting, contracting, staffing, and facility management—classic executive functions. That encroachment was “clearly erroneous and in excess of [the circuit court’s] legitimate powers,” warranting prohibition.

5) Statutory Context

The circuit court cited Title 49 generally, including provisions addressing DHS’s obligations regarding juvenile custody and services. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Legislature has charged DHS with, among other duties, “establish[ing] and maintain[ing] one or more rehabilitative facilities to be used exclusively for the lawful custody of status offenders” (W. Va. Code § 49-2-1003(a), as referenced in the opinion), and provisions governing juvenile custody (e.g., W. Va. Code §§ 49-4-113 and 49-4-706).

But the Court found no statutory authority allowing a circuit judge to dictate how DHS fulfills those obligations at the level of ordering a specific facility to remain open. The record also contained an 11-page list of licensed group residential facilities and child placing agencies, undermining any claim that DHS had abdicated its statutory responsibilities altogether.

6) Why Appeal Was Not an Adequate Remedy

The Court highlighted the unusual procedural posture—an administrative directive entered across several matters (many not involving juveniles at the Children’s Home) and then in a separate proceeding—as well as the open-ended duration of the order. Delayed appellate review after an eventual final order would not protect DHS from immediate and ongoing harms:

• Re-staffing the facility and rescinding cancelled contracts
• Resuming $1.7 million in annual operating expenditures
• Potentially expending nearly $8 million for safety and code compliance

These factors strongly supported immediate prohibition.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W. Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996): Established the five-factor test for discretionary prohibition when a tribunal allegedly exceeds its legitimate powers. The Court leaned heavily on the “clear legal error” factor here, finding encroachment on executive authority.
• Freeland v. Marshall, 249 W. Va. 151, 895 S.E.2d 6 (2023); Greenbrier Cnty. Airport Auth. v. Hanna, 151 W. Va. 479, 153 S.E.2d 284 (1967); Lawson, 113 W. Va. 60, 166 S.E. 696 (1932): Clarify mandamus standards. Emphasized that mandamus enforces nondiscretionary duties and cannot be used to micro-direct executive decision-making.
• Affiliated Constr. Trades Found. v. Vieweg, 205 W. Va. 687, 520 S.E.2d 854 (1999): “Mandamus is never employed to prescribe in what manner [an agency] shall act,” a key limit the circuit court’s order violated.
• State ex rel. WVDHHR v. Frazier, 198 W. Va. 678, 482 S.E.2d 663 (1996): Courts select placements from available options with agency assistance; the executive has responsibility to construct/establish necessary in-state facilities. Used to reject the notion that courts can require a non-existent or closed placement.
• State ex rel. Pressley Ridge v. WVDHHR, 238 W. Va. 268, 793 S.E.2d 918 (2016): Courts may make facility-specific placement decisions but may not dictate executive contracting or force-provider terms. Supports the executive’s control over facility operations and contracts.
• State ex rel. WVDHHR v. Bloom, 247 W. Va. 433, 880 S.E.2d 899 (2022): Acknowledged systemic capacity concerns without authorizing courts to create capacity by order. Reinforces limits on judicial remedies in this domain.
• In re Goldston, 246 W. Va. 61, 866 S.E.2d 126 (2021); W. Va. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n v. Dostert, 165 W. Va. 233, 271 S.E.2d 427 (1980): Warn against judges assuming functions belonging to other branches.
• State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 167 W. Va. 155, 279 S.E.2d 622 (1981): Separation-of-powers provision must be strictly enforced. Anchors the core constitutional holding.

These authorities collectively delineate the constitutional boundary: judicial placement authority stops at creating, operating, or compelling executive facilities.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeded in three interlocking steps:

1. Characterization and deficiency of the administrative order: Functionally a mandamus directive, the order lacked a statutory basis and failed mandamus prerequisites. DHS’s decision to close a specific home did not constitute abdication of its statutory duties, particularly where other placements existed; and even if duties were implicated, courts cannot prescribe the manner of executive fulfillment.
2. Scope of judicial placement discretion: Under Frazier, Bloom, and Pressley Ridge, circuit courts choose among available placements. The circuit court’s order crossed that line by attempting to keep a closed facility open—effectively creating a judicially compelled placement not provided by the executive branch.
3. Separation-of-powers violation: By dictating executive operations (staffing, contracting, budgeting, capital improvements), the order invaded the executive’s sphere. This was clear legal error and an excess of judicial power, warranting prohibition under § 53-1-1 and Hoover.

Impact and Significance

A. Immediate implications for juvenile practice

• Judges retain authority to make facility-specific placement orders—but only among existing, available options. They cannot require the executive to open, reopen, or continue operating a particular facility.
• Administrative orders that attempt to resolve systemic capacity shortages by directing executive operations will face swift prohibition.
• Courts addressing urgent placement needs should leverage DHS’s duty to assist and provide the menu of available placements and services, and may employ case-specific orders within those options.

B. Executive authority and agency discretion

• DHS may restructure, close, or reconfigure facilities consistent with its statutory obligations, without risk that a court will compel operation of a particular site by administrative fiat.
• Budgetary, contracting, and capital decisions remain firmly in the executive’s domain, even when the judicial branch identifies pressing needs in the juvenile system.

C. Litigation pathways for systemic deficiencies

• If stakeholders believe DHS is abdicating a clear statutory duty (e.g., to maintain at least some capacity for status offenders), the proper vehicle is a traditional mandamus action seeking compliance with the duty—not a directive prescribing the specific means (such as operating a named facility).
• Courts may order agencies to discharge nondiscretionary duties but cannot micromanage how those duties are fulfilled.

D. Prohibition jurisprudence

• The decision reinforces that prohibition is appropriate to halt orders that intrude upon executive powers, especially where immediate, non-correctable harms would accrue and appeal is impracticable due to procedural posture or indefinite duration.
• Practitioners should foreground the “clear error” factor under Hoover when a lower tribunal’s order infringes on constitutional boundaries.

E. What the decision does not do

• It does not excuse DHS from its underlying statutory obligations to provide appropriate juvenile placements and services, including maintaining capacity for status offenders.
• It does not diminish courts’ authority to make case-specific placement decisions among available options.
• It does not define the minimum level of statewide capacity DHS must maintain or specify remedies if the State truly lacks any lawful placements—an issue that would require a different record and posture.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Writ of Prohibition: An extraordinary remedy used by a higher court to stop a lower court from acting beyond its authority. It is not a review of the merits but a jurisdictional or power check.
• Mandamus: An extraordinary writ compelling a government official or agency to perform a nondiscretionary legal duty. It cannot be used to tell an agency how to perform a duty or to force a particular policy choice.
• Administrative Order: A court’s directive managing proceedings or operations. It cannot substitute for a petition-based action (like mandamus) to compel another branch to act and must be grounded in legal authority.
• Separation of Powers: The constitutional division of government into legislative, executive, and judicial branches, each with distinct functions. A court cannot exercise executive powers (like deciding which state facilities must operate).
• Juvenile “Status Offender” vs. “Delinquent”: A status offender commits conduct that is unlawful due to the person’s status as a minor (e.g., truancy), while a delinquent commits conduct that would be criminal regardless of age. Statutes may require the State to maintain certain facilities specifically for status offenders.
• Placement Determinations: Courts decide where an adjudicated juvenile should be placed, but only among the placements that actually exist and are made available by the executive branch.

Practice Pointers

• For judges: When placement shortages arise, require DHS to provide a comprehensive inventory of available options and services; craft orders selecting among those options. Avoid directives that compel the operation, staffing, or contracting of specific facilities.
• For DHS: When closing facilities, document alternative capacity and transition plans; be prepared to furnish courts with up-to-date placement availability and provider lists to support case-by-case decisions.
• For advocates: If seeking systemic relief, frame requests in terms of enforcing clear, nondiscretionary statutory duties, not dictating particular means; assemble records showing abdication if alleged. Consider the high hurdles for extraordinary writs and the limits imposed by separation of powers.

Key Takeaways

• Circuit courts have authority to select juvenile placements—but only from options actually available; they cannot create or require the continued operation of a facility.
• Mandamus cannot be used to dictate how an agency fulfills its duties, and a court cannot issue sua sponte, mandamus-like directives via administrative order.
• Separation of powers strictly bars judicial intrusion into executive decisions over staffing, contracting, budgeting, and facility operations.
• Prohibition is the proper remedy to prevent a lower court from exceeding its legitimate powers in a manner that causes immediate, non-correctable harm.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s decision in State ex rel. West Virginia Department of Human Services v. The Honorable David H. Wilmoth decisively reaffirms the constitutional boundary between judicial placement authority and executive control over the creation and operation of juvenile facilities. By prohibiting enforcement of an administrative order that compelled DHS to keep a specific facility open, the Court underscores that judges may choose among available placements but may not create them by judicial command. Grounded in separation of powers and the limits of mandamus, the ruling provides clear guidance to courts, agencies, and advocates confronting the perennial challenges of juvenile placement capacity: solutions must respect the constitutional roles of each branch, and extraordinary judicial remedies cannot be used to run the executive’s operations.