County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Defining the Boundaries of Religious Displays under the Establishment Clause

County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Defining the Boundaries of Religious Displays under the Establishment Clause

Introduction

County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), is a pivotal United States Supreme Court case that delved into the delicate interplay between governmental acknowledgment of religious symbols and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The case specifically examined the constitutionality of holiday displays located on public property in downtown Pittsburgh, including a Christian creche and a Jewish menorah. This commentary provides an in-depth analysis of the judgment, exploring its background, the Court's reasoning, cited precedents, and its broader implications for future Establishment Clause jurisprudence.

Summary of the Judgment

The litigation questioned whether the County of Allegheny's holiday displays—a Christian creche and a Jewish menorah—on public property violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court initially denied injunctive relief, citing LYNCH v. DONNELLY, which upheld a similar creche display in a private park. However, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed this decision, distinguishing it from Lynch and holding that both the creche and the menorah constituted impermissible governmental endorsements of religion.

The Supreme Court's decision affirmed this judgment in part and reversed it in part. The Court held that the display of the creche violated the Establishment Clause by explicitly endorsing Christianity without sufficient secular context. In contrast, the menorah display was upheld, as it did not, in its specific setting, convey an unconstitutional endorsement of Judaism but rather recognized the cultural diversity of the winter-holiday season alongside Christmas.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively referenced several key Supreme Court cases interpreting the Establishment Clause:

  • LEMON v. KURTZMAN, 403 U.S. 602 (1971): Established the Lemon Test, which evaluates whether a government action violates the Establishment Clause based on purpose, effect, and entanglement with religion.
  • LYNCH v. DONNELLY, 465 U.S. 668 (1984): Upheld a creche display in a city's holiday decorations, emphasizing the importance of context in determining endorsement of religion.
  • MARSH v. CHAMBERS, 463 U.S. 783 (1983): Upheld the practice of legislative prayer in Nebraska, highlighting historical practices and ceremonial deism.
  • EVERSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 330 U.S. 1 (1947): Affirmed the compatibility of the Establishment Clause with state aid to religious activities, introducing the principle of government neutrality.
  • ENGEL v. VITALE, 370 U.S. 421 (1962): Invalidated state-sponsored prayer in public schools, reinforcing the prohibition against governmental endorsement of religion.

Legal Reasoning

Justice Blackmun delivered the majority opinion, reinforcing the Lemon Test's application while emphasizing the context's significance. The Court determined that the creche's placement on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse—described as the building's most public and beautiful part—communicated a clear endorsement of Christianity through explicit religious messaging ("Gloria in Excelsis Deo"). The floral decorations and lack of secular holiday paraphernalia further amplified the message, distinguishing it from the Lynch case, where multiple secular symbols mitigated any religious endorsement.

Conversely, the menorah's display outside the City-County Building, adjacent to a large Christmas tree and accompanied by a secular "Salute to Liberty" sign, presented a message of cultural recognition rather than religious endorsement. The Court concluded that the menorah, in this context, acknowledged the Jewish holiday of Chanukah within a broader, secular celebration of winter holidays, thus not violating the Establishment Clause.

Impact

This judgment has significant implications for the interpretation of the Establishment Clause. It underscores the necessity of context in evaluating religious displays on public property and delineates clearer boundaries between permissible cultural acknowledgment and unconstitutional religious endorsement. Future cases involving public religious symbols will likely reference this decision to assess the specific settings and accompanying elements that might influence the perception of endorsement.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Establishment Clause

Part of the First Amendment, the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from establishing an official religion, favoring one religion over others, or favoring religion over non-religion. It aims to maintain government neutrality in religious matters.

Lemon Test

Derived from LEMON v. KURTZMAN, the Lemon Test assesses whether a government action violates the Establishment Clause by evaluating:

  • Secular Purpose: The action must have a legitimate secular objective.
  • Primary Effect: The action must neither advance nor inhibit religion.
  • Excessive Entanglement: The action must not result in excessive government involvement with religion.

Endorsement Test

Emerging from subsequent cases like ENGEL v. VITALE and LYNCH v. DONNELLY, this test evaluates whether a government action conveys a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion. It considers what a reasonable observer would perceive about the government's stance on religion based on the action's context and presentation.

Conclusion

County of Allegheny v. ACLU serves as a landmark case in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, articulating the importance of context in evaluating religious displays on public property. By affirming the creche display's constitutionality violation and reversing the menorah's, the Court reinforced a nuanced approach that balances cultural acknowledgment with the prohibition of religious endorsement. This decision mandates that governmental actions involving religious symbols must be carefully scrutinized within their specific settings to ensure they do not convey unconstitutional messages of favoritism or exclusion based on religious belief. The case thereby provides a foundational framework for assessing the constitutionality of future religious displays and governmental recognitions in a pluralistic society.

Case Details

Year: 1989
Court: U.S. Supreme Court

Judge(s)

John Paul StevensHarry Andrew BlackmunAnthony McLeod KennedySandra Day O'ConnorWilliam Joseph BrennanAntonin Scalia

Attorney(S)

Peter Buscemi argued the cause for petitioners in Nos. 87-2050 and 88-96. With him on the briefs were George M. Janocsko, Robert L. McTiernan, D. R. Pellegrini, and George R. Specter. Nathan Lewin argued the cause for petitioner in No. 88-90. With him on the briefs was Charles H. Saul. Roslyn M. Litman argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief for respondents American Civil Liberties Union et al. were Jon Pushinsky, James B. Lieber, John A. Powell, and Steven R. Shapiro. Ruti Teitel, Jeffrey P. Sinensky, Steven M. Freeman, Richard E. Shevitz, and Jill L. Kahn filed a brief for respondent Tunador. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Ayer, and Michael K. Kellogg; for the city of Warren, Michigan, by Robert E. Williams; for Concerned Women for America by Jordan W. Lorence, Cimron Campbell, and Wendell R. Bird; for the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs by Dennis Rapps and A. David Stern; and for the National Legal Foundation by Douglas W. Davis, Robert K. Skolrood, and William C. Wood, Jr. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Jewish Committee et al. by Samuel Rabinove, Richard T. Foltin, James G. Greilsheimer, Alan M. Klinger, David A. Stein, Lauren G. Klein, and Lee Boothby; and for the American Jewish Congress et al. by Arlene Fickler, Marc D. Stern, Lois C. Waldman, and Amy Adelson.

Comments