County Lines Matter: Third Department Holds Different County DAs Are Not the Same “Party” for Criminal Collateral Estoppel

Introduction

In The People of the State of New York v. William Kent, 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 1014 (3d Dept Feb. 20, 2025), the Appellate Division, Third Department, confronted a recurring problem in modern fraud prosecutions: when a course of conduct spans multiple counties, can an acquittal in one county preclude a separate prosecution in another county for closely related conduct? The court’s answer centers on the “identity of parties” requirement for criminal collateral estoppel and the constitutional and statutory limits on the authority of county district attorneys and county courts.

The case involves a multi-check, multi-county scheme tied to a purported $250,000 private loan, leading to two indictments—one in Albany County (resulting in an acquittal) and one in Schenectady County (resulting in convictions). After trial in Schenectady County, the defendant, William Kent, argued via a CPL 440.10 motion that the prior Albany acquittal collaterally estopped the Schenectady prosecution and that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek dismissal on that ground. The Third Department affirmed the convictions and the denial of post-conviction relief, squarely holding that different county district attorneys are not the same “party” for purposes of collateral estoppel, notwithstanding that both prosecutions proceed in the name of “The People of the State of New York.”

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department affirmed Kent’s Schenectady County convictions for grand larceny in the third degree (two counts) and criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree (seven counts) and also affirmed the County Court’s order denying his CPL 440.10 motion without a hearing. The court held:

Collateral estoppel did not bar the Schenectady County prosecution, even though the defendant was acquitted of related charges in Albany County. The “identity of parties” element of issue preclusion was not satisfied because district attorneys and county courts have constitutionally and statutorily defined geographic authority; the Schenectady County District Attorney’s Office did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the Albany County case.
Because the collateral estoppel theory would have failed on the merits, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek dismissal. The court applied the “single egregious error”/“clear-cut and dispositive defense” standard for ineffective assistance and found no deficiency.
The statutory double jeopardy claim under CPL 40.20(2) was unpreserved and, in any event, meritless because the indictments arose from separate criminal transactions involving different victims.

The court remitted the matter to the County Court for proceedings under CPL 460.50(5) following affirmance.

Factual and Procedural Background

William Kent owned K3 Works, Inc., operating eight Domino’s franchises in New York. In June 2019, he obtained a purported $250,000 business loan through a broker, funded by 11 Navy Federal Credit Union cashier’s checks made payable to K3 Works, Inc. Two unidentified couriers delivered the checks to Kent in a Schenectady County parking lot around June 11, 2019. Over June 12–15, 2019, Kent deposited the checks at multiple branches: four at NBT Bank in Albany County, one at NBT Bank in Schenectady County, and six at Cap Com Federal Credit Union in Schenectady County. He withdrew funds corresponding to the deposits. All checks were later determined to be forged.

Two indictments followed:

Albany County indictment (Apr. 9, 2021): one count of grand larceny in the third degree and four counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree. The larceny count was dismissed before trial; a jury acquitted Kent on the remaining charges in August 2021.
Schenectady County indictment (Jan. 6, 2021): two counts of grand larceny in the third degree and seven counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree. In December 2021, the County Court denied the People’s Molineux application to introduce the Albany County conduct to prove intent or common scheme, reasoning that the Albany acquittal barred that use via collateral estoppel. Kent testified that the Schenectady checks were part of the same overall $250,000 loan. A certified fraud examiner testified that the timing of deposits and withdrawals was consistent with a check-kiting scheme. In February 2022, a jury found Kent guilty on all counts, and he received an aggregate sentence of 1 1/3 to 4 years.

Kent later filed a CPL 440.10 motion arguing that the Albany acquittal collaterally estopped the Schenectady prosecution and that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek dismissal on that ground. County Court denied the motion without a hearing. On appeal, the Third Department considered the collateral estoppel claim only through the lens of ineffective assistance because the issue had not been preserved in the trial record.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

PEOPLE v. GOODMAN, 69 N.Y.2d 32 (1986): Recognizes that collateral estoppel applies in criminal cases and is “embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy,” but is broader in that it can prevent harassment via serial prosecutions over a single act or group of acts. The court uses Goodman to frame the doctrine and its prerequisites—identity of parties and issues, and a prior final judgment following a full and fair opportunity to litigate.
PEOPLE v. ACEVEDO, 69 N.Y.2d 478 (1987): Emphasizes that criminal collateral estoppel is applied more sparingly than in civil litigation. The Third Department invokes Acevedo for the proposition that courts are cautious about issue preclusion in criminal matters and that an acquittal’s preclusive effect turns on precise identity of issues actually decided.
PEOPLE v. AGUILERA, 82 N.Y.2d 23 (1993); People v. O’Toole, 22 N.Y.3d 335 (2013): Reinforce the requirements of identity of parties and issues, and the necessity of a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding. These cases fortify the doctrinal framework applied here.
MATTER OF KELLEY v. MCGEE, 57 N.Y.2d 522 (1982); PEOPLE v. KELLY, 88 N.Y.2d 248 (1996); MATTER OF DONDI v. JONES, 40 N.Y.2d 8 (1976): Explain the role of district attorneys as local enforcers of state penal law. These cases support the court’s conclusion that a DA’s authority is geographically bounded and that “The People” are represented locally, not by a single, statewide prosecutorial entity in county courts.
County Law § 700(1); N.Y. Const., art XIII, § 13; N.Y. Const., art VI, § 11(a); CPL 20.40(1): Establish the geographic jurisdiction of district attorneys and county courts. The court relies on these texts to conclude that different county DAs are not the same “party” for collateral estoppel purposes because each is authorized only to prosecute crimes cognizable in his or her county’s courts.
MATTER OF JUAN C. v. CORTINES, 89 N.Y.2d 659 (1997): Clarifies that the mere fact that two entities derive authority from the same sovereign does not establish privity for collateral estoppel; the practical relationship and statutory authority matter. This principle is pivotal to rejecting the defendant’s “same ‘People’ equals same party” argument.
ASHE v. SWENSON, 397 U.S. 436 (1970): A landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision on criminal issue preclusion after an acquittal. The Third Department cited Ashe in a “compare” signal, underscoring that Ashe’s preclusion analysis hinges on identity of issues actually decided, in a unique single-incident context. The Kent court emphasized, by contrast, the absence of party identity between county prosecutors and the presence of different victims and venues.
People v. Williams, 163 A.D.3d 1418 (4th Dept 2018): Applied collateral estoppel to limit Molineux evidence after an acquittal. In Kent, the Schenectady trial court relied on Williams to preclude the People from using the Albany conduct as propensity/intent evidence. The Third Department did not disturb that evidentiary ruling, but distinguished the broader question of whether a separate prosecution could proceed.
PEOPLE v. DEAN, 45 N.Y.2d 651 (1978); People v. Brandi E., 105 A.D.3d 1341 (4th Dept 2013): Cited for the general caution that collateral estoppel is more limited in criminal prosecutions than in civil actions.
People v. Lynch, 25 N.Y.3d 331 (2015); PEOPLE v. BIGGS, 1 N.Y.3d 225 (2003); PEOPLE v. ROSSI, 222 A.D.2d 717 (2d Dept 1995): Applied to reject the CPL 40.20(2) statutory double jeopardy claim, emphasizing that prosecutions involving different victims and separate transactions do not trigger the statute’s “same transaction” bar.
People v. Watkins, 42 N.Y.3d 635 (2024): Articulates that a single attorney error can constitute ineffective assistance only if it forgoes a clear-cut, dispositive defense that no reasonable lawyer would omit, and the decision cannot be justified as strategy. The court applied Watkins to conclude counsel was not ineffective for omitting a meritless collateral estoppel motion.
People v. Hartle, 192 A.D.3d 1199 (3d Dept 2021), affd 37 N.Y.3d 1027 (2021): Confirms that CPL 440.10 relief is available for constitutional ineffective assistance claims; the trial court can summarily deny where no legal basis is shown (CPL 440.30[4][a]).
People v. Taylor, 156 A.D.3d 86 (3d Dept 2017): Supports reviewing extra-record materials (e.g., transcripts from the Albany case) in the context of the 440 appeal.
PEOPLE v. McGRIFF, 130 A.D.2d 141 (1st Dept 1987) (compare): The court signals that there are circumstances where identity-of-parties analysis can cut differently. Kent is distinguished: here, the structural and practical separation of county prosecutors defeated party identity.

Legal Reasoning: Why Collateral Estoppel Did Not Apply

The key to the Third Department’s analysis is the “identity of parties” prong of criminal collateral estoppel. Even though both prosecutions were styled in the name of “The People of the State of New York,” the court emphasized the constitutional and statutory framework:

County district attorneys are charged with “conduct[ing] all prosecutions for crimes and offenses cognizable by the courts of the county” where they are elected or appointed (County Law § 700[1]).
County courts have jurisdiction over crimes occurring within their county (N.Y. Const., art VI, § 11[a]; CPL 20.40[1]).
The DA’s responsibility is “the enforcement, on a local level, of the penal laws of this State and representation of the people of this State in criminal matters arising within the county” (MATTER OF KELLEY v. MCGEE, 57 N.Y.2d at 539).

Against this backdrop, the court held that the Albany County DA had authority to prosecute the checks deposited in Albany County in an Albany court, and the Schenectady County DA, likewise, had authority to prosecute the Schenectady checks in Schenectady court. Because each DA’s mandate is geographically bounded, the Schenectady DA cannot be said to have had a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate in the Albany prosecution. As a result, there was no “identity of parties” between the two prosecutions for collateral estoppel purposes. The court underscored that six of the seven Schenectady checks involved a different victim (Cap Com Federal Credit Union), reinforcing both the separateness of the issues and the prosecution’s independent interests.

The court also invoked the settled caution that “collateral estoppel is not as liberally applied in criminal prosecutions as in civil actions” (PEOPLE v. ACEVEDO, 69 N.Y.2d at 485), indicating that even where factual overlap exists, the doctrine’s prerequisites are stringently applied in criminal cases to preserve the State’s ability to enforce penal laws across different venues and protect the public’s interest, particularly when different victims and local concerns are implicated.

Finally, because the proposed collateral estoppel motion would have failed on the merits, trial counsel’s failure to raise it did not meet the Watkins standard for ineffective assistance. The court affirmed the CPL 440.10 denial without a hearing, as the motion papers did not present a legal basis for relief (CPL 440.30[4][a]).

Double Jeopardy (CPL 40.20): A Separate, Statutory Bar That Also Fails

Kent also argued that CPL 40.20(2), New York’s statutory double jeopardy rule, barred the Schenectady prosecution. The Third Department rejected the claim as unpreserved and, alternatively, meritless. Under Lynch and Biggs, the “same transaction” bar focuses on whether offenses are so connected in their criminal transactions that they should be tried together. Here, the prosecutions involved different victims and separate deposits/withdrawals in different counties. That separation sufficed to avoid CPL 40.20(2)’s prohibition.

Scope and Limits: What the Court Did—and Did Not—Decide

The court did not hold that collateral estoppel can never apply between county prosecutions. Its reasoning is anchored “on this record,” emphasizing geographic authority and the lack of a full and fair opportunity for the second DA to litigate in the first county’s case. The opinion leaves open that different facts (e.g., a cross-designation, a special prosecutor, a multi-county grand jury, or a showing that the second office effectively controlled or participated in the first prosecution) could alter the party-identity analysis.
The court also did not disturb the Schenectady trial court’s evidentiary ruling that the Albany acquittal prevented admission of the Albany conduct under Molineux to show intent or common plan. That narrower use of issue preclusion as an evidentiary limitation can coexist with the broader conclusion that a separate prosecution is not barred.

Impact and Practical Implications

Kent clarifies and strengthens a practical rule in multi-county criminal litigation in New York:

Successive prosecutions by different county DAs are not barred by collateral estoppel merely because both actions are brought by “The People of the State of New York.” For issue preclusion, party identity turns on practical authority and opportunity to litigate—criteria that typically will not be met across different county offices.
Defendants cannot assume that an acquittal in County A will preclude prosecution in County B when there are separate victims, separate deposits, or county-specific effects, even if the conduct arises from a single overarching scheme.
Prosecutors should consider coordination across counties when schemes cross borders, but the absence of such coordination will generally not backfire by creating party identity for collateral estoppel. If anything, Kent signals that separate county prosecutions remain viable tools to address county-specific harms.
On the defense side, ineffective assistance claims premised on omitted collateral estoppel motions face a high bar post-Watkins. Unless counsel forgoes an obvious, dispositive defense with no strategic justification, the omission will not meet the constitutional threshold. Given Kent’s holding on party identity, a motion to dismiss on collateral estoppel grounds would not be “clear-cut and dispositive.”
Even when a second prosecution may proceed, acquitted-conduct evidence from an earlier case may be limited under Molineux and issue preclusion principles. Kent’s trial-level ruling (undisturbed on appeal) illustrates how courts may bar the use of acquitted conduct to prove intent or common plan, even if they allow a new prosecution on different counts and in a different county.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion): A doctrine preventing the relitigation of specific issues that were actually decided in a prior case. In criminal law, it is cautiously applied, and requires:
- Identity of parties (or their privies),
- Identity of issues actually and necessarily decided, and
- A prior final judgment where the party to be bound had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.
Identity of parties: Not simply about similar captions. Courts look to whether the same legal entity had authority and a real opportunity to litigate the prior case. In New York, county DAs are separate, locally empowered prosecutors; one DA’s litigation does not automatically bind another DA in a different county.
Double jeopardy vs. collateral estoppel:
- Double jeopardy (constitutional/statutory) prevents successive prosecutions or multiple punishments for the “same offense” or the “same transaction” (see CPL 40.20).
- Collateral estoppel is narrower in effect: it bars relitigation of issues decided in the defendant’s favor. It can sometimes protect defendants even when double jeopardy does not, but its prerequisites (like party identity) can be harder to satisfy between different prosecuting offices.
Molineux evidence: Refers to the rule limiting the use of prior bad acts to prove propensity. Such evidence can be admitted for non-propensity purposes (e.g., intent, motive, common scheme), but courts often exclude it if its probative value is outweighed by prejudice or, as in Kent, when a prior acquittal creates issue-preclusion concerns about what the defendant did or intended.
CPL 440.10 motion: A post-judgment motion to vacate a conviction on specified grounds (including constitutional ineffective assistance). The court may summarily deny if the motion lacks a legal basis or the papers are insufficient (CPL 440.30[4][a]).
Ineffective assistance standard (Watkins): A single omission by counsel can amount to ineffective assistance only if it failed to raise a defense so obvious and dispositive that no reasonable lawyer would have omitted it, and the omission cannot be justified as strategic.

Conclusion

People v. Kent clarifies a significant point of New York criminal procedure: different county district attorneys are not the same “party” for purposes of criminal collateral estoppel, even though both act in the name of “The People of the State of New York.” Because county DAs and courts exercise geographically bounded authority, a DA in County B generally did not have a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate a case tried in County A. That structural reality defeats the party-identity requirement and preserves the ability to prosecute county-specific offenses arising from multi-county schemes, particularly where different victims are involved.

The decision also underscores two further points. First, while a subsequent prosecution may proceed, issue preclusion can still restrict evidentiary uses of acquitted conduct under Molineux, a nuance reflected at Kent’s Schenectady trial. Second, under Watkins, counsel is not ineffective for omitting a collateral estoppel motion that would fail on the merits; ineffective assistance claims require more than the failure to bring a colorable but losing argument.

In sum, Kent offers a clear, administrable rule for multi-county prosecutions: county lines matter. Absent proof of a unified prosecutorial identity or participation across counties, an acquittal in one county will not collaterally estop a separate county’s prosecution, especially where different victims and transactions are at issue. The ruling will guide prosecutors, defense counsel, and trial courts in structuring and litigating complex, multi-venue financial and fraud cases across New York.