Country-Conditions Arguments May Exhaust an Internal-Relocation Challenge; Speculative Hardship Plans Do Not Establish “Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship”

I. Introduction

Case: Hernandez Bernal v. Bondi, No. 25-9541 (10th Cir. Jan. 9, 2026) (Order and Judgment).
Parties: Alex Misael Hernandez Bernal (petitioner), a native and citizen of El Salvador, versus the U.S. Attorney General (respondent).
Procedural posture: Petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) single-member summary affirmance of an Immigration Judge (IJ) decision denying asylum, withholding of removal, Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection, and cancellation of removal.

The case arose from Hernandez’s claim that he fled El Salvador after gang-linked threats connected to his former work as a police officer and after he reported a colleague’s suspected gang collaboration. After years of proceedings (including administrative closure pending an I-130 petition), the government reopened removal proceedings following Hernandez’s 2024 border-checkpoint incident in which seven unlawfully present individuals were found hidden in his truck. Hernandez renewed applications for asylum, withholding, CAT protection, and sought cancellation of removal based on claimed hardship to his U.S.-citizen father.

The key issues were: (1) whether threats and intimidation rose to “persecution”; (2) whether Hernandez had a “well-founded fear” of future persecution given the possibility of internal relocation and changed country conditions; (3) whether he met the higher withholding standard and the CAT likelihood-of-torture standard; and (4) whether he proved “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative for cancellation of removal.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the agency’s findings that:

the threats Hernandez described did not compel a finding of past “persecution”;
his fear of future persecution was not objectively reasonable given the agency’s internal-relocation and changed-country-conditions findings;
failure to meet the asylum standard necessarily defeated withholding of removal; and
CAT relief was unsupported for materially the same reasons as the future-persecution analysis;
cancellation of removal failed because Hernandez’s claimed plan to help his father overcome alcoholism was too speculative and insufficiently supported to show that removal “would result in” the requisite hardship.

Notably, the court also rejected the government’s exhaustion objection to the internal-relocation issue, explaining that Hernandez’s presentation to the BIA of country-conditions evidence—central to the IJ’s relocation finding—was enough to exhaust the point even without an explicit label.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Scope of review and deference

Uanreroro v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2006): The court reiterated that it reviews the BIA’s decision but may consult the IJ’s more complete reasoning when the BIA relies on the same grounds. This mattered here because the BIA issued a short summary order, making the IJ’s decision the functional locus of analysis.
Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2005): The decision restated the bifurcated standard—legal determinations de novo and factfinding under substantial evidence. This framework drove the outcome: Hernandez’s challenges largely asked the court to reweigh facts and country-conditions evidence, which substantial-evidence review forbids.
Sarr v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 2007): Cited for the principle that appellate courts do not weigh evidence or evaluate credibility in reviewing IJ/BIA decisions. The court used this to reject Hernandez’s attempt to re-litigate competing narratives about present conditions in El Salvador.

2. Persecution standard and threats

Hayrapetyan v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 1330 (10th Cir. 2008): The court treated the “ultimate determination” of persecution as a question of fact in the Tenth Circuit—even when underlying facts are undisputed—thereby tightening review under the “compelled to conclude to the contrary” standard.
Vatulev v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2003): The court relied on the maxim that threats “generally do not constitute actual persecution,” and only rarely qualify when “so immediate and menacing as to cause significant suffering or harm in themselves.” Hernandez’s showing was deemed conclusory; he did not demonstrate that the threats met this “rare” threshold in a way that would compel reversal.

3. Future fear, objective reasonableness, and relocation

Tulengkey v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2005): Used for the “subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable” formulation of a well-founded fear. The IJ’s internal-relocation and changed-conditions findings undercut objective reasonableness.

4. Withholding follows asylum where asylum burden not met

Zhi Wei Pang v. Holder, 665 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2012): The court applied the principle that withholding of removal requires a more stringent showing than asylum; failure on asylum typically defeats withholding when based on the same factual predicate.

5. Independent grounds and affirmance

Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388 (10th Cir. 1994): Cited for the rule that an independently sufficient administrative finding sustains denial regardless of arguments attacking another finding. This supported affirmance of cancellation denial because either (i) the plan was speculative or (ii) the hardship level was not shown.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Asylum: past persecution

The court treated the persecution determination as factual (Hayrapetyan), reviewable only for whether any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to disagree. Applying Vatulev, it acknowledged that threats can sometimes qualify as persecution, but only in exceptional circumstances. Hernandez’s appellate presentation did not marshal specific facts or record-based argumentation demonstrating that the threats were “so immediate and menacing” as to themselves inflict significant suffering or harm. Under substantial-evidence review, the absence of developed argument mattered: the court framed his position as an invitation to substitute its judgment for the IJ’s, which § 1252(b)(4)(B) forbids.

2. Asylum: well-founded fear, internal relocation, and country conditions

Even without past persecution, asylum remains available upon a well-founded fear that is subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable (Tulengkey). The IJ found the objective component lacking because Hernandez could relocate within El Salvador away from the same gangs, emphasizing (i) the long passage of time (over ten years) and minimal evidence that anyone still sought him, and (ii) country reports describing El Salvador’s “State of Exception” beginning in 2022 and a government crackdown leading to fewer murders.

Hernandez countered with evidence that progress against gangs was overstated or fragile. The court refused to reweigh those competing accounts, invoking Sarr. This illustrates a recurring dynamic in asylum review: where the agency explicitly considers country reports and competing evidence, appellate relief is difficult unless the record compels the opposite conclusion.

3. Exhaustion and issue presentation to the BIA (internal-relocation dispute)

In a consequential footnote, the government argued that Hernandez did not exhaust his internal-relocation challenge because he did not explicitly identify it before the BIA. The court rejected that objection, reasoning that Hernandez presented contrary country-conditions evidence in the context of future fear, which “contest[ed] an integral part” of the IJ’s relocation finding—especially because country conditions were “crucial” to that finding. The court further emphasized that his evidence included expert discussion of the practical difficulty of remaining anonymous after relocating.

The doctrinal significance is pragmatic: when an IJ’s internal-relocation determination is substantially grounded in country-conditions analysis, a petitioner may exhaust the relocation issue by presenting and arguing country-conditions evidence to the BIA that directly undermines the relocation rationale, even if the petitioner does not separately label the argument “internal relocation.”

4. Withholding of removal

The court applied Zhi Wei Pang to dispose of withholding efficiently: because Hernandez did not satisfy the lower asylum burden on the same facts, he necessarily failed the more stringent withholding standard.

5. CAT protection

The court treated the CAT dispute as “materially the same” as the future-persecution dispute, affirming based on the same passage-of-time and changed-conditions reasoning and again refusing to reweigh competing country-conditions evidence.

6. Cancellation of removal: “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” and evidentiary speculation

Cancellation required proof that removal “would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative, here Hernandez’s U.S.-citizen father (§ 1229b(b)(1)(D)). Hernandez’s theory depended on a future plan: his father would move in and travel with him for work, allowing Hernandez to curb his alcoholism. The agency found the plan insufficiently supported and not persuasive.

The court focused on the first, causation-adjacent prong: insufficient evidence that the plan would actually be implemented and thus that removal “would result in” the claimed hardship. The IJ pointed to concrete gaps: Hernandez had not lived with his father for nearly a decade; supporting affidavits did not mention the plan; and the father lived with his wife and nearer other siblings. Under § 1252(b)(4)(B), the record did not compel a contrary finding. Citing Murrell v. Shalala, the court noted it could affirm on this independently sufficient ground without reaching the second ground (whether the father’s condition would rise to the required hardship level absent Hernandez).

C. Impact

1. Exhaustion: practical guidance for briefing to the BIA

Although the disposition is “not binding precedent” (as the order itself states), the reasoning is instructive for practitioners in the Tenth Circuit. It signals that exhaustion can be satisfied where the petitioner’s BIA briefing substantively attacks the logic of an IJ finding (here, internal relocation) through the evidentiary lens the IJ relied upon (country conditions), even if the petitioner does not use the IJ’s precise label.

2. Threats-as-persecution remains a steep climb

The decision reinforces Vatulev’s high bar: threats “alone” will “rarely” qualify as persecution. Petitioners must connect threats to immediate, severe, independently harmful consequences and develop record-based argumentation explaining why the threats themselves inflicted significant suffering or harm.

3. Changed-country-conditions and internal relocation are fact-intensive and hard to overturn

The opinion exemplifies how “changed conditions” (e.g., a crackdown) can support denial of asylum/CAT on future-risk theories, and how appellate courts defer when the agency has considered competing evidence. For future cases, the path to reversal will typically require showing the agency ignored material evidence, applied an incorrect legal standard, or made findings no reasonable adjudicator could reach.

4. Cancellation: evidentiary rigor for future-plans theories

The cancellation analysis underscores that hardship claims premised on proposed future arrangements must be corroborated and plausibly implemented. Unsupported intent—especially when inconsistent with living arrangements and silent affidavits—may be deemed too speculative to establish that removal “would result in” the statutory hardship.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Persecution”: Serious harm (or in rare cases, threats so severe and immediate that they themselves cause significant suffering) inflicted for a protected reason (race, religion, nationality, particular social group, political opinion).
“Well-founded fear”: The applicant must genuinely fear harm (subjective) and also show a reasonable possibility of harm (objective). Objective reasonableness can be undermined if safe internal relocation is feasible.
“Internal relocation”: Even if danger exists in one area, asylum may be denied if the person can reasonably and safely move to another part of the country to avoid the persecutor.
“Substantial evidence” / “compelled to conclude”: The court does not decide what it thinks is most likely; it asks whether the agency’s view is one a reasonable decisionmaker could hold on this record. Reversal occurs only when the record forces the opposite conclusion.
CAT protection: Requires showing it is more likely than not the applicant will be tortured if removed; it is distinct from asylum but often turns on similar predictive, country-conditions factfinding.
“Exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”: A very high hardship threshold for cancellation of removal, and it must be hardship to a qualifying relative (not to the applicant). The applicant must show removal would result in that hardship, not merely that hardship is possible.
“Exhaustion”: A petitioner generally must present issues to the BIA before a federal court will review them. This opinion suggests that substance can suffice over labels when the petitioner’s BIA presentation directly contests the IJ’s rationale.

V. Conclusion

Hernandez Bernal v. Bondi is a deferential-review decision upholding denial of asylum, withholding, CAT, and cancellation of removal on a record the court found did not compel a different result. Its most notable contribution is its practical approach to exhaustion: when internal relocation is driven by country-conditions reasoning, presenting contrary country-conditions evidence to the BIA may adequately exhaust a relocation challenge even without expressly naming it. The case also reiterates two demanding evidentiary realities of immigration relief: threats rarely suffice as “persecution” without a developed showing under Vatulev, and cancellation hardship theories premised on future plans must be supported by concrete, corroborated evidence demonstrating that removal would cause the claimed hardship.