Counting Pre‑Cooperation Buyers and Prior Suppliers as “Participants” Under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b): United States v. Monroe (11th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

In United States v. Lennard Rashard Monroe, a per curiam, unpublished decision on the Eleventh Circuit’s Non‑Argument Calendar, the court affirmed a 240‑month sentence that included a three‑level managerial enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). The appeal turned on whether the criminal activity “involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” Monroe conceded managerial status but argued the district court erred in counting fewer than five “participants.” The panel held there was no reversible error in counting both (i) a prior supplier (“AT,” Monroe’s uncle) and (ii) a confidential source who made numerous purchases before cooperating with law enforcement.

Although the panel emphasized standards of review—plain error for an objection not clearly raised below and clear error for factual findings—the opinion meaningfully clarifies two recurring sentencing questions: whether § 3B1.1(b)’s “participants” must be contemporaneous with the charged conduct, and whether a confidential source can be counted when their criminal role predated cooperation. The court answered both questions in a way that favors inclusion, grounded in the Guidelines’ relevant‑conduct framework and existing Eleventh Circuit precedent.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the managerial enhancement under § 3B1.1(b), concluding that the district court did not commit plain or clear error in finding “five or more participants.”

Standard of review: Participant status determinations are reviewed de novo, with underlying factual findings reviewed for clear error. Unpreserved arguments are reviewed for plain error.
Managerial status: Not challenged on appeal; the only live issue was the participant count.
Participants conceded: Monroe acknowledged that he, Justin Farrior, and Mr. Gibson counted as participants (three total).
Disputed participants:
- “AT,” Monroe’s uncle: The court held there was no plain error in counting AT as a participant, noting neither Eleventh Circuit nor Supreme Court precedent requires participants to be involved only during the precise period of charged conduct and citing record testimony that AT supplied Monroe over an “extended period,” including when Monroe and Farrior sold drugs together.
- Confidential source: Notwithstanding the Application Note excluding undercover officers, the court concluded there was no clear error in counting a confidential source whose drug purchases (approximately 50 between 2019 and 2022) preceded her cooperation.
Because AT and the confidential source were properly counted, the five‑participant threshold was satisfied; the panel did not need to decide whether the activity was “otherwise extensive,” nor whether an unidentified security guard qualified.
Result: Sentence affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

United States v. Williams, 527 F.3d 1235, 1249 (11th Cir. 2008): The court reiterated that whether someone is a “participant” under § 3B1.1 is reviewed de novo, but the factual underpinnings of that determination are reviewed for clear error. This framework allowed the panel to accept the district court’s fact findings unless left with a “definite and firm conviction” of error.
United States v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279, 1300 (11th Cir. 2015): Reaffirmed the clear‑error standard for factual determinations at sentencing; the panel implicitly applied that deference in upholding the district court’s findings about the confidential source’s pre‑cooperation purchasing history and AT’s supplier role.
United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1222 (11th Cir. 2010), and United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th Cir. 2003): These cases set the stage for plain‑error review when objections were not specifically preserved. The opinion uses Zinn to emphasize that a failure to articulate a specific ground at sentencing waives the objection as raised on appeal.
United States v. Roosevelt Coats, 8 F.4th 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2021): Articulates the four‑prong plain‑error test. The court applied that test to Monroe’s newly framed temporal argument about AT.
United States v. Lejarde‑Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003): A cornerstone of Eleventh Circuit plain‑error practice—no plain error where neither the statute/rule’s text nor binding Eleventh Circuit or Supreme Court precedent squarely resolves the issue. This principle was critical: because no controlling authority requires participants to be confined to the charged period, any error in counting AT was not “plain.”
United States v. Holland, 22 F.3d 1040, 1045–46 (11th Cir. 1994): The court relied on Holland for the proposition that § 3B1.1 analysis is not limited to the offense conduct alone but extends to “the events surrounding the criminal act,” including acts forming the “same course of conduct or common scheme or plan.”
United States v. Zitron, 810 F.3d 1253, 1261–62 (11th Cir. 2016): Cited to anchor the relevant‑conduct lens—courts may consider acts that are part of the “same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction” (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2)) in deciding who qualifies as a participant.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) & comment. (n.1): The guideline provides a three‑level enhancement if the defendant was a manager or supervisor and the activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. Note 1 defines “participant” as a person “criminally responsible for the commission of the offense,” excluding undercover officers. The panel used this note to reject Monroe’s attempt to categorically exclude the confidential source, emphasizing her pre‑cooperation criminality.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeds in disciplined steps, tightly cabined by the standards of review and the Guidelines’ text and structure.

Issue Framing and Standards of Review. Monroe did not contest that he acted as a manager or supervisor. The appeal instead targeted the numerical threshold for § 3B1.1(b), asserting that the criminal activity involved fewer than five participants and was not “otherwise extensive.” The court applied:
- De novo review to the legal question of who counts as a “participant,”
- Clear‑error review to the district court’s underlying factual findings, and
- Plain‑error review to the specific, unpreserved argument that AT’s participation fell outside the charged period.
Counting the Conceded Participants. Monroe conceded three participants: himself, Justin Farrior, and Mr. Gibson. The dispute focused on whether two additional individuals could be counted: AT and the confidential source.
AT (the prior supplier). The panel foregrounded Monroe’s preservation problem: his sentencing memorandum argued insufficient evidence that AT “had anything to do with the criminal activity involved in this case at all,” but on appeal he recast the argument as a temporal one—AT supplied in the past, while the charged conduct involved a new Orlando supplier. Because the timing argument was not clearly articulated below, review was for plain error. Under Lejarde‑Rada, the absence of controlling precedent limiting “participants” to those acting during the charged period defeated any claim of “plainness.” Moreover, the record independently supported counting AT: a case agent testified AT supplied Monroe “for an extended period,” including when Monroe and Farrior were “selling drugs together.” Thus, two independent bases sustained the district court’s finding: (i) no plain error given unsettled law; and (ii) evidentiary support for overlap with the charged scheme.
The Confidential Source (pre‑cooperation buyer). The panel rejected Monroe’s reliance on Application Note 1’s exclusion for undercover officers. While a person acting as an undercover agent is not a “participant,” the record showed that this confidential source made approximately 50 purchases from 2019 until she later met with agents in 2022, with quantities ranging from grams to ounces. The court held it was not clear error to treat the confidential source as a participant “prior to her involvement with federal agents.” In other words, the undercover exclusion does not retroactively sanitize pre‑cooperation criminal conduct; a cooperator can be a “participant” for periods in which they were criminally responsible.
Relevant Conduct and Temporal Scope. The panel leaned on Holland and Zitron to reject a strict temporal confinement of “participants” to the date range of the charged conduct. By instructing district courts to consider acts “that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan,” the Guidelines permit counting individuals whose involvement surrounds, precedes, or otherwise connects to the offense of conviction. The opinion also notes that § 3B1.1’s text does not require that “all five participants be involved in the criminal activity at the time the defendant managed or supervised other participants.”
Disposition. With Monroe, Farrior, and Gibson conceded, and AT plus the confidential source properly counted, the threshold of five participants was met. That mooted the need to reach the “otherwise extensive” prong or the status of the unidentified security guard. The sentence was affirmed.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although unpublished and therefore non‑precedential in the Eleventh Circuit, the court’s reasoning is a clear, practical guide for litigants and district courts applying § 3B1.1(b).

Temporal breadth of “participants”. The opinion strongly signals that participant counting is not rigidly confined to the charged date range. Individuals whose conduct is part of the “same course of conduct or common scheme or plan”—even if occurring earlier—may be counted, especially when the record evidences continuity or overlap.
Confidential sources and informants. The decision clarifies that the undercover‑officer exclusion in Application Note 1 does not categorically exclude confidential sources. If a cooperator engaged in criminal conduct before assisting law enforcement, those pre‑cooperation acts can make them a “participant.” This will matter frequently in narcotics cases where informants were long‑time buyers, couriers, or facilitators before their cooperation began.
Reinforcing the relevance of relevant conduct. By centering § 1B1.3’s relevant‑conduct concept, the opinion confirms that § 3B1.1(b)’s participant analysis can reach beyond the strict elements or timeframe of the offense of conviction to encompass reasonably related acts and actors.
Preservation matters. Monroe’s failure to articulate a precise timing objection at sentencing triggered plain‑error review. Under Lejarde‑Rada, the Eleventh Circuit rarely finds plain error absent directly on‑point precedent. Defense counsel should make specific, issue‑framed objections at sentencing—e.g., “AT’s involvement ended before the offense period; there is no evidence he was a participant in the same course of conduct”—to preserve more favorable review.
Government strategy. Prosecutors can marshal participant counts by documenting the roles of pre‑cooperation informants and prior suppliers if their conduct ties to the same scheme. Corroborated agent testimony about duration, overlap, and scope of roles was decisive here.
Buyer‑seller nuance remains. While the panel accepted the district court’s treatment of a frequent purchaser as a participant, it did so through clear‑error review and without a detailed analysis of the buyer‑seller doctrine. Future litigants may test the boundary between “mere end‑user customer” (often not a participant in the seller’s offense) and “criminally responsible participant” (e.g., repeat purchasers engaged in distribution or other facilitating acts). The record’s suggestion of substantial, repeated transactions likely proved important.

Complex Concepts Simplified

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) (Manager/Supervisor Enhancement): Adds three offense levels if the defendant was a manager or supervisor and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. Distinct from the four‑level “organizer/leader” enhancement in § 3B1.1(a).
Participant (Application Note 1): A “participant” is anyone criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, whether or not convicted. Undercover law enforcement officers are not participants. A confidential source may be a participant for periods before cooperation if they engaged in criminal conduct then.
Relevant Conduct (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3): Sentencing can consider acts that are part of the “same course of conduct or common scheme or plan” as the offense of conviction, even if not charged. This broadens who and what counts for enhancements like § 3B1.1.
Standards of Review:
- De novo: The appellate court gives no deference on pure legal questions (e.g., the legal meaning of “participant”).
- Clear error: Factual findings stand unless the appellate court has a definite and firm conviction of error.
- Plain error: For unpreserved issues, the defendant must show (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights, and (4) seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. In the Eleventh Circuit, absent clear binding precedent or text, an error is rarely “plain.”
Otherwise Extensive: An alternative to the “five or more participants” route. The court did not reach this prong because it found at least five participants.
Non‑Argument Calendar and Unpublished Opinions: Cases decided without oral argument on the Non‑Argument Calendar are often unpublished. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, though they can be persuasive.

Conclusion

United States v. Monroe offers a pragmatic, standards‑of‑review‑driven resolution to a common § 3B1.1(b) dispute. Two key takeaways emerge. First, the Eleventh Circuit endorses a relevant‑conduct frame for counting participants: the pool is not fixed to the charged timeframe, and actors whose misconduct forms part of the same course of conduct or common scheme can be counted—even if their primary involvement preceded the charged period. Second, confidential sources are not categorically excluded; their pre‑cooperation criminality may make them “participants” despite later cooperation.

While the opinion is unpublished and therefore not binding, it is a careful application of Guideline text, commentary, and Eleventh Circuit precedent that will likely influence district‑court practice. For defense counsel, the case underscores the importance of precise, preserved objections and the need to develop a record on the distinct roles of buyers, informants, and suppliers. For the government, it affirms that detailed, credible testimony about the scope and timing of co‑actors’ roles can sustain § 3B1.1(b) enhancements. In affirming Monroe’s sentence, the panel situates participant counting within the broader relevant‑conduct universe—an approach that will continue to shape sentencing advocacy in multi‑actor drug and firearms cases in the Eleventh Circuit.