Counterfeit Bill Identification as Probable Cause: Clarifying §1983 False Arrest Standards

Introduction

Glover v. Onondaga County Sheriff's Dept, decided April 10, 2025 by the Second Circuit, concerns Plaintiff‐Appellant Kelly Glover’s § 1983 and state‐law claims arising from her warrantless arrest for alleged first‐degree criminal possession of a forged instrument. Glover was arrested after Deputy Albanese viewed Wegmans surveillance footage showing a woman using counterfeit $20 bills, matched the suspect to Glover via the store’s loyalty program data and DMV photo, and secured her admission—later recanted—that she knowingly passed fake bills. Glover sued for false arrest, unlawful entry and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, due‐process and equal‐protection violations, conspiracy, fraud, emotional distress, and municipal liability, claiming lack of probable cause, improper home entry, missed arraignment, discovery abuses, and coercive waivers. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants; this appeal followed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit affirmed. Key holdings:

On procedural rulings, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying late discovery requests or deeming Defendants’ summary‐judgment motion unopposed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
A law enforcement officer had probable cause to arrest Glover for forging because he viewed her on video passing counterfeit bills, physically examined them, and extracted her admission of wrongdoing.
Glover voluntarily consented to Deputy Albanese’s entry; her belated “ask him to leave” came only after he announced the arrest. No Fourth Amendment violation.
No due‐process violation arose from Glover’s non‐arraignment: she spent under five hours in custody, was released without charge, and thus faced no “delay” requiring judicial review under McLaughlin.
The County could not be held liable under Monell for forcing Glover to sign a release form: she suffered no additional detention or cognizable injury.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court relied on and discussed at length the following authorities:

Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1995) – Elements of false arrest under § 1983 mirror New York common law.
Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 1996) – Probable cause is a complete defense to false‐arrest claims.
Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2006) – Defines probable cause: “knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information…”
Curry v. City of Syracuse, 316 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2003) – Warrantless arrests raise a presumption of unlawfulness unless probable cause is shown.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) – Warrantless home‐entry arrests require either consent or exigent circumstances.
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) – Arrestees must be judicially presented “promptly,” usually within 48 hours.
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) – Municipal liability under § 1983 requires a policy or custom causing a constitutional injury.
Discovery and summary‐judgment procedure cases: Jackson v. FedEx, Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, Alphonse Hotel Corp. v. Tran.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in three stages:

Procedural Discretion: Magistrate Judge Baxter’s early invitation to invoke Rule 56(d) or a spoliation motion went unused. Months after close of discovery, Glover sought documents long deemed nonexistent. The district court reasonably declined further discovery and treated Defendants’ motion as unopposed when Glover failed to respond or demonstrate how withheld records were “germane,” per Paddington Partners and Alphonse Hotel.
Probable Cause and Fourth Amendment: Under Jaegly and Weyant, officers need only “reasonably trustworthy information” of a crime. Viewing video of the suspect passing plastic‐free $20 bills (no watermark) and matching her DMV photo created probable cause. Glover’s post‐arrest story could not defeat probable cause, consistent with Wesby (2018): innocent explanations need not be ruled out before an arrest.
No Unlawful Entry: Glover invited Deputy Albanese into her home. Her request that he leave came after he announced the arrest. Under Payton, consent precludes a Fourth Amendment challenge to home entry.
No Due‐Process Violation: Under McLaughlin, a four‐ to five‐hour detention without arraignment does not constitute “unnecessary delay.” Glover suffered no legal detriment or prolonged custody.
No Municipal Liability: To invoke Monell, a plaintiff must show a policy or custom that inflicted a constitutional injury. Signing the release form caused no additional detention or harm; no policy forced wrongful arrests.

Impact

Though non‐precedential, this summary order provides valuable guidance:

It reinforces that an officer’s physical inspection of suspect currency plus video identification suffices for probable cause—even absent proof of the suspect’s criminal intent prior to arrest.
It affirms strict adherence to Federal Rule 56(d): plaintiffs must show how withheld discovery is material, not merely assert delay or prejudice.
It clarifies that brief, sub‐48‐hour detentions without formal arraignment do not violate due‐process rights when no charges are pursued.
It signals that “release and waiver” forms, without coercive effect on detention length or other injuries, do not trigger municipal liability.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable Cause: A reasonable belief, based on facts and trustworthy information, that a person committed a crime. Officers need not guarantee a conviction.
Summary Judgment: A court decision without trial, granted when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d): Allows a non‐moving party to request more time or discovery if needed to oppose summary judgment; requires a sworn affidavit describing outstanding evidence and its relevance.
Monell Liability: A municipality can be sued under § 1983 only if a government policy, custom, or practice directly causes a constitutional violation.
Unwarranted Entry & Payton Rule: Absent consent or exigent circumstances, the Fourth Amendment prohibits home‐entry arrests without a warrant.
McLaughlin “Prompt” Arraignment: Courts generally deem arraignments within 48 hours after arrest constitutionally sufficient; shorter detention without formal arraignment typically poses no due‐process issue if release follows quickly.

Conclusion

Glover v. Onondaga County Sheriff's Dept reaffirms that: (1) video identification plus physical inspection of forged bills establishes probable cause for arrest; (2) consent to enter a home precludes Fourth Amendment challenges; (3) brief, sub-48-hour detentions without arraignment do not violate due process when no charges ensue; and (4) release‐and‐waiver forms unaccompanied by extended custody or coercion do not trigger municipal liability under Monell. The decision underscores procedural rigor under Rule 56(d) and delineates clear boundaries for § 1983 wrongful‐arrest and due‐process claims.

This summary order, while non‐precedential, offers practical guideposts for trial and appellate courts in evaluating probable cause, discovery disputes, home‐entry arrests, and municipal‐liability claims in § 1983 actions.