Counsel’s Duty at Sentencing: Strickland Standard and the Limits of Cronic Presumption

Introduction

Baker v. Conway is a Second Circuit summary order issued on April 3, 2025, affirming the denial of federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner Sean Baker, convicted of second-degree murder under New York’s felony-murder statute, challenged his 20-to-life sentence on the ground that his court-appointed attorney rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing stage. After unsuccessful collateral attacks in state court—including a CPL 440.10 motion—Baker filed a federal habeas petition arguing that counsel’s failure to prepare for sentencing and to advise him adequately entitled him to relief under Strickland v. Washington (1984) or, alternatively, to a presumption of prejudice under United States v. Cronic (1984). The District Court adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation to deny relief, and the Second Circuit, in a de novo review, affirmed.

Key parties and figures:

Petitioner-Appellant: Sean Baker, New York State inmate.
Respondent-Appellee: James Conway (Bronx County District Attorney’s Office).
District Judge: Laura Taylor Ramos (S.D.N.Y.).
Circuit Judges: Richard C. Wesley, Gerard E. Lynch, Eunice C. Lee.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit affirmed denial of habeas relief, holding:

The state courts did not unreasonably apply Strickland’s two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. Although counsel’s performance was arguably deficient—he failed to discuss the presentence report, neglected to present mitigating evidence, and did not advise Baker to make a allocution—the record does not establish a “reasonable probability” of a different sentence but for counsel’s errors.
Baker was not entitled to a presumption of prejudice under Cronic. His case did not involve a complete deprivation of counsel or such a breakdown in adversarial testing as to trigger automatic reversal. Instead, Strickland’s prejudice analysis remains the appropriate framework.
Under AEDPA’s deferential standard, the state courts’ rulings were neither “contrary to” nor an “unreasonable application of” clearly established Supreme Court precedent.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Strickland v. Washington (1984) – Establishes the two-prong test for ineffective assistance: (1) deficient performance and (2) resulting prejudice.
Cronic (1984) – Identifies narrow circumstances warranting a presumption of prejudice when counsel entirely fails to function as the adversary.
Gonzalez v. United States (2d Cir. 2013) – Recognizes that counsel’s failure to review a presentence report or present mitigating evidence can be objectively unreasonable.
Cullen v. Pinholster (2011) – Reinforces AEDPA’s “doubly deferential” review of state court adjudications of Strickland claims.
Bell v. Cone (2002) – Clarifies the narrow scope of Cronic’s presumption of prejudice and distinguishes it from Strickland’s necessity of showing likely impact.

Legal Reasoning

Under AEDPA, the panel reviewed de novo whether the District Court correctly applied Supreme Court precedent, and whether the state courts’ determinations were “objectively unreasonable.”

Deficient Performance: The court acknowledged that counsel’s failure to provide Baker with the presentence report, interview him about mitigation, correct inaccuracies in the report, or argue for a lower sentence amounted to objectively unreasonable conduct. Citing Gonzalez, the panel underscored that attorneys must conduct reasonable investigations and cannot simply rely on a perfunctory record.

Prejudice Under Strickland: Even assuming deficient performance, the court found no “reasonable probability” of a lesser sentence. The sentencing judge—who later denied Baker’s § 440.10 motion—deemed the crime’s facts “senseless” and emphasized Baker’s lack of remorse. Moreover, Baker’s co-defendant received a 25-to-life term, while Baker was sentenced at 20-to-life, suggesting the judge already differentiated culpability.

Cronic Presumption: The panel held that Cronic’s automatic-prejudice rule applies only in extreme situations—complete denial of counsel at a critical stage, or total breakdown of adversarial testing—none of which were present here. Counsel appeared and made a minimal record, so the court properly applied Strickland rather than Cronic.

Impact

Baker v. Conway clarifies two important points for future sentencing and habeas challenges:

Sentencing counsel must review presentence reports with clients, develop mitigating evidence, and advise on allocution. Failure to do so is objectively unreasonable under Strickland.
Even serious sentencing-stage deficiencies do not automatically trigger Cronic’s presumption of prejudice. AEDPA requires a particularized showing of prejudice unless counsel was so absent or inactive as to wholly undermine adversarial testing.

The decision thus preserves Strickland’s centrality in sentencing-ineffectiveness claims and confines Cronic to its narrow original terms.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Strickland Two-Prong Test: (1) Counsel’s work must meet professional standards; (2) Counsel’s mistakes must actually affect the outcome—i.e., there must be a “reasonable probability” of a different result if counsel had performed adequately.
Cronic Presumption: A rare rule that assumes prejudice without proof if counsel was absent or inactive at a critical stage, or if the adversarial process collapsed entirely.
AEDPA Deference: When a habeas petitioner challenges a state-court ruling, federal courts give the state court the benefit of the doubt unless its decision was “unreasonably” wrong under Supreme Court law.
§ 440.10 Motion: A New York vehicle for post-conviction relief on grounds such as ineffective assistance of counsel.

Conclusion

Baker v. Conway reinforces that attorneys owe their clients meaningful preparation and advocacy at sentencing—reviewing the presentence report, raising mitigation, and advising on allocution. However, even serious strategic lapses do not automatically entitle defendants to relief under Cronic. Instead, Strickland’s requirement of showing actual prejudice remains the lodestar, and AEDPA’s doubly deferential lens demands that only the most unreasonable state-court rulings be overturned. This decision thus fortifies the careful balance between ensuring competent representation at sentencing and respecting state-court adjudications within the federal habeas framework.