Counsel’s Duty at Sentencing: Establishing Effective Assistance Standards in Baker v. Conway

Introduction

This commentary examines the Second Circuit’s summary order in Baker v. Conway, decided April 3, 2025, which affirmed the denial of a federal habeas petition challenging the effectiveness of trial counsel at the sentencing stage. Petitioner‐Appellant Sean Baker, convicted of second‐degree murder under New York’s felony‐murder statute, argued that his court‐appointed attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to prepare for or advocate at his sentencing hearing. The key legal issues include the application of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel at sentencing, the Strickland v. Washington two‐prong test for ineffective assistance, and the narrow circumstances warranting a Cronic v. United States presumption of prejudice. The parties are Sean Baker (petitioner) and James Conway, represented by the Bronx District Attorney’s Office (respondent).”

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit, in a non‐precedential summary order, affirmed the Southern District of New York’s denial of Baker’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. The court held that:

Baker’s trial counsel performance at sentencing fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under Strickland;
However, Baker failed to show a “reasonable probability” of a different sentence absent counsel’s errors, as required to prove prejudice;
The circumstances did not warrant invoking a Cronic presumption of prejudice;
AEDPA’s deferential standards prevented relief, because no fair‐minded jurist could conclude Baker was both deficiently represented and prejudiced thereby.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668, 1984): Established the two‐prong test—deficient performance and prejudice—for Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
United States v. Cronic (466 U.S. 648, 1984): Identified three narrow scenarios in which prejudice may be presumed without the usual Strickland showing, including total failure to test the prosecution’s case.
Burt v. Titlow (571 U.S. 12, 2013) and Harrington v. Richter (562 U.S. 86, 2011): Clarified AEDPA’s “doubly deferential” standard giving both state courts and counsel the benefit of the doubt.
Gonzalez v. United States (722 F.3d 118, 2013): Recognized failure to review the presentence report (PSR) or pursue mitigating evidence at sentencing as deficient performance under Strickland.

Legal Reasoning

The Second Circuit’s reasoning unfolded in several steps:

Deficient Performance: Baker’s attorney, Patrick Bruno, never reviewed the PSR with him, failed to investigate or present any mitigating evidence (including a troubled childhood), and made only a three‐sentence argument at sentencing. This conduct mirrored Gonzalez and fell below objective standards.
Prejudice under Strickland: Although performance was deficient, Baker could not show that a different sentence was reasonably probable absent these errors. The sentencing judge had explicitly noted Baker’s lack of remorse and refusal to accept responsibility, made clear Baker could address the court (and declined), and ultimately imposed a below‐maximum sentence—suggesting limited room for mitigation.
No Cronic Presumption: Baker argued that Bruno “entirely failed” adversarial testing at a critical stage. The court declined, finding Cronic’s presumption reserved for more extreme scenarios (e.g., no counsel at all or no meaningful testing of the prosecution’s case from the outset).
AEDPA Deference: Because the state trial and appellate courts evaluated Baker’s Sixth Amendment claim under Strickland (not unreasonably) and Baker could not show prejudice, habeas relief was barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Impact

The decision in Baker v. Conway clarifies several points for future sentencing‐stage ineffective assistance claims:

Counsel must conduct a meaningful investigation and prepare clients with the PSR and potential mitigation—the absence of which may constitute deficient performance.
Even clear performance failures will not require relief unless there is a substantial likelihood of a different sentence, especially where a judge has expressed specific sentencing reasons.
Cronic’s presumption of prejudice remains a narrow doctrine, unlikely to apply when counsel simply omits arguments or investigation at sentencing.
Under AEDPA, federal courts grant significant deference to state court determinations of counsel effectiveness and prejudice, making habeas relief at sentencing rare.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Habeas Corpus (28 U.S.C. § 2254): A federal remedy for state prisoners alleging constitutional violations in their convictions or sentences.
AEDPA Deference: Federal courts must defer to state courts’ rulings unless they are “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application” of Supreme Court precedent.
Strickland Two‐Prong Test: To prove ineffective assistance, a defendant must show (1) counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and (2) a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for counsel’s errors.
Cronic Presumption: In rare cases where counsel entirely fails to mount any meaningful defense at a critical stage, prejudice may be presumed without showing Strickland’s second prong.
Presentence Report (PSR): A probation‐department report summarizing a defendant’s background, criminal history, and personal circumstances to assist the sentencing judge.

Conclusion

Baker v. Conway reinforces that effective assistance of counsel at sentencing requires proactive investigation, client preparation, and presentation of mitigation. Even where counsel’s performance is deficient, habeas relief under AEDPA hinges on proving that these errors likely altered the sentence—a high bar when the sentencing judge has articulated clear reasons and imposed a non‐maximum term. The case underscores the limited scope of Cronic’s presumption of prejudice and affirms AEDPA’s deferential framework, signaling to practitioners that robust advocacy at sentencing remains both a professional duty and a critical safeguard of constitutional rights.