“Equity Aids the Vigilant”: Cotenants May Defend Absent Cotenants Against Adverse Possession, and Laches Bars a Century-Old Land Court Claim

Introduction

In a published opinion with far-reaching consequences for quiet title practice and adverse possession in Hawaiʻi, the Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi (opinion by McKenna, J.) addressed a land court application filed in 1919 to register fee title to multiple parcels in Lāhainā, Maui. The application, initiated by Pioneer Mill Company, Limited and later prosecuted by its successor Kahoma Land LLC, lay dormant for decades and was resolved piecemeal a century later. The primary dispute on certiorari centered on Lot 3A (Kuhua), descended through Charles Kanaʻina and his heirs.

Two issues proved dispositive:

• Standing: Whether appearing descendants and cotenants of the Kanaʻina lineage could defend the interests of non-appearing cotenants (whose interests had been defaulted) against an adverse possession claim by Kahoma.
• Laches: Whether a 100-year delay in advancing the adverse possession claim required dismissal due to unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice.

The Court affirmed paper title awards for Lots 1 and 2. But as to Lot 3A, it recognized cotenants’ standing to defend the whole against a “stranger” to title claiming adverse possession and concluded that laches barred the adverse possession claim in light of the century-long delay and loss of critical testimonial evidence and living memory.

Parties included the substituted applicant Kahoma Land LLC, petitioners Edward P. Kakalia (pro se) and the “Schneider descendants” (appearing heirs of Kanaʻina), myriad defaulted heirs, and amici from West Maui community organizations. The opinion is for publication and thus binding precedent.

Summary of the Judgment

• Standing: Cotenants of record descendants have standing to defend not only their own undivided interests but also the interests of other (non-appearing or defaulted) cotenants against a third party asserting adverse possession.
• Laches: The land court abused its discretion by denying motions to dismiss the adverse possession claim as to Lot 3A based on laches. A 100-year delay was “blatantly unreasonable,” and prejudice was “obvious” due to the disappearance of witnesses, memories, and the opportunity to test adverse possession evidence through cross-examination.
• Disposition as to Lot 3A: Vacated the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) judgment to the extent it affirmed the land court’s September 24, 2019 findings and conclusions and its May 27, 2020 Amended Decree No. 2017 awarding 78.704% of Lot 3A to Kahoma. Remanded with instructions to dismiss the Land Court application as to Lot 3A without prejudice. Any new quiet title proceeding must proceed under current Hawaiʻi law.
• Disposition as to Lots 1 and 2: Affirmed the ICA and the land court’s May 27, 2020 Amended Decree No. 2016 confirming paper title in Kahoma based on an unbroken chain of title.

Background and Procedural Posture

Pioneer Mill filed Land Court Application No. 439 in 1919 to register fee title to multiple parcels (Lots 1, 2, and 3). Lot 3 was later subdivided into 3A–3E; this case concerns Lot 3A (Kuhua). An Examiner in 1919 concluded Pioneer Mill had paper title to Lots 1 and 2, but not to Lot 3. The Examiner suggested Lot 3 might have been acquired by adverse possession, but the record was unclear. The last record owner for Lot 3A was identified as Charles Kanaʻina; his heirs included Princess Ruth Keʻelikōlani and Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop, among others.

Key historical landmarks include:

• 1920: Defaults entered after service by publication; however, some heirs and respondents later appeared to reopen defaults.
• 1967: Trial held; the land court awarded title (including Lot 3A) to Pioneer Mill.
• 1972: The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court nullified the 1967 decision because the trial judge had forfeited office by announcing a gubernatorial candidacy; remanded for a new trial. No trial ever occurred thereafter.
• 1993–1994: State disclaimed interest in Lots 1, 2, 3A–3C; Pioneer Mill quitclaimed 3D–3E to the State.
• 2009–2011: Kahoma substituted as applicant; defaults re-entered; Lot 1 and Lot 2 title confirmed by summary judgment.
• 2017–2020: Land court awarded Kahoma a 78.704% undivided interest in Lot 3A via adverse possession, corresponding to defaulted heirs, leaving 21.296% with appearing Kanaʻina descendants.
• ICA (2024): Affirmed the land court, holding that appearing heirs lacked standing to defend the interests of defaulted cotenants.
• Supreme Court (2025): Granted certiorari, reversed in part as to Lot 3A, and remanded for dismissal based on laches; affirmed as to Lots 1 and 2.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Role

• Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Silva, 124 Hawaiʻi 476, 248 P.3d 1207 (App. 2011)
  The ICA relied on Silva for the proposition that a respondent cannot defeat a petitioner’s title by pointing to a third party’s superior title. The Supreme Court distinguished Silva as inapposite: Silva involved competing paper titles and defendants with no title. In this case, appearing Kanaʻina descendants are in the chain of title as cotenants; it is the applicant (Kahoma) who lacks title absent adverse possession.
• Wailuku Agribusiness Co. v. Ah Sam, 114 Hawaiʻi 24, 155 P.3d 1125 (2007)
  Reiterated the elements of adverse possession: actual, open, notorious, hostile, continuous, and exclusive possession for the statutory period. The Court referenced this baseline to frame the adverse possession claim at issue (ultimately not reached on the merits due to laches).
• City & County of Honolulu v. Bennett, 57 Haw. 195, 552 P.2d 1380 (1976)
  Recognized a general fiduciary relationship among tenants in common and noted the judiciary’s “critical attitude” toward expansive adverse possession rules. This theme of caution toward adverse possession undergirded the Court’s willingness to let cotenants defend against a stranger’s adverse claim and to view long delay skeptically.
• Chipman v. Hastings, 50 Cal. 310 (1875); Boon v. Knox, 80 Tex. 642, 16 S.W. 448 (1891); Nat’l Surety Corp. v. Smith, 168 Or. 265, 114 P.2d 118 (1941); Freeman v. Southland Paper Mills, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Carlson v. McNeill, 114 Colo. 78, 162 P.2d 226 (1945)
  Longstanding common-law authorities supporting the principle that one cotenant may recover or defend possession of the entire property against a stranger, with the benefit accruing to all cotenants. The Court used these authorities to root its standing holding in common-law doctrine.
• Tax Foundation of Hawaiʻi v. State, 144 Hawaiʻi 175, 439 P.3d 127 (2019)
  Provided the de novo standard and framing for standing analysis.
• Chun v. Board of Trustees of ERS, 106 Hawaiʻi 416, 106 P.3d 339 (2005)
  Articulated the abuse-of-discretion standard for appellate review of laches.
• Association of Apartment Owners of Royal Aloha v. Certified Management, Inc., 139 Hawaiʻi 229, 386 P.3d 866 (2016)
  Confirmed that laches applies in both law and equity, requiring (1) unreasonable delay and (2) prejudice.
• Herrmann v. Herrmann, 138 Hawaiʻi 144, 378 P.3d 860 (2016)
  Applied laches to delays occurring within litigation—not just before filing—illustrating that inaction within a pending case can trigger laches.
• HawaiiUSA Federal Credit Union v. Monalim, 147 Hawaiʻi 33, 464 P.3d 821 (2020)
  Reinforced that laches may apply to intra-litigation delay (there, a four-year delay in seeking a deficiency judgment warranted remand to assess laches). This case underscores that even far shorter delays than 100 years can be legally significant.
• Johnston v. Standard Mining Co., 148 U.S. 360 (1893)
  The mere institution of suit does not defeat laches; a claimant must diligently prosecute the action. The Court invoked this principle to emphasize that filing in 1919 did not immunize the applicant from laches given the ensuing decades of inactivity.
• Waltrip v. TS Enterprises, Inc., 140 Hawaiʻi 226, 398 P.3d 815 (2016)
  Submissions by self-represented litigants should be construed liberally; used here to treat a pro se motion complaining of delay as a laches assertion.
• Statutory context: HRS § 501-11 (Examiners of Title); HRS § 669-3 (modern service provisions in quiet title/adverse possession cases). The Court noted that modern law prefers personal service when possible rather than reliance on publication—contextualizing fairness concerns in century-old proceedings.

Legal Reasoning

1) Standing of Cotenants to Defend the Whole Against Adverse Possession

The Court held that appearing descendants who are tenants in common with other heirs have the right to defend the entire commonly held property against a third party (“stranger”) asserting adverse possession. Central to this holding are:

• Nature of Tenancy in Common: Each cotenant has an equal right to possess the whole property (though their interests are undivided). Against outsiders, a cotenant may assert rights to full possession, and recovery inures to the benefit of all cotenants.
• Common-Law Tradition: Multiple jurisdictions (California, Texas, Oregon, Colorado) have long recognized that one cotenant may recover the entirety as against strangers to title. The Court aligned Hawaiʻi law with this tradition.
• Doctrinal Fit: Silva does not bar cotenant-standing in the adverse possession context where the appearing parties are within the chain of title. Here, Kahoma is without title unless it proves adverse possession.
• Policy and Fiduciary Considerations: In Bennett, the Court recognized fiduciary obligations among cotenants and noted a critical stance toward expansive adverse possession. Allowing only claimants with a formal share to defend the whole preserves land held in common—particularly significant in settings involving Native Hawaiian ʻāina and dispersed heirship, while expressly not limiting the ruling to indigenous contexts.

2) Laches: Unreasonable Delay and Prejudice in a Century-Old Case

The Court applied laches to dismiss Kahoma’s adverse possession claim as to Lot 3A. Two elements controlled:

• Unreasonable Delay: The Court deemed the delay “blatantly unreasonable.” The application languished without meaningful prosecution for decades (e.g., 1920–1965 inactivity; post-1972 remand no new trial; 1983 trial dates came and went; 1994–2009 silence), with Kahoma itself waiting nine years after acquiring Pioneer Mill’s interests to act.
• Prejudice: The subject of adverse possession concerned pre‑1919 facts. Witnesses, Kanaʻina descendants, and oral history were no longer available a century later. The land court relied heavily on 1967 transcripts; Petitioners could not cross-examine those witnesses. The Examiner’s 1919 uncertainty about adverse possession underscored the need for live proof now irretrievably lost.

Importantly, the Court emphasized that laches can bar claims based on intra‑litigation delay: filing in 1919 did not immunize the applicant; what matters is vigilant prosecution. The land court’s refusal to dismiss on laches was an abuse of discretion.

Impact and Forward-Looking Significance

A. Immediate Consequences

• Lot 3A: The adverse possession award to Kahoma is vacated; the application as to Lot 3A must be dismissed. Any renewed quiet title or adverse possession action must proceed under current Hawaiʻi law, including modern service requirements and evidence standards.
• Lots 1 and 2: Title confirmed by paper chain remains intact and is affirmed.

B. Doctrinal Developments

• Standing: Formal recognition that a cotenant may defend the entirety of commonly held property against a stranger asserting adverse possession. This protects communal and heirship interests where not all cotenants can or do appear.
• Laches: Robust application to intra‑litigation delay, not just pre‑filing delay. A powerful cautionary precedent that even longstanding filings can be dismissed where prosecution is not diligent and prejudice accrues. The Court’s reliance on Herrmann and Monalim signals that far shorter delays than 100 years may trigger laches depending on prejudice.
• Adverse Possession Scrutiny: The opinion’s tone continues the “critical attitude” toward adverse possession noted in Bennett. Courts may be more reluctant to declare adverse title where evidence is stale and service histories are imperfect.

C. Practical Effects on Hawaiʻi Land Court and Quiet Title Practice

• Service and Notice: Historical reliance on publication alone will be viewed skeptically in modern proceedings. Practitioners should pursue personal service where feasible and provide clear, targeted notice (e.g., to identifiable lines of descent).
• Diligent Prosecution: Applicants must actively move cases forward. Dormancy invites laches. Courts can and should consider laches sua sponte or upon motion when long delays create evidentiary prejudice.
• Strategy in Heirship Cases: Appearing heirs may assert the whole against adverse claimants, averting outcomes where defaults carve up undivided interests. Applicants asserting adverse possession should anticipate coordinated defense by any appearing cotenant.
• Evidence Preservation: Where historical use is pivotal, early and thorough collection of testimony (including deposition preservation) is essential. Reliance on decades-old transcripts without cross-examination is vulnerable to a prejudice finding.
• Community and Cultural Stakes: The opinion acknowledges the communal nature of heirship lands and the public interest in historically sensitive adjudications, especially in Native Hawaiian contexts, while formulating a rule of general applicability.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Land Court (Torrens) System: Hawaiʻi’s Land Court registers title to land with a state-backed certificate, intended to quiet title definitively. Cases often turn on historic chains of title and proper notice to all interested parties.
• Tenants in Common: Multiple owners each hold an undivided fractional share, but every cotenant has a right to possess the entire parcel (subject to equal rights of the other cotenants). Against outsiders, one cotenant can defend the whole parcel.
• Adverse Possession: A method of acquiring title by possession that is actual, open, notorious, hostile, continuous, and exclusive for the statutory period. Courts scrutinize such claims carefully, especially against record owners and their heirs.
• Laches: An equitable defense that bars claims when there is (1) unreasonable delay and (2) resulting prejudice. It can apply to delays after a case is filed if the party fails to diligently prosecute.
• Default: When a party fails to appear or respond, the court may enter default and proceed without them. But defaults do not prevent appearing cotenants from defending commonly held property against third-party claims.

A Timeline View of Delay and Prejudice (Illustrative)

• 1919: Application filed; Examiner uncertain about adverse possession of Lot 3 (including 3A).
• 1920–1965: Little to no prosecution.
• 1967: Trial; 1970 written decision.
• 1972: Decision nullified; remand for new trial; no trial held.
• 1982–1984: Efforts to set trial dates; no trial occurs.
• 1993–1994: State disclaimers; quitclaim of other sub-lots.
• 2009: Kahoma substituted; renewed defaults and motions.
• 2017–2020: Adverse possession decree entered for 78.704% of Lot 3A.
• 2025: Supreme Court applies laches to dismiss Lot 3A claim, citing lost witnesses, lost memory, and inability to cross-examine.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in In re Application of Pioneer Mill Co., Limited reshapes two foundational aspects of Hawaiʻi land litigation:

• Cotenants’ Standing: Appearing cotenants may defend the entirety of commonly held property against a stranger asserting adverse possession, with the benefit accruing to all cotenants, including those absent or defaulted. This aligns Hawaiʻi law with longstanding common-law doctrine and protects shared heirship interests.
• Laches in Long-Pending Land Cases: The Court forcefully applies laches to intra‑litigation delay, holding that a century of stagnation—causing loss of witnesses, memory, and fair trial opportunities—requires dismissal. Filing alone does not forestall laches; diligence is mandatory.

Practitioners in quiet title and Land Court matters must now account for this dual precedent: cotenants can mount comprehensive defenses, and laches can negate claims even in venerable cases. The opinion thus advances fairness and accuracy in adjudicating Hawaiʻi land titles, especially where historical ownership, ancestral lines, and communal interests converge.