Introduction

In William Coston v. State of Arkansas, 2025 Ark. 143 (Oct. 2, 2025), the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed multiple life sentences imposed after a jury convicted the defendant of ten counts of rape, one count of introducing a controlled substance into the body of another person, and one count of sexually grooming a child. The sole appellate issue was whether the circuit court abused its discretion by allowing the State to amend the criminal information shortly before trial to add charges, most notably increasing rape counts from three to ten.

The opinion, authored by Chief Justice Karen R. Baker, clarifies the scope of a prosecutor’s ability to amend charging instruments prior to submission of the case to the jury, and crystallizes two interconnected principles: (1) adding additional counts of the same offense before trial does not change the “nature or degree” of the offense for amendment purposes, and (2) absent a claim of unfair surprise and a request for a continuance, prejudice will not be presumed. The court also reinforces preservation rules, limiting appellate review to objections actually raised below.

Parties: Appellant, William Coston; Appellee, State of Arkansas. Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas. Disposition: Affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

The State filed an amended information eleven days before trial, increasing rape charges from three to ten and adding two non-rape offenses. The defense objected at a pretrial hearing, arguing broadly that adding seven rape counts was “arbitrary,” but conceded the evidence underpinning all counts had been in discovery “since day one.” The defense did not move to strike the amendment or request a continuance.

On appeal, Coston argued the late amendment changed the nature/degree of the charged offenses and created unfair surprise. The Supreme Court:

• Held that adding counts of the same offense (rape) did not change the nature or degree of the charges.
• Found adequate notice because the amendment occurred eleven days before trial and relied on evidence long available in discovery.
• Found no prejudice because Coston did not claim surprise or seek a continuance; prejudice is not presumed.
• Limited review to the added rape counts because alleged surprise regarding the “introduction of a controlled substance” and “grooming” charges was not preserved in the circuit court.
• Distinguished cases where amendments were allowed after the jury was sworn or after the State rested to remedy proof deficiencies.
• Conducted Rule 4-3(a) review and found no prejudicial error.

Factual and Procedural Background

The case arises from years-long sexual abuse of a minor victim (MV) beginning when she was four. Initially charged in November 2022 with three counts of rape, the State amended in January 2023 to add first-degree endangering the welfare of a minor. On February 29, 2024, the State filed a second amended information eliminating the endangerment count and alleging ten counts of rape, one count of introducing a controlled substance into another’s body, and one count of sexually grooming a child. A final amendment on March 6, 2024, altered only the grooming count’s date range to conform to the statute of limitations.

At a March 6, 2024 pretrial hearing, the defense objected to the increased number of rape counts as arbitrary but acknowledged the evidence for those incidents had been discoverable from the outset. The defense identified surprise as the only possible prohibition but neither sought to strike the amendment nor requested a continuance—despite acknowledging that a continuance would be the remedy for any surprise.

At trial, the State presented Coston’s confessions (to law enforcement and others), MV’s testimony describing multiple instances of penetration and oral sexual acts over several years, and evidence of drugs provided to MV before sexual acts. After the State rested, Coston moved for a directed verdict, arguing it was difficult to target individual rape counts because the counts were similarly worded and covered similar date ranges. The State delineated ten specific incidents from MV’s testimony; the motion was denied. The jury convicted on all counts; the court imposed consecutive sentences.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Green v. State, 2012 Ark. 19, 386 S.W.3d 413: Establishes the governing rule that the State may amend an information any time before submission to the jury so long as the amendment does not change the nature or degree of the offense or create unfair surprise (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 16-85-407(b)). This case supplies the core standard applied in Coston.
• Carter v. State, 2015 Ark. 166, 460 S.W.3d 781: Even when an amendment does change the nature or degree of the offense, the analysis focuses on adequate notice and prejudice. The Coston court invokes Carter to emphasize that the ultimate inquiry is practical fairness, not labels.
• Harmon v. State, 277 Ark. 265, 641 S.W.2d 21 (1982): Amendment after the jury was sworn to add a new alternative underlying felony (robbery) to a capital-felony-murder charge was reversible error because it changed the nature of the charge without notice. Coston distinguishes Harmon on timing (post-swearing vs. eleven days pretrial) and substance (new alternative felony vs. additional counts of the same offense).
• Martinez v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 182, 432 S.W.3d 689: Amendment after the State rested to add a lesser/different offense (second-degree sexual assault) to fit the proof was reversible; it effectively forced the defendant to defend a different crime mid-trial. Coston distinguishes Martinez on timing and purpose: here the State amended before trial, not to patch a proof defect, but to reflect evidence long in discovery.
• Morehead v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 624, 704 S.W.3d 322: Closer to Coston. Two business days pretrial, the State added second-degree sexual assault counts to existing rape counts. The court of appeals affirmed because the amendment preceded trial, the evidence supporting all counts had been disclosed, counts arose from the same facts, and the defendant neither claimed surprise nor sought a continuance. Coston adopts this logic; indeed Coston presents a stronger case for affirmance because the amendment added only more counts of the very same offense.
• Holloway v. State, 312 Ark. 306, 849 S.W.2d 473 (1993), and Hoover v. State, 353 Ark. 424, 108 S.W.3d 618 (2003): No presumption of prejudice where a defendant, after notice of an impending amendment, fails to seek a continuance or claim surprise. Coston relies on this non-presumption to conclude the defense suffered no prejudice.
• Sylvester v. State, 2016 Ark. 136, 489 S.W.3d 146: Appellate courts will not consider arguments not raised below; parties are bound by the scope of their objections at trial. Coston applies this to confine the appellate review to added rape counts and to disregard new appellate arguments about the grooming and controlled-substance charges.
• Williams v. State, 2024 Ark. 12, 682 S.W.3d 313: Arguments without citation or convincing authority will not be considered. The court uses this to sidestep the verdict-form confusion argument, which lacked supporting authority.

Legal Reasoning

Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. This standard is deferential; reversal requires a clear showing that the trial court acted improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. The court’s analysis proceeds in three steps.

1) Nature or Degree of the Offense

The amendment increased the number of rape counts from three to ten. The court held that this did not change the “nature or degree” of the charged offense because the offense remained rape; the amendment merely alleged additional instances of the same crime. This stands in contrast to Harmon (adding an alternative underlying felony to capital murder) and Martinez (adding a different offense post-proof). In both of those cases, nature or degree changed because the legal elements the defendant had to defend against shifted. Here, the elements remained identical across counts.

2) Adequate Notice and Unfair Surprise

Even if a change arguably implicated the nature/degree question, the court emphasized functional notice. The State disclosed the added counts eleven days before trial based on evidence “in discovery since day one,” a fact Coston conceded. The State’s purpose was not to cure a failure of proof mid-trial but to track evidence it intended to present—distinguishing Martinez. The court concluded there was no unfair surprise.

3) Prejudice and the Continuance Requirement

Central to the outcome is the absence of a requested remedy. Coston admitted the remedy for surprise would be a continuance but did not ask for one and did not claim he needed more time to prepare. Arkansas precedent declines to presume prejudice in such circumstances. This aligns with Holloway and Hoover: a defendant who does not seek a continuance after notice of an amendment cannot ordinarily establish prejudice on appeal.

Preservation Limits the Appeal

On appeal, Coston argued that adding the non-rape offenses (introducing a controlled substance and grooming) was improper. The Supreme Court refused to entertain that argument because it was not raised to the trial court. The appellate court also declined to address an argument that identical verdict forms for each rape count confused the jury, noting the lack of supporting authority (Williams). The opinion underscores that preserving particularized objections at the time of the ruling is indispensable.

Impact and Practical Implications

The court’s decision reaffirms and clarifies a pragmatic, notice-and-prejudice-oriented approach to amendments:

• Prosecutors: May add additional counts of the same offense close to trial, provided the case has not been submitted to the jury, the defense has had prior access to the underlying evidence, and there is no unfair surprise. The opinion signals that Arkansas courts will tolerate significant increases in count numbers where discovery laid the groundwork.
• Defense Counsel: Objections should be paired with concrete remedies. If surprise or inability to prepare is claimed, a motion for continuance is critical. Failure to request a continuance will likely foreclose a prejudice argument on appeal. Counsel should also request the State to identify the factual act corresponding to each count, seek tailored jury instructions or special verdict forms when appropriate, and preserve specific objections to identical or undifferentiated counts. Generalized “arbitrariness” arguments, without authority and remedy, are insufficient.
• Trial Courts: Retain broad discretion to allow pretrial amendments that do not alter offense nature or degree. Even where nature/degree arguably changes, the focus remains on notice and actual prejudice. Timing matters: amendments after the jury is sworn or after the State rests to fit proof (Harmon, Martinez) remain disfavored and risky.
• Future Litigation: The opinion strengthens a line of Arkansas cases emphasizing practical fairness over formalistic constraints. It will be cited to uphold late pretrial amendments when discovery has long contained the relevant evidence and when defendants do not adequately preserve claims of surprise or request continuances.

Caveats: The court did not decide broader questions about due process, duplicity, or “unit of prosecution” concerns associated with multiple indistinguishable counts, because those issues were not supported by authority or were not preserved. Practitioners should frame and preserve those issues explicitly where warranted, for example by:

• Moving for an election of specific acts tied to each count;
• Requesting a unanimity instruction tailored to multiple-incident cases;
• Seeking special verdict forms or interrogatories that link counts to specific factual episodes; and
• Objecting to duplicative counts or insufficient differentiation with supporting authority.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Criminal Information: A formal charging document filed by the prosecutor (as opposed to an indictment by a grand jury). It sets out the crimes alleged and their elements.
• Amendment of Information: Changes to the charging document. Arkansas allows amendments any time before the case is submitted to the jury, so long as the change does not alter the “nature or degree” of the offense or cause unfair surprise. Even if it does, courts ask whether the defendant had adequate notice and suffered prejudice.
• Nature or Degree of the Offense: Concerns whether the legal elements or severity classification of the charged crime changed. Adding counts of the same offense typically does not change nature or degree; adding a different offense or a new alternative underlying felony for capital murder can.
• Unfair Surprise: A due process concern that the defendant did not have fair notice of what he had to defend against. Surprise is less likely when the evidence underpinning new counts has long been available in discovery.
• Prejudice and Continuance: Prejudice means the amendment impaired the defense’s ability to prepare or present its case. Arkansas courts generally require defendants claiming surprise to ask for a continuance; failing to do so undercuts any prejudice claim.
• Preservation of Error: Appellate courts review only issues raised and ruled upon below. New arguments or different grounds on appeal are typically barred.
• Directed Verdict: A motion asserting that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain conviction on one or more counts. Where multiple similar counts are alleged, defense counsel should press the State to specify which facts correspond to each count to allow targeted sufficiency challenges.
• Rule 4-3(a) Review: In Arkansas, when a defendant receives a life sentence, the Supreme Court automatically reviews the record for all adverse rulings to ensure no prejudicial error occurred.

Conclusion

Coston reinforces Arkansas’s flexible, fairness-oriented regime governing amendments to criminal informations. The Supreme Court held that adding multiple counts of the same offense eleven days before trial—based on longstanding discovery—neither changed the nature or degree of the charges nor created unfair surprise. Without a motion for continuance or a concrete claim of inability to prepare, prejudice will not be presumed.

The opinion draws a bright timing line: pretrial amendments grounded in disclosed evidence are generally permissible; mid-trial amendments to fit proof—especially after the jury is sworn or the State has rested—remain suspect. Equally important is preservation: defendants must make specific, supported objections and request appropriate remedies. In short, the case provides prosecutors and courts with a clear pathway for pretrial amendments while reminding the defense that the path to relief requires both timely objection and requests for realistic remedies.

Key Takeaways

• Amending an information to add more counts of the same offense before trial does not change the offense’s nature or degree.
• Unfair surprise is unlikely where the underlying evidence has been in discovery; timing and disclosure drive the analysis.
• No prejudice will be presumed if the defense, after notice of amendment, does not request a continuance or claim surprise.
• Arguments not raised below are waived on appeal; generalized objections without authority are insufficient.
• To challenge multiple similar counts, defense counsel should seek specificity (election of acts, tailored jury instructions, special verdict forms) and preserve those issues meticulously.