Corroboration and “Government Awareness” in U.S.-Based Online-Activism Asylum Claims; “Previously Available” Evidence Bars Reopening (Second Circuit)

1. Introduction

In Mohamed v. Bondi (2d Cir. Jan. 7, 2026) (summary order), petitioner Ali Abdou Mohamed, a citizen of Djibouti, sought review of two decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”): (i) affirmance of an Immigration Judge’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection; and (ii) denial of a motion to reopen. Mohamed’s fear claim centered on alleged risk in Djibouti arising from his mother’s online activism conducted from the United States, and alleged retaliation against family members in Djibouti.

The core issues were whether Mohamed met his burden to show a well-founded fear of future persecution—especially where the claim depended on government awareness of U.S.-based online activity—and whether he could cure evidentiary gaps via reopening with new family statements.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit denied both petitions. On the merits, the court held that the agency permissibly required corroboration because Mohamed’s and his mother’s testimony was vague about (a) who threatened her, (b) who would threaten Mohamed in Djibouti, and (c) whether any mistreatment of relatives was causally linked to her online activity. The record also failed to corroborate that Djiboutian authorities were aware of the mother’s online activity or would target Mohamed because of it.

On reopening, the court agreed with the BIA that the submitted statements—though prepared after the hearing—were previously available because they addressed events that occurred before the merits hearings and could have been obtained earlier. The BIA also reasonably found, in the alternative, that the added statements did not establish prima facie eligibility because they still lacked key details tying Djiboutian officials to awareness or retaliation.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2005): Applied for the review posture—when the BIA affirms and supplements, the court reviews the IJ decision “as supplemented by the BIA.”
Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 2018): The opinion’s backbone on corroboration. It supplied (i) the principle that credible testimony can still be insufficient without reasonably available corroboration; (ii) the “missing evidence” framework (identify what is missing, explain availability, give opportunity to explain, assess explanation); and (iii) deference to agency determinations of availability. The panel also relied on Wei Sun to support denial of a post-hearing request to keep the record open.
Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2004): Cited for the basic future-fear framework absent past persecution.
Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2008): Central to U.S.-based activity claims—an applicant must show that home-country authorities are aware of the activity or are reasonably likely to become aware, and also for the “pattern or practice” route and the requirement that the applicant be similarly situated to the persecuted group.
Pinel-Gomez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 523 (2d Cir. 2022): Reinforced that the agency may deem testimony credible yet still unpersuasive or insufficiently specific, supporting denial where proof lacked detail and corroboration.
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024): Used in a limited way—via a footnote—to state that Wei Sun’s deference to the agency’s statutory interpretation remains binding under stare decisis notwithstanding Loper Bright’s changed interpretive methodology.
Morgan v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 2006): Supported the proposition that IJs have “wide latitude” in calendar management, and such rulings are reviewed under a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.
Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 516 (B.I.A. 2015): Cited to frame when continuances to obtain evidence are typically warranted (e.g., where a unique essential piece of evidence was not known).
Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2013): Invoked to reject speculative assumptions that government officials monitor or know of all online criticism.
Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 433 F.3d 332 (2d Cir. 2006), and Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2011): Used to draw the line between discrimination/harassment and “persecution,” rejecting the record’s showing of limited representation and employment difficulty as insufficient.
Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), and Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2006): Supported the conclusion that failure on the asylum factual predicate also disposes of withholding and CAT when all claims share the same predicate.
Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2008): Provided standards of review for denial of reopening (abuse of discretion) and country-conditions determinations (substantial evidence).
INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988): Anchored the BIA’s discretion to deny reopening for lack of previously unavailable, material evidence, and/or for failure to establish prima facie eligibility for relief.
Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292 (2d Cir. 2006): Key to the reopening denial—evidence is “previously available” if it could have been presented at the prior IJ hearing.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Corroboration as a decisive burden-of-proof tool (even without an adverse credibility finding)

The court applied the statutory corroboration framework in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (and parallel provisions for withholding), emphasizing that testimony—even if credible—must be “persuasive” and “refer[] to specific facts” to meet the refugee burden. Where the agency expects corroboration, the applicant must provide it unless it cannot reasonably be obtained.

Here, the panel agreed that vagueness on critical points made corroboration reasonably necessary: the identity of the threat actors, the nexus between the mother’s online activity and any retaliation, and the mechanism by which Mohamed himself would be targeted in Djibouti. The court treated the absence of corroboration as an independent basis to deny relief, consistent with Wei Sun v. Sessions.

2) “Government awareness” requirement for U.S.-based activity claims

Under Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, a claim grounded in U.S.-based activities requires some showing that home authorities are aware (or likely to become aware). The panel concluded the record did not corroborate awareness in Djibouti: the mother’s online materials addressed regional Afar issues and violence outside Djibouti, did not criticize the Djiboutian government, and threats came from two individuals living outside Djibouti. That mix did not reasonably establish that Djiboutian officials knew of, or would retaliate for, her activity, and Y.C. v. Holder cautioned against assuming ubiquitous governmental monitoring.

3) Identifying missing evidence and reasonable availability

The IJ satisfied Wei Sun v. Sessions’s procedural expectations by identifying the missing evidence (statements from relatives regarding job loss/mistreatment tied to activism; the uncle’s opposition role; and alleged torture and murder of a cousin), finding it reasonably available (given frequent contact and no meaningful attempt to obtain statements), and considering explanations.

4) Continuance / keeping the record open

The panel upheld denial of the request to keep the record open, citing Morgan v. Gonzales (calendar-management deference), Wei Sun v. Sessions (continuances not required to obtain non-unique corroboration), and Matter of L-A-C- (continuances typically for unique, essential evidence not previously understood to be required). The IJ’s suggestion that late evidence could be sought later (via motion practice) further supported the discretionary ruling.

5) Pattern-or-practice arguments rejected as mismatched to the applicant’s showing

The court agreed that evidence regarding imprisonment of activists/journalists was immaterial because Mohamed did not show his mother engaged in comparable anti-government criticism, nor that children of such activists face a pattern or practice of persecution. It also rejected a claimed pattern-or-practice of persecuting the Afar based on record facts showing underrepresentation and employment difficulty—insufficient under Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep't of Just. and Mei Fun Wong v. Holder because persecution is an “extreme concept.”

6) Reopening: “previously available” evidence and lack of prima facie eligibility

For reopening, the court applied 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) and INS v. Abudu. It held that statements created after the hearing can still be “previously available” if they concern pre-hearing events and could have been obtained earlier, per Norani v. Gonzales. That finding alone defeated reopening; the BIA also permissibly concluded the new statements were still too thin on the central missing elements: Djiboutian official awareness, retaliation causation, and threats originating from within Djibouti.

C. Impact

Although expressly nonprecedential, the order is practically instructive in three recurring asylum contexts:

Online/diaspora-activity claims: Courts will scrutinize concrete proof that the home state is (or is likely to become) aware of the U.S.-based activity and will not infer awareness merely from internet posting or generalized country repression.
Corroboration discipline: Even with credible testimony, vague accounts on identity of persecutors, nexus, and targeting theory invite a corroboration demand; failure to produce readily obtainable family statements can be case-dispositive.
Reopening limits: Post-hearing affidavits do not qualify as “new” if they recount pre-hearing events and could have been obtained earlier; reopening is not a second chance to supply routine corroboration that the IJ flagged as missing.

The footnote referencing Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo is also noteworthy: the panel signals that pre-Loper Bright decisions upholding particular agency interpretive moves (here, the corroboration framework as applied in Wei Sun v. Sessions) remain binding through stare decisis, limiting attempts to relitigate that structure in routine cases.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantial evidence review: The court defers to agency factfinding unless the record would compel any reasonable factfinder to reach the opposite conclusion (8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).
De novo review: Legal questions are reviewed independently, without deference on the court’s interpretive judgment.
Well-founded fear: A forward-looking risk standard; absent past persecution, the applicant must show a reasonable possibility of future harm.
Pattern or practice: A route to future fear that does not require proof the applicant will be individually singled out, but requires proof that a similarly situated group is systematically persecuted and that the applicant is part of that group.
Corroboration requirement: Even credible testimony may need supporting evidence—especially when key facts are vague or easily verifiable. If the agency identifies specific missing evidence reasonably obtainable, failure to provide it can independently defeat the claim.
Government awareness (U.S.-based activity claims): When fear is based on conduct in the United States (e.g., online activism), the applicant must show that home-country authorities are aware or likely to become aware; otherwise the feared harm is speculative.
Motion to reopen: A request to restart proceedings based on material evidence that was not available and could not have been presented earlier; it is discretionary and also commonly denied if the applicant cannot show prima facie eligibility for relief.

5. Conclusion

Mohamed v. Bondi affirms a stringent, evidence-centered approach to asylum claims premised on a relative’s U.S.-based online activism: applicants must bridge the gap between online expression and real-world risk by showing (with specific, reasonably obtainable corroboration) that home-country actors are aware of the activity and would target the applicant because of it. The decision also underscores that reopening is not designed to remedy earlier failures to collect routine corroboration—post-hearing statements recounting pre-hearing events are typically “previously available,” and reopening will fail absent materially stronger proof of eligibility.